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Note: *significant at 5%, +significant at 10%, “significant at 15%; j*jointly signifi-

Table 5 Note: *significant at 5%, +significant at 10%, “significant at 15%; j*jointly signifi-

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Table 1: Payoffs in Lubao, Pampanga Even if the equivalent payoffs in the old style of the game (i.e. one number from 1 to 37) were the same as the current payoffs from, say, "First Ball" or "Diretsa", the current style is actually more confusing to the bettor who now has to choose to bet one or two numbers. The old style just requires the bettor to decide whether to bet or not, and on which number, but the current style requires him to decide whether to bet or not, then decide to bet on one or two numbers, before picking which number/s. That is, although the probability of winning conditional on having chosen to bet on just one number might be the same before and now, the ex ante probability of winning is actually lower now. , re: ee ee i) ce eee nn ees ie nn. a ea: ee ae .. ee
Table 1: Payoffs in Lubao, Pampanga Even if the equivalent payoffs in the old style of the game (i.e. one number from 1 to 37) were the same as the current payoffs from, say, "First Ball" or "Diretsa", the current style is actually more confusing to the bettor who now has to choose to bet one or two numbers. The old style just requires the bettor to decide whether to bet or not, and on which number, but the current style requires him to decide whether to bet or not, then decide to bet on one or two numbers, before picking which number/s. That is, although the probability of winning conditional on having chosen to bet on just one number might be the same before and now, the ex ante probability of winning is actually lower now. , re: ee ee i) ce eee nn ees ie nn. a ea: ee ae .. ee
Note that when a bettor has both higher (lower) net utility from degla and higher (lower) marginal utility from winning, then that bettor always demands more (less) or has more (less) elastic demand, and the draws are skewed against (towards) her. When net utilities from degla are the same, the bettor that has the higher marginal utility from winning demands more and is less favored to win. Similarly, if marginal utilities are the same, the bettor that has relatively higher net utilities from degla demands more. Note that when a bettor has both higher (lower) net utility from degla Table 2: Subgame-perfect Nash Equilibria h; — g;) and of their marginal utility f; from winning:
Note that when a bettor has both higher (lower) net utility from degla and higher (lower) marginal utility from winning, then that bettor always demands more (less) or has more (less) elastic demand, and the draws are skewed against (towards) her. When net utilities from degla are the same, the bettor that has the higher marginal utility from winning demands more and is less favored to win. Similarly, if marginal utilities are the same, the bettor that has relatively higher net utilities from degla demands more. Note that when a bettor has both higher (lower) net utility from degla Table 2: Subgame-perfect Nash Equilibria h; — g;) and of their marginal utility f; from winning:
If the above association is causal, this would imply that bettors are To proxy for the demand for jueteng, we obtain the average bet the individual placed in the current week and take its logarithm to create the variable InBet. Our variable of interest, degla, which captures the degla- intensity of the individual, is a binary variable that equals 1 if she engaged in or used degla that week, 0 otherwise. A casual comparison of the the value of InBet for degla users and non-degla users shows that the average (mean) InBet is higher for non-degla users:
If the above association is causal, this would imply that bettors are To proxy for the demand for jueteng, we obtain the average bet the individual placed in the current week and take its logarithm to create the variable InBet. Our variable of interest, degla, which captures the degla- intensity of the individual, is a binary variable that equals 1 if she engaged in or used degla that week, 0 otherwise. A casual comparison of the the value of InBet for degla users and non-degla users shows that the average (mean) InBet is higher for non-degla users:
Of course, the trend does not take into account the marginal utility from winning. All other things equal, a higher marginal utility from winning tends to induce the player to bet more (since a higher bet also translates to large payoff if the bettor wins). Taking into account degla, however, the marginal utility from winning can either bolster the positive effect of degla on demand, or it can dampen or overturn it. This is because as our model shows, the demand of bettors depends on the relative effects of the net utility from degla and the marginal utility from winning. To control for the effect on demand of the marginal utility from winning, we construct a binary variable Won which takes on one (zero) if the bettor won (lost) in her most recent play prior to the current week. The table below shows that among those who won (lost), the mean InBet is higher (lower) for degla users than for non-degla users. However, comparing across winners and above mean InInc and inc have higher InBet.
Of course, the trend does not take into account the marginal utility from winning. All other things equal, a higher marginal utility from winning tends to induce the player to bet more (since a higher bet also translates to large payoff if the bettor wins). Taking into account degla, however, the marginal utility from winning can either bolster the positive effect of degla on demand, or it can dampen or overturn it. This is because as our model shows, the demand of bettors depends on the relative effects of the net utility from degla and the marginal utility from winning. To control for the effect on demand of the marginal utility from winning, we construct a binary variable Won which takes on one (zero) if the bettor won (lost) in her most recent play prior to the current week. The table below shows that among those who won (lost), the mean InBet is higher (lower) for degla users than for non-degla users. However, comparing across winners and above mean InInc and inc have higher InBet.
