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The share of Russian gas imports in total gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, %). Source: Eurostat (2015a, 2015c).

Table 17 The share of Russian gas imports in total gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, %). Source: Eurostat (2015a, 2015c).

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chart of different potential CEE diversification options (Fig. 1). Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions diversification. Purchasing gas from a non-Russian supplier can occur either through
chart of different potential CEE diversification options (Fig. 1). Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions diversification. Purchasing gas from a non-Russian supplier can occur either through
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(continued on next page)
BP: Flows are ona contractual basis and may not correspond to physical gas flows in all cases. IEA, Eurostat: The IEA’s definitions are the same as those of Eurostat in terms of import and export data. The IEA reports the ultimate origin of gas, i.e. the country in which gas was produced. Swap deals and spot purchases are taken into account as well. But only imports destined for use in the importing country are considered, and only exports of domestically produced gas are reported as exports (Mieke Reece, IEA, personal communication, 8 October 2013). GE (Gazprom Export): This gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance and is supplied by Gazprom Export under LTSCs. GG (Gazprom Group): These volumes include both exports from Russia and sales of gas purchased by the Gazprom Group outside Russia. Intra-group sales are not taken into account. Note: 2013 data from the JEA are estimates. Russian sources apply different standards for measuring gas volume than BP, the IEA and Eurostat. In this table, the
BP: Flows are ona contractual basis and may not correspond to physical gas flows in all cases. IEA, Eurostat: The IEA’s definitions are the same as those of Eurostat in terms of import and export data. The IEA reports the ultimate origin of gas, i.e. the country in which gas was produced. Swap deals and spot purchases are taken into account as well. But only imports destined for use in the importing country are considered, and only exports of domestically produced gas are reported as exports (Mieke Reece, IEA, personal communication, 8 October 2013). GE (Gazprom Export): This gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance and is supplied by Gazprom Export under LTSCs. GG (Gazprom Group): These volumes include both exports from Russia and sales of gas purchased by the Gazprom Group outside Russia. Intra-group sales are not taken into account. Note: 2013 data from the JEA are estimates. Russian sources apply different standards for measuring gas volume than BP, the IEA and Eurostat. In this table, the
Table 2 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions and two pending cases (Lithuania and Poland) (see Table 3).
Table 2 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions and two pending cases (Lithuania and Poland) (see Table 3).
Table 3 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Table 3 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Fig. 3. Gas demand (1*t column, annual, 2013 est.) vs. storage capacity (2™4 column, end-2013) in CEE (bcm). Source: Own compilation based on IEA (2014). 2013 (i.e. 40.1 bcm of the 68.9 bcm gas market).
Fig. 3. Gas demand (1*t column, annual, 2013 est.) vs. storage capacity (2™4 column, end-2013) in CEE (bcm). Source: Own compilation based on IEA (2014). 2013 (i.e. 40.1 bcm of the 68.9 bcm gas market).
aThe information came from a private study conducted by IHS CERA. According to John Roberts, the information dates back to 2010. » Final customers. ¢ The data for 2010 is also an estimate. 4 2008: 0.0 bcm; 2020: 0.2 bcm. ¢ Without Montenegro and Kosovo. f The most updated figure for 2020. Note: Declines are highlighted in grey. are also significant markets of Russian gas, but the rest are small or even negligible.
aThe information came from a private study conducted by IHS CERA. According to John Roberts, the information dates back to 2010. » Final customers. ¢ The data for 2010 is also an estimate. 4 2008: 0.0 bcm; 2020: 0.2 bcm. ¢ Without Montenegro and Kosovo. f The most updated figure for 2020. Note: Declines are highlighted in grey. are also significant markets of Russian gas, but the rest are small or even negligible.
respectively producing 84.1% and 70.4% of gas consumed domestically in 2013 (see Fig.
respectively producing 84.1% and 70.4% of gas consumed domestically in 2013 (see Fig.
