According to David Lewis, something 'endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than... more According to David Lewis, something 'endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time'. (1986: 202) Lewis claims that the 'problem of temporary intrinsics' (PTI, henceforth) is a decisive objection against endurance: 'Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape, when I stand, I have a straightened shape. ... How is such change possible?' (1986: 203-4) Robin Le Poidevin explicates the difficulty this way: 'Among the set of past facts is Fa; among the set of present facts is Not-Fa. So reality contains two facts, Fa and Not-Fa, which together form a
, 1997. 'The Biological Approach,' Eric T. Olson writes, 'is the view that you and I are human an... more , 1997. 'The Biological Approach,' Eric T. Olson writes, 'is the view that you and I are human animals, and that no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or sufficient for a human animal to persist through time.' Human 'persons' are selfaware human animals which, as they aren't essentially self aware, aren't essentially persons. Ranged against this position is the 'Psychological Approach,' a family of views according to which
This paper will argue that there are no people. 1 Let me summarize the argument (part I is covere... more This paper will argue that there are no people. 1 Let me summarize the argument (part I is covered last). In part II of what follows, I argue that if identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Psychological connectedness, according to Derek Parfit, is the 'holding of particular direct psychological connections,' for example, when a belief, a desire, or some other psychological feature continues to be had (Parfit 1986, 206); psychological connectedness consists in two other relations-resemblance plus a cause that produces it. For our purposes, to say of a relation that it is 'what matters in survival' is to say that it carries the burden of responsibility, remorse, and regret for past misdeeds; and that it is what makes rational the anticipation of,
According to David Lewis, something 'endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than... more According to David Lewis, something 'endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time'. (1986: 202) Lewis claims that the 'problem of temporary intrinsics' (PTI, henceforth) is a decisive objection against endurance: 'Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape, when I stand, I have a straightened shape.… How is such change possible?' (1986: 203-4) Robin Le Poidevin explicates the difficulty this way: 'Among the set of past facts is Fa; among the set of present facts is Not-Fa. So reality contains two facts, Fa and Not-Fa, which together form a contradiction' (1998: 38). Lewis's alternative is 'Perdurantism': ordinary material things persist by having parts that exist at different times. Temporary intrinsics belong to different temporal parts. Lewis is bent in the derived sense that he has a part that is bent simpliciter; he sits and stands much as a road is both straight and windy because it has a straight part and a windy part. One way to defend Endurantism against PTI is to deny that shapes are intrinsic properties. Lewis, setting out this view, writes:
I've argued that a version of Pascal's Wager applies to PVS so forcefully that no one who decline... more I've argued that a version of Pascal's Wager applies to PVS so forcefully that no one who declines continued life without considering it makes a reasoned and informed decision. Thomas Mappes objects that my argument is much more limited than I realize. Of special interest is his appeal to an emerging diagnostic category, the 'minimally conscious state,' to argue that there is much to lose in gambling on life. I will defend the Wager. Along the way I maintain that the chance of recovery from long-term PVS is much better than represented (as is the prospect of regaining independence if one recovers consciousness), and that the 1994 Multi-Society Task Force definitions of 'permanent' PVS are confused in ways that make crafting advance directives dangerously difficult. Valid advance directives require informed consent, I argue; the Wager needs to be part of the process. A consequence of my argument is that withdrawing medicallydelivered nutrition and hydration from PVS patients is much harder to justify. 2 Pascal's Wager and the Persistent Vegetative State A version of Pascal's Wager applies to the PVS... People in such condition are not suffering. There remains a small possibility that they will wake up, as some do, or that medical advances will enable doctors to help them. ... Consequently you have everything to win and nothing to lose if you gamble on staying alive: you may wake up and, if you do not, unconscious life is no worse than being dead. The argument concludes that it is in your interest to stay alive if you are comatose, the more so the younger you are. One difficulty is that you may be severely disabled... Severe disability, however, while not as good as normalcy, is usually better than being dead. That's what the severely disabled typically say, anyhow. We generally do not think they are better off dead; but that judgment should guide decisions about ourselves. Another difficulty is that... your financial resources, needed to support your family, will be exhausted. Note that in the famous cases of comatose patients (e.g. Karen Quinlan) insurance or Social Security paid the bills. I submit that anyone who opts for death if he becomes comatose, without first considering this argument, has not reached a reasoned and informed decision. 1
Cogito Ergo Sum Descartes' dictum "I am thinking, therefore I am" looks like an argument, and man... more Cogito Ergo Sum Descartes' dictum "I am thinking, therefore I am" looks like an argument, and many philosophers take it to express an enthymeme: Whatever is thinking exists, I am thinking, therefore I exist. But this interpretation is vulnerable to objections. Descartes writes: "When someone says 'I am thinking, therefore I
