How Particulars Naturally Belong to (Natural) Classes

In this paper, I first propose a new account of the concept of ontological form and its difference from the notion of ontological matter or content. I begin by suggesting that we replace “ontological matter” or “content” with just “being” because the latter term catches my proposal better. My first main theses are that the concept of ontological form is explicated by the concepts of nature-neutral internal relation and existence or being and that the ontological forms of entities consist of these relations, that is, of formal ontological relations in which the entities are. Secondly, I apply this account of ontological form to categories and their existence and reality. I defend a relationist view that, to put it briefly, categories are pluralities of entities that exist in the same formal ontological relations (in the same order in some cases). Therefore they do not exist as additional entities to their members; they exist only as pluralities. Yet they may be said to be real in a sense that their membership is determined by formal ontological relations that actually hold of the relata of these relations and the holding can be expressed by true relational predications. My view is moderately realist although I do not identify categories with universals. Hence, I hold a nominalist view of categories.

Metaphysica, 2006

Concepts and properties are usually considered to be distinct universals, but the present paper argues that of the usual candidates for distinguishing concepts from properties, all are inadequate. The paper also suggests two new candidates: The first claims that concepts are ontologically dependent on their possibly being possessed or grasped by some mind, while properties are not. The second claims that concepts enter into the type-token relation, but properties do not. These latter two criteria are rejected as well, leaving a general, conditional conclusion that if the options discussed exhaust the alternatives, then the concept of being F and the property of being F are identical.

Russell held that ‘a exists’, where ‘a’ is a logically proper name, was necessarily true. By contrast his account of ‘The K exists’ allowed this to be contingent, since, on his Theory of Descriptions, it did not assert the existence of an individual, but merely the instantiation of some uniquely identifying properties. The present paper refines Russell’s distinction in several ways, first by providing what Russell merely gestured at, namely explicit, formally defined logically proper names. But following from this it is seen that Russell’s intention with regard to ‘The K exists’ is better expressed ‘A unique K exists’, leaving the former to be assimilated into the non-contingent category, through interpreting its subject phrase ‘The K’ non-attributively. The paper closes with an exhibition of similar discriminations that are available with higherorder subjects, such as properties, numbers, and facts; and most particularly with propositions

Philosopher's Imprint, 2016

Metaphysicians generally agree that not all predicates are created equal. In the Parmenides, young Socrates affirms that there are Forms of the beautiful, the just, and the good, but denies that there is a Form of hair or of mud. In classical Indian metaphysics, Udayana’s followers distinguished ‘real’ universals (jāti) from those that are merely ‘constructed’ (upādhi).1 And in recent Western philosophy, Goodman (1955) has distinguished projectible from non-projectible predicates, Armstrong (1978) predicates that correspond to universals from those that don’t, Shoemaker (1980) genuine from ‘mere Cambridge’ properties, and David Lewis (1983; 1986) perfectly natural attributes from those that are less than perfectly natural.2 It is easy to notice that in each of these distinctions, one of the two respective classes of predicates (or universals, etc.) is in some way privileged. The distinction that this paper is concerned with also fits into this roster. I shall try to give an account ...

Philosophical Studies, 1981

Philosophy of Science, 1977

In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay-a bare particular-does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay-a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premise that only particulars can ground individuation as deeply as is required, it follows that Bergmann and Hausman have not proved particulars are necessary and that positional qualities are insufficient for individuation.

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1981

classic tradition in first philosophy, descending from Plato and Aristotle, A and recently reaffirmed by D. M. Armstrong,' proposes two equally essential, yet mutually exclusive, categories of reality: Substances (or Particulars), which are particular and concrete, and Properties (and Relations), which are universal and abstract Material bodies are the most familiar examples of Concrete Particulars, and their characteristics, conceived of as repeatable entities common to many different objects, are paradigms of Abstract Universals. Particular being's distinguishing mark is that it is exhausted in the one embodiment, or occasion, or example. For the realm of space, this restricts particulars to a single location at any one time. Particulars thus seem to enjoy a relatively unproblematic mode of being.

Thinking & Reasoning, 2005

We re-evaluate existing data that demonstrate a large amount of variability in the content of categories considering the fact that these data have been obtained in a specific task: the production of features of single isolated categories. We present new data that reveal a large consensus when participants have to judge whether or not a given feature is characteristic of a category and we show that classification tasks produce an intermediate level of consensus. We argue that the differences observed between tasks are due to the extent of implied context and we propose a reinterpretation of typicality effects, demonstrating that they are compatible with the existence of a stable conceptual core. In order to explain how the existence of a conceptual core is consistent with variability due to context, we present a theory of categorisation based on a property tree organisation. Within a domain of description, we distinguish between semantic implications (flying ? moving) and empirical implications (flying ? having wings) as well as between properties used to describe objects. Semantic implications serve to build property lines and Galois lattices are used to reveal category structures according to empirical implications. We show that variability in the category content may be explained by the fact that some properties are emphasised while others are masked according to the context.

Manuscrito, 2019

In this article, we analyse the ontological import of adding classes to set theories. We assume that this increment is well represented by going from ZF system to NBG. We thus consider the standard techniques of reducing one system to the other. Novak proved that from a model of ZF we can build a model of NBG (and vice versa), while Shoenfield have shown that from a proof in NBG of a set-sentence we can generate a proof in ZF of the same formula. We argue that the first makes use of a too strong metatheory. Although meaningful, this symmetrical reduction does not equate the ontological content of the theories. The strong metatheory levels the two theories. Moreover, we will modernize Shoenfields proof, emphasizing its relation to Herbrands theorem and that it can only be seen as a partial type of reduction. In contrast with symmetrical reductions, we believe that asymmetrical relations are powerful tools for comparing ontological content. In virtue of this, we prove that there is no interpretation of NBG in ZF, while NBG trivially interprets ZF. This challenges the standard view that the two systems have the same ontological content.