THE THING ITSELF. A NEW DEFENCE OF KANTIANISM
2025
Sign up for access to the world's latest research
Abstract
In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux presents some objections against Kant's transcendental idealism that have been especially developed in the field of so-called "speculative realism". This article examines one of these objections. It is the objection according to which an access to things themselves is possible. For Meillassoux, the case of the "arche-fossils" is the proof that some sciences produce knowledge about things. The aim of this paper is to show that what the arche-fossil refers to corresponds, strictly speaking, to the realm of the objects of experience possible for us. In this way, according to our interpretation, the objection does not succeed in attacking the difference between the objects of knowledge and things themselves, which is the core of Kant's transcendental idealism.
Related papers
1978
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate Erich Adickes' view of the problem of the existence of the thing-in-itself and of the question of whether or not some of the categorial concepts, including that of existence, apply to the things-in-themselves in Kant's philosophy. In chapter one I dealt with the·former of these two questions and I concluded, in agreement tvith Adickes, that Kant held the view that the things-in-themselves do exist in some sense of the term 'to be'. In chapter two I came to the tentative conclusion, this time disagreeing with Adickes, that the categories were not meant by Kant to apply to the in-itself. In the third chapter I briefly discussed George Schrader's views of the above outlined problems as well as some other possible alternate accounts of the matter at hand.
Open Philosophy, 2018
In the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the term object has an extensive and far-reaching significance, and it can therefore be understood as a theory of objects. This becomes particularly clear when it is observed that all of his guidelines can be traced to different concepts of objects and their combination. With his concept of the object of experience, he attempts to mediate incompatible aspects in this: in relation to the object of experience, we have apodictic claims but at the same time our knowledge of the object develops and contains the possibility of historical progress. This theory of objects was elaborated by Kant with regard to natural science and the claim of its metaphysical foundation. For this reason, Kant’s concept of object is inherently linked with his concept of science. Astronomy is at the core of his investigation, because it represents a perfect example of a so-called proper and rational natural science.
In this paper I present a new solution to the so-called ‚neglected alternative'-objection against Kant's argument for transcendental idealism. According to this objection, Kant does not give sufficient justification for his claim that not only are space and time forms of our intuition but that they also fail to be things in themselves or properties thereof. I first discuss a proposal by Willaschek and Allais, who try to defend Kant against this charge by building on his account of a priori intuition, and argue that it is insufficient in order to meet the objection in its full force. I then present my own solution to the problem. It is based on a reconstruction of Kant's account of properties of appearances and tries to show that this account implies that spatio-temporal properties could in principle not pertain both to appearances and to things in themselves.
dialectica, 1981
The paper discusses major issues concerning the A104-10 transcendental-object theory. For that theory, our de re knowledge becomes related to its object just because our understanding (using the concept of a transcendental object) thinks a certain object to stand related to the intuition via which we know. Employing an apparatus of intensional logic, I argue that this thought of an object is to be understood as a certain sort of intuition-related, de dicto thought. Then I explore how, via such a de dicto thought, we can nevertheless achieve de re knowledge. This question involves an important Kantian reduction of de re to de dicto outer-object thinking, which I consider. Finally, I investigate some further topics about the transcendental object. I endeavor to show, throughout, that Kant's theory of that object is crucially related to matters of intensionality. Rksume Cet article discute les problkmes principaux soulevks par la thkorie de I'objet transcendental A104-10. Selon cette theorie, notre connaissance de re est mise en relation avec son objet precisement parce que notre entendement (utilisant le concept d'objet transcendental) pense un certain objet comme &ant relie A l'intuition a travers laquelle nous connaissons. Employant un formal i m e de logique intensionnelle, je montre que cette pensee d'un objet doit &re comprise comme une pensee de dicto reliee a I'intuition. J'explore ensuite comment, a partir de cette pensee de dicto, nous pouvons neanmoins atteindre une connaissance de re. J'examine la manikre dont Kant reduit ainsi la pensee d'un objet exterieur du de re au de dicto. Finalement, j'explore quelques autres points concernant I'objet transcendental. Dans tout I'article je montre combien la theorie kantienne de I'objet transcendental est fondamentalement relike d I'intensionalite (au sens logiw e). Zusammenfassung Der Aufsatz hehandelt wichtige Themen, die die in A104-10 formulierte Theorie des transzendentalen Gegenstandes betreffen. Dieser Theorie nach bezieht sich unsere de re Erkenntnis auf ihren Gegenstand eben deshalh, weil unser Verstand, indem er den Begriff eines transzendentalen Gegenstandes verwendet, denkt, dass ein gewisser Gegenstand in Beziehung zur Anschauung steht, * The research underlying this paper was supported in part by an American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship, by the SUNY Research Foundation, and by a National Endowment for the Humanities summer stipend. I thank these organizations for their help. My work has benefitted from the reactions of the audience at the IVth. International Colloquium at Magglingen, May 1-4, 1980, and from subsequent comments of the audience at the University of Bielefeld.
