Books by François Tanguay-Renaud
Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 2012)
In the last two decades, the philosophy of criminal law has undergone a vibrant revival in Canada... more In the last two decades, the philosophy of criminal law has undergone a vibrant revival in Canada. The adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has given the Supreme Court of Canada unprecedented latitude to engage with principles of legal, moral, and political philosophy when elaborating its criminal law jurisprudence. Canadian scholars have followed suit by paying increased attention to the philosophical foundations of domestic criminal law. Because of Canada's leadership in international criminal law, both at the level of the International Criminal Court and of specific war crimes tribunals, they have also begun to turn their attention to international criminal law per se. This collection seeks to bring all these Canadian voices together for the first time, and evidence the fact that criminal law theory is no longer to be associated exclusively with the older British, German and American traditions. The topics covered include questions of philosophical methodology, the legitimate scope of domestic and international criminalization, rationales for criminal law defences in both domestic and international law, the philosophical underpinnings of specific crimes and forms of joint responsibility, as well as the theorization of criminal procedure and evidence law.
Papers by François Tanguay-Renaud
Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defence
Jeff McMahan rejects the relevance of desert to the morality of self-defense. In Killing in War h... more Jeff McMahan rejects the relevance of desert to the morality of self-defense. In Killing in War he restates his rejection and adds to his reasons. We argue that the reasons are not decisive and that the rejection calls for further attention, which we provide. Although we end up agreeing with McMahan that the limits of morally acceptable self-defense are not determined by anyone’s deserts, we try to show that deserts may have some subsidiary roles in the morality of self-defense. We suggest that recognizing this might help McMahan to answer some unanswered questions to which his own position gives rise
Discussion of Antony Duff\u27s \u27Or \u27Emet Lecture: Legal Philosophy Between State and Transnationalism
Follow-up seminar on Antony Duff’s ‘Or ‘Emet Lecture, delivered on Thursday, March 14, 2013. Part... more Follow-up seminar on Antony Duff’s ‘Or ‘Emet Lecture, delivered on Thursday, March 14, 2013. Part of the Legal Philosophy Between State and Transnationalism Seminar Series. Respondents: Michael Giudice, York Philosophy and François Tanguay-Renaud, Osgoode Hall Law School
Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law
PART I Rethinking the Philosophical Foundations of Substantive Domestic Criminal Law A. The Legit... more PART I Rethinking the Philosophical Foundations of Substantive Domestic Criminal Law A. The Legitimate Scope of Criminal Law and the Methodology of Criminal Law Theory 1. Two Conceptions of Equality before the (Criminal) Law Malcolm Thorburn 2. Individual Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law Francois Tanguay-Renaud 3. The Wrong, the Bad and the Wayward: Liberalism's Mala in Se Alan Brudner 4. Obscenity without Borders Leslie Green B. New Perspectives on Exculpation 5. Understanding the Voluntary Act Principle Andrew Botterell 6. Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal Law Benjamin L Berger 7. Responsibility, Self-respect and the Ethics of Self-pathologization Annalise Acorn 8. Excuses and Excusing Conditions Dennis Klimchuk PART II Rethinking the Philosophical Foundations of the Domestic Criminal Process 9. The Law of Evidence and the Protection of Rights Hamish Stewart 10. Packer's Blind Spot: Low Visibility Encounters and the Limits of Due Process vers...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict, 2012
What are emergencies and why do they matter? In this chapter (in its penultimate version), I seek... more What are emergencies and why do they matter? In this chapter (in its penultimate version), I seek to outline the morally significant features of the concept of emergency, and demonstrate how these features generate corresponding first-and second-order challenges and responsibilities for those in a position to do something about them. In section A, I contend that emergencies are situations in which there is a risk of serious harm and a need to react urgently if that harm is to be averted or minimized. These conceptual features matter morally, since it is precisely to them that those who invoke emergencies to justify otherwise impermissible actions tend to appeal. The basic first-order challenge facing emergency responders is twofold. It is, first, to identify how these features shape circumstances of action in ways that affect (or do not affect) which reasons for action and which corresponding courses of conduct are justifiably available to them. In situations when emergency responders are compelled to make authoritative determinations due to significant contestability and indeterminacies in the contours or materialization of the said features, their challenge is then also to make these determinations legitimately. In section B, I argue that second-order challenges having to do with the foreseeability of emergencies, the value(s) of exposure to them, and their preventability further compound the predicament of emergency responders. I conclude, in section C, by saying a few words about one last morally salient feature shared by many, though not all, emergencies considered in the chapter-namely, their public dimension.
The Constitution of the Criminal Law, 2013
Victor Tadros, and Ekow Yankah for constructive discussions, comments, and criticisms. I also tha... more Victor Tadros, and Ekow Yankah for constructive discussions, comments, and criticisms. I also thank all participants in the two workshops that led to this edited collection. l For example, in his recent book on The Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20 l O) 131, NW Barber remarks in passing chat 'A state which enters into an unjust war in a di mace of moral panic is, all ocher things being equal, less reprehensible th:u1 a state which enters into that same war whilst fully aware of its injustice'. For an argument assuming the availability of at least some excuses for domestic state wrongdoing, see T Sorell, 'Morality and Emergency' (2003) 103 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 21, 33-4. 9 Recall, for example, Hannah Arendt's writings on the acts of Adolf Eichmann: 'crimes of this kind were and could only be, committed under a criminal law and by a criminal stare'. H Arendt,
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
This is the penultimate draft of a paper initially presented in the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussi... more This is the penultimate draft of a paper initially presented in the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group and currently under review at Law and Philosophy. The paper assesses the relationship between individual emergencies and criminal law in light of the ideal of the rule of law and Joseph Raz's thesis about the normal justification of authority. After sketching out the main theoretical positions on how criminal law ought to provide for its own potential failure in the face of private emergencies, I argue that it is only in the most extreme and generalized cases that its sole legitimate response is to disclaim all competence in favour of its subjects. Whereas, in other cases (the focus of the paper), the criminal law may not be able to provide legitimate ex ante guidance, it may still be able to preserve the legitimacy of its authority. It may do so by granting some practical latitude to its subjects confronted with individual emergencies to act in accordance with morality, and by vindicating their correct responses ex post facto. The argument rests on the premise, which I defend, that morality never lapses even in the face of emergencies and that, therefore, the criminal law can always expect its subjects to abide by it. I then go on to contrast justification and excusatory defences as means of providing moral latitude to individuals facing emergencies, and conclude by refuting the assumption that people typically act irrationally when confronted with emergencies.
Philosophy of Management, 2009
In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of 'public emergency' and of some o... more In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of 'public emergency' and of some of its (supposedly) radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force. Emergencies are situations, often unforeseen, in which there is a risk of significant harm and a need to act urgently if the harm is to be averted or minimised. We encounter emergencies throughout our lives, and often allow them to shape our behaviour. Who has never sought to account for resorting to an unusual degree of force, failing to fulfil a promise, crossing a red light, or for any other sort of prima facie wrongdoing by citing an emergency? Some theorists and policy makers believe that there exists a special category of emergencies that pose distinctly greater challenges than others, and merit an independent focus. They tend to single them out as 'public emergencies'. The 'Public' Character of Emergencies: A Few Notes on Methodology Can an independent inquiry into the idea of 'public emergencies' teach us anything important about emergencies? Before entering the thick of the argument, I believe that a few methodological remarks about the use of the label 'public' are in order. First, it is important to note that the label can be misleading. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word may qualify that which 'belongs to, affects, or concerns the community or nation.' 2 In this sense, academic and policy designations of wide-scale or collectively-threatening emergencies as 'public' seem at least minimally fitting. Yet, as the editors of the OED are keen to add in a caveat: 'The varieties of sense [of the word 'public'] are numerous and pass into each other by
Legal Theory, 2010
Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extralegally in the sense of acting con... more Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extralegally in the sense of acting contrary to domestic law. This position finds its most robust articulation in the writings of Hans Kelsen and has more recently been taken up by David Dyzenhaus in the context of his work on emergencies and legality. This paper seeks to demystify their arguments and ultimately contend that we can intelligibly speak of the state as a legal wrongdoer or a legally unauthorized actor.
Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2012
When domestic criminal law theorists single out the state as a phenomenon in need of analytical e... more When domestic criminal law theorists single out the state as a phenomenon in need of analytical examination, they typically single it out as agent of criminal law. That is to say, they tend to approach it as the quintessential maker, definer, promulgator, adjudicator, and enforcer of criminal law. Their working assumption is, characteristically, that a sound account of the nature and role of the state has much to teach us about what criminal law and criminal process are, as well as what they should be. 1 Interestingly, theorists rarely ponder the possibility that the state may also be an agent of crimes, whose conduct may itself be dealt with according to the criminal process. It is now almost half a century since Hannah Arendt called for scrutiny of this possibility when she claimed that abominable crimes such as those of Adolf Eichmann could only be committed "under a criminal law and by a criminal state" (1963: 240). No doubt, this assertion is provocative. Does it even make sense to think of states as possible criminals? Insofar as it does, can it ever be legitimate to treat them as such? State policies commonly described as atrocious crimessuch "the Final Solution," apartheid, or slavery-surely invite such queries. So do all-too-frequent state-sponsored acts of aggression, terrorism, torture, mass expropriations without just compensation, murder, or rape. Besides, if other socially prominent organizations such as private corporations can be treated as criminals, as they often are, why can't states be? While a number of criminologists did heed Arendt's call and engaged
Discussion of Jeff McMahan\u27s \u27Or \u27Emet Lecture: Proportionality in Self-Defense and War
Follow-up seminar on Jeff McMahan\u27s ‘Or ‘Emet Lecture, delivered on Thursday, March 11, 2010. ... more Follow-up seminar on Jeff McMahan\u27s ‘Or ‘Emet Lecture, delivered on Thursday, March 11, 2010. Part of the Legal Philosophy Between State and Transnationalism Seminar Series. Respondents: François Tanguay-Renaud, Osgoode Hall Law School; Craig Scott, Osgoode Hall Law School
La Protection Lors De L'Arrestation, La Détention Et La Protection Contre L'Incrimination Rétroactive
… des droits et …, 1983
Biographie des auteurs et plan précèdent le texte.[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of ... more Biographie des auteurs et plan précèdent le texte.[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : Fac. Droit - Coll. facultaire - Droit constitutionnel et Libertés publiques
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
Discussion of Frederick Schauer's 'Or 'Emet Lecture: On Law and Coercion
Discussion of Christopher Kutz's 'Or 'Emet Lecture: Democratic Holy Wars
Making Sense of ‘Public’ Emergencies1
Uploads
Books by François Tanguay-Renaud
Papers by François Tanguay-Renaud