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Outline

Generic open theism and some varieties thereof

2008, Religious Studies

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412508009438

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional commitments. The result is a characterization of ‘generic open theism’, the minimal set of commitments that any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm. Second, within the framework of generic open theism, I distinguish three important variants and discuss challenges distinctive to each. The significance of this approach is that it helps avoid conflating arguments bearing on specific versions of open theism with arguments pertaining to open theism simpliciter.

References (11)

  1. Presentism is the view that only what exists now has any reality.
  2. knows, such as God's own unilateral decisions and the inevitable consequences of present causes. See, e.g. Pinnock et al. Openness of God, 51.
  3. Prior develops the ' Ockhamist '/' Peircean ' tense logic distinction in Arthur Prior ' The formalities of omniscience ', in Per Hasle et al. (eds) Papers on Time and Tense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 39-58.
  4. Ibid., 52 : ' nothing can be truly said to be ''going-to-happen '' … until it is so '' present in its causes '' as to be beyond stopping. ' In a similar fashion, many presentists will say that what can be truly said to have happened is ' present in its effects '. I apply Peircean semantics to truths about the future in Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt ' Open theism, omniscience, and the nature of the future '. I apply it to truths about the past in Alan Rhoda, ' Presentism, truthmakers, and God ' (currently unpublished).
  5. J. R. Lucas The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1989).
  6. A good overview of the controversies surrounding multi-valued logics can be found in Susan Haack Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic : Beyond the Formalism, 2nd edn (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
  7. Richmond Thomason ' Indeterminist time and truth-value gaps ', Theoria, 36 (1970), 265-281.
  8. Boyd's most explicit endorsement of this view occurs in Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt ' Open theism, omniscience, and the nature of the future '.
  9. For a clear presentation of this challenge, see Alfred J. Freddoso ' Introduction ', in Luis de Molina On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, tr. Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca NY : Cornell University Press, 1988), 71-72.
  10. See Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt ' Open theism, omniscience, and the nature of the future ' for a development and defence of two independent arguments for the thesis that pairs of corresponding ' will ' and ' will-not ' propositions are contraries. Both arguments stem from Prior's rejection of ' Ockhamist ' tense logic in Prior ' The formalities of omniscience', 49.
  11. Special thanks are due to Thomas G. Belt and an anonymous referee for this journal for constructive feedback on an earlier version of this paper.