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Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics

Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy

Profile image of Ahti PietarinenAhti Pietarinen

2009

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9374-6
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23 pages

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Abstract
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This work explores the trends in philosophical methodologies that unify various logical systems through the lens of games. It highlights the significance of games as a metaphor for argument and cooperation in logical inquiry, tracing the historical influence from early philosophers to contemporary applications in computation and language. The discussion delves into operationalization of concepts in philosophy, noting the game-theoretical foundations that underlie some key philosophical movements.

Key takeaways
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  1. Games unify methodologies in philosophy, logic, and language, challenging traditional logical pluralism.
  2. The book comprises 12 chapters exploring logical games, semantics, dialogues, and applications in computation.
  3. Game-Theoretical Semantics provides a game-theoretic interpretation of truth across various logical systems.
  4. Dialogical logic offers a game-theoretic approach to validity and satisfiability, linking it to proof theory.
  5. Historical figures like Hintikka and Peirce influenced the integration of game theory into logical frameworks.

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Semantic Games in Logic and Epistemology
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We introduce the reader to game-theoretic semantics (GTS) and to chart some of its current directions in formal epistemology. GTS was originally developed by Jaakko Hintikka in the 1960s and became one of the main approaches in logical and linguistic semantics. I place games in a wider historical and systematic perspective within the overall development of logic, and explore some of the recent advances.

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