UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS IN RWANDA

TURKISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE , 2022

The biggest test of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in the 21st century is the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. This is because the UN was incapable of preventing the genocide that took place in both countries. Therefore, these two case studies were not chosen by chance. In two case studies, the role of UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Bosnia, as well as the outcome of genocide caused by ethnic hatred, will be addressed. Thus, this study will answer three main questions. Firstly, what is the origin of ethnic hatred in Rwanda and Bosnia and its role in the genocide? Secondly, What is the role of UN in ethnic wars such as Rwanda and Bosnia? Lastly, What are the similarities and differences between Rwanda and Bosnia genocide based on ethnic reasons? In this context, it was concluded that ethnic and racial differences caused genocide in both countries and the UN intervention in Rwanda and Bosnia could not be effective due to the high level of ethnic hatred.

Journal of Refugee Studies, 1996

This article analyses five crucially relevant factors which may help to understand the extreme violence which affected Rwanda from April to July 1994. Two factors are shared with other African countries: the inherent destabilizing potential of processes of political transition, and the control of the state as a stake for political struggle. Three other factors are specifically Rwandan: the bipolar ethnic situation, the combination of a strong state and a socially conformist population, and the war waged by the RPF. The paper argues that violence has been political rather than ethnic. Looking at the prospects, the author warns that the ingredients for renewed violence are present and that the country is likely to face a prolonged period of destabilization if no political solutions are found. As this may well extend to the whole Great Lakes region, the international community would once more become the helpless witness of a major humanitarian drama.

I will start the essay by addressing the actions of the international community during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This will follow with a brief history of the two ethnic groups, the Tutsi and the Hutu, dating from pre-colonial times with a view to establish how the colonial influence has impacted the two ethnic groups into conflict and rivalry, despite long periods of ‘democratic’ living. I will then argue the IMF-World Bank structural adjustment program caused the deterioration of Rwanda’s economy as another cause, which has influenced the genocide. This will be followed by evidence showing the direct responsibility of the main actors of the international community with a focus on the U. S. and the UK support of the Rwandan Patriotic Front to secure a legal presence in Rwanda due to geopolitical interests in having access to the Congo’s mineral wealth. I will also argue the accuracy of the officially supported narrative of the genocide, presenting conclusive evidence towards the alternative narrative, which suggests the U.S. and its allies interests in overthrowing the Hutu-based Rwandan government. Finally this essay will briefly discuss post-genocide Rwanda and the crisis in the Congo, coming to the conclusion that mass human rights violations continue to be perpetrated in the Rwanda and neighbouring Congo due to main international actors’ overpowering geopolitical interests.

2012

On April 6, 1994, the jet carrying the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana, was shot down as it approached Kigali airport-killing all aboard. The systematic slaughter of Rwanda"s Tutsi minority by Hutu extremist hardliners began almost immediately. By killing ten UN peacekeepers, the hardliners who seemed to have done their homework well, knew the UN would abandon the peacekeeping mission and withdraw from Rwanda-and they were correct. For the next one hundred days using machetes and other low-tech weapons, the Hutus massacred almost one million Tutsis in a deliberate campaign to annihilate them. The systematic state-led effort to violently eliminate the Tutsi population unequivocally meets the definition of genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. If signatories of the Genocide Convention are obligated to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, why did the international community become bystanders to this horror? How could the screams of one million people be ignored? This thesis will analyze the response of both the United Nations and the United States to the Rwandan genocide. Why did the UN which already had peacekeepers on the ground, abandon Rwanda? Why did the US, the world"s most powerful nation refuse to iii intervene? Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented, or at least stopped? How could such a crime happen at the down of the twenty-first century when the world had said "never again," following the horrors of the Holocaust? To answer these questions, the first chapter will look at the key players in Rwanda"s politics, the Hutu and Tutsi, and the events leading to the slaughter. Chapter two focuses on Rwanda"s intertwined and complex history between the Hutu, Tutsi and, and the impact of colonial rule-by both German and Belgium. Chapter three examines why the US and UN became eye witnesses to a genocide and failed to intervene. Chapter four examines early ignored warnings of the disaster and the chances of a successful prevention. Chapter five seeks to draw lessons from the events in Rwanda that can help policymakers prevent future genocides. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are a number of people whom I wish to express my deepest gratitude, who without their contribution the completion of this thesis would not have been possible. First, I wish to thank my mentor, Gregory Havrilak, for his dedication and unequivocal commitment. He was always there to answer my questions. Second, I would like to thank my wife, Dr. Carolyne Siganda, for her encouragement and support throughout this process. Finally, I also want to thank my daughter, Katherine, for being patient when I had to go to the library on weekends and could not spend time with her. v

Journal of Refugee Studies, 1996

Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region. For several years preceding the massive violence of 1994, the international community contributed to efforts to find a peaceful solution to escalating conflict and it provided substantial assistance to alleviate the human suffering. During the nine months of the emergency in 1994, April to December, international assistance for emergency relief to Rwandese refugees and displaced persons is estimated to have cost in the order of US$1.4 billion, of which about oneothird was spent in Rwanda and two-thirds in asylum countries. This accounted for over 20% of all official emergency assistance, which in turn has accounted for an increasing share, reaching over 10% in 1994, of overall international aid. This growth reflects the worldwide proliferation in recent years of so-called complex emergencies. These tend to have multiple causes, but are essentially political in nature and entail violent conflict. They typically include a breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts, UN policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance by official and private agencies. A complex emergency tends to be very dynamic, characterized by rapid changes that are difficult to predict. Thus complex issues are raised regarding the timing, nature and scale of response. The Rwanda complex emergency shares all these characteristics and more. Although some evaluations of international assistance for complex emergencies have been carried out, experience from the planning and execution of large-scale aid for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction has not been extensively documented and assessed. Recognizing both the magnitude of the Rwanda emergency and the implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, Danida, proposed a Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, multi-donor evaluation effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee at a consultative meeting of international agencies and NGOs held in Copenhagen in November 1994. This Committee 1 is composed of representatives from 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) secretariat of the OECD; 9 multilateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC