Steven Wagner

Brunel University, Department of Politics, History and the Brunel Law School, Faculty Member

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I am looking at the influence of intelligence, especially secret diplomacy, on British policy and decision making in Palestine from the establishment of the civil administration in 1920 until the decision to quit in 1947.

Please feel free to contact me with questions. I am always happy to collaborate.

אני חוקר את השפעת המודיעין הבריטי, במיוחד דיפלומטיה סודית, על מדיניות וקבלת החלטות של המנדט הבריטי, מאז יסוד המנהל האזרחי ב1920 עד ההחלטה לעזוב את הארץ ב1947

אנא צרו קשר איתי עם שאלות. אשמח לשתף פעולה.

סטיבן וגנר

اهلا وسهلا!

مجال بحثي يركز على تاثير المخابرات البريطانية, خاصة في مجال الديبلوماسية السرية, على السياسه البريطانية عامة واتخاذ القرارات خاصة, منذ تأسيس الادارة البريطانية في سنة 1920 حتى قرار ترك الانتداب في سنة 1947.

اسعد دائما للتعاون. الرجاء للاتصال بي للاستفسار.

شكرا

ستيفن واغنر
Address: Department of History and Classical Studies, McGill University
855 Sherbrooke St. West,
Montreal QC H3A 2T7

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Papers by Steven Wagner

Espionage 1935 press war

The English Historical Review, 2023

In 1935, Palestinian newspapers published a forged letter alleged to have been sent from pan-Isla... more In 1935, Palestinian newspapers published a forged letter alleged to have been sent from pan-Islamist leader, Shakib Arslan, to the Palestinian leader and Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni. The letter indicated that Husayni and Arslan accepted Italian bribes in exchange for pro-Italian articles in the publications they controlled. Italy was widely despised for its treatment of Libyan Muslims, and so exposing this relationship was expected to be controversial. Amid a national debate about Italy’s imminent invasion of Abyssinia, and its role in the Eastern Mediterranean, Husayni’s Palestinian opponents hoped to embarrass him as a sell-out. Both a government official and national leader, Husayni’s true position came to define the Palestinian debate about the national interest: should Palestinians co-operate with one oppressive empire so as to free themselves from another? Relying on multilingual and multinational archival evidence, this article proves that the letter was indeed forged, but based on real intelligence gathered by Husayni’s Palestinian opponents who sought to damage his reputation. It also shows that British intelligence probably encouraged the forgery, hoping to expose and stem Italian propaganda activity. The scheme backfired and accelerated Italian interference in Palestine. It crystalised Husayni’s popularity, as Palestinians believed he could deliver national liberation. They did not care if Italy was involved. This episode shows that British assessments of ‘factional’ Palestinian politics reflected their shallow understanding of these conflicts. Meanwhile, it also sheds unique light on Palestinian espionage and counterintelligence work, and the way in which it empowered Husayni and Arslan.

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Intelligence and the Origins of the British Middle East

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2015

This article examines how intelligence services and officers laid the groundwork for British rule... more This article examines how intelligence services and officers laid the groundwork for British rule in Palestine during 1918-1923. The patterns for British rule in the Middle East were established by officers who, during the First World War, were responsible for the implementation of Britain's Arab and Zionist policies. It was not until mid-1919 that the inherent conflict between the Arab and Zionist policies became apparent to these officers, who had worked with Zionist intelligence and Arab nationalists during the war. This article examines the roots of British rule during 1919-21 as intelligence cooperation with Zionists helped guarantee a British Mandate, but could not secure the country from violence forever. The zero-sum conflict between Arab nationalist and Zionists emerged as British policy options narrowed.

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Britain and the Jewish Underground, 1944--1946: Intelligence, Policy and Resistance

British intelligence and Arab nationalism: the origins of the modern Middle East

The First World War and its Aftermath

During 1917-18, Sir Mark Sykes represented the cabinet's Middle Eastern policy, working with memb... more During 1917-18, Sir Mark Sykes represented the cabinet's Middle Eastern policy, working with members of General Allenby's staff in Cairo, including his staff intelligence and the Arab Bureau, which handled political intelligence in the region. These intelligence officers were also responsible for handling negotiations with the Hashemite chief Sherif Husayn of Mecca in 1915. Sykes and these officers had to simultaneously plan victory and Britain's postwar interests. Few British officials recognised the inherent contradiction in their promises to Zionists and Arabs between 1917 and 1919. This chapter argues that Britain's lack of appreciation for the conflict inherent in its various commitments derived more from weak assessments of Arab politics than from malevolence toward its new junior partners. By comparing what British intelligence officers believed about the relationship between Arab nationalist societies and the hashemites against the reality of that relationship, it is possible to understand Britain's contradictory policy commitments, which were made as British war aims evolved along with the conditions produced by the conflict.

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Intelligence and the Origins of the British Middle East

Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Sep 12, 2015

This article examines how intelligence services and officers laid the groundwork for British ru... more This article examines how intelligence services and officers laid the groundwork for British rule in Palestine during 1918–23. The patterns for British rule in the Middle East were established by officers who, during the First World War, were responsible for the implementation of Britain's Arab and Zionist policies. It was not until mid-1919 that the inherent conflict between the Arab and Zionist policies became apparent to these officers, who had worked with Zionist intelligence and Arab nationalists during the war. This article examines the roots of British rule during 1919–21 as intelligence cooperation with Zionists helped guarantee a British Mandate, but could not secure the country from violence forever. The zero-sum conflict between Arab nationalist and Zionists emerged as British policy options narrowed.

The Zionist Movement in Search of Grand Strategy

This article is an attempt to survey Zionist grand strategy using micro-biographies of three key ... more This article is an attempt to survey Zionist grand strategy using micro-biographies of three key strategic thinkers of the pre-state era. It examines three Zionist strategists, Chaim Weizmann, Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabontinsky, and David Ben-Gurion, focusing on their contributions towards Israeli statehood by 1948. There are certainly other figures deserving of attention on this issue, but these three have been chosen because of their consequence in both local and international affairs and, most importantly, for the grand strategic direction which they provided for the Zionist movement. Unlike other significant figures, these three men influenced strategy which touched on all significant fields of grand strategy. They are examined here together because they impacted all the economic, social, philosophical, political, diplomatic, and military components of strategy. When looked at together, theirs is a story about how a non-government organization (NGO) became a state, but also about the origins and nature of Israel and its politics. This story is important because it is an assessment of how the Zionist movement, which could not even agree that independent statehood was its goal, achieved that aim with the leadership of these individuals.

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Sherif Hussein , the Caliphate and the Hashemite-Arab Nationalist-British Alliance

How did Britain get the Middle East so wrong during the First World war? Gingko Speaker Steven Wa... more How did Britain get the Middle East so wrong during the First World war? Gingko Speaker Steven Wagner’s latest blog argues that the three way alliance between Britain, the Arab movements and the Hashemites was based on a temporary alignment of interests of each party. Britain misunderstood and overrated the connection between the Arab movements and Sherif Hussein, but only came to realize this after the end of the war.

Blog - The First World War Beyond the Western Front: Sykes-Picot

With heavy media attention around the horribly topical ongoing turmoil surrounding IS (ISIS/ISIL)... more With heavy media attention around the horribly topical ongoing turmoil surrounding IS (ISIS/ISIL), it is difficult to talk about this issue without delving into the history of these boundaries – specifically the Sykes-Picot agreement. Delegate Steven Wagner writes about just this in his blog post for the Gingko Library.

Whispers from Below: Zionist Secret Diplomacy, Terrorism and British Security inside and out of Palestine, 1944–47

This article discusses the global aspect of Zionist terrorism against Britain during 1944–47, rel... more This article discusses the global aspect of Zionist terrorism against Britain during 1944–47, relying on recently declassified documents and Hebrew records. Britain struggled against a global terrorist campaign which attacked British targets in Palestine, Egypt and the wider Middle East, continental Europe and the United Kingdom. This article refutes claims by other authors that British rule in Palestine failed because of intelligence failure. Intelligence failure was limited, but so were successes. British intelligence produced reasonable assessments on Zionist politics, but could do little to prevent violence without the cooperation of the Jewish Agency. Success was driven by a combination of signals intelligence, secret agents, one key defector, interrogations and intelligence shared by the Jewish Agency. Failure resulted from a weak understanding of the Zionist underground and from lack of cooperation by Agency authorities. Normally Britain's junior partner, the Jewish Agency was, by 1945, struggling against British restrictions on Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine. Its militia, Haganah, turned to cooperation with terrorists. British intelligence predicted that such developments could occur, but failed to identify them as they unfolded. Britain's dependence on Zionist security intelligence was a key vulnerability that never was addressed by policy-makers. The Jewish Agency leveraged its cooperation, applying it to prevent terrorism in Egypt and the United Kingdom, where violent incidents would harm the Zionist cause. It had little reason to prevent terrorism in the key battlegrounds of Palestine or Europe, and so terrorism harmed Britain's will to continue fighting. The root cause of Britain's failure was at the policy level. Despite known weaknesses, government never assessed its own will and ability to uphold restrictions on Zionist immigration, or to fight terrorism, as against the Yishuv's will and ability to struggle against Britain.

