Skip to main content

San Bilal

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Trade, Investment and Finance, Faculty Member

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Economic Transformation and Trade, Faculty Member

Followers

158

Following

6

Co-authors

5

Public Views

Dr. Sanoussi Bilal is a Senior Executive and Associate Director Sustainable economies and climate action at ECDPM (NL, BE). He is an expert on development finance and economics, international trade & development, structural transformation, Europe-Africa economic relations, African integration and Ukraine reconstruction. His current activities focus on financing for development and sustainable investment, climate finance, blended finance, climate and agri-finance, and the role of public financial institutions for development. He is also a member of Finance in Common Summit (FICS)' Knowledge Advisory Group and a Coordination member of OECD-THK Blended Finance Platform, European Think Tank Group & Ukȧmȧ Africa-Europe platform for sustainable development.
Phone: +32-22374389
Address: ECDPM, 5 rue Archimède, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

less

InterestsView All (10)

Uploads

Videos by San Bilal

EFAD Talks: A conversation with Thomas Wieser on European development finance architecture

Mikaela Gavas (CGD) and San Bilal (ECDPM) sit down with Thomas Wieser, Chair of the 2019 Wise Per... more Mikaela Gavas (CGD) and San Bilal (ECDPM) sit down with Thomas Wieser, Chair of the 2019 Wise Persons Group report on the European Financial Architecture to discuss the process, politics and scenarios put forward to solve Europe’s perennial problem of fragmentation, duplication, and competition in its development finance architecture and the contest between Europe’s two multilateral banks, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as to which would be most capable of fulfilling the role of a dedicated EU development banking institution. Thomas expresses his dismay with the endorsement of the status quo and puts forward his views on the reluctance of EU Member States to put additional capital into the system.

https://ecdpm.org/multimedia/reflections-european-financial-architecture-development/

9 views

Papers by San Bilal

EU-Africa trade and investment relations: towards greater convergence?

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Sep 7, 2021

Aid for Trade by the European Union: Preliminary insights from the Economic Partnership Agreements

Nomos eBooks, 2008

Concluding EPA Negotiations: Legal and institutional issues

2 Baseline Scenario: Towards a timely conclusion of EPA negotiations and entry into force ..

Three ways to scale up debt-for-climate swaps

ECDPM Guide, 2023

While multilateral debt reform has been slow since the pandemic, debt-for-nature swaps are emergi... more While multilateral debt reform has been slow since the pandemic, debt-for-nature swaps are emerging more and more as a unique tool to address liquidity problems and foster investments in e!ective climate action. Karim Karaki, Alfonso Medinilla and San Bilal propose three ways to scale up debt-for-climate swaps in developing countries.

The Global Gateway at two: Implementing EU strategic ambitions

ECDPM Briefing Note No.173, 2023

The recent Global Gateway Forum provided an opportunity to highlight progress on the Global Gatew... more The recent Global Gateway Forum provided an opportunity to highlight progress on the Global Gateway, the European Union's (EU) global connectivity strategy, which is two years old this week. The initiative aims to increase EU external investment and provide a more streamlined way to package EU international cooperation and investment, while in practice providing an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative and strengthening the EU's global influence. With around 160 flagship projects identified for 2023 and 2024, the Global Gateway has begun to gather steam, but challenges remain.

In this brief, we look at how the Global Gateway can make real progress towards operationalising a much-needed reorientation of EU international cooperation objectives and instruments to meet partners’ needs and to respond to current geostrategic realities. Achieving its investment target of €300 billion is crucial for the EU’s credibility. To do this – and possibly surpass it in the future – the EU and member states will need to enact a genuine shift in business practices. This includes rethinking their collective development cooperation objectives and taking a whole-of-government approach. This can happen through a series of political and technical evolutions, including on the narrative, the policy direction, the approach to partners, and the toolbox.
https://ecdpm.org/work/global-gateway-two-implementing-eu-strategic-ambitions

