Papers by Cintia Quiliconi
Regional and International Cooperation in South America After COVID
Routledge eBooks, Jun 9, 2022
South American Cooperation
Routledge eBooks, Jun 9, 2022
Revista uruguaya de ciencia política, Jul 1, 2019
Seattle: ¿crónica de un fracaso?
United Nations University Series on Regionalism, 2016
Power shifts are the bread and butter of International Relations whether they are feared or given... more Power shifts are the bread and butter of International Relations whether they are feared or given a welcome. The rise of countries with more assertive positions (another staple in International Relations) poses a challenge to the given world order. When Goldman Sachs put together the BRICs family comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2001 it looked too farfetched to be taken seriously. Brazil was barely out of a crisis, China was about to round off its accession to the World Trade Organization. Moreover, there was hardly any cohesion in the grouping. But as the years passed and the economic data, especially record high growth rates, began to flow in, the idea that the future global order would not solely be dominated by the West, gained traction. Both in the welcoming or the fearing camps many became convinced that the world was in the midst of a global process of power realignment. The hub of the international order that had for centuries revolved around the North Atlantic was moving-either towards the Pacific or more generally towards something dismissively defined as the 'rest' by the influential columnist, Fareed Zakaria. A power shift was in the making. This was further reinforced when the financial crisis broke out in late 2008 and the BRICS continued to
The main focus of this paper is the question if the success of regional integration organisation ... more The main focus of this paper is the question if the success of regional integration organisation in developing countries is, in fact, dependent on factors like similarity of their economic structure, market size or lack of committment. It is shown that there are also other more important institutional and politico-economical reasons to explain the functioning of such organisations in developing countries. Case studies of ECOWAS and SADC will be used to discuss this question. It is also very often argued that southsouth integration is inferior to north-south integration. This will be discussed considering the case of MERCOSUR as an example.
South American Cooperation
Regional and International Cooperation in South America After COVID
International Development, 2014
Historically, development has not been at the core of the multilateral trade regime. The multilat... more Historically, development has not been at the core of the multilateral trade regime. The multilateral trade system did not incorporate development concerns until the Doha Development round, which paradoxically has since its launching in 2001 contained the seed of its own failure, given the focus on development it was supposed to embrace. This chapter looks at the major aspects of the trading system and its relations to development. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) evolved over time in its treatment of developing countries, changing the use of special and differential treatment (S&D). An imbalance in rule making became evident with
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, 2020
The field of IPE has traditionally being conceptualized as an Anglo Saxon construct, in this pape... more The field of IPE has traditionally being conceptualized as an Anglo Saxon construct, in this paper we argue that it is critically important to reflect on the way IPE has developed outside the mainstream, in the periphery, focusing on the case studies of Africa-in particular South Africa; Asia-in particular China; and South America, in order to start a conversation that engages with the contributions of peripheral IPE. By bringing to light the way IPE has been approached in these regions of the world we identify problems, ideas, and concerns different from those in the North and which also call attention to the necessity of a conscious reading of these works and to opening a dialogue and comparison among them. The paper explores the contributions made by IPE in Africa, Asia and South America in order to discuss the possibility of widening IPE's 'global conversation' including peripheral approaches.
Relaciones Internacionales, 2022
Licencia CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Int Resumen Este artículo tiene como objetivo contribuir a un debate rec... more Licencia CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Int Resumen Este artículo tiene como objetivo contribuir a un debate reciente para revalorizar los aportes de América Latina a la Economía Política Internacional (EPI) desde una perspectiva más amplia y plural ofrecida por la Economía Política Global (EPG). Más que una disciplina, este enfoque representa un campo de estudio donde coexisten diversas posiciones teóricas, metodológicas, epistemológicas y ontológicas con base local para el reconocimiento equitativo de las teorías y aportes generados en el Sur Global. Aunque no representa un planteamiento contrahegemónico al pensamiento occidental, la EPG cuestiona la aplicabilidad de las teorías preponderantes de la EPI al considerarlas limitadas en términos de explicación y replicabilidad para Latinoamérica.
Leaving aside their differences and the problem to categorize them as a group, there is little qu... more Leaving aside their differences and the problem to categorize them as a group, there is little question that BRICS are increasingly seen as key actors in the international system (Mansfield 2014), thus there is an important space in the international political economy debate to analyse the meaning of the rise of these countries for their regions and the international system. Systematic studies of the role of the BRICS at the global and regional levels are still scarce, however the debate has been clearly divided in two camps. On one hand, a group considers the rise of BRICS as a challenge to the current US hegemonic driven order; leading to political and economic instability. On the other hand, another group considers that the US hegemonic power is still alive given that BRICS face important domestic challenges, need to build trust in their group and many of their members are reluctant to lead in global affairs (Donno and Rudra 2014). This book addresses some of these debates openin...
