The metaphysical equivalence of three and four dimensionalism
Erkenntnis
Abstract
I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special relativity lead me to conclude that the two theories are equally explanatory, and thus finally that they are metaphysically equivalent.
References (45)
- Cf. Baker, L. R. (1997). ''Why Constitution is not Identity.'' Journal of Philosophy 94: 599-621, Lewis. D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. New York Blackwell Press, Lowe, E. J. (1987). ''Lewis on Perdurance Versus Endurance.'' Analysis 47: 152-54, Lowe, E. J. (1995). ''Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the Standard Account''. Analysis 55: 171-178.
- Cf. Thomson, J. J. (1983). ''Parthood and Identity Across Time.'' Journal of Philosophy 80: 201-220.
- University Press, section 110. but is formally the same as the case of Dion and Theon originally created by Chryssipus, a stoic phiosopher in 280-206 BC. A discussion of the Dion and Theon problem can be found in Burke, M. (1994). ''Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle.'' Journal of Philosophy 91: 129-139.
- 21 This example is due to Alan Gibbard in his (1975). ''Contingent Identity.'' Journal of Philosophical Logic 4: 197-221.
- 22 Cases of Fission can be found in Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter ten and in Robinson, D. op cit., and in Lewis. D. (1983). ''Survival and Identity''. in Philosophical Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press, pp. 55-77.
- Cf. Parfit, D. op cit.
- Robinson, D. op cit.
- As opposed to the Jekyll and Hyde manner where the two persons have distinct personalities.
- Balashov, Y. (2000). ''Persistence and Space-time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn.'' The Monist 83(3): 240-321.
- Smart, J. J. C (1968). Between Science and philosophy: an introduction to philos- ophy of science. New York: Random House., Quine, W.V.O (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 172-253.
- 29 This terminology comes fromYuri Balashov in his (1999). ''Relativistic Objects.'' Nous. 33(4): 644-662.
- Cf. Sider, T. op cit, and Balashov, Y. op cit.
- Balashov, Y. (2000) op cit and Balashov, Y (1999) op cit.
- I owe this point to David Braddon-Mitchell in discussion. REFERENCES
- Baker, L. R.: 1997, 'Why Constitution is not Identity', Journal of Philosophy 94, 599- 621. Balashov, Y.: 1999, 'Relativistic Objects', Nous 33(4), 644-662.
- Balashov, Y.: 2000, 'Persistence and Space-time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn', The Monist 83(3), 321-240.
- Burke, M.: 1994, 'Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle', Journal of Philosophy 91, 129-139.
- DeVito, S.: 1997, 'A gruesome problem for the curve-fitting solution', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48(3), 391-396.
- Doepke, F.: 1982, 'Spatially Coinciding Objects', Ratio 24, 45-60.
- Geach, P. T.: 1980, Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories, Cornell University Press.
- Gibbard, A.: 1975, 'Contingent Identity', Journal of Philosophical Logic 4, 197-221.
- Haslanger, S.: 1989, 'Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics', Analysis 49, 119-125.
- Johnston, M.: 1987, 'Is There a Problem about Persistence?' The Aristotelian Society Supp 61: 107-135. pp. 113-115.
- Lewis, D.: 1983, 'Survival and Identity', in Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, pp. 55-77.
- Lewis, D.: 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, New York Blackwell Press.
- Lowe, E. J.: 1987, 'Lewis on Perdurance Versus Endurance', Analysis 47, 152-154.
- Lowe, E. J.: 1988, 'The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis', Analysis 48, 72-77.
- Lowe, E. J.: 1995, 'Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the Standard Account', Analysis 55, 171-178.
- McCall, S.: 1994, A Model of the Universe: Space-Time; Probability; and Decision, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Merricks, T.: 1994, 'Endurance and Indiscernibility', The Journal of Philosophy 91, 165-184.
- Merricks, T.: 1995, 'On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities', Mind 104, 523-541.
- Merricks, T.: 1999, 'Persistence, Parts and Presentism', Nous 33(3), 421-438.
- Parfit, D.: 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Parsons, J.: 2000, 'Must a Four-dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?'' The Monist 83(3), 399-418.
- Quine, W. V. O.: 1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Robinson, D.: 1985, 'Can Amoebae Divide without Multiplying?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63, 299-319.
- Sider, T.: 2001, Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time, Oxford University Press.
- Simons, P.: 1987, Parts: A Study in Ontology, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Smart, J. J. C.: 1968, Between Science and philosophy: an introduction to philosophy of science. Random House, New York.
- Thomson, J. J.: 1983, 'Parthood and Identity Across Time', Journal of Philosophy 80, 201-220.
- Thomson, J. J.: 1998, 'The Statue and the Clay', Nous 32, 149-173.
- Van Inwagen, P.: 1990, 'Four-Dimensional Objects', Nous 24, 245-255.
- Van Inwagen, P.: 2000, 'Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time', The Monist 83(3), 437-459.
- Wiggins, D.: 1968, 'On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time', Philosophical Review 77, 90-95. Department of Philosophy University of Queensland Brisbane Aust 4072 My current mailing address is: 2/425 Elizabeth Street North Hobart, Tasmania 7000
- Australia E-mail: kristie_miller@yahoo.com Manuscript submitted 3 October 2003 Final version received 9 March 2004