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Title
Abstract
Key Takeaways
Introduction
An Analogous Analysis of Attribute Simplicity
Conclusion
References
All Topics
Philosophy

Logically Simple Properties and Relations

Profile image of Jan PlateJan Plate

2016, Philosopher's Imprint

Abstract

Metaphysicians generally agree that not all predicates are created equal. In the Parmenides, young Socrates affirms that there are Forms of the beautiful, the just, and the good, but denies that there is a Form of hair or of mud. In classical Indian metaphysics, Udayana’s followers distinguished ‘real’ universals (jāti) from those that are merely ‘constructed’ (upādhi).1 And in recent Western philosophy, Goodman (1955) has distinguished projectible from non-projectible predicates, Armstrong (1978) predicates that correspond to universals from those that don’t, Shoemaker (1980) genuine from ‘mere Cambridge’ properties, and David Lewis (1983; 1986) perfectly natural attributes from those that are less than perfectly natural.2 It is easy to notice that in each of these distinctions, one of the two respective classes of predicates (or universals, etc.) is in some way privileged. The distinction that this paper is concerned with also fits into this roster. I shall try to give an account ...

Key takeaways
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  1. The text analyzes the distinction between logically simple and complex attributes in metaphysics.
  2. It critiques existing theories from Socrates to Lewis on the nature of attributes.
  3. Logically simple attributes are defined via their reducibility to atomic terms in a formal language.
  4. The paper proposes that negations and permutations of logically simple attributes also retain simplicity.
  5. A sparseness result claims that logically simple attributes are not analyzable in terms of complex ones.

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