Revista Uruguaya de Ciencias Políticas, 2019
El siguiente artículo analiza cómo las dinámicas de convergencia/ divergencia de ideologías polít... more El siguiente artículo analiza cómo las dinámicas de convergencia/ divergencia de ideologías políticas en América del Sur, y la presencia y apoyo de líderes regionales en agendas regionales influyeron en los niveles de cooperación en Unasur. Para este objetivo, se analizan diversos niveles de cooperación regional durante el período 2008-2015, a fin de explorar por qué la cooperación se ha profundizado en ciertos sectores en detrimento de otros. A través del análisis de dos consejos sectoriales, el artículo muestra que un contexto de convergencia ideológica es una condición necesaria pero no suficiente para mejorar la cooperación regional.
En el artículo se argumenta que la combinación entre convergencia ideológica con un fuerte liderazgo regional, que apoya la agenda del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, y la mejora del consenso entre los miembros, profundizó la cooperación. Además, la alternancia en liderar este tema por otros países como Argentina y Venezuela hizo posible la cooperación en defensa. Por el contrario, el caso del Consejo Suramericano sobre el Problema Mundial de las Drogas muestra que, aunque hubo una importante convergencia ideológica entre los miembros, esta agenda no prosperó, dado que no había líderes regionales comprometidos con la promoción del tema.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Paper, 2021
Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources... more Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results.
Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels.
This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities.
To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land.
In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016.
This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced.
This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
All Azimuth, 2020
The field of IPE has traditionally being conceptualized as an Anglo Saxon construct, in this pape... more The field of IPE has traditionally being conceptualized as an Anglo Saxon construct, in this paper we argue that it is critically important to reflect on the way IPE has developed outside the mainstream, in the periphery, focusing on the case studies of Africa-in particular South Africa; Asia-in particular China; and South America, in order to start a conversation that engages with the contributions of peripheral IPE. By bringing to light the way IPE has been approached in these regions of the world we identify problems, ideas, and concerns different from those in the North and which also call attention to the necessity of a conscious reading of these works and to opening a dialogue and comparison among them. The paper explores the contributions made by IPE in Africa, Asia and South America in order to discuss the possibility of widening IPE's 'global conversation' including peripheral approaches.
Colombia Internacional , 2020
En 2019, se celebraron los 100 años de la creación de la primera cátedra de Relaciones Internacio... more En 2019, se celebraron los 100 años de la creación de la primera cátedra de Relaciones Internacionales (RI) en Aberystwyth. Ese evento es generalmente considerado el nacimiento de la disciplina de las relaciones internacionales. Desde ese momento, su crecimiento intelectual e institucional en el mundo durante su primer siglo de existencia es innegable. Más allá del sinnúmero de programas existentes alrededor del mundo, hay una producción académica muy importante en torno a las RI con varias revistas entre las más citadas en el campo de las ciencias sociales. 1 Otro ejemplo del éxito institucional de la disciplina es la International Studies Association, que cumplió 60 años en 2019 y tiene más de 7.000 miembros en 110 países.
Análisis Fundación Carolina 23, 2019
Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 2019
220 | Ideología y liderazgo en la cooperación regional Resumen: El siguiente artículo analiza cóm... more 220 | Ideología y liderazgo en la cooperación regional Resumen: El siguiente artículo analiza cómo las dinámicas de convergencia/ divergencia de ideologías políticas en América del Sur, y la presencia y apoyo de líderes regionales en agendas regionales influyeron en los niveles de cooperación en Unasur. Para este objetivo, se analizan diversos niveles de cooperación regional durante el período 2008-2015, a fin de explorar por qué la cooperación se ha profundizado en ciertos sectores en detrimento de otros. A través del análisis de dos consejos sectoriales, el artículo muestra que un contexto de convergencia ideológica es una condición necesaria pero no suficiente para mejorar la cooperación regional.
Uploads
Papers by Cintia Quiliconi
En el artículo se argumenta que la combinación entre convergencia ideológica con un fuerte liderazgo regional, que apoya la agenda del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, y la mejora del consenso entre los miembros, profundizó la cooperación. Además, la alternancia en liderar este tema por otros países como Argentina y Venezuela hizo posible la cooperación en defensa. Por el contrario, el caso del Consejo Suramericano sobre el Problema Mundial de las Drogas muestra que, aunque hubo una importante convergencia ideológica entre los miembros, esta agenda no prosperó, dado que no había líderes regionales comprometidos con la promoción del tema.
Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels.
This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities.
To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land.
In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016.
This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced.
This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.