The Ukraine Facility: Building on Team Europe and the European Investment Bank

ECDPM Briefing Note No.169, 2023

The European Union (EU), its institutions and member states are united in supporting Ukraine foll... more The European Union (EU), its institutions and member states are united in supporting Ukraine following Russia's war of aggression, providing about €76 billion to Ukraine and its people to date. To continue to respond to Ukraine's mounting needs, and with the EU's budget under stretch, the European Commission proposed an additional financial package of €50 billion for 2024-2027, the Ukraine Facility, currently under negotiations with the Council and the European Parliament. It is important that they do not water down the laudable proposal by the European Commission, but seek to further improve it. Specific attention should notably go to ensuring that the Ukraine Facility can help mobilise public investments, which are critical for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. The European Investment Bank (EIB), as the EU Bank fully aligned to and promoting EU values, standards and interests, is uniquely placed to do so. In line with the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), the EIB should have a specific investment window in the Ukraine Facility. This would allow the EU to take advantage of the EIB's added value in public investments-EIB's core business, in a way that would also support Ukraine in the perspective of its accession to the EU. The EIB can also be instrumental in anchoring a Team Europe approach through the Ukraine Facility, partnering with other key European, international and local financiers and development actors, and the private sector, to support Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction through comprehensive public and private endeavours.
https://ecdpm.org/work/ukraine-facility-building-team-europe-and-european-investment-bank

Matching businesses, public support and sustainability ambitions

ECDPM Briefing Note No.90, 2016

In a context where sustainability goals become overarching principles, what then distinguishes pu... more In a context where sustainability goals become overarching principles, what then distinguishes public support instruments to business that are more development-oriented from those that are more commercially-oriented, along economic diplomacy objectives?

To shed light on this process, ECDPM mapped instruments focused on engaging the private sector for development, and those supporting own businesses with commercial objectives in order to better understand their challenges, opportunities and synergies. We also examined EU matchmaking instruments with development cooperation and commercial interests.

This synthesis note summarises some of the key findings of our analysis so far, and presents implications and an outlook on what that means for public support instruments to better engage businesses for inclusive and sustainable development. It provides policy recommendations along the dimensions of institutions, instruments and criteria.

Key messages
Public instruments to support the private sector, for both development and commercial interests, have similar objectives and take similar forms. They, therefore, offer
potential synergies to achieve more sustainable development outcomes, while sharing risks, costs and resources.
ECDPM research points to a lack of consistent sustainability and development criteria for businesses to access public support instruments. While this is important for
development cooperation, commitments to both the 2030 Agenda and policy coherence for sustainable development also raise their importance for commercial instruments.
As development and commercial objectives are increasingly sought through private sector engagement at EU and national levels, there is a need for a more integrated approach to tackle global challenges: one that explicitly recognises the similarities between commercial and development instruments and draws lessons from both.
Systematically applied, sustainability criteria could increase the effectiveness and impact of all public support instruments to businesses and help ensure that firms actively contribute to development outcomes, beyond ‘doing no harm’.

