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Abstract
Introduction
Problems and Questions for Future Research
Implications for Philosophy
Broader Practical Implications
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Philosophy
Logic

Informal Logic: An Overview

Profile image of Anthony BlairAnthony Blair

2000, Informal Logic

https://doi.org/10.22329/IL.V20I2.2262
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Abstract

In this overview article, we first explain what we take informal logic to be, discussing misconceptions and distinguishing our conception of it from competing ones; second, we briefly catalogue recent informal logic research, under 14 headings; third, we suggest four broad areas of problems and questions for future research; fourth, we describe current scholarly resources for informal logic; fifth, we discuss three implications of informal logic for philosophy in particular, and take note ofpractical consequences of a more general sort.

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