Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften

Migrationsbewegungen irritieren die mit symbolischen, strukturellen, rechtlichen sowie territorialen Grenzen verbundenen und von diesen hervorgebrachten Zugehorigkeitsordnungen. Aus diesem Grund sind Krisendiskurse Kennzeichen migrationsgesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit. Ein empirisch wirksamer migrationsgesellschaftlicher Krisendiskurs greift auf den Topos der Bedrohung zuruck. Der Bedrohungsdiskurs ist kennzeichnend fur offentliche Verhandlungen von Migration, weil in diesem die Gefahrdung der vorherrschenden Zugehorigkeitsordnung plausibel gemacht und gleichzeitig regulative Krisenlosungsverfahren auf den Weg gebracht werden konnen. Dort, wo sich Krisendeutungen etwa mit Hilfe von bedrohungsinszenierungen herauspragen, werden Zugehorigkeitsordnungen durchgesetzt. Border, Movement, Disquiet. Migration Research in the Framework of Belonging Theory Migration movements disquiet the orders of belonging associated with and generated by symbolic, structural, legal and territorial borders....

The Gülen Movement, a global network and religious community revolving the Turkish Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, has become a topic of political discourses in worldwide media since the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. Earlier, it was particularly known for its worldwide education activities. The article discusses first results of a reconstructive analysis of practices and biographies in a context of a weekly religious sohbet (conversation circle) for male university students within the DFG-financed project Pedagogy of the 'Gülen Movement' (2016-2019). The Islamic culture of education inside the sohbet can be understood in the context of ongoing educational inequalities of Turkish-Muslim students in the German migration-society. Against this background, in Germany, Gülen Movement's idea of education hizmet comes along with certain religious practices and subjectifications, which aim to enable young Turkish Muslims taking a recognised standing in society.

Babbage wrote two relatively detailed, yet significantly incongruous, autobiographical accounts of his pre-Cambridge and Cambridge days. He published one in 1864 and in it advertised the existence of the other, which he carefully retained in manuscript form. The aim of this paper is to chart in some detail for the first time the discrepancies between the two accounts, to compare and assess their relative credibility, and to explain their Author’s possible reasons for knowingly fabricating the less credible of the two.

This article suggests a Davidsonian argument for a unique and overlooked metanormative package:l the Davidsonian theory of meaning, we argue, strongly suggests that, although normative discourse is fully factual (i.e., normative claims are truth-apt) in one important sense of the term "realism," normative realism is false and the position we dub "Irrealism" is true. "Realism" is the view that a t least one of two conflicting conceptions of the good life is false. "Irrealism" (not to be identified with a denial of realism) is the claim that, if they are internally coherent, conflicting normative outlooks both are true. We shall deduce Irrealism from an attractive version of the Davidsonian theory of meaning.

menachem fisch from the more subtle idea of one book holding the key to the other. 4 For the early reformers the two books metaphor was rendered a powerful and suggestive analogy between the way the two texts were conceived. As Kenneth Howell nicely puts it, Harrison reversed the common view that the new sciences provoked new interpretations of the Bible, maintaining that sixteenth-century people "found themselves forced to jettison traditional conceptions of the world" when they "began to read the Bible in a different way." 5 Reading Scripture became the model, rather than the key, for studying nature, bestowing upon science much of the new urgency, enthusiasm, and promise it was enjoying. This explains the impact of the Reformation on the rise of natural science. But Harrison's most novel and important claim is that the early reformers' attitude to the Bible not only motivated the early modern turn toward nature, but inspired an importantly new conception of nature. By insisting that the Bible's message resided in the plain, literal meaning of the text, the reformers were forced to empty the biblical text of all manner of symbolical, metaphorical and allegorical meaning. And by analogy, so was nature. By virtue of its new understanding of two books metaphor, argues Harrison, Protestantism was responsible for rendering nature, for the first time, purely factual.

Science studies the world, but does not include itself in it. The task of systematically studying science falls to the humanities. The problem is that philosophers who take recent developments in philosophy seriously are forced to deny any credence to the self-image of science as a steadily progressive, self-critical enterprise, while philosophers who take what scientists do and feel more seriously, are forced to ignore some of the most profound latter-day findings of philosophy. What makes this issue highly relevant in the present context, is that at its heart it is a dispute about language.This paper explores the possibility not of adjudicating this dispute, but of somehow bridging it. What it asks and proposes to answer positively is whether it is possible to remain committed to both horns of the dilemma: to salvage a philosophically viable account of science as a self-critical enterprise, without having to breach the latter-day philosophical framework that would seem to deem this impossible.

The gravest challenge to orthodox Judaism is not that of coexisting peacefully with communities whose forms of life it considers religiously objectionable but that of taking responsibility for the management of such peaceful coexistence. Government is required not merely to turn a blind eye to the conduct of such communities but to take active responsibility for their security, well-being and capacity to flourish according to their custom and conviction. This sort of active enabling is forbidden by Jewish Law as it now stands. Is the Jewish legal tradition capable in principle of grounding a genuinely liberal yet non-relativistic pluralism? This paper explores a way of answering this crucial question in the affirmative.

The paper argues that identifying rational action with action undertaken for a reason yields Popper's well-known identification of rationality with criticism. However, it is also shown, pace Popper, to yield a strong form of normative framework dependency of the kind critical rationalists notoriously reject. But deeming rationality to be framework dependent, it argues further, raises the particularly exasperating problem of the very possibility of rational framework replacement. If the normative framework to which one is committed is presupposed in critical reasoning, how can one ever have normative reason to replace it? The first part of the paper briefly discusses the problem and some of the attempts to solve it, while arguing for an alternative approach. The second part, explores some of the consequences of adopting such an approach first for the historiography of scientific framework transitions, and finally for the theology of inter and intra-religious dialogue, with special reference to what might be termed the confrontational theology of the rabbinic literature of late antiquity.

Moshe Halbertal's close reading of Mishna and Tosefta Eduyot reveals a fundamental disagreement between the two texts as to the aim and the function of canonizing disputes. According to the Mishna, rejected minority opinions are canonically preserved for the benefit of future, inappropriately qualified courts who may see fit to revive them. According to the Tosefta's very different view, rejected opinion is recorded to ensure that it is remembered as such and never revived. According to the Mishna, it is the minority voices themselves that the canon seeks to preserve for future reference; according to the Tosefta, it is an unambiguous record of their rejection. The Mishna, as Halbertal puts it, thus envisages itself as "a flexible code which preserves minority opinion for a future recall against its own ruling". The Tosefta, by contrast, sees it as "a closed code which preserves the minority opinion in order to freeze the rejection forever." 1