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Philosophy
Logic

How philosophical is informal logic?

Profile image of John WoodsJohn Woods
https://doi.org/10.22329/IL.V20I2.2266
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Abstract

Consider the proposition, "Informal logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy". The best chance of showing this to be true is showing that informal logic is part of logic, which in turn is a part of philosophy. Part 1 is given over to the task of sorting out these connections. If successful, informal logic can indeed be seen as part of philosophy; but there is no question of an exclusive relationship. Part 2 is a critical appraisal of the suggestion that informal logic is applied epistemology. Part 3 examines the claim that informal logic has failed to penetrate into mainstream philosophy, and suggestions for amelioration are considered.

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References (84)

  1. I mention in passing the infinite regress to which this pair of statements gives rise.
  2. However, I part company with Fisher on the issue of reflective equilibrium as ajustification of principles of inference: Fisher pro and Woods contra. See Woods (2001a), Chapter 8.
  3. ' Weinstein (1999),868-871.
  4. Co pi (1995), 84-94.
  5. See, e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992). Their theory means to range "from the formal context of law in an address to the court to the informal context of an ordinary conversation at home" (8).
  6. Honesty compels me to say that when the present writer put this suggestion to Lotfi Zadeh at the first Bonn Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning in 1996, the father of fuzzy logic was noticeably underwhelmed. For a more detailed discussion of the connection with informal logic, see Woods (200Oc).
  7. For a good sampler offuzzy logics, Kosko (1991). A more rigorous treatment is Hlijek (1998). For a more detailed discussion of the connection with informal logic, see again Woods (2000c).
  8. A resistance that doesn't prevent him from characterizing fallacy theory -in comparison with analyses ofthe concept of argument -as an "equally substantial and equally important subject of investigation within informal logic" (130).
  9. Finocchiaro (1981), 13-22.
  10. For further discussion, see Woods (1992),23-48; reprinted in Woods (2000d).
  11. A fuller discussion can be found in Woods (2000a), 107-134.
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  13. Starmans (1996), 77-83. Of course, a compact precis implies not that the theory is simple but rather that it is clear, that, in particular, it has a clear structure.
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  19. In many of these cases co-authors are Douglas Walton, Brent Hudak and Hans V. Hansen.
  20. In other fields, or sub fields, the trickle down relation is empty, for want of one of the relata. Primary research there is, but textbooks are nowhere in sight. The pragma-dialectical approach to the theory of argument is a case in point. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have written accessible monographs, relatively free of technical arcana. These works not only showcase the primary research in pragma-dialectics, but they also serve as textbooks. See, e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).
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