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions Many hope unconventional gas will bring competition to the Russian-dominated CEE
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions Many hope unconventional gas will bring competition to the Russian-dominated CEE
Table 5 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions in 1999. Commissioned that year, Yamal-Europe reduced the significance of Slovakiz
Table 5 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions in 1999. Commissioned that year, Yamal-Europe reduced the significance of Slovakiz
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Fig. 8. Transit routes of Russian gas to CEE vs. Russian-backed Ukraine-bypass pipelines and pipeline plans and projects to Europe. Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. Note: HR: No LTSC with Gazprom. ME, KV and AL: No import capacity. For a legend of the different colours, see also Fig. A1.2 and Note (1) below Table Al in the Appendix. The European onshore connecting pipelines of Nord Stream (NEL and OPAL) and the Gazelle pipeline are also indicated and marked in dark grey. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey. The Sokhranovka-Oktyabrskaya gas pipeline is intended to transport gas to Southern Russia without transiting Ukraine. The map shows the latest version of South Stream before being abandoned. A South Stream leg planned to Macedonia has not been included. Yamal-Europe 2 is not on the agenda either. Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Fig. 8. Transit routes of Russian gas to CEE vs. Russian-backed Ukraine-bypass pipelines and pipeline plans and projects to Europe. Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. Note: HR: No LTSC with Gazprom. ME, KV and AL: No import capacity. For a legend of the different colours, see also Fig. A1.2 and Note (1) below Table Al in the Appendix. The European onshore connecting pipelines of Nord Stream (NEL and OPAL) and the Gazelle pipeline are also indicated and marked in dark grey. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey. The Sokhranovka-Oktyabrskaya gas pipeline is intended to transport gas to Southern Russia without transiting Ukraine. The map shows the latest version of South Stream before being abandoned. A South Stream leg planned to Macedonia has not been included. Yamal-Europe 2 is not on the agenda either. Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions Whichever option is chosen, EU Members and Energy Community Contracting Parties
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions Whichever option is chosen, EU Members and Energy Community Contracting Parties
South Stream: planned partners, ownership and routes. Source: Own compilation. Table 6
South Stream: planned partners, ownership and routes. Source: Own compilation. Table 6
Consequences of the Third Gas Directive on existing assets with Russian ownership in EU-member CEE countries. Ds Pee a as Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Consequences of the Third Gas Directive on existing assets with Russian ownership in EU-member CEE countries. Ds Pee a as Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Gazprom’s long-term transit contracts through the CEE region. Source: EE: ACER (2013), ERRA-ECA-PUC-NCC (2013); LT: Gazprom, Lietuvos Dujos; PL: Gaz-System; SK: Gazprom Export (2013), Medvedev (2012); CZ: Gazprom Export (2013), Net4Gas; RO: Transgaz (2013a, 2013b): BG: Gazprom Export (2013).
Gazprom’s long-term transit contracts through the CEE region. Source: EE: ACER (2013), ERRA-ECA-PUC-NCC (2013); LT: Gazprom, Lietuvos Dujos; PL: Gaz-System; SK: Gazprom Export (2013), Medvedev (2012); CZ: Gazprom Export (2013), Net4Gas; RO: Transgaz (2013a, 2013b): BG: Gazprom Export (2013).
Fig. 11. The losing gas pipeline projects from the western border of Turkey to Europe. Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. Note: For abbreviations, see Table 9. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey. White Stream, trans-Black Sea pipeline plan from Georgia to Romania, is not indicated on the map because this plan ha never been in competition for Shah Deniz 2 gas with other pipeline projects. Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Fig. 11. The losing gas pipeline projects from the western border of Turkey to Europe. Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. Note: For abbreviations, see Table 9. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey. White Stream, trans-Black Sea pipeline plan from Georgia to Romania, is not indicated on the map because this plan ha never been in competition for Shah Deniz 2 gas with other pipeline projects. Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Fig. 12. The winning gas pipeline project from the western border of Turkey to Europe Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. Note: For abbreviations, see Table 9. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey.
Fig. 12. The winning gas pipeline project from the western border of Turkey to Europe Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. Note: For abbreviations, see Table 9. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey.