https://ecdpm.org/bn90

On the political economy of reforms in the extractive sector

ECDPM GREAT insights Magazine, 2017

Poor or inappropriate policies, governance and institutional structures have commonly been blamed... more Poor or inappropriate policies, governance and institutional structures have commonly been blamed for the resource curse that plagues so many developing countries. Instead of focusing on mainly technical remedies, more effort should be dedicated to designing reforms that are incentive-compatible with key stakeholders that can drive or hinder such reforms, and to promoting initiatives that can enhance domestic incentives towards a pro-development path in resource-rich countries. When properly managed, natural resources can effectively contribute to sustainable and equitable development. Yet too often, resource-rich countries have failed to capitalise on the benefits and transformative potential of their natural endowment. The poor performance of some resource-rich countries can be explained by a number of economic factors, including possible negative effects through the terms of trade, the cyclical long term price fluctuation of commodities, short term high price volatility of commodities, the crowding out of manufacturing and the Dutch disease, according to which the natural resources sector grows at the expense of manufacturing, and associated notably with real exchange rate appreciation. Poor macroeconomic management and budgetary processes, as well as the absence of coherent long-term strategic approaches, policies and mechanisms are other common factors. Power relations and institutional settings also often explain the resource curse. Natural resources create rents, which affect incentives and behaviour of political and economic actors. Political elites play a central role in the collection and allocation of these rents and the distribution of revenues generated directly and indirectly by the exploitation of natural resources. Accordingly, they may pursue self-interest objectives rather than development goals in the management of natural resources, and thus capture these rents. Economic actors are also more likely to engage in wasteful rent-seeking activities, thus diverting resources away from the productive sector. Rents in turn affect the economic structure, political framework, institutional setting and power relations within a country, particularly where patronage prevails. Foreign partners, governments or companies, in the pursuit of their own interests, have also at times contributed to reinforce these negative tendencies and the associated resource curse. The competition for the control and allocation of natural resources and the revenues they generate may lead to political instability, conflicts and authoritarian regimes. In other words, power relations, politics and governance matters a great deal!

'Making Africa work': What not to do

ECDPM Talking Points, 2017

Africa Works’ was the somewhat provocative title of a book published in 1999. With the subtitle “... more Africa Works’ was the somewhat provocative title of a book published in 1999. With the subtitle “disorder as a political instrument”, the problem cited is that it often ‘works’ in a perverse way, and to the benefit of a select few. This was brought to mind by a more recent arrival entitled: ‘Making Africa Work’, authored by Chief and Ex-President Obasanjo of Nigeria, Greg Mills and Dickie Davis from the Brenthurst Foundation and Jeffrey Herbst (well known for his book on states and power in Africa). Obasanjo, Mills and Davies were at ECDPM in Brussels last week for closed-door discussions with high-level development officials, framed in the context of the upcoming AU-EU Summit. The discussion was followed by a public launch of their ‘handbook for economic success’, jointly organised by Brenthurst Foundation, ECDPM and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Though a welcome, forward-looking compendium of successful examples from around the world, with ‘Africa Works’ in mind the question arises: how much can a handbook offer if the current system ‘works’ for those in power?

Can Africa and Europe jointly walk the talk on investment mobilisation?

ECDPM Talking Points, 2017

Mobilising Investments for African Structural Transformation is one of the key areas that the Afr... more Mobilising Investments for African Structural Transformation is one of the key areas that the African Union (AU) wants to discuss at the 5th AU-EU Summit in Côte d’Ivoire on 28-29 November 2017. Indeed this may well underpin the other proposed focal areas of governance, peace and security and investing in people. The Summit will be meaningful only if it initiates new concrete efforts by Africa and Europe to mobilise more effectively sustainable investment for Africa’s transformation, building on common interests, to the benefits of all.

Au delà des discours : l'Afrique et l'Europe vont-elles mobiliser ensemble les investissements pour le développement

ECDPM Talking Points, 2017

Mobiliser les investissements pour la transformation structurelle en Afrique est l’un des thèmes ... more Mobiliser les investissements pour la transformation structurelle en Afrique est l’un des thèmes clés que l’Union africaine (UA) veut discuter lors du 5ème Sommet UA-UE en Côte d’Ivoire les 28 et 29 novembre. En effet, cela pourrait bien étayer les autres domaines d’intervention proposés en matière de gouvernance, de paix et de sécurité et d’investissement dans le capital humain. Le Sommet n’aura de sens que s’il initie de nouveaux efforts concrets de la part de l’Afrique et de l’Europe pour mobiliser plus efficacement des investissements durables pour la transformation de l’Afrique, en s’appuyant sur des intérêts communs, pour le bénéfice de tous. ECDPM Talking Point 27.11.2017

