Department of Political Science and Management

Since 2009, the European Union has developed strategies for the Baltic Sea, Danube, Adriatic-Ionian and Alpine macro-regions. These macro-regional strategies represent a new tool of European Union governance that seeks to combine the community’s territorial cooperation and cohesion policy repertoire with intergovernmental ‘regional cooperation’ involving European Union member and partner countries. By establishing comprehensive governance architectures for cross-sectoral and trans-boundary policy coordination in areas such as transport infrastructure and environmental protection, macro-regional strategies seek to mobilise European Union member and non-member states alike in promoting and harmonising territorial and trans-governmental cooperation. Both the macro-regional strategies and the macro-regions themselves have been met with increasing interest across several disciplines, including geography, regional planning, political science and public administration, triggering questions...

Peacebuilding and state building have been discussed in the past as concepts having a difficult relationship with one another, at times involving trade-offs and even dilemmas. Analysing this relationship on the basis of relevant OECD/DAC documents, this briefing paper argues that the two concepts have in fact increasingly converged, representing today two different perspectives on one underlying problem. Regarding their positive vision, their action-guiding principles and even the areas of engagement they suggest, they are now largely congruent. This surprisingly high degree of common ground most likely reflects lesson-drawing from past state-building efforts and the older peacebuilding debate. Consolidating the two strands of the debate into one common framework and moving “from fragility to resilience” could be a logical way forward.

Events in the vicinity of the European Union are constantly challenging the EU's foreign policy, but complex internal governance processes have been hampering the EU from responding coherently. This analysis of the Northern Dimension Initiative considers whether the EU is compensating for this dilemma by adopting an innovative network governance strategy to integrate those external actors in the European North who can bring complementary resources to the policy-making processes. The formulation and execution of EU foreign policy may thus be alleviated, and the lack of internal problem-solving capacity does not automatically lead to failure in foreign policy-making.

In a time where everybody talks about the current situation and is trying to find some answers and even solutions in past similar situations, the volume edited by Stefan Gänzle, Guido Müntel and Evgeny Vinokurov with the title Adapting to European Integration? Kaliningrad, Russia and the European Union tries to find a new way to look at possible future developments in Europe. This book, that is better defined as a collection of good and very well documented articles, themselves an indispensable part, wants to be an analysis of a phenomenon that we expect to find only inside the boundaries of the European Union and the states that want to become part of it: Europeanization. In order for this intention to become a reality, the authors choose to study the singular case of oblast Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad, also known in the past as the city of Koningsberg and a part of East Prussia, is a small territory, part of the Russian Federation as an exclave, because it is not within the boundaries of Russia, but it is situated more than 500 km from it, having as neighbours Lithuania and Poland. From this situation the authors see the region of Kaliningrad as an enclave of the European Union even if it is not part of the Union, but Poland and Lithuania are.

Events in the vicinity of the European Union are constantly challenging the EU's foreign policy, but complex internal governance processes have been hampering the EU from responding coherently. This analysis of the Northern Dimension Initiative considers whether the EU is compensating for this dilemma by adopting an innovative network governance strategy to integrate those external actors in the European North who can bring complementary resources to the policy-making processes. The formulation and execution of EU foreign policy may thus be alleviated, and the lack of internal problem-solving capacity does not automatically lead to failure in foreign policy-making.

Makroregionale Strategien der Europäischen Union-eine Definition Makroregionale Strategien der Europäischen Union zielen auf Natur-, Funktions-beziehungsweise Kulturräume innerhalb Europas, die von einem Gebirgszug wie den Alpen, einem Binnenmeer wie der Ostsee oder auch einem Fluss wie der Donau maßgeblich geprägt werden. So verstand der damalige EU-Kommissar für Regionalpolitik, Paweł Samecki, eine Makroregion als ein aus unterschiedlichen Ländern und Regionen bestehendes Territorium, "das ein oder mehrere gemeinsame Charakteristika oder Herausforderungen" 1 aufweist. Eine aktuelle Definition der Europäischen Kommission aus dem Jahre 2013 fasst makroregionale Strategien dementsprechend als Entwurf zur Bewältigung gemeinsamer Herausforderungen und als "regionale Bausteine für eine EU-weite Politik, die nationale Ansätze in eine kohärentere Durchführung auf EU-Ebene einbinden." 2 Makroregionale Strategien formulieren also einen Gesamtrahmen für transnationale Zusammenarbeit, der sich sowohl an Mitglied-wie auch Drittstaaten desselben geografischen Raumes wendet, und versuchen zugleich, einen Beitrag zur Umsetzung des in Artikel 174 Vertrag über die Europäische Union (EUV) primärrechtlich verankerten Prinzips territorialer Kohäsion zu leisten-in Ergänzung der bereits im Vertrag von Maastricht 1992 vereinbarten Ziele sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Kohäsion. Im Hinblick auf den EU-Finanzplan für den Zeitraum von 2014 bis 2020 waren die jeweils betroffenen Mitgliedstaaten von der Europäischen Kommission dazu angehalten, die Ziele der bereits bestehenden makroregionalen Strategien sowohl in ihren Partnerschaftsabkommen als auch den operativen Programmen zur Umsetzung der EU-Regional-und Strukturpolitik aufzugreifen. Im Kern bilden makroregionale Strategien nunmehr einen Referenzpunkt zur politikfeldübergreifenden Koordination von Akteuren auch über die Regionalpolitik im engeren Sinne hinaus. Dabei besteht die Absicht, Synergieeffekte sowohl durch eine bessere Verknüpfung von Instrumenten unterschiedlicher Politikbereiche über die Grenzen von Politiksektoren (Transport, Umwelt usw.) als auch Gouvernanz-Ebenen (regional-mitgliedstaatlich-europäisch) hinweg zu erzielen. Damit knüpfen makroregionale Strategien zwar an die bereits bestehen

