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Introduction
Paradigms Used to Study Consciousness
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Psychology

Theories and methods in the scientific study of consciousness

Profile image of Victor LammeVictor Lamme

2015, Advances in Consciousness Research

https://doi.org/10.1075/AICR.92.02KLI
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Abstract

The scientific study of consciousness has gained much interest over the past several decades. Here, we provide a primer on the topic by introducing the most commonly used concepts, the most prominent scientific theories, and an overview of broadly used methods of studying consciousness. With a focus on visual perception, we discuss the distinction between phenomenology and cognitive accessibility in the context of the different consciousness theories and highlight elements in which these theories are either complementary or more or less in agreement.

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