Strict Liability

In a few years, autonomous vehicles will be prevalent on roadways. These vehicles will be designed to operate without human intervention. Through the use of algorithms, a vehicle’s on-board computer will determine who or what is hit by that vehicle if a collision is unavoidable. This article demonstrates that current product liability standards are inapplicable to the new technology of autonomous vehicles, and suggests alternative approaches for compensating the victim chosen by an autonomous vehicle in an unavoidable accident scenario.

With the rapid advancement of human-centric artificial intelligence, this technology has become a significant factor influencing various fields, including medicine, industry, transportation, commerce, law, and banking. Machine-based artificial intelligence, through automated decision-making, has taken over tasks that were previously performed by humans. However, a fundamental challenge in this area is determining legal liability in cases where AI systems make errors. The significance of this issue lies in the fact that, in many countries, traditional civil liability laws are primarily based on human will and actions, and a comprehensive legal framework for artificial intelligence and automated decision-making has yet to be developed. This paper examines the theoretical foundations of civil liability in automated decision-making and the emerging challenges in this domain. This study employs an analytical-descriptive and comparative legal research method. Different legal systems have adopted varying approaches to determining AI civil liability. In the United States, liability is primarily assessed under product liability and vicarious liability doctrines, whereas the European Union is moving towards a strict liability model and AI civil liability insurance. In Iran, civil liability remains based on human and corporate legal personality, and AI lacks independent legal personality. Some legal systems, such as Germany, have proposed that AI-based decision- making should be subject to a corporate liability model. This paper analyzes various models for determining AI civil liability, including developer and manufacturer liability, operator liability, strict liability, civil liability insurance, and the possibility of granting AI limited legal personality. The strict liability model, which is gaining traction in the European Union, holds organizations accountable for AI- related damages, regardless of fault. In Iran, the absence of specific regulations in this area may lead to significant legal ambiguities and enforcement challenges in AI-related lawsuits. Finally, this paper emphasizes the necessity of drafting new legal regulations aligned with international standards to effectively address the legal challenges and civil liability issues arising from AI-driven automated decision- making.

Rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) and its mass application to domains of medicine, transport, and industry made determination of civil responsibility for errors by automatic decision making mechanisms an issue of law. The traditional mechanisms of law, based on human agency and fault ideology, lack proper means to take account of the autonomy and opaqueness of AI, so called "black box" syndrome. Applying analytical deductive and comparative approach, the current study examines the mechanisms of law responsible for AI related civil responsibility of Germany (product responsibility), the United States (product responsibility and agency), China (strict responsibility and state administration), Japan (auto regulation and product responsibility), Canada (fault and common law), the European Union (strict responsibility and obligatory insurance), and Iran (human fault). The results indicate that AI is not viewed as an independent juridical person within any of the examined jurisdictions and any responsibility is always attributed to developers or operators. The study recommends that spurred by international practice, Iran elaborate and apply a mechanism of law including strict responsibility of high-risk systems and obligatory civil insurance to achieve the target of technology development and protection of victims' rights.

Under a market setting, we analyse the impact of legal liability on prevention, taking into account the possible limited wealth of firms. We show that under strict liability, firms my choose ex ante not to be able to fully indemnify victims ex post: whatever the market structure, they may use limited liability strategically by investing in prevention in excess of what is socially optimal. The negligence rule prevents firms from over-investment. For high levels of damages, under both liability rules, firms exert an insufficient effort of prevention. A welfare analysis established that when the judgment proof problem is acute, the optimal public intervention ranges from banning the production to imposing the negligence rule.

Cultured meat, sometimes called in vitro, clean or cell-based meat, is an innovative approach to sustainable food production, addressing urgent problems like those surrounding wellbeing, the environment and health. Although the prospects for cultured meat are good, consumer acceptance is a key determinant for successful entry into the market. This paper aims to review the current trend and perspective of halal cultured meat in Malaysia. A review analysis was used in this paper to study the current literature on halal cultured meat with special reference to the evolution, challenges, and potential in Malaysia. The review analysis revealed several current trends and prospects of halal-cultured meat in Malaysia, including: (a) the process of cultured meat; (b) the challenges of the development of cultured meat; (c) the markets of cultured meat; (d) the halal parameters of cultured meat; and (e) the consumers' acceptance of cultured meat. In conclusion, the introduction of halal-cultured meat to the Malaysian market depends upon the intricate negotiation of the dynamics of consumer education, strategic communication, and the larger sociocultural and religious context. Future studies should include longitudinal research to measure behaviour change as a result of educational outreach and cross-cultural comparison of meat perception, religious adherence and product identity.

O presente artigo busca analisar se a prática da responsabilidade civil objetiva na seara das relações consumeristas reflete os avanços tão propalados pela doutrina ao longo dos séculos XIX e XX, sobretudo no que diz respeito à substituição do nexo de imputação da culpa pelo nexo de imputação do risco da atividade. Como método, serão analisadas as causas excludentes de responsabilidade previstas no Código de Defesa do Consumidor e as reconhecidas pela jurisprudência e doutrina. Em seguida, perscrutar-se-á se a aplicação jurisprudencial reflete uma responsabilidade calcada no risco ou se o fundamento do dever de reparar continua sendo a culpa.  

