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Reconciling current approaches to blindsight

Profile image of Morten OvergaardMorten Overgaard

2015, Consciousness and cognition

https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CONCOG.2014.08.003
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Abstract

After decades of research, blindsight is still a mysterious and controversial topic in consciousness research. Currently, many researchers tend to think of it as an ideal phenomenon to investigate neural correlates of consciousness, whereas others believe that blindsight is in fact a kind of degraded vision rather than "truly blind". This article considers both perspectives and finds that both have difficulties understanding all existing evidence about blindsight. In order to reconcile the perspectives, we suggest two specific criteria for a good model of blindsight, able to encompass all evidence. We propose that the REF-CON model (Overgaard & Mogensen, 2014) may work as such a model.

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