The EU’s financial instruments for access to energy in sub-Saharan Africa

ECDPM Discussion Paper 218, 2017

The European Union (EU) has committed to ambitious energy-related objectives that shall contribut... more The European Union (EU) has committed to ambitious energy-related objectives that shall contribute to inclusive, sustainable development. It therefore has put a number of financial instruments in place that support energy access in sub-Saharan Africa. Beyond traditional grants (still the bulk of EU funding), the EU increasingly uses its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to leverage loans and private investments from Development Finance institutions (DFIs) and the private sector, as also envisioned in the recently agreed European External Investment Plan (EIP). Through blended finance and smart technical assistance, there is a huge potential to develop and finance more energy projects that are currently (perceived) too risky and do not attract purely private investment. The EIP, through its 3-pillar approach and the setting of a dedicated 'sustainable energy' investment window, offers the opportunity to boost public and private investments in a more coherent, coordinated, and differentiated manner, and to foster impact investments, including towards the poor and enhancing their access to energy. Blending is however not a silver bullet, as it only works in certain areas and conditions, and cannot compensate for a lack of bankable and economically viable projects, particularly in less developed areas, where access rates are usually the lowest and the private sector is least interested and attracted. There will therefore be a continued need for i) grant funding for not fully economically viable projects, including when reaching some of the remote and poorest areas, ii) the right mix of public and private support instruments depending on context and need, and iii) more patience to see results. Besides, while many of the policy documents and instruments, most notably the EC's Africa Investment Facility and ElectriFI, make specific reference to enhancing access to energy, there is little information on results and impact, in particular for remote areas and poor segments of the population. The lack of transparency and data makes it often difficult to identify best practice and lessons learnt.The EIP also offers an opportunity for the EC to reconsider its monitoring and reporting results framework, and adapting expectations on impact, over a longer time horizon. ECDPM Discussion Paper 218 http://ecdpm.org/publications/eu-financial-instruments-access-energy-sub-saharan-africa/

SADC Institutional Capacity to Deliver on its Mandate

ECDPM Paper prepared for the SADC Strategic Ministerial Retreat - “The SADC We Want”, 12-14 March 2017, Kingdom of Swaziland, 2017

