Papers by Lambros Pechlivanos
Social Science Research Network, Oct 4, 1999
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and Business. 4 Maddison's (2010) data indicate that the percentage drop in Greek GDP from 2007 t... more and Business. 4 Maddison's (2010) data indicate that the percentage drop in Greek GDP from 2007 to 2013 is two-and-a-half times larger than the drop in Greek GDP from peak to trough in the 1930s.
Reputation Based Intelligent Agent Negotiation Frameworks in the e-Marketplace
International Conference on E-Business and Telecommunication Networks, 2006
We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents... more We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term wage contracts, two types of implicit incentives emerge. First, agents become concerned about their perceived personal productivity. Second, agents become more reluctant to behave cooperatively-they have an incentive to 'sabotage' their colleagues. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal must offer more collectively oriented incentive schemes. We also show that temporary workers are not affected by the sabotage effect and that as a result, their incentives are more individually oriented.
Teamwork Management in an Era of Diminishing Commitment
This paper studies management when the principal has different degrees of commitment power. In a ... more This paper studies management when the principal has different degrees of commitment power. In a model in which both the principal and agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, implicit incentives arise when the principal is not able to commit herself to long-term contracts. The presence of implicit incentives makes the agents more reluctant to behave cooperatively (they actually have incentives to 'sabotage' their colleagues). This forces the principal to offer more 'collectively oriented' incentive schemes than in the presence of commitment, in order to induce the desired level of cooperation. Moreover, teamwork exposes agents to higher risks than the ones they are exposed to in a Taylorist workplace. We find that the optimal team size is constrained by risk considerations, and is decreasing in the uncertainty of the production technology and in the time horizon of the team.
CESifo DICE report, 2015
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
An optimization-based control framework that simultaneously determines the optimal inventory and ... more An optimization-based control framework that simultaneously determines the optimal inventory and product pricing policies is developed for multi-product, multi-echelon supply chain networks. The optimization problem aims at adjusting the available manufacturing resources, product transportation, inventories and prices for the entire supply chain network to satisfy demand while maximizing network’s revenues and service level, through the minimization of unsatisfied demand, over a specified rolling time horizon. The control scheme employs model predictive control principles with local feedback inventory controllers for the satisfaction of the overall objectives. Customer demand responses to product prices are taken directly into consideration through the explicit utilization of demand elasticity. The optimal manipulation of the product prices acts as an additional instrument for the efficient operation of the supply chain through the direction of product demand in less congested parts...
Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
Abstract------------------------------The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-va... more Abstract------------------------------The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. Bikhchandani (1988) has shown that if it is common knowledge that a bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent, this bidder (almost surely) never wins the auction. This paper is the first to show that this result does not carry through when one allows for two-sided uncertainty. Whe show that even if the probabilities that one of the bidders is advantaged while the other one is disadvantaged are arbitrarily large, in every equilibrium, the disadvantaged bidder needs to win the auction with strictly positive probability. We then solve for the equilibria in two cases (one with two types and another with a continuum of types) and we characterize their expected revenues properties. We find that although they underperform relative to "comparable " symmetric auctions, they perform much better than what it...
Self-enforcing corruption: Information transmission and organizational response
Lambsdorff, J, 2004
The electronic commerce market segment will further expand, if coupled with the appropriate techn... more The electronic commerce market segment will further expand, if coupled with the appropriate technologies and mechanisms. The intelligence and efficiency of systems in the e-marketplace can be drastically enhanced by introducing mobile agents in various levels. In this paper, we propose a dynamic multilateral negotiation model and we build an effective seller agent negotiation strategy on the grounds of a weighted ranking mechanism adopted by the buyer agents. The objective of this strategy is to extend the functionality of autonomous agents, so that they reach to an agreement aiming to maximise their owner's utility. This approach considers both contract and decision issues, is based on real market conditions, and has been empirically evaluated.
We describe the evolution of the power struggle in Greece among key economic and political stakeh... more We describe the evolution of the power struggle in Greece among key economic and political stakeholders, who have tried, via strategic positioning and rent-seeking activities, to influence economic policy outcomes during the postwar decades. We split the postwar decades in three periods: the catching-up period, the overt populism period of 1973-1993, and the 1993-2008 of stealth populism. In each period, we identify the important players to see how they managed to forge a sustainable wining coalition, and to understand how they shaped policies. The three periods vary substantially in terms of the inherent degree of economic inefficiency they brought about; the first one was characterized by a concentration of rent-seeking mainly among the economic and political elite, whereas the middle period exemplifies the "democratization" of rent-seeking. The middle period's proliferation of rent seeking received some legitimacy by large segments of the population due to widespread, and often ideological, perceptions of long-lasting unfairness in the distribution of economic and political power. The covert populism of the last period used an unsustainable expansion of foreign borrowing to allow for an intensification of rent seeking while providing a semblance of fiscal rectitude. JEL-Code: P160, N140, H110.
