Forms for "Informal Logic
1984, Informal Logic
https://doi.org/10.22329/IL.V6I1.2720…
5 pages
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Abstract
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This note presents two main messages regarding the teaching of informal logic. Firstly, the author advocates for the use of 'target forms' to assist students in identifying and reconstructing arguments in written materials, emphasizing the value of understanding both formal and informal logic. Secondly, new fallacious forms of 'ignoratio elenchi' are introduced, which provide insight into how flawed arguments may be organized to deduce conclusions. The note highlights the importance of applying a principle of charity in argument interpretation, especially for students who may not yet have the skills to recognize common fallacies.
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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY

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