Journal articles by Tobias Hoffmann
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, 2024
Ce numéro spécial réunit des articles dont une première version a été présentée au XVe Congrès In... more Ce numéro spécial réunit des articles dont une première version a été présentée au XVe Congrès International de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.) sur le thème « La pensée radicale au Moyen Âge », Paris-Aubervilliers, Campus Condorcet, 22-26 août 2022. Sous l’égide du Centre Pierre Abélard de Sorbonne Université, nous avions organisé des séances intitulées « À la racine de la connaissance, du vouloir et de l’agir ».
Some medieval authors defend free choice by arguing that, even though human choices are indeed ca... more Some medieval authors defend free choice by arguing that, even though human choices are indeed caused by the practical judgment about what is best to do here and now, the individual is nevertheless able to freely influence that practical judgment’s formation. This paper examines Peter Auriol’s account of free choice, which is a quite elaborate version of this approach and which brings its theoretical problems into focus. I will argue in favor of Auriol’s basic theory, but I will also propose an emendation to his theory in order to respond to some problems he leaves unresolved.
Are there subjective or objective conditions under which human life is not worth living? Or does ... more Are there subjective or objective conditions under which human life is not worth living? Or does human life itself contain the conditions that make it worth living? To find answers to these questions, this paper explores Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Mediavilla, and John Duns Scotus, who discuss whether the damned in hell can, should, and do prefer non-existence over their existence in pain and moral evil. In light of Aristotle’s teaching that there is a certain pleasure inherent to life itself, I shall argue that even a life that is in important respects painful and unpleasant is still worth living.
The paper is open access; see URL below the title line.
his article studies Duns Scotus’s account of freedom in its metaphysical, psychological, and mora... more his article studies Duns Scotus’s account of freedom in its metaphysical, psychological, and moral dimensions. The metaphysical characteristic of freedom is that it springs from the indeterminate will rather than from a “natural power,” which for Scotus is a power that acts deterministically. The psychological basis of freedom consists in the fact that the act of will is not caused by the desired object, but primarily by the will itself. The moral dimension of freedom lies in the fact that the will is free to act for motives other than the individual’s own happiness. In all three dimensions, freedom transcends nature; hence Scotus’s account of freedom can be called anti-naturalistic.
This article studies Walter Chatton's account of the connection of the virtues and its relation t... more This article studies Walter Chatton's account of the connection of the virtues and its relation to the teaching of Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. Chatton's position with regard to the connection of temperance, fortitude, and justice is influenced by Henry and yet importantly different from him. Chatton's teaching on the connection between prudence and the moral virtues closely follows Scotus's view. Both Franciscans frame this problem in terms of the connection between intellect and will. They both deny that having prudence implies possessing the moral virtues on account of the freedom of the will. Furthermore, they deny that prudence presupposes the moral virtues, because they consider it impossible that the will induce the intellect to err.
The article studies the reception of Aristotle’s treatments of voluntariness and decision (EN 3.1... more The article studies the reception of Aristotle’s treatments of voluntariness and decision (EN 3.1–5) in the first three Latin commentaries (two by Albert the Great, one by Thomas Aquinas) that are based on the integral text of the Nicomachean Ethics. In particular, my goal is to examine how Albert’s and Thomas’s non-Aristotelian concepts of the will as a faculty distinct from reason influences their explanations of the Aristotelian account. It is argued that the Dominican commentators emphasize the idea of freedom more than Aristotle did.
I study different medieval explanations of moral goodness in relation to its main principles, i.e... more I study different medieval explanations of moral goodness in relation to its main principles, i.e., the end of the agent and the object of the action. Special focus lies on Thomas Aquinas who considers the end (that which is willed) to be not only the 'origin' of moral goodness, but also its main 'criterion'. Peter Abelard, whose ethics I argue not to be subjectivist, had developed a similar theory, though the vocabulary he uses is not yet very refined. By contrast, for Albert and Duns Scotus the end is accidental to the moral act.
The distinction of active potencies into will and nature is one of the most characteristic traits... more The distinction of active potencies into will and nature is one of the most characteristic traits of Duns Scotus’s thought. Scotus distinguishes free and self-determining causality from natural and necessary causality. In this article I show how this distinction underlies large parts of his moral psychology, ethics, metaphysics, and Trinitarian theology.
Duns Scotus vigorously defends an idea foreign to Greek philosophers, namely that the individual ... more Duns Scotus vigorously defends an idea foreign to Greek philosophers, namely that the individual has a higher ontological dignity than the species. He develops this view in two contexts: the problem of the principle of individuation and the discussion of divine ideas of individuals. This article focuses on the latter, in which Scotus critiques Aquinas, whom he mistakenly interprets as denying that there are divine ideas of individuals, as well as Henry of Ghent, who repeatedly rejects this hypothesis. In connection with the claim that God has distinct ideas for each individual, Scotus argues that the intentio naturae concerns not merely the species, but also individuals. Contrary to Greek thought, therefore, Scotus holds that the purpose of individuals is not merely to guarantee the eternity of the species; rather, they have an intrinsic value.
Leibniz’s first essay, his dissertation on the principle of individuality, is mainly dedicated to... more Leibniz’s first essay, his dissertation on the principle of individuality, is mainly dedicated to a critique of Duns Scotus’s explanation of individuation. Leibniz’s critique of Scotus and the historical antecedents of the German philosopher’s position have not been studied before. The paper examines Scotus’s and Leibniz’s views on individuation and sheds some light on the doctrinal genealogy that leads up to Leibniz’s position. I argue that Leibniz’s view and his critique of Scotus depend upon William of Ockham and Francis Suárez. Ockham, Suárez, and Leibniz posit that individuals are such by themselves or by their entire entity, rather than by an entity that is only a part of their being (as Scotus’s ‘haecceity’). Furthermore, all three take issue with Scotus’s view for the same reason, i.e. because they reject the formal distinction, a key assumption in Scotus’s account of individuation.
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Journal articles by Tobias Hoffmann
The paper is open access; see URL below the title line.