I make a critical exposition of Kant’s transcendental idealism and empirical realism about space and time: I see that while transcendental idealism, to Kant, warrants his distinction between mere appearances (mere presentations) and things-in-themselves pertaining to external objects, it necessitates empirical realism which demarcates it from the other ‘metaphysically erroneous’ versions of idealism. I argue that Kant’s distinction between these two “doctrinal systems” – or rather, the correlation between the two – serves to defend his conception of objectivity (of perceptual experiences and of judgments) as that which arises from subjectivity. Such relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, in turn, defends his contention of synthetic a priority, the possibility of which determines the plausibility of metaphysics as a science of pure reason. Furthermore, I argue that Kant’s treatment of objectivity goes against the Lockean construal of “secondary qualities” as the ‘powers of objects’; rather, to Kant, the cognitive powers lie in us. (Content word count 1,624)
2007
The paper presents one of the sources of the incoherence objection to Kant’s transcendental idealism, i.e. the problem of “affection” between the “transcendental ground” and mental representations. It is divided into two sections: in the first the historical context of the problem is sketched; in the second two contemporary solutions to the problem are suggested. The latter include N. Rescher’s “conceptual idealist” interpretation, which postulates a logical (rational) relation between representational content and its “ground”, and A. Brook’s cognitivist explanation, which appeals to a materialist hypothesis that makes use of a kind of correlation between the mental and the physical. The conclusion grants both stances considerable plausibility, admitting that, as often is the case, Kant’s way of posing questions here too leads to contradictory answers. It seems that the options suggested cannot be reconciled: one has to choose between the presence of metaphysics in Kant’s critical p...
The Being of Negation in Post-Kantian Philosophy, 2022
An accurate framework for interpreting Kant’s theory of knowledge must clearly distinguish between the six terms he uses to describe the various stages in the epistemological development of the ‘object’ of knowledge. Kant portrays the object transcendentally in the first Critique as passing from an unknowable ‘thing in itself’ through the intermediate stage of being a ‘transcendental object’, and finally attaining the ideal status of an ‘appearance’. When the object is considered empirically, it passes through three corresponding stages: the ‘phenomenon’ is the real object as known in experience, the ‘negative noumenon’ limits our knowledge to its intuitive manifestation, and the ‘positive noumenon’ is that aspect of the known object which remains ultimately transcendent.
2018
In this thesis I develop both immanent and extrinsic critiques of Meillassoux’s argument, principally as it is developed and articulated in his book After Finitude. Meillassoux’s ambitious project is assessed in detail. While I concede that the anti-realism developed in the shadow of Kant’s legacy has a produced a profound rift between philosophical and scientific discourse, I contend that Meillassoux’s argument tacitly conflates epistemology with ontology. Most pressing, however, is that his central argument is predicated on a misreading of Kant’s idealism. I defend the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s idealism over the traditional metaphysical reading, and argue that Kant’s transcendental idealism and his empirical realism not only accommodates the ‘literal’ truth of ancestral claims but also demonstrates that what counts as real depends on an intuitive-epistemic framework: a standpoint. Moreover, I demonstrate that Meillassoux’s argument is predicated on, and permeated by...

Loading Preview
Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.
References (7)
- ■ References Caimi, M. (2005). Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer. Kant-Studien 96, 135-146.
- -, (2012). The logical structure of time ac- cording to the chapter on Schematism. Kant-Studien 103, 415-428.
- Jaúregui, C. (2008). Sentido interno y sub- jetividad: un análisis del problema del auto-conocimiento en la filosofía trascen- dental de Kant. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
- Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meillassoux, Q. (2008) After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Trad. Ray Brassier. New York: Continuum.
- Prauss, G. (1971) Erscheinung bei Kant. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin. Laura Pelegrin Universidad Diego Portales Cucha Cucha 2696, Buenos Aires, Argentina. lauraalejandrapelegrin@gmail.com Luciana Martínez Universidad de Buenos Aires luciana.mtnz@gmail.com
- Artículo recibido: 17 de junio de 2024 Artículo aprobado: 10 de septiembre de 2024