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) overarching objective is to foster peace, susta... more The Southern African Development Community (SADC) overarching objective is to foster peace, sustainable development, freedom and social justice, and the eradication of poverty for the people of Southern Africa, by creating the enabling environment for deep regional integration and cooperation. The vision is clear and ambitions are high. Yet, progress is slow. It is with the aim of addressing this issue that the Council decided to hold a Strategic Ministerial Retreat on 12-14 March 2017, to review the state of affairs of SADC and identify remedies to speed up progress towards ‘The SADC We Want’. A number of institutional challenges have often been identified for SADC, including issues such as the lack of supranational SADC institutions, the vulnerability of institutions to power games, the influence of external partners, the lack of funding, the lack of non-state actor involvement, the lack of Parliamentary scrutiny, the vagueness of mandate and procedures, the inflexible decision-making procedure by consensus, and the incoherence of overlapping regional initiatives. While these provide some possible pointers for institutional reforms, it is important to keep in mind some guiding principles and observations about institutional arrangements. Discussions around institutional settings, and more generally about regional integration processes, tend to be quite prescriptive, with many preconceived ideas about what regional integration should or should not be, and what institutions are desirable or not. In reality, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’, best practice model of institutional configuration for regional integration, or one predetermined trajectory that needs to be followed. Analysing the dynamics of integration in Africa, Vanheukelom et al. (2016) identify several key findings of particular pertinence for institutional reforms. They note that while regional organisations adopt institutional forms to foster regional integration, these institutions often do not serve their stated functions. Focusing on institutional functions rather than forms should thus be at the heart of any institutional reform process. They have also warned about the tendency for actors to pretend that major reforms are being undertaken where there is a strong degree of dependency on external funders. In such circumstances, member states are incentivised to signal their support for regional policies, programmes and institutions even when implementation is not a domestic priority, as illustrated by numerous examples in different RECs. In this context, the position of larger member states and coalitions of member states tend to play a major role in shaping (i.e. driving or hindering) regional outcomes. Coalitions of stakeholders, civil society actors or businesses, can also become important factors influencing regional dynamics. The tendency in many RECs, as in SADC, to focus mainly on state actors with little active involvement of non-state actors may also explain some of the problems in pursuing effective regional integration. Besides, integration dynamics are very sector or thematic specific, and can be perceived very differently in each country. Given the broad scope of sectors and integration issues on the SADC agenda, some will have more traction than others, depending on the sector characteristics and specific institutional and interest dynamics within each country around each issue. Finally, the availability and allocation of resources to pursue the broad regional agenda also dictates the dynamics and speed of progress of the different thematic areas. In this respect, the role of donors in terms of the quantity and quality of support they provide to regional organisations such as SADC presents opportunities but also profound challenges depending on whether donors support home grown institutional reforms or drive the process. What does it mean for the SADC institutional reform? First, institutions should not be designed or reformed in a vacuum. This means that institutional adjustments are not a technical, or merely capacity issue, but first and foremost a political process, which requires political leadership, meaning take political responsibility for making choices and prioritising in the face of resources scarcity. Second, institutional arrangements and processes should not be considered in an ideal form, but should respond to realities, at the regional and national levels. This means that SADC institutions should respond to the interests and incentives of the SADC Member States. They should also accommodate financial constraints. Besides, overdependence on external support raise the risk of donors driving rather than supporting reforms, reducing the ownership and ultimately the commitment of regional leaders to their own institutions. Third, institutional arrangements should foster a greater connection with key domestic stakeholders in the SADC Member States, building on their incentives and interests, so as to harness their potential to drive, support or accompany integration processes. This means adapting institutional arrangements to include (and structure) private sector and civil society voices, at all stages of the regional policy cycle, i.e. in agenda setting, decision-making, implementation and monitoring & evaluation processes. Therefore, identifying institutional reforms requires addressing issues of sovereignty and power relations, focusing on key priorities and building on national interests to stimulate regional coalitions. In terms of institutional setting, this would require for instance to strengthen the coordinating and facilitating role of the SADC Secretariat, to dedicate greater efforts to strengthen the SADC National Committees, and to structure and support non-state actors’ coalitions (business and civil society) at national and regional levels. In this optic, the role of the SADC Parliamentary Forum could also be enhanced. Given the traditionally strong role given to national ownership in the SADC construction, SADC leaders might rightly be more inclined to strengthen the SADC capacity to pursue effective intergovernmentalism, while aspiring in the longer term to more powerful regional institutions. In practice, institutional reforms can take an hybrid form, combining some features of each of the options.

EU financing and private investments: Time for a quantum leap

ECDPM Talking Points, 2018

Negotiations on the future of the EU finances post-2020 are a unique occasion to reconsider the f... more Negotiations on the future of the EU finances post-2020 are a unique occasion to reconsider the financial instruments of the European Union, for both internal and external actions. They are also a chance to address more systemic issues. In a turbulent world, with the EU in need of new momentum, this window of opportunity should not be wasted. In particular, it is time to rethink how grants, and more generally public finance, can better stimulate investment (inside and outside the EU) for sustainable and inclusive growth. And in doing so, how leveraged finance can contribute to and be accompanied by efforts to improve an enabling environment and sustainable ecosystem.

Why the EU must do better in supporting African job creation: A rapier not a blunderbuss

European Think Tank Group (ETTG) Policy Brief, 2018

Key messages: • Sub-Saharan Africa will need to create 18 million jobs each year until 2035, to a... more Key messages: • Sub-Saharan Africa will need to create 18 million jobs each year until 2035, to accommodate young labour market entrants. • The AU-EU Summit of November 2017 was right: this is a top priority, for Africa, and for development cooperation. • The EU has the desire and the instruments needed to support the efforts African countries themselves will need to lead. • But the EU needs an approach which is smarter and better targeted: a rapier not a blunderbuss. • Supporting structural transformation is the long term priority, helping the creation of new jobs in sectors with higher productivity, with special attention to youth and women, and making low carbon development central. • Quality education and business-oriented skills development are needed, better linked to investment promotion. • However, the informal sector also needs support. • And special programmes, including more social protection, are needed for the most vulnerable. • Every country needs a strategy – but different countries need different strategies. European Think Tank Group Policy Brief https://ettg.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ETTG-Paper.pdf http://ecdpm.org/publications/why-eu-must-do-better-supporting-african-job-creation/

What is the European External Investment Plan really about?

