Dept of Philosophy

This article discusses how worship, recitation and various modes of oral transmission contributed to the manifestation of avadānas as literary works. I look specifically at the Maṇiśailamahāvadāna extant in Nepāl Bhāṣā and Sanskrit, that highlights figures such as the Buddhist goddess Ugratārā Vajrayoginī and a lineage of Vajrācāryas from Sankhu, resulting in a uniquely localized "tantric" avadāna. Further, I discuss passages in this text that describe the benefits of reading and listening to avadānas, and also the approaches of scholars and master storytellers such as Badri Ratna Guruju (1946-2016), Barnavajra Vajracharya (1922-1993) and Naresh Man Bajracharya, known for their exceptional transmission of the dharma through the lively narration and expansion of avadānas and dharma stories.

A study and full translation of the Maṇiśailamahāvadāna in the form of my PhD thesis, University of Toronto, Canada. Department for the Study of Religion. Proquest Version from Robarts Library. Also available in hardcover format in the stacks at the Cheng Yu Tung East Asian Library.

Page 38 - 78 in, The European Bulletin of Himalayan Research (EBHR). EBHR was founded by the late Richard Burghart in 1991 and has appeared twice yearly ever since. It is the result of a partnership and is edited on a rotating basis between the Centre for Himalayan Studies (CEH: Centre d'études himalayennes) within the

In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains how these same dispositions naturally give rise to corresponding moral judgments in individuals.

"FRANÇAIS: Dans le but de défendre la thèse de la correspondance entre le comportement moral et le bonheur, j’analyse dans cet article le cas problématique des psychopathes. Les psychopathes sont des individus qui ne reculent devant aucun interdit moral pour satisfaire leurs désirs, et qui ne ressentent aucun remord ou scrupule face à leurs agissements. En ce sens, ils paraissent obtenir un « ticket gratuit » dans le domaine de la moralité. Comment un défenseur de la thèse de la correspondance entre moralité et bonheur peut-il rendre compte du cas du psychopathe ? Le psychopathe vient-il réfuter cette thèse, ou représente-t-il plutôt une exception légitime ? Je défendrai ici une solution alternative  ; après avoir proposé une version plausible de la thèse de la correspondance, je tenterai de démontrer que les psychopathes ne sont pas heureux, et ce en vertu de caractéristiques essentielles de la psychopathie. Leur statut de « criminel en puissance » et leur faible capacité de contentement sont les deux éléments centraux qui m’amèneront à conclure que les psychopathes ne sont pas heureux. Loin de réfuter ou d’échapper à la thèse de la correspondance, le cas des psychopathes vient donc en réalité renforcer cette thèse.

ENGLISH: My goal in this paper is to defend the idea of a general correspondence between happiness and morality, and I do so by analyzing the problematic case of psychopaths. Psychopaths are individuals who are not bothered by moral restrictions when it comes to satisfying their desires. They feel no remorse and have no scruples, and as such they appear to be “free-riders” in the realm of morality. The unusual case of psychopaths will therefore pose a problem to someone who argues that there is a correspondence between happiness and morality: should psychopaths be seen as refuting the correspondence rule, or are they merely a legitimate exception to that rule? I will propose an alternative explanation; after having presented a plausible version of the correspondence thesis, I will try to show that psychopaths, for reasons constitutive of their nature, really are not happy. Psychopaths’ quasi-inevitable criminal behaviours as well as their low capacity for contentment are two central elements that lead me to argue that they are not happy. I therefore conclude that psychopaths, far from refuting the correspondence thesis, actually reinforce that thesis. "

"FRANÇAIS: J’aborde dans cet article un problème que je nomme le « spectre épistocratique ». Le problème se présente ainsi : s’il existe des vérités politiques, c’est-à-dire des positions politiques qui soient véritablement bonnes, ne devrait-on pas faire de l’atteinte de ces vérités politiques l’objectif central de notre système politique, ce qui pourrait nous conduire à limiter le pouvoir populaire afin de laisser les individus « éclairés » prendre toutes les décisions politiques ? J’explore différentes stratégies possibles afin de défendre la démocratie contre l’attrait d’une telle épistocratie, et je conclus que la meilleure stratégie consiste à souligner qu’une démocratie délibérative bien organisée démontre un potentiel épistémique supérieur à tout autre système politique. Je termine en montrant comment une telle conclusion parvient à nous informer sur le phénomène de la contestation politique.

ENGLISH: In this paper, I consider a problem that I call the “epistocratic specter”. The problem goes as follows : if there are political truths, by which I mean political positions that are truly good, shouldn’t we make the attainment of such truths the central goal of our political system, which could lead us to restrict popular power and let only truly “enlightened” individuals make every political decision ? I explore various possible strategies in order to defend democracy against the appeal of such an epistrocratic system, and I conclude that the best available strategy is one that emphasizes that a well-organized deliberative democracy possesses an epistemic potential that is superior to that of any other political system. I conclude by showing how this fact can inform our understanding of the phenomenon of political dissent."

This article compares different models of the origin of moral norms. It begins by distinguishing two main models, one that views moral norms as social constructions transmitted to individuals through socialization (the Input model), and one that views moral norms as naturally emerging from human dispositions (the Output model). Contemporary examples are given for each model, and each is then divided between ‘nativist’ and ‘anti-nativist’ versions. After the strengths and weaknesses of each model are highlighted, an alternative model is proposed, which is an ‘anti-nativist’ version of the Output model that is called the ‘Direct Outgrowth’ model. That model construes moral norms as being directly shaped by innate dispositions such as emotional preparedness. However, despite the central role played by innate dispositions, none of those dispositions evolved for the purpose of morality, which is why the model is still described as ‘anti-nativist’.

