Philosophy

Singer did not invent the animal liberation movement, nor did he coin its central term, speciesism. But he made both famous, beginning with his essay, "Animal Liberation", which appeared in the New York Review ofBooks in April, 1973. His book of the same PHILOSOPHY Between the Species 36 Winter 1991

Most Most humans humans eat eat other other animals. animals. The The are, are, however, however, highly highly selective selective in in their their choices choices of of which which species species they they will will devour. devour. Food Food fastidiousness fastidiousness is is sometimes sometimes a a greater greater obstacle obstacle to to the the upgrading upgrading of of a a culture's culture's nutrition nutrition than than is is technological technological limitation. limitation. (You (You wouldn't wouldn't expect expect Burger Burger King King to to do do well well in in India.) India.) "UNMENTIONABLE "UNMENTIONABLE CUISINE CUISINE is is a a book book about about foods foods seldom seldom eaten eaten by by Americans Americans though though standard standard fare fare for for others. others. It It is is meant meant to to be be a a practical practical guide guide to to help help us us and and our our children children prepare prepare for for the the not not too too distant distant day day when when the the world's world's growing growing food food population population problem problem presses presses closer closer upon upon us us and and our our overly overly restrictive restrictive eating eating habits habits become become less less tolerable." tolerable." The The author author provides provides "a "a sampler sampler of of recipes recipes for for foods foods of of animal animal origin origin which which most most of of us us do do not not now now eat eat but but which which millions millions of of other other people people do." do." In In Peter Peter Singer's Singer's ANlt1AL ANlt1AL LIBERATION LIBERATION we we dis dis covered covered that that the the provision provision of of recipes recipes is is not not incompatible incompatible with with the the presentation presentation of of philosophical philosophical arguments. arguments. Argument Argument plays plays in in Schwabe's Schwabe's book book about about the the same same role role that that recipes recipes played played in in Singer's. Singer's. In In some some 400 400 pages pages of of recipes recipes we we learn learn how how to to prepare prepare pork pork testicles testicles in in cream, cream, uterus uterus sausage, sausage, stewed stewed cat, cat, grilled grilled rat rat Bordeaux Bordeaux style, style, baked baked bat, bat, stuffed stuffed squid, squid, fried fried silkworm silkworm pupae, pupae, crisp crisp roasted roasted termites, termites, fish fish sperm sperm crepes, crepes, smoked smoked dog, dog, lamb's lamb's brain brain tacos, tacos, and and many many other other more more or or less less exotic exotic dishes. dishes. Unfortunately Unfortunately for for vegetarians, vegetarians, Schwabe Schwabe focuses focuses on on foods foods of of animal animal origin. origin. On On the the central central question question of of whether whether meat meat should should be be eaten, eaten, he he touches touches only only briefly. briefly. "While "While I I have have no no quarrel quarrel with with the the personal personal preferences preferences of of philosophic philosophic vegetarians, vegetarians, it it should should be be made made clear clear that that the the consequences consequences of of lifetime lifetime strict strict vegetarianism-through vegetarianism-through the the reproductice reproductice cycle-have cycle-have never never been been scientifically scientifically assessed." assessed." Schwabe Schwabe worries worries about about vitamin vitamin B12 B12 deficiency deficiency in in infants infants nursed nursed by by vegetarian vegetarian mothers, mothers, and and alludes alludes to to "important "important practical practical diffi diffi cultires cultires in in obtaining obtaining a a dietary dietary balance balance of of essential essential amino amino acids acids solely solely from from plant plant proteins." proteins." He He argues argues that that "herbivorous "herbivorous animals animals provide provide the the only only vehicle vehicle for for exploitation exploitation of of imme~land imme~land areas areas for for food food production." production." That, That, however, however, is is no no argument argument for for Americans Americans to to eat eat meat meat rather rather than than grain, grain, since since the the cows cows and and chickens chickens they they eat eat are are not not in in fact fact used used to to exploit exploit nonarable nonarable land, land, but but

Here is a new version of the Evidential Problem of Evil.Theists claim that it is reasonable for atheists to believethat if God did exist, suffering would look just as it does now. I endorse this claim, however it cannot be deployedagainst my argument without the following epistemic principle:what we see makes p likely only if it is reasonable tobelieve it would be discernibly different if p were false. I demonstrate that this principle is mistaken. The paperalso responds to objections from Alvin Plantinga and PeterVan Inwagen that God’s existence is compatible with pointlessnatural evil. In particular, I argue that appeals to vaguenessdo not support the compatibility claim.

This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons.

This Paper argues that Living wills are typically nebulous and confused documents that do not effectively enable you to determine your future treatment. Worse, signing a living will can end your life in ways you never intended, long before you are either incompetent or terminally ill. This danger is compounded by the fact that those who implement living wills are often themselves dangerously confused, so that, for example, they cannot be relied upon to distinguish living wills from DNR orders. In addition, the Paper argues that advance directives concerning resuscitation are often so confused that they end the lives of healthy, alert people who have not suffered cardiac or pulmonary arrest. Finally, the paper argues that advance directives establishing durable power of attorney for health care often preserve the chief dangers of living wills. Suggestions are offered as to how you can most effectively direct your future treatment without endangering your life.

Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday 'I know that p' claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the idea of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. Roughly, we are asserting that we know p 'for all practical purposes.' The truth of such claims is consistent with skepticism; various other vexing problems don't arise. In addition, even if no claim about the world outside my mind can be more probable than its negation, the project of pure scientific research remains well motivated.

