Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg (Final Draft)

Philosophy of Science Today, 2003

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2006

The paper builds on the basically Humean idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this 'status raising' is best explicated not in regularity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals with cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. It finally indicates how the account's profound epistemic relativization induced by ranking theory can be undone. 1 Introduction 2 Variables, propositions, time 3 Induction first 4 Causation 5 Redundant causation 6 Objectivization 1 The major cycles have been produced by David Lewis himself. See Lewis ([1973b], [1986], [2000]). Hints to further cycles may be found there. 2 It is first presented in (Spohn [unpublished]). 3 See, e.g. the April issue of the Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000), or the collection by Collins et al. ([2004]). See also the many references therein, mostly referring to papers since 1995.

Philosophical Studies, 2007

Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example Keywords David Lewis Á Causation Á Causal influence Á Counterfactuals Á Symmetrical redundant causation Á Trumping preemption Complex and ingenious alleged counterexamples have been offered to David Lewis's causal influence account of causation (for instance, Schaffer 2001; Strevens 2003). These efforts are themselves under attack (see Noordhof 2001; Choi 2005). What follows is a simple counterexample, especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example. 1 The causal influence account of causation is largely a response to 'trumping' cases. There are two kinds of 'redundant' causation (there are two potential causes and either alone would have been followed by the effect). First, 'symmetrical' redundant causation: both candidates have an equal claim to be called causes of the effect. Second, 'asymmetrical' redundant causation: just one of the potential causes (the 'preempting cause') causes the effect. There are at least two kinds of preemption. In the first, the preempted cause fails to run to completion because the causal chain that would have run from it to the effect is cut by the preempting cause. 'Trumping' is J. Stone (&)

Cognitive science has developed many different theoretical approaches to causality. All of these approaches assume (sometimes implicitly) that we conceptualize causality in terms of cause and effect. It is argued that the elements-the conceptual primitives-of a cause and of an effect have not been identified yet. Thus, this paper sets out to carry out cognitive-linguistic analysis (systematic sentence manipulations) to answer the following two questions: (1) What are the mental elements that make up a cause? And what are the mental elements that make up an effect? It is argued that Talmy's force dynamics-with three revisions-can be used as a basic framework to identify these elements. The causal concepts investigated are: successful causation (CAUSE), failed causation (DESPITE), negative causation (PREVENT), and disengaged potential negative causation (ENABLE). This account of "force-dynamic elementary causality" is then also compared with other variants of force-dynamic theory. It is furthermore demonstrated how forcedynamic elementary causation can be integrated with epistemic and with counterfactual and probabilistic accounts. Finally, it is discussed how these causal elements might manifest in mental spatiotemporal structure.

TAKING UP MCLUHAN'S CAUSE, 2017

Formal causality has, in large part, been eschewed by both the philosophic and scientific communities alike. David Hume in particular levied an assault against any form of causality other than material cause. But formal cause is as viable a notion as material cause, and one that is of vital importance in both philosophy and science. By re-assessing Aristotle’s notion of formal causality, and interweaving it with inspirations from such diverse disciplines as Anthropology, Semiotics, and Communication Studies the notion of formal cause can be restored to its rightful place, along side material cause, as a fundamental principle of scientific and philosophical methods alike.

The problems of how the world is made, how things could have gone, and how causal relations work (if any such relation is at play) cross the entire historical development of philosophy. In the last forty years, the philosophical debate has given these problems a prominent role in its agenda, and David Lewis has suggested methodologies and theories that have contributed to enrich our notions in the fields of mereology, modality and the theory of causation. Such contributions have been among the most influential in analytic philosophy. The following theses -among others -have been milestones for the current philosophical debate:

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1993

Erkenntnis, 2012

David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis’s influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation.

Chicago Kent Law Review, 1987