ECDPM Briefing Note No.101, 2018

Leveraging more impactful private investments will be key to address current development challeng... more Leveraging more impactful private investments will be key to address current development challenges and for promoting sustainable development in line with the UN 2030 Agenda. Raising to the challenge of addressing the root causes of migration, creating decent jobs and fostering sustainable and inclusive growth, the European Union (EU) launched at the end of 2017 the European External Investment Plan (EIP). Building on the EU’s over-a-decade long experience with blended finance (notably in their regional blending facilities), it intends to use aid in a ‘smarter’ and more strategic way to spur sustainable private investments by providing a new guarantee mechanism, tailored technical assistance and dedicated action to promote the investment climate. Perhaps even more importantly, the EU aims to do so by taking a comprehensive and integrated approach, combining financial and non-financial support to address current shortcomings and increase overall effectiveness and coherence of the EU support. The EIP intends to respond to the need to be more ambitious in terms of mitigating risk and fostering greater development impact through blended finance, in particular in least developed and more fragile countries. It will seek to do so by harnessing the potential of (mainly European, but not only) development finance entities, given them additional tools (blended finance, guarantees, technical assistance) to do more and better, while enhancing the enabling environment. Five priority areas are covered under dedicated investment windows: renewable energy, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises financing, sustainable agriculture, sustainable cities and digitalisation for sustainable development. The EIP is a most opportune and timely initiative. Yet, to be really successful, the EIP will need to have a systemic impact on the way the European institutions and their partners effectively manage to work together in a more coherent and complementary manner.

The European External Investment Plan: Challenges and next steps for a game changer

by San Bilal and Sebastian Große-Puppendahl

ECDPM Briefing Note No.102, 2018

The European External Investment Plan (EIP) provides an attractive framework to leverage private ... more The European External Investment Plan (EIP) provides an attractive framework to leverage private investments differently, improving on current practices to foster sustainable and inclusive growth and to create more decent jobs. It can represent a major paradigm shift in EU development policy and influence the way the EU will position itself beyond 2020, as the EU seeks to use more strategically its aid and policy-clout to leverage private investments in a fully integrated manner. Yet, to turn commendable aspirations into reality, a number of implementation challenges have to be addressed: i) operationalising the integrated EIP’s three-pillar approach, ii) better harnessing (European) development finance entities to the EU agenda and the SDGs, iii) reconciling development impact, risk levels, and disbursement requirements with the pressure to show results, iv) adopting an effective and transparent monitoring and results measurement system, v) fostering complementarity and coherence with other instruments and initiatives, vi) building on African own initiatives and institutions, and vii) better taking into account political economy dynamics on the ground. The EU’s biggest challenge will thus be to overcome a natural tendency towards institutional inertia, which could be compound by the rather conservative attitude of many financial entities, not least when dealing with development. We propose five areas that should immediately be addressed to avoid ‘business-as-usual’: 1) better reflecting on past (EU) blending experiences and lessons learnt, 2) ensuring complementarity and linkages with other actors, strategies and instruments, 3) better monitoring and evaluation practices and principles, and prudent project selection/eligibility criteria, 4) ensuring linkages to and integration of political economy dynamics, and 5) better integrating African strategies and (finance) institutions. Addressing those can further help the EIP to be the game changer in developing a sustainable pipeline of projects and effectively connecting financial and non-financial support.