We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents... more We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term wage contracts, two types of implicit incentives emerge. First, agents become concerned about their perceived personal productivity. Second, agents become more reluctant to behave cooperatively -they have an incentive to`sabotage' their colleagues. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal must o®er more collectively oriented incentive schemes. We also show that temporary workers are not a®ected by the sabotage e®ect and that as a result, their incentives are more individually oriented.
An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment
European Journal of Operational Research, 2008
E-commerce will strongly penetrate the market if coupled with appropriate technologies and mechan... more E-commerce will strongly penetrate the market if coupled with appropriate technologies and mechanisms. Mobile agents may enhance the intelligence and improve the efficiency of systems in the e-marketplace. We propose a dynamic multi-lateral negotiation model and construct an efficient negotiation strategy based on a ranking mechanism that does not require a complicated rationale on behalf of the buyer agents. This strategy can be used to extend the functionality of autonomous intelligent agents, so that they quickly reach to an agreement aiming to maximise their owner’s utility. The framework proposed considers both contract and decision issues, is based on real market conditions, and has been empirically evaluated. Moreover, it is shown that in a linear framework like the one we employ, more elaborate ranking mechanisms do not necessarily improve efficiency.
Journal of Labor Economics, 2002
We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents... more We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term wage contracts, two types of implicit incentives emerge. First, agents become concerned about their perceived personal productivity. Second, agents become more reluctant to behave cooperatively -they have an incentive to 'sabotage' their colleagues. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal must offer more collectively oriented incentive schemes. We also show that temporary workers are not affected by the sabotage effect and that as a result, their incentives are more individually oriented.
Journal of Labor Economics, 2002
We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents... more We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term wage contracts, two types of implicit incentives emerge. First, agents become concerned about their perceived personal productivity. Second, agents become more reluctant to behave cooperatively -they have an incentive to 'sabotage' their colleagues. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal must offer more collectively oriented incentive schemes. We also show that temporary workers are not affected by the sabotage effect and that as a result, their incentives are more individually oriented.
We describe the evolution of the power struggle in Greece among key economic and political stakeh... more We describe the evolution of the power struggle in Greece among key economic and political stakeholders, who have tried, via strategic positioning and rent-seeking activities, to influence economic policy outcomes during the postwar decades. We split the postwar decades in three periods: the catching-up period, the overt populism period of 1973-1993, and the 1993-2008 of stealth populism. In each period, we identify the important players to see how they managed to forge a sustainable wining coalition, and to understand how they shaped policies. The three periods vary substantially in terms of the inherent degree of economic inefficiency they brought about; the first one was characterized by a concentration of rent-seeking mainly among the economic and political elite, whereas the middle period exemplifies the "democratization" of rent-seeking. The middle period's proliferation of rent seeking received some legitimacy by large segments of the population due to widespread, and often ideological, perceptions of long-lasting unfairness in the distribution of economic and political power. The covert populism of the last period used an unsustainable expansion of foreign borrowing to allow for an intensification of rent seeking while providing a semblance of fiscal rectitude. JEL-Code: P160, N140, H110.
The democratization of rent seeking in modern Greece
Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking, 2015
Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement
Economics Letters, 2000
IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, 2005
Various state-of-the-art technologies are necessary to enhance the efficiency and increase the in... more Various state-of-the-art technologies are necessary to enhance the efficiency and increase the interest for ecommerce transactions. Mobile agents are one of the means that may enhance the intelligence and improve the effectiveness of systems in the e-marketplace. This paper aims to present the basic elements of the designed dynamic multilateral negotiation model and strategies that do not require a complicated rationale on behalf of the buyer agents. It focuses on the enhancement of the Seller's reasoning component by incorporating to the designed negotiation strategies a novel mechanism for the estimation of the mutually acceptable contract region by exploiting relative market data combined with knowledge acquired from previous experience. This technique is used to extend the functionality of autonomous agents, so that they reach to an agreement faster aiming to maximise their owner's utility. The framework considers both contract and decision issues, is based on real market conditions, and has been empirically evaluated.
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Papers by Lambros Pechlivanos