Gazprom’s long-term gas supply contracts in CEE and price discounts (Disc.) by Gazprom since 2010. Source: Own compilation. The fertiliser producer Nitrofert purchased gas directly from Gazprom. In February 2009, it suspended its activities ue to high gas prices. At the end of 2012, Nitrofert finally reinitiated its gas imports. But these were stopped again in 1id-2013 (Egert Luukas, personal communication, 14 January 2014; Estonian Competition Authority). No information ; available about this contract. Also, no precise information is available about gas supplies from Russia’s Itera Oil and as Company to Estonia and Latvia. During 2012 and 2013, Russia’s independent gas producer Itera Oil and Gas ompany was acquired by Russia’s state-controlled Rosneft from Itera Holdings Limited (Cyprus). Consequently, osneft holds a 66% stake in Latvia’s Itera Latvija. Eesti Gaas purchases gas from Itera Latvija, but in small quantities. ccording to a 2009 presentation regarding the gas sales chain of Itera Oil and Gas Company in 2008, gas belonging to tera arrived at Itera Latvija through Gazprom Export, and then, in turn, was transferred from Itera Latvija to Eesti Gaas nd Latvia’s Latvijas Gaze. Henderson (2010: 70) claimed Itera had an LTSC to supply 0.6 bcma of gas to Latvia by 2030, vyhile supplies to Estonia were only 0.1 bcma. Reportedly, in 2011, Gazprom became the sole supplier of gas to Latvia nd Estonia. If all the above-mentioned points are true, then presumably Itera used Gazprom Export as an agent, but nder the new system presumably sells gas to Gazprom (DELFI, 2011; Interfax-Azerbaidzhan, 2011). Gazprom Export rgues the three Baltic States are supplied by Gazprom and not Gazprom Export (Gazprom Export Communications eam, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Also, see Note (b) below. Egert Luukas reported (personal ommunication, 14 January 2014) that Gazprom had been storing gas for winter supply in Latvia and, as curious as it 1ay be, there was no normal sale between Eesti Gaas and non-Gazprom companies. In Latvia, all import operations are handled by Latvijas Gaze on the basis of an LTSC among Latvijas Gaze, Gazprom Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Gazprom’s long-term gas supply contracts in CEE and price discounts (Disc.) by Gazprom since 2010. Source: Own compilation. The fertiliser producer Nitrofert purchased gas directly from Gazprom. In February 2009, it suspended its activities ue to high gas prices. At the end of 2012, Nitrofert finally reinitiated its gas imports. But these were stopped again in 1id-2013 (Egert Luukas, personal communication, 14 January 2014; Estonian Competition Authority). No information ; available about this contract. Also, no precise information is available about gas supplies from Russia’s Itera Oil and as Company to Estonia and Latvia. During 2012 and 2013, Russia’s independent gas producer Itera Oil and Gas ompany was acquired by Russia’s state-controlled Rosneft from Itera Holdings Limited (Cyprus). Consequently, osneft holds a 66% stake in Latvia’s Itera Latvija. Eesti Gaas purchases gas from Itera Latvija, but in small quantities. ccording to a 2009 presentation regarding the gas sales chain of Itera Oil and Gas Company in 2008, gas belonging to tera arrived at Itera Latvija through Gazprom Export, and then, in turn, was transferred from Itera Latvija to Eesti Gaas nd Latvia’s Latvijas Gaze. Henderson (2010: 70) claimed Itera had an LTSC to supply 0.6 bcma of gas to Latvia by 2030, vyhile supplies to Estonia were only 0.1 bcma. Reportedly, in 2011, Gazprom became the sole supplier of gas to Latvia nd Estonia. If all the above-mentioned points are true, then presumably Itera used Gazprom Export as an agent, but nder the new system presumably sells gas to Gazprom (DELFI, 2011; Interfax-Azerbaidzhan, 2011). Gazprom Export rgues the three Baltic States are supplied by Gazprom and not Gazprom Export (Gazprom Export Communications eam, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Also, see Note (b) below. Egert Luukas reported (personal ommunication, 14 January 2014) that Gazprom had been storing gas for winter supply in Latvia and, as curious as it 1ay be, there was no normal sale between Eesti Gaas and non-Gazprom companies. In Latvia, all import operations are handled by Latvijas Gaze on the basis of an LTSC among Latvijas Gaze, Gazprom Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Some characteristics of LNG regasification projects under construction in CEE. Source: Own compilation. FSRU - floating [LNG] storage and regasification unit. a To be achieved after the capacity expansion of the Klaipéda-Kiemeénai gas pipeline in Lithuania. ‘To be delivered from the end of December 2014. Litgas also has 16 non-binding master trade agreements with other LNG suppliers.
Some characteristics of LNG regasification projects under construction in CEE. Source: Own compilation. FSRU - floating [LNG] storage and regasification unit. a To be achieved after the capacity expansion of the Klaipéda-Kiemeénai gas pipeline in Lithuania. ‘To be delivered from the end of December 2014. Litgas also has 16 non-binding master trade agreements with other LNG suppliers.
Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. a See also Table A3 for supplementary information. » Without taking into account Lithuania’s LNG terminal. ME, KV and AL: No import capacity. See Fig. A1.2-A1.4. ¢« According to my collected data, all the border crossings are indicated on the map (including pipelines of local significance; either transmission or distribution). 4In fact, Makpetrol of Macedonia and Energoinvest of Bosnia and Herzegovina still extend their gas supply contracts annually. See Note (1) below Table A1 in the Appendix. ¢ The Austrian-Czech border is marked with an “X”, because there is only a connection of the distribution networks between Hevlin (CZ) and Laa an der Thaya (AT). f It includes new exit and entry points but excludes reverse flow projects as well as capacity expansions. ¢ In certain cases, more than one project/location was proposed. 4 From Austria’s Baumgarten via the Austrian-Hungarian gas interconnector (HAG), the Kittsee-Petrzalka gas pipeline (KIP) - an Austrian-Slovak “mini” gas pipeline - connects with the Southern Bratislava distribution system in Slovakia. KIP was completed after the January 2009 gas crisis broke out. i The Moldovan party, Moldovagaz is marked with an “S”, though it is half-owned by the Russian-state-controlled Gazprom and half by Moldova (Republic of Moldova: 35.33%; Transnistria: 13.44%; the latter stake is held by Gazprom in trust management). i Only a European Investment Bank loan.
Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. a See also Table A3 for supplementary information. » Without taking into account Lithuania’s LNG terminal. ME, KV and AL: No import capacity. See Fig. A1.2-A1.4. ¢« According to my collected data, all the border crossings are indicated on the map (including pipelines of local significance; either transmission or distribution). 4In fact, Makpetrol of Macedonia and Energoinvest of Bosnia and Herzegovina still extend their gas supply contracts annually. See Note (1) below Table A1 in the Appendix. ¢ The Austrian-Czech border is marked with an “X”, because there is only a connection of the distribution networks between Hevlin (CZ) and Laa an der Thaya (AT). f It includes new exit and entry points but excludes reverse flow projects as well as capacity expansions. ¢ In certain cases, more than one project/location was proposed. 4 From Austria’s Baumgarten via the Austrian-Hungarian gas interconnector (HAG), the Kittsee-Petrzalka gas pipeline (KIP) - an Austrian-Slovak “mini” gas pipeline - connects with the Southern Bratislava distribution system in Slovakia. KIP was completed after the January 2009 gas crisis broke out. i The Moldovan party, Moldovagaz is marked with an “S”, though it is half-owned by the Russian-state-controlled Gazprom and half by Moldova (Republic of Moldova: 35.33%; Transnistria: 13.44%; the latter stake is held by Gazprom in trust management). i Only a European Investment Bank loan.
Table S2
Table S2
Russian gas imports as a share of gross inland gas consumption, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, %). Source: Eurostat (2015a, 2015c).
Russian gas imports as a share of gross inland gas consumption, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, %). Source: Eurostat (2015a, 2015c).
Russian gas imports as a share of gas consumption, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, % Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014).
Russian gas imports as a share of gas consumption, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, % Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014).
Table $13
Table $13
Table $14
Table $14
The Czech Republic’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a). Table $12 Table S11 The Czech Republic’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, mmcm). Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014).
The Czech Republic’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a). Table $12 Table S11 The Czech Republic’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, mmcm). Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014).
Table S20 Slovakia
Table S20 Slovakia
Table $15 Table S16 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Table $15 Table S16 Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions
Slovenia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a). Table S24 Table S23 Slovenia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, mmcm). Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). Slovenia
Slovenia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a). Table S24 Table S23 Slovenia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, mmcm). Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). Slovenia
Table S25
Table S25
Slovenia’s gas imports, according to BP (2009-2011, bcm). Source: BP (2010, 2011, 2012).
Slovenia’s gas imports, according to BP (2009-2011, bcm). Source: BP (2010, 2011, 2012).
Romania’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a).
Romania’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a).
e — Estimates.
e — Estimates.
Table S34 Lithuania Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions Table S35
Table S34 Lithuania Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions Table S35
e - Estimates. NB - No such breakdown is available for that year. Table S42
e - Estimates. NB - No such breakdown is available for that year. Table S42
Table S41 Croatia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, mmcm). Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). Croatia
Table S41 Croatia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008-2013e, mmcm). Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). Croatia
Estonia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a).
Estonia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008-2013, mmcm). Source: Eurostat (2015a).
aImports other than from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdo! Turkmenistan. b Imports other than from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. NB - No such breakdown is available for that year.
aImports other than from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdo! Turkmenistan. b Imports other than from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. NB - No such breakdown is available for that year.
Table S47
Table S47
Gas consumption in CEE, according to Eurostat (2003-2013, Terajoule).? Source: Eurostat (2015c). a Gross inland consumption; net calorific value (NCV). One NCV equals to 0.9 gross calorific value (GCV).
Gas consumption in CEE, according to Eurostat (2003-2013, Terajoule).? Source: Eurostat (2015c). a Gross inland consumption; net calorific value (NCV). One NCV equals to 0.9 gross calorific value (GCV).
Gas production in CEE, according to Eurostat (2003-2013, Terajoule).? Source: Eurostat (2015c). a Primary production; net calorific value (NCV). One NCV equals to 0.9 gross calorific value (GCV).
Gas production in CEE, according to Eurostat (2003-2013, Terajoule).? Source: Eurostat (2015c). a Primary production; net calorific value (NCV). One NCV equals to 0.9 gross calorific value (GCV).
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