Papers by Franz Altner
A counterfactual account of diachronic structural rationality
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Jun 3, 2021
Philosophers who take rationality to consist in the satisfaction of rational requirements typical... more Philosophers who take rationality to consist in the satisfaction of rational requirements typically favour rational requirements that govern mental attitudes at a time rather than across times. One...
A counterfactual account of diachronic structural rationality
Inquiry
Philosophers who take rationality to consist in the satisfaction of rational requirements typical... more Philosophers who take rationality to consist in the satisfaction of rational requirements typically favour rational requirements that govern mental attitudes at a time rather than across times. One...
A counterfactual account of diachronic structural rationality
Inquiry, 2021 - Taylor & Francis, 2021
Philosophers who take rationality to consist in the satisfaction of rational requirements typical... more Philosophers who take rationality to consist in the satisfaction of rational requirements typically favour rational requirements that govern mental attitudes at a time rather than across times. One such account has been developed by Broome in Rationality through reasoning. He claims that diachronic functional properties of intentions such as settling on courses of actions and resolving conflicts are emergent properties that can be explained with reference to synchronic rational pressures. This is why he defends only a minimal diachronic requirement which characterises forgetting as irrational. In this paper, I show that Broome’s diachronically minimalist account lacks the resources to explain how a rational agent may resolve incommensurable choices by an act of will. I argue that one can solve this problem by either specifying a mode of diachronic deliberation or by introducing a genuinely diachronic requirement that governs the rational stability of an intention via a diachronic counterfactual condition concerning rational reconsideration. My proposal is similar in spirit to Gauthier’s account in his seminal paper ‘Assure and threaten’. It improves on his work by being both more general and explanatorily richer in its application with regard to diachronic phenomena such as transformative choices and acts of will.
Thesis Chapters by Franz Altner
Philosophers of group agency have argued forcefully that we should view
structured groups – with ... more Philosophers of group agency have argued forcefully that we should view
structured groups – with a hierarchy and decision mechanisms – as agents
capable of rational and moral agency. These include, but are not limited to,
corporations, universities, and states. Most theorists have maintained that
moral agency allows groups to participate in our responsibility practices that
are shaped by the reactive emotions. Part of this practice is an entrenched
care for each other’s quality of will. Consequently, these theorists must also
hold that groups are capable of a good or ill will. This dissertation argues
that despite these aspirations, most theories of group agency fall short of
providing a theory of a group or corporate will. It first surveys List and
Pettit’s prominent, functionalist theory of group agency, as well as alternative accounts. Two desiderata for any adequate model of a corporate will
are developed. The account must 1) be able to distinguish between group
activity in which the group is not in control and autonomous group action
and 2) explain why certain normative profiles and functional structures that distinguish corporations from universities and states can undermine a group’s capacity for moral agency and its capacity to manifest an
autonomous will. After arguing that List and Pettit’s theory cannot meet
these challenges, a positive proposal is developed that provides a successful
answer. It extends List and Pettit’s functionalist picture with a collective
version of David Velleman’s constitutive aim of agency: Self-Intelligibility.
As part of this proposal, a novel way of capturing a group’s practical identity
is developed that builds on the notion of constitutive rules to model social
practices. The resulting constitutive theory of group agency is able to satisfy
both desiderata and provides insights into how different types of corporate
governance of public corporations undermine and enable their capacity for
moral and autonomous agency
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Papers by Franz Altner
Thesis Chapters by Franz Altner
structured groups – with a hierarchy and decision mechanisms – as agents
capable of rational and moral agency. These include, but are not limited to,
corporations, universities, and states. Most theorists have maintained that
moral agency allows groups to participate in our responsibility practices that
are shaped by the reactive emotions. Part of this practice is an entrenched
care for each other’s quality of will. Consequently, these theorists must also
hold that groups are capable of a good or ill will. This dissertation argues
that despite these aspirations, most theories of group agency fall short of
providing a theory of a group or corporate will. It first surveys List and
Pettit’s prominent, functionalist theory of group agency, as well as alternative accounts. Two desiderata for any adequate model of a corporate will
are developed. The account must 1) be able to distinguish between group
activity in which the group is not in control and autonomous group action
and 2) explain why certain normative profiles and functional structures that distinguish corporations from universities and states can undermine a group’s capacity for moral agency and its capacity to manifest an
autonomous will. After arguing that List and Pettit’s theory cannot meet
these challenges, a positive proposal is developed that provides a successful
answer. It extends List and Pettit’s functionalist picture with a collective
version of David Velleman’s constitutive aim of agency: Self-Intelligibility.
As part of this proposal, a novel way of capturing a group’s practical identity
is developed that builds on the notion of constitutive rules to model social
practices. The resulting constitutive theory of group agency is able to satisfy
both desiderata and provides insights into how different types of corporate
governance of public corporations undermine and enable their capacity for
moral and autonomous agency