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Alan Rhoda

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Papers by Alan Rhoda

The Problem of Induction: An Epistemological and Methodological Response Summary

My dissertation concerns the problem of induction, or rather, two related problems of induction. ... more My dissertation concerns the problem of induction, or rather, two related problems of induction. The first is what I call the negative problem of induction. This is the problem of rebutting the skeptical argument, first articulated by Hume, which purports to show that inductive inferences cannot in principle result in epistemically justified beliefs. A solution to this problem, i.e., a negative justification of induction, merely shows that the skeptical conclusion can be plausibly denied, specifically, that it is possible that induction results in epistemically justified beliefs. It does not show that this is probable, or that it is reasonable to rely on induction as a source of epistemically justified beliefs. This is the second or positive problem of induction. In this dissertation I develop solutions to both of these problems. In what follows, I briefly summarize each chapter and then say a few words about the philosophical significance of my results. Chapter 1: The Problem of In...

IS an Open Infinite Future Impossible? A Reply to Pruss

Faith and Philosophy, 2020

Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should r... more Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle certain statements about infinite futures in a mathematically or religiously adequate manner. We argue that, once the distinction between being true and becoming true is applied to such statements, it is evident that they pose no problem for Open Futurists.

Omniscience , and the Nature of the Future

If the future is settled in the sense that it is exhaustively and truly describable in terms of w... more If the future is settled in the sense that it is exhaustively and truly describable in terms of what either will or will not obtain, then divine omniscience (the thesis that God knows all and only truths) entails exhaustively definite foreknowledge. Conversely, if the future is open in the sense that a complete, true description of it must include reference to what might and might not obtain, then divine omniscience entails open theism and the denial of exhaustively definite foreknowledge. The nature of the future is, therefore, a key issue in the open theism debate. In this paper, we develop two arguments in support of a central claim of the open future view and critically respond to several arguments in favor of the settled future view. A key issue in the ongoing debate between defenders of exhaustively definite foreknowledge and open theists is a dispute about the nature of the future. Since the former hold that God knows the future as exhaustively settled, i.e., that he knows an...

The Fivefold Openness of the Future

entities. World states, and states of affairs generally, are concrete. History, I take it, has be... more entities. World states, and states of affairs generally, are concrete. History, I take it, has been a continuous succession of world states begin8. The classic expression of this argument is Hilary Putnam, “time and Physical Geometry,” in idem, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). For an extended response, see William Lane Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2001). 9. see William Lane Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2000) and Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. 10. Verificationism is widely regarded as self-refuting. Regardless, it should be clear that the inference from the epistemological claim that we cannot experimentally identify absolute simultaneity relations to the metaphysical claim that there are no absolute simultaneity relations is a non sequitur. 11. Recent defenses of divine sempiternality include William Lane Craig, Time an...

The Problem of Induction: An Epistemological and Methodological Response

My dissertation concerns the problem of induction, or rather, two related problems of induction. ... more My dissertation concerns the problem of induction, or rather, two related problems of induction. The first is what I call the negative problem of induction. This is the problem of rebutting the skeptical argument, first articulated by Hume, which purports to show that inductive inferences cannot in principle result in epistemically justified beliefs. A solution to this problem, i.e., a negative justification of induction, merely shows that the skeptical conclusion can be plausibly denied, specifically, that it is possible that induction results in epistemically justified beliefs. It does not show that this is probable, or that it is reasonable to rely on induction as a source of epistemically justified beliefs. This is the second or positive problem of induction. In this dissertation I develop solutions to both of these problems. In what follows, I briefly summarize each chapter and then say a few words about the philosophical significance of my results. Chapter 1: The Problem of Induction A successful response to the negative problem of induction must show either (a) that the skeptical argument is invalid, or (b) that it is unsound, i.e., that it relies on some premise that we can plausibly reject. In chapter one I outline the skeptical argument in such a way that it is both valid and, apparently at least, sound. I do not think it is sound, but it is important to pose a problem as forcefully as possible before attempting to solve it, lest one succeed only in knocking down a straw man. Indeed, if the skeptical argument did not seem at least prima facie sound to a great many people, including many of the learned, then there wouldn't be a philosophical problem of induction, for if any of the premises were obviously false then we could avoid the

Theism and Other Models of Divine Providence

J. Diller and A. Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, DOI 10.1007/978... more J. Diller and A. Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5219-1_24, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Among the many models of God now competing in the marketplace of ideas is a view that has come to be known as ‘open theism’. 1 The view itself is not new, 2 but until very recently it was off the radar of most philosophers of religion. Things changed dramatically in 1994 with the publication of The Openness of God , 3 a book which ignited a fi restorm of controversy among evangelical Christians. 4 Open theism has since been embraced by a sizable and growing minority of theistic philosophers and is now recognized as a major player in philosophical discussions of the nature of God and of divine providence. The main goal of this paper is to situate open theism in conceptual space by explaining its core commitments and distinguishing it from its primary competitors. While most of the popular discussion of open theism has bee...

Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer, eds. Skeptical Theism: New Essays

Journal of Analytic Theology

Bootstrapping Divine Foreknowledge? Comments on Fischer

Science, Religion and Culture

Problems of evil and the power of God

Choice Reviews Online

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving... more This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

Open Theism and Other Models of Divine Providence

Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, 2012

In this paper I define ‘open theism’ as a version of ‘broadly classical theism’ distinguished by ... more In this paper I define ‘open theism’ as a version of ‘broadly classical theism’ distinguished by commitment to a causally, epistemically, and providentially open future. After clarifying open theism, I then compare and contrast the open theistic model of divine providence with its chief competitors: theological determinism, Molinism, and process theism.

Generic open theism and some varieties thereof

Religious Studies, 2008

The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First... more The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional commitments. The result is a characterization of ‘generic open theism’, the minimal set of commitments that any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm. Second, within the framework of generic open theism, I distinguish three important variants and discuss challenges distinctive to each. The significance of this approach is that it helps avoid conflating arguments bearing on specific versions of open theism with arguments pertaining to open theism simpliciter.

The Philosophical Case for Open Theism

Philosophia, 2007

The goal of this paper is to defend open theism vis-à-vis its main competitors within the family ... more The goal of this paper is to defend open theism vis-à-vis its main competitors within the family of broadly classical theisms, namely, theological determinism and the various forms of non-open free-will theism, such as Molinism and Ockhamism. After isolating two core theses over which open theists and their opponents differ, I argue for the open theist position on both points. Specifically, I argue against theological determinists that there are future contingents. And I argue against non-open free-will theists that future contingency is incompatible with the future's being epistemically settled for God. This paper is a follow-up to the author's Rhoda (Religious Studies, 2008) which was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. Keywords Open theism. Free-will theism. Theological determinism. Arthur Prior Given all the forms of theism out there, why be an 'open theist'? Indeed, why be a theist of any sort? These are both good questions but too broad to be manageable in a paper of this size. To make my job easier I'm going to assume that some version of theism is correct. Even more restrictively, I'm going to assume that some version of broadly classical theism is correct. By 'broadly classical theism' (hereafter 'theism') I mean the view that God is a personal being who exists necessarily, 1 who possesses a maximal set of compossible great-making properties, including maximal power, knowledge, and goodness, and who created the world ex nihilo 2 and can unilaterally intervene in it as he pleases. 3 Within these constraints, I want to argue for open

Presentism, Truthmakers, and God

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2009

Page 1. PRESENTISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND GOD by ALAN R. RHODA Abstract: The truthmaker objection to p... more

In Defense of Weak Inferential Internalism

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2012

Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of Inference

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2008

I argue that Richard Fumerton's controversial "Principle of Inferential Justification" (PIJ) can ... more I argue that Richard Fumerton's controversial "Principle of Inferential Justification" (PIJ) can be satisfactorily defended against several charges that have been leveled against it, namely, that it leads to skepticism, that it confuses different levels of justification, and that it involves a fallacy of 'misconditionalization'. The basis of my defense of PIJ is a distinction between two theories of the nature of inference-an internalist conception (IC), according to which inferring requires that the reasoner have a conscious perspective on the evidential relation between premises and conclusion, and an externalist conception (EC), which does not require any such perspective. Given IC, the above charges against PIJ fail and PIJ emerges as a plausible thesis. Given EC, however, the above charges stick and PIJ is untenable. An internalist position on inferential justification is tenable, therefore, if and only if it is held in conjunction with an internalist conception of inference.

Peirce and Lonergan on Inquiry and the Pragmatics of Inference

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2011

Drawing on the work of Charles Peirce and Bernard Lonergan, I argue (1) that inferences are essen... more Drawing on the work of Charles Peirce and Bernard Lonergan, I argue (1) that inferences are essentially related to a process of inquiry, (2) that there is a normative pattern to this process, one in which each of Peirce's three distinct types of inferenceabductive, deductive, and inductive-plays a distinct cognitive role, and (3) that each type of inference answers a distinct type of question and thereby resolves a distinct kind of interrogative intentionality. 1

Bayes’s Theorem

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2005

Probability, Truth, and the Openness of the Future

Faith and Philosophy, 2010

Alexander Pruss's recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. Contra Pruss, the... more Alexander Pruss's recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. Contra Pruss, there is no conflict between OF, which holds that there are no true future contingent propositions (FCPs), and the high credence we place in some FCPs. When due attention is paid to the semantics of FCPs, to the relation of epistemic to objective probabilities, and to the distinction between truth simpliciter and truth at a time, it becomes clear that what we have good reason for believing is not that some FCPs are true, but rather that some FCPs have a good chance of becoming true.

Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future

Faith and Philosophy, 2006

If the future is settled in the sense that it is exhaustively and truly describable in terms of w... more If the future is settled in the sense that it is exhaustively and truly describable in terms of what either will or will not obtain, then divine omniscience (the thesis that God knows all and only truths) entails exhaustively definite foreknowledge. Conversely, if the future is open in the sense that a complete, true description of it must include reference to what might and might not obtain, then divine omniscience entails open theism and the denial of exhaustively definite foreknowledge. The nature of the future is, therefore, a key issue in the open theism debate. In this paper, we develop two arguments in support of a central claim of the open future view and critically respond to several arguments in favor of the settled future view.

Problems of Evil and the Power of God

Ars Disputandi: the Online Journal for Philosophy of …