Peacekeeping and the UN: lessons from Rwanda

Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2017. , 2018

Blue Helmet' peacekeeping operations have come to characterise the UN's response to armed conflict. These operations have evolved from the 'simple' monitoring of ceasefires, into complex 1 'peacebuilding' projects and interventionist 'peace enforcement' actions, and employ considerable forces of peacekeepers, contributed by member states. The composition of these forces has also transformed over the period, as the previously predominant troops from the developed Northern states have given way to the peacekeepers of the Global South. Peacekeeping scholarship is sharply divided, between those who regard this sea-change as indicative of a rising Global South and those who perceive its soldiers as exploited substitutes for the developed world, finessed into the role via a West oriented UN. This paper asks if the current composition of troop contributing countries to UN Blue Helmet peacekeeping operations reflects the changing identities, interests and ambitions of the Global South, or just the continuing hegemony of the developed world. Do the Southern states have agency in respect of their participation, or are they merely 'fish in a stream', obliged by persistent hegemonic currents to conform to the agendas of the North? Using a case study of India and Rwanda, the article argues that Northern hegemony does still find expression in UN peacekeeping operations, but is straining to contain the more assertive Southern states, which participate, largely, for their own carefully considered, often very disparate, reasons.

An essay from the MA module in International Relations at Kingston University: This essay aims to examine UNAMIR’s failure, the lack of international response and essentially the failure of international cooperation in preventing the genocide. It will do so with the perspective of the two International Relations (IR) theories Neoliberalism and Constructivism, looking at how the theories view successful and unsuccessful international cooperation. The theories differ in their perspectives on how international cooperation can be utilized, what role institutions (like the UN) plays in utilizing, and what factors that impacts the ability for countries to cooperate, as well as their epistemological and ontological views on how interest, identity, norms, and rules are created between states and within institutions (Kurki & Wright, 2013, p. 27). However, despite the theories being separated in having micro and a macro perspective on peacekeeping, they can also be argued to compliment each other (Checkel, 1998, p. 342). The essay will focus on the theoretical implications of the different perspectives on the UNAMIR peacekeeping mission in Rwanda with the following research question: How does Neoliberalism and Constructivism differ and compliment each other in providing a perspective on the case of the lack of international response in the UNAMIR peacekeeping mission during the Rwandan genocide?

African Union Commission & APSTA, 2016

This chapter reviews the Rwandan genocide experience and its critical influence on the subsequent development of Africa’s collective security framework. The defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had operated on the principle of “non-interference” in internal affairs of Member States, and absolute respect for their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Moreover, the conflict handling structures of OAU were largely dormant before 1990. Between April and July 1994, African and the entire world was shocked as they witnessed one of the most gruesome murder and massacre of close to 800,000 Rwandans within a short period of about 100 days.. Yet, the nations that matter most within the UN Security Council, for unstated reasons, declined commitment to accord the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR the required resources for its mission in Rwanda. Instead, Rwanda and the international community became seized with the politics and debate regarding the concept of genocide. The controversy hinged on the most politically correct nomenclature for the events of April-July 1994 in Rwanda, as major culprits frantically sought self-exoneration. The UN finally accepted to call it ‘genocide against the Tutsis’ almost two decades afterwards. Rwanda on the other hand remains embroiled in a genocide revisionist debate. The chapter is focused not on these debates, but on the critical influence of the Rwanda crisis, on the mindset within the OAU, which hassled to the renewal of the continent’s apparatus for collective security. Most importantly, the Rwanda experience should facilitate expedited action on operationalising the ASF and the ACIRC as planned

The limits of UNAMIR and its consequences on evolution of peace operations (Atena Editora), 2023

The main concern of this work is how the peace mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR, contributed to the evolution of the following missions. To achieve this objective, a historical research was carried out to contextualize the civil war in Rwanda, and soon after an analysis to understand the international context in which the UNAMIR mandate was fulfilled and why it was not efficient to contain the genocide that followed. Finally, we conclude that the lack of freedom of the UN to act in the mission due to the principles of non-intervention, non-use of force and impartiality are the main cause of the humanitarian failure of the mission, and that from then on the international system understood that the flexibilization of these principles was necessary to guarantee the protection of civilians and human rights.

The Rwandan Genocides of 1994 claimed the lives of an estimated 800,000 people in the matter of weeks and is subsequently regarded as one of the most horrendous human rights atrocities of the twentieth century. It is widely viewed as a complete collapse of the system of International Peacekeeping. Although the United Nations had instruments available to prevent a crisis such as the Genocides, it did not do so effectively. Just a year earlier, the Secretary General described Preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”( Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 20). While he further regarded Peace-keeping as a “a technique which expands the possibilities for... the prevention of conflicts” the occurrence of the genocide later exemplified the numerous shortcomings of peacekeeping in preventing the escalation of violence. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how and why the UN failed to prevent the Rwandan Genocides by addressing the flaw in early warnings whether and how the UN responded & the reasons for its actions.

II.

TURKISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE , 2022

The biggest test of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in the 21st century is the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. This is because the UN was incapable of preventing the genocide that took place in both countries. Therefore, these two case studies were not chosen by chance. In two case studies, the role of UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Bosnia, as well as the outcome of genocide caused by ethnic hatred, will be addressed. Thus, this study will answer three main questions. Firstly, what is the origin of ethnic hatred in Rwanda and Bosnia and its role in the genocide? Secondly, What is the role of UN in ethnic wars such as Rwanda and Bosnia? Lastly, What are the similarities and differences between Rwanda and Bosnia genocide based on ethnic reasons? In this context, it was concluded that ethnic and racial differences caused genocide in both countries and the UN intervention in Rwanda and Bosnia could not be effective due to the high level of ethnic hatred.

2004

BACKGROUND Post-colonial Rwanda was born out of a decisive reversal of power from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu occasioned by the 1959 revolution. The revolution inaugurated an era of massive movement of refugees in the region, endemic communal violence, and political frailty. In the early 1980s, the government of Juvenal Habyarimana and the one-party state he had erected since 1973, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, MRND), was under siege from three fronts. First, as the Habyarimana government grew more authoritarian, the intra-Hutu common political front frayed, shifting military and economic power to the president's narrow northern ruling elites. Second, inequitable access to resources heightened intra-Hutu cleavages amidst a worsening economy. With the highest population density in mainland Africa (256 persons per square kilometer), Rwanda typifies the dilemma of overpopulation and resource scarcity compounded by severe dependence on coffee production. By the second half of the 1980s, with economic growth rates falling behind a burgeoning population, the government admitted that it could only feed five million people. Internal and external economic shocks were to worsen the class and regional polarization, contributing to the general weakening of the Habyarimana state. Economic decline and external pressure for democratization galvanized domestic opposition groups to demand political reforms. In response, Habyarimana appointed a commission in September 1990 to work out a National Political Charter that would allow the establishment of different political parties. 1 Third, against the backdrop of economic and political weakness, Tutsi exiles in Uganda organized in the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded in October 1990. Caught in an uncertain exile, RPF units that had been part of Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA) took the initiative, at the opportune instance of regime weakness, to force the issue of return, restoration of citizenship rights, national unity, and an end to a dictatorial system that generates refugees. The Internationalization of the Conflict Between the RPF's invasion in October 1990 and the signing of the Arusha Agreement in August 1993, the conflict went through two significant stages that form the background to UN intervention: external military intervention to support the belligerents; and regional mediation efforts to end the conflict. Regional mediation had two primary phases: November 1990-May 1992; and June 1992-August 1993. These phases are important to analyses of the dynamics of the conflict and international efforts to address it. A. Foreign Military Intervention The fledgling Habyarimana government invited foreign military support in the fall of 1990 support from its allies, Belgium, France, and Zaire to meet the RPF's threat. Responding to this appeal, Belgium sent 535 troops and France sent 300 troops ostensibly to protect their nationals in Rwanda. Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko dispatched about 1, 000 troops that were deployed in direct combat against the RPF. External support enabled the Rwandese army to inflict heavy casualties on the RPF. But as the war raged on, however, Zaire and Belgium withdrew their troops, the latter citing a legal obligation to remain neutral in war situations, while Mobutu's undisciplined troops left in ignominy. After the withdrawal of Zairian and Belgian troops, France was left as the principal supporter of the government. French military commitment to the government included the provision of troops and military advisers, the supply of heavy weaponry such as armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, communications equipment, and helicopters. France also provided financial guarantees for purchases of small arms, mortars, and grenade launchers from Egypt and South Africa. Military assistance and training enabled Habyarimana to boost the government army, Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR), which grew from 5,200 in October 1990 to 15,000 by mid-1991, and 30,000 by the time the Arusha negotiations began in June 1992. 2 Uganda's military and political support for the RPF was indispensable to its initial survival. Stemming from the RPF's long-term alliance with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's NRA, Uganda provided arms, food, and gasoline, and willingly opened its southern 2. For analyses of French role see Alison Des Forges, Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human overtures to the RPF during these talks, the government either refused to participate or sent representatives who had no negotiating mandate. The government's unyielding stance was demonstrated when it scuttled the deployment of OAU military observers, insisting on stationing a military team on the Rwanda-Uganda border to prevent further incursions by the RPF. With futile regional mediation efforts to stop the war, the focus shifted to finding a regional solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees. The conference on Rwandese refugees in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in February 1991, brought together Rwanda's neighbors, the OAU, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Habyarimana promised to remove all obstacles impeding the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees. In return, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire agreed to naturalize and integrate refugees who opted to settle outside Rwanda. With no end in sight for the war, Mobutu reinvigorated his efforts to find a durable ceasefire culminating in an agreement at N'sele, Zaire, on March 29, 1991 which proposed the immediate cessation of hostilities as a prelude to negotiations on power-sharing. At N'sele, the Habyarimana government, for the first time, agreed on direct negotiations with the RPF. Further favoring the negotiations were fundamental changes in the domestic balance of power engendered by Habyarimana's internal reforms. These reforms created a new multiparty constitution and led to the formation of political parties sympathetic to the RPF's position. In a major breakthrough in April 1992, the major political parties signed a protocol that established a coalition transitional government. As part of this agreement, Habyarimana conceded to the start of negotiations with the RPF. 3