Contextualists offer ‘high-low standards’ practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of warranted assertion  and argue that it beats Kn as a response to the 'knowledge' version of Moore's Paradox.

The Principle of Credulity: 'It is basic to human knowledge of the world that we believe things are as they seem to be in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary' [Swinburne 1996: 133]. This underlies the Evidential Problem of Evil, which goes roughly like this: ‘There appears to be a lot of suffering, both animal and human, that does not result in an equal or greater utility. So there's probably some pointless suffering. As God's existence precludes pointless suffering, theism is implausible.’ CORNEA is the principle that observation O raises hypothesis H's probability only if O is more probable given H than it is given not-H. Theists sometimes maintain that apparently pointless suffering is just as likely given theism as atheism (I support this claim by appealing to a Lewisian account of the relevant counterfactuals). Given CORNEA, therefore, what we see of suffering does not make theism unlikely. I maintain that a consequence of so deploying CORNEA is that CORNEA and the Principle of Credulity are incompatible. We are left with a skeptical paradox. CORNEA is a consequence of Bayes’s Theorem, I argue; but it is incompatible with a presupposition of empirical science, namely, that appearances create epistemic warrant, ceteris paribus. External-world probability skepticism follows. I treat the paradox as real. First, I offer an account of how we strike a balance in practice between CORNEA, on the one hand, and the Principle of Credulity and the scientific enterprise on the other. Second, I try to resolve the paradox outright by rejecting the Principle of Credulity and maintaining that the scientific project remains well motivated even allowing probability skepticism. On either response to the paradox, the Evidential Problem of Evil continues to have serious, but defeasible, force against theism.

In Meditation I, Descartes considers whether it is reasonable to doubt that he is seated by the fare attired in a dressing gown. He writes But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions,and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifest-' ly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. 1

Four-dimensionalism (the view that ordinary things persist by having temporal parts)is largely a response to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics (see David Lewis 1986: ch 4, sec 2). I sit at one time; I stand at another. As nothing can be both standing and sitting, one temporal part of me stands, another sits. I, this persisting human person, am identical to a four dimensional space-time worm made of temporal parts. Just as a road can be both straight and curvy because it has a straight part and a curvy part, I can be both sitting and standing because I have a sitting part and a standing part. Like the road, I have these properties in a derivative way. To say I'm sitting is to say that one of my temporal parts is sitting; to say I'm thinking I'm hungry (I won't think it after lunch) is to say a temporal part of me thinks it. I will argue that this account of persons is incoherent. Let's accept four-dimensionalism for the sake of reductio. 1. The reductio. Suppose I'm a three-dimensionalist; I believe I persist by being wholly present at every moment of my life (threedimensionalists believe this about persisting things in general). On my death bed I suddenly realize the truth: There exists an x such that x is a four dimensional space-time worm lasting for decades and I = x (call this proposition 'p'). Immediately I expire. As nothing can both believe and not believe p, I have a temporal part, S (let's allow that S is virtually instantaneous)that believes p. Given four-dimensionalism, I believe p because S does; I think what it thinks. Consider S again. It thinks this thought: There exists an x such that x is a four dimensional space-time worm lasting for decades and I = x. This is false; by hypothesis S is an instantaneous object, entirely present at the moment it exists. Consequently four-dimensionalism is self refuting if it applies to me. For if four-dimensionalism is correct, what I think is true. But if four-dimensionalism is true, I think the false thought S does. In short, four-dimensionalism entails that I am and am not made of temporal parts. Here is the nub of the difficulty. Given fourdimensionalism, I think p truly. I am a person if I exist at all, as persons can consider themselves as themselves, they can use the personal pronoun to denote themselves in thinking such thoughts, and persons are indeed identical to space-time worms. According to four-dimensionalism, to say I have the property of thinking p is to say S has that property. Indeed, S is all there is to me at the time I think p. As nothing else is available to do any thinking, if S doesn't think p, I don't either. But S can't think p truly. Given four-dimensionalism, therefore, what I think is true, what S thinks is false, but what I think = what S thinks.

Antony Eagle has critiqued my attempt to prove that counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism are incompatible. 1 Let me explain why I'm unpersuaded. I began my paper by considering two scenarios. In I, God creates ex nihilo a bronze unicorn-statue; later he annihilates it. The statue and the bronze occupy the same space for their entire career. If God had recast the bronze as a mermaid, the piece of bronze, not the statue, would have survived. As nothing has and lacks the capacity to survive the same change, they are distinct. How can two material objects coincide ever, not to mention for their whole career? Counterpart Theory (CT) offers a solution, one that four-dimensionalists often embrace. The statue and the piece of bronze are the same fourdimensional object. The statue cannot survive being recast as a mermaid, the bronze can. According to CT, the first claim is true because no statuecounterpart of the statue is mermaid shaped, the second because the bronze has a mermaid-shaped bronze counterpart. Counterpart relations are similarity relations. As one thing can have resemblance relations to different sets of things, depending on which of its features we emphasize, the fact that the bronze can, but the statue cannot, survive the same change does not entail they are distinct. There is one space-time worm, A, lasting from t1 to t10; the statue and the bronze are identical to A, which has different counterpart relations depending upon which of its features we emphasize.

IN HIS Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces the notion of a 'family resemblance' to deal with certain problems. Talking of games and what they seem to have in common, he points out that there are no common features (or no common feature) in ...