In the past, Baltic Sea cooperation has been characterized by a plethora of actors, embracing a wide range of policy objectives, such as the establishment of a good environmental status for the regional sea. In 2009, the European Council endorsed the European Union's (EU) Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) as a new tool in the repertoire of Cohesion Policy and European Territorial Cooperation (ETC). The EUSBSR seeks to foster cross-sectoral coordination and functional cooperation in policy areas of 'macro-region-level' relevance, such as transport infrastructure, economic development and environmental protectionthus projecting a 'soft space' of transnational Baltic Sea cooperation. Although firmly placed under the socalled 'Three No's', that is, the requirement of no additional EU funding, institutions and legislation, a lean governance architecture at the macro-regional level has emerged over time and the strategy mobilizes actors from all tenets of the EU's multilevel governance system, including the EU itself, its member and adjacent partner states, as well as subnational authorities and civil society. Drawing on the lens of experimentalist governance, this paper analyzes the underlying mechanisms that allow it to be gauged to what extent the Baltic Sea 'soft space' has solidified over the past decade. It also shows that the EUSBSR effectively rebalances EU transnational and intergovernmental regional cooperation in the Baltic macro-region.

Differentiation is becoming an increasingly salient feature of European integration. The multifaceted European crisis and the subsequent Brexit vote (paving the way for a groundbreaking case of differentiated disintegration) have led scholars and practitioners to think about the consequences of differentiated integration. This article draws on five empirical models of differentiation experienced by countries both inside and outside the EU: the European economic area model, the Danish model of (quasi-)permanent differentiation, the Swedish model of de facto differentiation, the instrumental model and the Brexit process of differentiation. It addresses the different risks and opportunities that each of these models entail. The article also introduces the contributions to this symposium, which aims at paving the way for future research on the consequences of differentiation in light of Brexit.

The Nordic countries constitute an interesting laboratory for the study of differentiated European Integration. Even though Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden share some historical, cultural, socio-economic and political characteristics, all those countries have ultimately opted for a different kind of relationship with the EU. Whereas Finland, a member of the Eurozone since its inception in 1999, has been considered to be part of the Union’s ‘inner core’ for quite some time, Iceland and Norway, in contrast, have opted to remain outside the EU albeit closely associated via the European Economic Area Agreement. The variation of relationships has also been reflected in Nordic parties’ positioning vis-à-vis European integration in general and differentiation of European integration in particular. Broadly speaking, party families can be distinguished along traditional (e.g., agrarian, Christian democratic, conservative, and social democratic) and modern (e.g., socialist left,...

This paper analyses the representation of the EU in Canadian print media focusing in particular on the EU’s 50th anniversary in March 2007. Assuming that the ways by which the European Union (EU) is being construed by the world media co-determines the EU’s role and, probably, its effectiveness as an international actor, we apply this hypothesis to the case of Canada. By utilising Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as our methodological tool, this paper analyses the reception and representation of the EU in Canadian print media, and further unveils the discursive strategies employed by different media outlets.

Jean Monnet, the first President of the High Authority, predecessor of the European Commission, famously maintained that "Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises" (Monnet 1978: 417). Extrapolating on this almost proverbial, but certainly popular and often quoted statement by one of the founding fathers of European integration after Europe's so far largest crisis-World War II-one could intuitively assume that most of the solutions, which have hitherto been propelled in response to crises, would include some form of differentiation by which one or several member states deviate in terms of functionality of integration temporarily or even permanently. As this chapter suggests, differentiation can

Figures Contributors Acknowledgements Abbreviations 1. Introduction: adapting to European integration? Kaliningrad, Russia and the European Union - Stefan Ganzle and Guido Muntel Part I: Analytical framework 2. Conceptualising Europeanisation in Eastern Europe: EU impact in 'likely' and 'unlikely' member states - Christoph Knill, Diana Pitschel and Michael W. Bauer 3. How do enclaves adjust to changes in the external environment? A theory of enclaves and the case of Kaliningrad - Evgeny Vinokurov 4. EU-Russia-Kaliningrad relations - a case of soft securitisation? - Holger Moroff Part II: The policy framework: Kaliningrad in its domestic and international context 5. Multi-level governance and centralisation in Russia: implications for EU-Russia relations - Joan DeBardeleben 6. Federalism in Russia: opportunity or constraint for Kaliningrad? - Stefan Meister 7. Social identity and regionalisation: the case of Kaliningrad - Anna M. Karpenko 8. Kaliningrad in its neighbo...

The Spitzenkandidaten experiment has been at the centre of a heated debate for several months now, prompting much speculation as to the changes it will bring to the balance of power between the EU institutions. But the real coup d’etat has been directed against the old process of appointing the European Commission President behind closed doors. Although the new procedure entails “a number of political, institutional and ‘thus’ constitutional ambiguities”, according to the authors of this commentary, it has rendered that process more transparent, if not more democratic – and will almost certainly endure to the next European elections in 2019 and beyond. As a result, they conclude that the new procedure is likely to trigger important changes in Europe’s political parties and elections.

Jean Monnet, the first President of the High Authority, predecessor of the European Commission, famously maintained that "Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises" (Monnet 1978: 417). Extrapolating on this almost proverbial, but certainly popular and often quoted statement by one of the founding fathers of European integration after Europe's so far largest crisis-World War II-one could intuitively assume that most of the solutions, which have hitherto been propelled in response to crises, would include some form of differentiation by which one or several member states deviate in terms of functionality of integration temporarily or even permanently. As this chapter suggests, differentiation can