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Outline

Title
Abstract
Conclusion and Perspectives
Little Bit of Technical Background
No Go Results for 𝜙 𝑥
Conclusions
Introduction
Conclusion
Book Review
References
All Topics
Philosophy

From Timeless Physical Theory to Timelessness

Profile image of Kristie MillerKristie Miller

2010, Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies

Abstract

20 This section is not supposed to be an exhaustive treatment of such issues. It should give the reader a flavor, so to say, of how a fruitful interaction between Physics and Metaphysics might work. For a careful analysis see Calosi (unpublished). 21 I am taking for granted that these debates are genuine metaphysical debates and not just semantic debates in disguise. Those who are inclined to endorse such a semantical skepticism should read my claims counterfactually. 22 The justification for this conjunction is based upon some implicit technical assumptions about reducibility of objects to spacetime regions. It should be noted that the presentism eternalism debate is not to be confused with another classical debate in philosophy of time, namely the debate between A-theory of time and B-theory of time. 23 I am personally inclined to read this claim within the framework of a formal theory of location. Such a theory is a formal theory in the logic sense. It is a set of definitions, axioms and theorems in the language of the first order calculus. See again Calosi (unpublished). 24 In what follows I focus on Presentism. Most of the arguments will apply to Possibilism too so there is no need to distinguish here. 25 As I maintain it is. 26 See the excellent Barons, Evans and Miller (this volume). 27 Most notably Barbour, Pooley and Stein. 32 This claim is allegedly based upon the causal structure of Minkowski Spacetime. 33 Though I know that this might be, again, a controversial claim. 34 For a detailed presentation see Calosi (unpublished). 35 This is due to facts about signature and facts about causal isomorphisms of Minkowski spacetime, i.e., maps of the form : A  A where A is the underlying affine space that preserves the causal structure. Formally if pKq stands for p is causally connectible with q then invariance under causal isomorphism can be written as pKq   (p)K(q). Then the distinction between a 3D and a 4D object can be make precise in locational terms, along those lines. A three-dimensional object is an object that 38 I cannot enter into the details of different formal theories of location. I will therefore stick to the theory that is almost invariably used, as it is found in Gilmore 2007 or Balashov (forthcoming). I have personally some reservations about those theories of location. 39 Notation and definitions are taken from Calosi (unpublished). 40 << stands for the mereological notion of proper parthood. The mereological system presupposed in what follows is Minimal mereology. For those and other mereological details see Varzi (2009). 41 If there is just one such a region than it follows that ExL(x, Path (x)). 42 Index i ranges over spacetime regions. 43 The relativistic counterpart of this notion is achronality. See later on. 44 Where pq is spacelike iff <pq, pq> < 0. 45 Note that Pers (x) is redundant here. This definition of a 3D object can indeed be improved upon, but I cannot refine it here. 46 I cannot enter here into the subtleties about the relationships between Mereological Persistence and Locational Perisistence. * I would like to thank the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (www.jsps.go.jp) for giving me the means to attend this conference.

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In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language is dictated by purely pragmatic reasons, we should abstain from bringing to bear pseudo-debates generated by the “tensed” or the “tenseless theories” of time on the question of understanding the philosophical implications of contemporary spacetime theories, or notions like becoming, change and persistence in time.

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I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special relativity lead me to conclude that the two theories are equally explanatory, and thus finally that they are metaphysically equivalent.

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In a recent article, Ned Markosian gives an argument against four-dimensionalism understood as the view that time is one of four identical dimensions that constitute a single four-dimensional manifold. In this paper, I show that Markosian attacks a straw man as his argument targets a theory known to be false on empirical grounds. Four-dimensionalism rightly conceived in no way entails that time is identical to space. I then address two objections raised by Markosian against four-dimensionalism rightly conceived.

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Defining 'presentism' in a way that saves it from being trivially false yet metaphysically substantively distinct from eternalism is no mean feat, as the first part of this collection testifies. In Wüthrich (forthcoming), I have offered an attempt to achieve just this, arguing that this is best done in the context of modern spacetime theories. Here, I shall refrain from going through all the motions again and simply state the characterization of an ersatzist version of presentism as it has emerged from considerations there. Any acceptable formulation of presentism should remain neutral among competing spacetime theories in order to enable the present project of assessing the compatibility of presentism with various theories of modern physics, including both spacetime theories and theories of physical processes situated in a spatiotemporal setting.

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