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Hypothesis
Simplicity Constraints and Subjectivity
References

How to Undermine Underdetermination?

Profile image of John BennettJohn BennettProfile image of Prasanta BandyopadhyayPrasanta Bandyopadhyay
https://doi.org/10.1007/S10699-014-9353-3
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21 pages

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Abstract

The underdetermination thesis poses a threat to rational choice of scientific theories. We discuss two arguments for the thesis. One draws its strength from deductivism together with the existence thesis, and the other is defended on the basis of the failure of a reliable inductive method. We adopt a partially subjective/objective pragmatic Bayesian epistemology of science framework, and reject both arguments for the thesis. Thus, in science we are able to reinstate rational choice called into question by the underdetermination thesis.

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Duhem-Quine underdetermination plays a constructive role in epistemology by pinpointing the impact of non-empirical virtues or cognitive values on theory choice. Underdetermination thus contributes to illuminating the nature of scientific rationality. Scientists prefer and accept one account among empirical equivalent alternatives. The non-empirical virtues operating in science are laid open in such theory choice decisions. The latter act as an epistemological test tube in making explicit commitments to how scientific knowledge should be like.

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This study aims to articulate and compare the structure, presuppositions and implications of two paradigmatic sceptical arguments, i.e. arguments from underdetermination of scientific theories by observational data (UA) and Cartesian-style arguments (CA) invoking sceptical scenarios of severe cognitive dislocation. Although salient analogies between them may prompt one to think that a unified diagnosis of what is amiss with them is called for, it will be argued that this may be a false hope, if those analogies do not underwrite a complete homology. That said, possible parallels of one promising anti-sceptical exposure of CA are pointed out for the case of UA, which conspire together to render the problem of underdetermination less threatening than it could at first appear.

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The papers collected in this special issue are written versions of talks delivered at the Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination workshop which we organised at the University of Duesseldorf on April 11-12 2008. Early in the summer of 2007 we were still immersed in the planning stages of the workshop. At the time our main concern was to invite philosophers that were making and would continue to make significant contributions to the scientific realism debate. With this aim in mind, we prepared a list of invitees. One of the names at the top was that of Peter Lipton. His work on inference to the best explanation had established him as one of the most prominent and formidable defenders of scientific realism. When Peter accepted the invitation our confidence in the workshop's prospects was greatly enhanced. Alas it was not meant to be. Peter unexpectedly passed away in November 2007. His absence from the workshop was strongly felt not least because quite a few of the participants had known Peter both on a professional as well as on a personal basis. David Papineau was drafted in as a replacement. Since David had a long and entwined history with Peter he was entrusted with the honourable task of delivering a eulogy on the opening day of the workshop. We are very thankful to David for delivering a moving eulogy as well as for agreeing to replace Peter at such short notice. We would like to dedicate this special issue of Synthese to the memory of Peter Lipton, a fellow philosopher and to some of us a dear friend.

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The problem of underdetermination
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The problem of underdetermination is the main theme of the work. In scientific practice, observation becomes burdened with scientific theories, and this can be a problem for science. The problem relates to the way we choose a particular scientific theory. In philosophy, there are two main approaches to this problem. One refers to an attempt to give a reason or justification for choosing a particular theory, the other claims that the way a scientific theory is chosen is socially conditioned. The concept of underdetermination also appears in science and philosophy. The term underdetermination refers to the underdetermination of a theory in relation to certain empirical data. This means that there is always the possibility of the existence of one or more conflicting theories, which explains the theory we already have just as well. That is, the theories are compatible with the empirical data we have; but they are mutually incompatible. Therefore, on what basis do we choose one theory and reject another. So it seems that the choice of theory does not depend on the facts but on something else. There are several possible approaches to the problem: choosing a certain methodological principle or method that would be characteristic of one or more theories and in what relation is such a method to reality; then epistemic virtues and the approach of relying on social factors. In my paper, I argue that something more than empirical data is needed to accept a certain scientific thesis. Certain criteria and rules are needed, which are not just empirical data. These criteria refer to epistemic virtues and methodological principles. Epistemic virtues refer to our subjective set of beliefs, which we already have about existing theories. To what extent is a theory more coherent, simpler, explains more phenomena, better agrees with empirical data or with our background belief system. While the methodological principle refers to data or a set of rules, which will show that we should choose one theory and not another. Such a method should be objective and independent of our set of beliefs about theories. A third approach to the problem is in the form of social factors, which are necessary to select a theory. In my paper, I analyzed the mentioned approaches, and I advocate the approach of methodological principles.

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2014, M.Sc. Dissertation. Pessimistic Meta-Deduction and Its Implications for Scientific Realism.
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I delve into the scientific realism – antirealism debate to scrutinize one of the antirealists’ primary arguments, the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). After I find PMI to be lacking and untenable as originally articulated by Larry Laudan, I put forward a deductive-analytical version of it instead. I propose that this refinement, the Pessimistic Meta-Deduction (PMD), is in two ways superior to the PMI: First, it does justice to the history of science by not taking the past failure or success of scientific theories to guarantee their falsehood or truthfulness respectively. Second, it constitutes a more powerful weapon in the antirealists’ arsenal by overcoming PMI’s primary problems. In conclusion, I examine the PMD as an answer to the No Miracles Argument (NMA), one of the realists’ primary arguments. I proffer that the PMD raises very serious objections even for the most convincing versions of NMA. On a closing note, open questions regarding the debate are highlighted.

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