British Intelligence and the ‘Fifth’ Occupying Power: The Secret Struggle to Prevent Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine

Intelligence and National Security

At the end of the Second World War, British Intelligence Struggled to enforce strict limits impos... more At the end of the Second World War, British Intelligence Struggled to enforce strict limits imposed on Jewish Immigration to Palestine. Holocaust Survivors and Jews wishing to escape communism in Eastern Europe flooded the western Zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, while the Zionist movement worked to bring them to Palestine. Illegal Immigration to Palestine was the key policy dispute between Britain and the Zionist movement, and a focus for British intelligence. Britain sought both overt and covert means to prevent the boarding of ships at European ports which were destined for Palestine, and even to prevent the entry of Jewish refugees into the American zones. This article highlights Britain’s secret intelligence gathering efforts as well as its covert action aimed to prevent this movement. It highlights a peculiar episode in the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States, during which cooperation and partnership was lacking. British intelligence promoted a rumour that Soviet agents were using Jewish escape lines to penetrate Western Europe and the Middle East in order to persuade American authorities to prevent the movement of Jewish refugees. Instead, this article argues, American intelligence secretly cooperated with the Zionist organizers of the escape routes so to expose Soviet agents. Britain’s attempt at deception backfired, and provided effective cover for the movement of hundreds of thousands of Jews during a critical period. Meanwhile its intelligence had dramatically improved, but policymakers failed to reassess Britain’s ability to sustain immigration restrictions and the indefinite detention of tens of thousands of illegal migrants.

Britain and the Jewish Underground, 1944-46: Intelligence, Policy and Resistance

Starting in the 1930s, but especially during the Second World War, the intelligence agencies of B... more Starting in the 1930s, but especially during the Second World War, the intelligence agencies of Britain and the Jewish Agency for Palestine had a complicated relationship. They often worked together to fight common threats, such as Arab rebels and Nazi Germany. Jewish terrorists presented another common threat during the Second World War, when the Jewish Agency cooperated with Britain, in the hopes of political rewards in the postwar settlement. British Intelligence, unable to penetrate the Jewish terrorist organizations, Irgun and Lehi, relied on the cooperation of the Jewish Agency to maintain security. This dependency and the strengthening of the underground Haganah, weakened the grip of British authority in Palestine, and made the Jewish community, the Yishuv, increasingly powerful. By 1945, when Britain did not fulfil the expectations of the Yishuv to lift immigration restrictions on Jews to Palestine, its dominant figure, David Ben-Gurion, launched a secret war against British policy. Intelligence failed to understand and react effectively to this development because it relied on its liaison with the Jewish Agency, now secretly hostile, to interpret the political and security situation in Palestine. In a classic problem of net assessment, British officials overestimated their own strength and resolve, and underestimated that of the Yishuv. British intelligence failed to accurately assess Jewish threats or intentions in Palestine from 1944 to 1946. These mistakes in intelligence contributed to failures of policy, which destroyed British policy in the Palestine Mandate, and opened the door to the creation of the state of Israel.

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British Intelligence and the Jewish Resistance Movement in the Palestine Mandate, 1945-46

At the end of the Second World War, British and Zionist interests came into conflict over the iss... more At the end of the Second World War, British and Zionist interests came into conflict over the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which raised the broader issue of what sort of National Home could exist within the British Mandate. As a result, in 1945–46, the three Jewish armed groups in the Mandate, the Haganah, Etzel and Lehi, started a loosely coordinated armed struggle against British rule. Even the moderates in the Jewish Agency rejected their former partner against Hitler, Britain, and used force against it in order to achieve their political goals. This article assesses British intelligence on these developments, and demonstrates that it failed to anticipate or even to understand the threat until the destruction of the King David Hotel. The article demonstrates that these mistakes occurred because British intelligence relied heavily on the intelligence organs of the Jewish Agency itself for intelligence about political threats within Palestine. The article assesses this intelligence failure, and its heavy costs. However, it denies that bad intelligence caused British failures in the Mandate. On the contrary, that failure stemmed from deeper problems of policy.

Talks by Steven Wagner

intelligence and Origins of British Middle East

Zionist Secret Diplomacy, 1944-1947, and the end of the Palestine Mandate

Whispers from Below: Zionist Secret Diplomacy, Terrorism and British Security inside and out of Palestine, 1930-47

British SIGINT and Palestine Security 1934-47

The Secret Origins of Britain’s Middle Eastern Empire: The Role of Intelligence in Stabilizing Palestine 1920-23

Blowing the source: Secret Intelligence and the Jewish insurgency in Palestine, 1943-47

Conference Presentations by Steven Wagner

British Intelligence and Arab Nationalism: The Origins of the Modern Middle East

Blowing the Source’ – Britain’s use of SIGINT in Palestine, 1933-47

In the summer of 1946, British troops in Palestine had occupied the offices of the Jewish Agency ... more In the summer of 1946, British troops in Palestine had occupied the offices of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the semi-autonomous governing body for Palestine's Jewish community, or the Yishuv. Four weeks later, and for reasons which I will get into, the government published the communications of the Jewish Agency between London and Jerusalem. Newspapers reported that these signals had been intercepted and decrypted by British intelligence. The government aimed to prove that the Jewish Agency was directing a terrorist campaign, so it published material which showed that the commander of the Jewish paramilitary, or Haganah (meaning defence), had conspired with the Jewish Agency to begin a sabotage campaign during the previous year. Yet, the publication and exposure of this most secret source failed to draw world sympathy away from the Jewish Agency, and overall did more harm than good.

Steven Wagner

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