Reshaping the EU 'private finance for development' landscape

ECDPM GREAT insights Magazine, 2018

With the ambition to move from billions to trillions in line with the 2030 and Addis Agendas, the... more With the ambition to move from billions to trillions in line with the 2030 and Addis Agendas, there is a need to shift towards using public interventions and finance in a smarter way, including leveraging private investments for inclusive and sustainable development. This does not only mean to integrate a private sector dimension in development cooperation.

Cities of arrival: Integrated urban and private sector responses to migrants and refugees

by San Bilal and Giulia Maci

European Think Tank Group (ETTG) , 2018

Migration is a local reality. People may migrate voluntarily, but migration can also be an impera... more Migration is a local reality. People may migrate voluntarily, but migration can also be an imperative necessity. Approximately 30 million people are currently considered refugees or internally displaced people, two-thirds of whom live in urban areas. Forced migration and refugee inflows into cities are taking place within the broader context of global urbanisation. And large camps such as Zaatari in Jordan and Dadaab in Kenya are increasingly considered as cities in their own right. KEY MESSAGES 1. Temporary displacement should be thought of as long term 2. Most displaced people and refugees live in towns and cities – either because that is where they have moved, or because long-term camps become like towns. 3. Both humanitarian and development actors need to engage more forcefully with the urban aspects of displacement. 4. The private sector will be at the heart of a comprehensive response, and will need new norms, standards and regulation. 5. The EU has set a progressive policy framework and now needs to deliver.

Le Plan d’investissement extérieur européen: défis et prochaines étapes pour changer la donne

ECDPM Information Note No.102, 2018

Le Plan d’investissement extérieur (PIE) de l’Union européenne (UE) propose un cadre de stimulati... more Le Plan d’investissement extérieur (PIE) de l’Union européenne (UE) propose un cadre de stimulation des investissements privés attrayant et différent, plus propre que les pratiques actuelles à favoriser une croissance durable et inclusive et à créer des emplois décents. Il pourrait incarner un changement de paradigme majeur dans la politique de développement de l’UE et influencer le positionnement de l’UE après 2020, au moment où celle-ci cherche à conférer une valeur stratégique à son aide et à son influence politique afin de mobiliser les investissements privés de manière totalement intégrée. La concrétisation de ces aspirations louables soulève néanmoins plusieurs défis au niveau de la mise en oeuvre : i) opérationnaliser l’approche intégrée à trois piliers du PIE ; ii) mieux impliquer les entités de financement du développement (européennes) dans l’agenda de l’UE et les ODD ; iii) concilier l’impact sur le développement, les niveaux de risque et les impératifs de décaissement avec la nécessité d’afficher rapidement des résultats ; iv) adopter un mécanisme efficace et transparent pour suivre et mesurer les résultats ; v) favoriser la complémentarité et la cohérence avec d’autres instruments et initiatives ; vii) mieux prendre en compte la dynamique de l’économie politique sur le terrain. Le principal écueil à surmonter sera donc celui de l’inertie institutionnelle, une tendance naturelle que pourrait accentuer l’attitude plutôt conservatrice de nombreuses entités financières, surtout lorsqu’il s’agit de développement. Il faudrait donc immédiatement s’atteler à cinq points pour éviter de retomber sur les pratiques habituelles: 1) mieux tenir compte des expériences de financement mixte (de l’UE) et les leçons qui ont pu en être retirées ; 2) assurer la complémentarité et l’articulation avec d’autres acteurs, stratégies et instruments ; 3) avoir de meilleures principes et pratiques de suivi et d’évaluation, de même que des critères prudents d’éligibilité et de sélection des projets ; 4) assurer les liens avec le contexte et les dynamiques de l’économie politique et leur intégration ; 5) mieux intégrer les stratégies et les institutions (de financement) africaines. S’atteler à ces cinq points permettrait sans doute au PIE de changer la donne en développant une réserve de projets durables et en étant un trait d’union efficace entre l’appui financier et non financier.