The above suggests that the effects of degla, and/or winning in the past, The above suggests that the effects of degla, and/or winning in the past, are not straightforward. Simultaneously considering the effect of income can also make it harder to predict the final outcome on demand. ‘To tease out the effect of degla on demand, we thus control for the net utility from degla and the marginal utility from winning by running regressions of InBet on degla, InInc (and inc), and Won using various functional specifications. We also include a time dummy variable, June, and the (logarithmic) value of the most recent bet prior to the current one - InprevBet - as additional controls. The next section reports the results. their bet (relative to losing in the past).
The above suggests that the effects of degla, and/or winning in the past, The above suggests that the effects of degla, and/or winning in the past, are not straightforward. Simultaneously considering the effect of income can also make it harder to predict the final outcome on demand. ‘To tease out the effect of degla on demand, we thus control for the net utility from degla and the marginal utility from winning by running regressions of InBet on degla, InInc (and inc), and Won using various functional specifications. We also include a time dummy variable, June, and the (logarithmic) value of the most recent bet prior to the current one - InprevBet - as additional controls. The next section reports the results. their bet (relative to losing in the past).
Table 4: Marginal Effect dy/dx of Degla winning again. — oO ee ene een ee ee eee en nee amen eae ee one en IE For models (3) and (4), the table also provides cutoff values of InInc for Won= 1 (first element in the pair) and Won= 0 (second element). Note that the the cutoff points are lower for Won = 1 than Won = 0. That is, it takes a lower income for the positive effect of degla to kick in when the bettor won in a prior bet. That is, it seems that having won in a prior bet makes degla more ’affordable’ even at a lower income. This result is intuitive, since the bettor also takes into account the utility from possibly winning again.
Table 4: Marginal Effect dy/dx of Degla winning again. — oO ee ene een ee ee eee en nee amen eae ee one en IE For models (3) and (4), the table also provides cutoff values of InInc for Won= 1 (first element in the pair) and Won= 0 (second element). Note that the the cutoff points are lower for Won = 1 than Won = 0. That is, it takes a lower income for the positive effect of degla to kick in when the bettor won in a prior bet. That is, it seems that having won in a prior bet makes degla more ’affordable’ even at a lower income. This result is intuitive, since the bettor also takes into account the utility from possibly winning again.
Note: *significant at 5%, +significant at 10%, “significant at 15%; j*jointly signifi- Table 5: FE Results; Dependent Variable - InBet; N=80
Note: *significant at 5%, +significant at 10%, “significant at 15%; j*jointly signifi- Table 5: FE Results; Dependent Variable - InBet; N=80
Note: *significant at 5%, +significant at 10%, “significant at 15%; j*jointly signifi- Thus, whether by OLS, FE or 2SLS, the results suggest that degla-users have lower demand, that is, they systematically place lower bets than non- d d d d egla users. By revealed preference, degla-users must be deriving relatively lower utility from betting, even if they have that added enjoyment from egla. Of course, a simple, straightforward explanation might be that the psychic benefit from degla does not rise with the bet, but may actually ecrease with the amount of the bet. Perhaps there is something akin to a social stigma that a bettor incurs from his community if he engages in egla too much. That is, perhaps there is a socially acceptable optimal level of degla beyond which the bettor incurs a (psychic) loss. Our casual assessment of the interviews by Pamintuan in Lubao, Pampanga is that at least in that area, there seems to be no clear social stigma associated with intensive degla. A certain resident, Mang Teo, has a reputation there as a degla enthusiast, and yet this seems to be a source of pride for him.
Note: *significant at 5%, +significant at 10%, “significant at 15%; j*jointly signifi- Thus, whether by OLS, FE or 2SLS, the results suggest that degla-users have lower demand, that is, they systematically place lower bets than non- d d d d egla users. By revealed preference, degla-users must be deriving relatively lower utility from betting, even if they have that added enjoyment from egla. Of course, a simple, straightforward explanation might be that the psychic benefit from degla does not rise with the bet, but may actually ecrease with the amount of the bet. Perhaps there is something akin to a social stigma that a bettor incurs from his community if he engages in egla too much. That is, perhaps there is a socially acceptable optimal level of degla beyond which the bettor incurs a (psychic) loss. Our casual assessment of the interviews by Pamintuan in Lubao, Pampanga is that at least in that area, there seems to be no clear social stigma associated with intensive degla. A certain resident, Mang Teo, has a reputation there as a degla enthusiast, and yet this seems to be a source of pride for him.
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EconomicsMicroeconomicsSocial Science Research NetworkModel GenerationUtility Maximization
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