I find a lost wallet containing the owner's address and a lot of cash. Shall I keep it or return ... more I find a lost wallet containing the owner's address and a lot of cash. Shall I keep it or return it? Suppose I have the 'liberty of indifference': whatever I do, I could have done otherwise. Indeed, part of what is meant in saying I act freely is that either way what I do is up to me. And let's allow this liberty requires that my choice is not a logical consequence of the past and natural laws. If I return the wallet, I could have kept it without violating a law of nature or changing the past. Let's call this 'situation S' (where the liberty of indifference is part of S). Suppose I return the wallet. Others are also in S: free people find lost wallets every day. Each of us can freely return the wallet we find. It doesn't follow immediately that we can all return it, however. That each ticket holder can win the lottery doesn't entail they can all win it. We need the additional premiss that no number of people (short of all those in S) freely returning the wallet prevents the remainder from freely returning it. In short: each of us in S can freely return the wallet. Further, no number of us doing so prevents the remainder from doing so. Therefore it's possible that we all freely do what I do. According to Modal Realism (MR), other possible worlds are concrete realities and the people in them as real as you and me. Some of these people are in S. Each of them can freely return the wallet; none of them is prevented from exercising that ability by others doing so, including others in worlds causally isolated from theirs. For instance, our doings in the actual world no more limit their abilities than their doings limit ours. Therefore it's possible that all S-people, whatever world they are part of, freely return the wallet. Suppose for reductio that everyone in S freely returns the wallet. This entails that each of us could have freely kept it. According to Counterpart Theory (CT), each of us could have freely kept it only if each of us has a counterpart in S in some world who freely keeps it. Given CT, therefore, the supposition entails that all of us have such a counterpart. As all of us in S return the wallet and, given MR, this includes those in S in other possible worlds, none of us has such a counterpart. Given MR and CT, therefore, the supposition entails that we all do and do not have a counterpart in S who freely keeps the wallet. If, given P, Q entails a contradiction, then, given P, it's impossible that Q. In short: given MR, it's possible that all S-people, whatever world they are part of, freely return the wallet. Given the conjunction of CT and MR, it's impossible. Suppose MR is true. As the conjunction is false
This lucid and interesting paper, well worth reading, concerns the neural correlates of conscious... more This lucid and interesting paper, well worth reading, concerns the neural correlates of conscious experiences. The authors (A, henceforth) argue that conscious experience 'must be events in individual neurons, not spread across neuronal networks or brain regions.' They own that 'conscious events in individual neurons would make our subjectivity massively multiple' and add 'Yet it appears this is how neuroscience shows things must be.' In what follows, I will forgo explaining how A argues neuroscience shows this (these arguments are well worth considering) and I will instead raise questions about this position's consequences.
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-g... more Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"-but look and see whether there is anything common to all.-For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!-Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.-Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-around a roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared!... I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances";... And I shall say: 'games' form a family. 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953 Even at the ordinary-language level, it is strange to say that all games "have something in common," namely, being games. For some games involve winning and losing, others ("Ring a Ring o'Roses") do not; some games are played for the amusement of the players, others (gladatorial games) are not; some games have more than one player, others do not; and so on. In the same way, when we examine closely all the cases in which we would say that someone has "referred to" something...., we do not find any one relation between the word and the thing referred to. 2 Hilary Putnam, 1988 The doctrine of family resemblances is tied in a peculiar way to the particular example of games. For although the doctrine has become part of the arsenal of analytic philosophy, on the occasions when philosophers feel a need to support it, the
Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, one that ... more Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example Keywords David Lewis Á Causation Á Causal influence Á Counterfactuals Á Symmetrical redundant causation Á Trumping preemption Complex and ingenious alleged counterexamples have been offered to David Lewis's causal influence account of causation (for instance, Schaffer 2001; Strevens 2003). These efforts are themselves under attack (see Noordhof 2001; Choi 2005). What follows is a simple counterexample, especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example. 1 The causal influence account of causation is largely a response to 'trumping' cases. There are two kinds of 'redundant' causation (there are two potential causes and either alone would have been followed by the effect). First, 'symmetrical' redundant causation: both candidates have an equal claim to be called causes of the effect. Second, 'asymmetrical' redundant causation: just one of the potential causes (the 'preempting cause') causes the effect. There are at least two kinds of preemption. In the first, the preempted cause fails to run to completion because the causal chain that would have run from it to the effect is cut by the preempting cause. 'Trumping' is J. Stone (&)
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