FRANÇAIS: "Ce mémoire porte sur les intuitions utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaine. Les intuitions sont interrogées sur trois aspects : leur nature, leur fiabilité et leur rôle. Concernant la nature des intuitions, celles-ci sont présentées comme des jugements spontanés ayant une valeur épistémique « à première vue ». Concernant la fiabilité des intuitions, trois grands types de raisons de douter de leur fiabilité sont considérés, à savoir les résultats de certaines études scientifiques montrant de diverses manières leur instabilité, les études réalisées par le mouvement de philosophie expérimentale afin d'illustrer le phénomène du désaccord intuitif, et enfin, le problème de l'origine douteuse des intuitions. Aucune de ces raisons n'est jugée efficace afin de discréditer l'usage des intuitions en philosophie. Concernant le rôle des intuitions, une distinction est proposée entre deux grands types d'usage philosophique contemporain. D'une part, ce qu'on peut appeler la méthodologie standard en philosophie morale contemporaine consiste en une combinaison d’expériences de pensée et de la méthode de l’équilibre réfléchi. Différentes manières d'aborder la méthode de l'équilibre réfléchi sont présentées, et le modèle de l'équilibre réfléchi large développé par Norman Daniels est jugé le plus efficace. D'autre part, les intuitions sont parfois utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaine dans le cadre de la théorie de l'intuitionnisme éthique. La théorie est défendue contre diverses objections, et elle est montrée compatible avec la méthode de l’équilibre réfléchi."

ENGLISH: "The object of this Master’s thesis is the intuitions used in contemporary moral philosophy. Intuitions are investigated on three aspects: their nature, their reliability, and their role. Regarding the nature of intuitions, they are presented as spontaneous judgments with “prima facie” epistemic value. Regarding the reliability of intuitions, three general types of reasons to question their reliability are considered, namely, the results of certain scientific studies showing in various ways Fiabilité des intuitionstheir unreliability, studies conducted in the field of experimental philosophy which emphasize the phenomenon of intuitive disagreement, and finally, the problem of the origin of intuitions. None of these reasons is judged good enough to discredit the use of intuitions in philosophy. Regarding the role of intuitions, a distinction is drawn between two main types of usage in contemporary philosophy. On the one hand, what can be called the “standard methodology” in contemporary moral philosophy consists in the combination of thought experiments and the method of reflective equilibrium. Different ways of construing the method of reflective equilibrium are considered, and the “Wide Reflective Equilibrium” model developed by Norman Daniels is judged the most successful. On the other hand, intuitions are sometimes used in contemporary moral philosophy in the context of the theory of ethical intuitionism. The theory is defended against various objections, and it is shown to be compatible with the method of reflective equilibrium."

Logic is often characterized as the study of arguments. This is not incorrect, but it is far from complete. It is true that, in this course, we will study arguments, to understand what their components are and how they work. But treating logic as merely the study of argument might lead one to think that there are arguments out there in the world, just ready for us to describe.

This course provides an introduction to ethics, or moral philosophy. Ethics is the philosophical study of the nature of right or good actions, behaviors, and human lives. This topic is studied at different levels of generality. We focus on normative ethics-the study of what theory provides the best account of right and wrong as such-and applies ethics-the application of ethical theories to particular cases. We will also cover a few topics in metaethics-the study of the fundamental status of moral concepts, values, and language. Regarding normative ethics, we will perform an in-depth study of the three most important ethical theories: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Our study of applied ethics will focus on topics in biomedical ethics as well as topics that are to be determined by student interest.

This course focuses on ethical issues in the practice of medicine, biological and medical research, the allocation of medical resources, public health policy, and related issues. We will first consider the foundations of the ethical study of these topics, by gaining a fluency in the basic language and tools of philosophy and by considering several theories of ethical decision-making. Then, we will consider some of the core concepts and principles that govern the field of bioethics, before turning to specific topics.

Life is so wretched that it would be impossible to endure were it not for the luminous beams of illusion that guide us through its darkest moments. 2 Many argue, perhaps not to this degree (or with this much drama), that were it not for some modest illusions about the world and ourselves we would experience a serious decline in quality of life. On those not-so-good days, this claim strikes me as irresistible. How would I endure life and maintain my sanity if I had to embrace each and every disgusting and disheartening fact about the world? Perceiving the world in a way that is neither clear-eyed nor complete may not be without its advantages. But even if being mistaken about the world or self-deceived causes one to be healthier or more comfortable, it is worth asking whether there is something to be said against a life of this kind. Might there not be some knowledge about ourselves or the world that we ought to have? Do not these positive illusions, 3 or flattering but inaccurate beliefs that people have about themselves and the world, interfere with

Is it possible to develop a personal narrative that is not fictitious or selfdeceptive? In this essay, I will look at the way that personal narratives contribute to self-deception. In so doing, I will consider the narrative that the narrator or pastor of André Gide's Pastoral Symphonie develops while reflecting upon his romantic relationship with his blind adopted -daughter‖, Gertrude. Although the pastor's narrative is largely selfdeceptive, we need not fear that all narratives are equally delusional. When a narrative is not self-deceptive, it can make a positive contribution to self-knowledge and moral understanding.