Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Outline

THE THING ITSELF. A NEW DEFENCE OF KANTIANISM

2025

Abstract

In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux presents some objections against Kant's transcendental idealism that have been especially developed in the field of so-called "speculative realism". This article examines one of these objections. It is the objection according to which an access to things themselves is possible. For Meillassoux, the case of the "arche-fossils" is the proof that some sciences produce knowledge about things. The aim of this paper is to show that what the arche-fossil refers to corresponds, strictly speaking, to the realm of the objects of experience possible for us. In this way, according to our interpretation, the objection does not succeed in attacking the difference between the objects of knowledge and things themselves, which is the core of Kant's transcendental idealism.

References (7)

  1. ■ References Caimi, M. (2005). Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer. Kant-Studien 96, 135-146.
  2. -, (2012). The logical structure of time ac- cording to the chapter on Schematism. Kant-Studien 103, 415-428.
  3. Jaúregui, C. (2008). Sentido interno y sub- jetividad: un análisis del problema del auto-conocimiento en la filosofía trascen- dental de Kant. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
  4. Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  5. Meillassoux, Q. (2008) After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Trad. Ray Brassier. New York: Continuum.
  6. Prauss, G. (1971) Erscheinung bei Kant. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin. Laura Pelegrin Universidad Diego Portales Cucha Cucha 2696, Buenos Aires, Argentina. lauraalejandrapelegrin@gmail.com Luciana Martínez Universidad de Buenos Aires luciana.mtnz@gmail.com
  7. Artículo recibido: 17 de junio de 2024 Artículo aprobado: 10 de septiembre de 2024