This article proposes a theory' of vicarious liability which attempts to explain the central features and limitations of the doctrine. The main premise of the article is that the common law should continue to impose vicarious liability because it can co-exist with the current tort law regime that imposes liability for fault. The author lays out the central features of the doctrine of vicarious liability and examines why the leading rationales (such as control, compensation, deterrence, loss-spreading, enterprise liability and mixed policy) fail to explain or account for its doctrinal rules. The author offers an indemnity theory for vicarious liability and examines why the current rules of vicarious liability are limited in application to employer-employee relationships and do not extend further. It is proposed that the solution to the puzzle of vicarious liability rests within the contractual relationship between employer-employee and not the relationship between the employer an...

The traditional view of tort liability in the USA is based on the assumption that fault generally turns on whether the tortfeasor's actions were reasonable. This understanding has resulted in a legal landscape where the exceptions defy the rule, creating anomalous areas of law that operate according to completely different rationales. This paper suggests that this is because the decisions that have created this landscape are motivated by less articulated rationales. An unarticulated adherence to the concept of transactional justice explains why anomalous doctrines such as strict liability and the law of necessity operate the way they do. But this adherence is tempered by equal awareness of the importance of reciprocal risks – the background risks of participating in society. This limiting doctrine of reciprocity explains the existence of negligence theory, and why some cases fall under a negligence standard while others fall under strict liability. The result is a more cohesive theory of liability, which allows for the intersection of two mutually limiting principles. This theory unites the various conflicting areas of tort law in US jurisprudence in a way that is conceptually logical, so that the exceptions are in fact predictable outcomes of the overarching pattern.

Trade secret theft is a costly and ongoing risk to many businesses. As the two most populous states, California and Texas are home to numerous businesses that own trade secrets. Although civil remedies afford one source of relief when a trade secret has been stolen or disclosed, collecting on a judgment may be impossible due to the Homestead laws in both states, which effectively render the defendants judgment proof. In such cases, another alternative is to consider a criminal prosecution under the Federal Economic Espionage Act or state law. The same misconduct that results in civil liability can also violate criminal laws. However, because federal prosecutors have so far shown minimal interest in pursuing cases that do not involve a foreign government or agent, a prosecution under state criminal trade secret theft statutes should be considered. This Article discusses how California and Texas trial and appellate courts have applied theses statutes so that businesses can better consider this alternative.

Trade secret theft is a costly and ongoing risk to many businesses. As the two most populous states, California and Texas are home to numerous businesses that own trade secrets. Although civil remedies afford one source of relief when a trade secret has been stolen or disclosed, collecting on a judgment may be impossible due to the Homestead laws in both states, which effectively render the defendants judgment proof. In such cases, another alternative is to consider a criminal prosecution under the federal Economic Espionage Act or state law. The same misconduct that results in civil liability can also violate criminal laws. However, because federal prosecutors have so far shown minimal interest in pursuing cases that do not involve a foreign government or agent, a prosecution under state criminal trade secret theft statutes should be considered. This Article discusses how California and Texas trial and appellate courts have applied theses statutes so that businesses can better cons...

This paper intends to identify the main legal issues that regard the recognition of compensation for damages; if a product or any of its component parts are defective, its manufacturer may be liable for damage under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) or the common law of negligence, caused by a wrongful act of another. The first part of the paper aims to give general information on the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to liability arising out of products. This institute is an additional guarantee for the protection of consumers, in addition to special legislation (for example: Law no. 9135, dated: 11.9.2003 "Consumer Protection") existing in this field. With the purpose of handling these cases the civil rights law has provided civil liability arising from products, in order to be clear and well-defined the responsibility of subjects that will be considered as such. Forecasting these provisions serves as a guarantee not only for the protection customers' of health or property but also to increase the quality standards of marketing of products by manufacturers. In the second part we shortly treat the constituent elements of liability arising from products and investigating potential cases of wide occurrence, which have arisen from the doctrine to which we must say that, have been mostly of foreign origin. As part of the civil liability arising from the products are also the unfair competition actions (Art. 638-640 of the Civil Code) and fraudulent publications (Art. 635-637 of the Civil Code). These are addressed in a general way at the end of this paper and finally this paper closes with indemnification and the treatment of types of damages caused to consumers as a result of the faulty produced goods or by low quality services and the appropriate rewards for those damages.

Before World War 11, in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 191. 202 (1963) ("the British law of 1897 played almost as important a role in the history of workmen's compensation legislation as the original German Act") (emphasis ad-ded); Reisenfeld, supra note 2, at 529, 536-39. Boyd is still cited as an authoritative source.

Many disasters are foreshadowed by insu¢cient preventative care. In this paper, we argue that there is a true problem of prevention, in that insu¢cient care is often the result of rational calculations on the part of agents. We identify three factors that lead to dubious e¤orts in care. First, when objective risks of a disaster are poorly understood, positive experiences may lead to an underestimation of these risks and a corresponding underinvestment in prevention. Second, redundancies designed for safety may lead agents to take substandard care. Finally, elected o¢cials have an incentive to underinvest in prevention for some disasters, especially those that are relatively unlikely.

This case note appraises the judicial proceedings in Cyprus Republic v Danail Naydenov, while at the same problematizes precedent for human trafficking offences. The three-member Criminal Court in Nicosia, disentangles itself from dated common law and adopts a fresh approach towards the adjudication on cases of human trafficking for sexual purposes.

Travel generally and group tours particularly have never been bigger businesses than they are today. But at the same time, never have tourists been more at risk for personal injury from a host of causes, including their own activities. To the tour operator, those risks can add up to a large potential liability if a guest is hurt during a tour. Potential liability arises from three sources. First, if the tour operator maintains control of (or actually owns) the vendor in whose care the guest is injured, the tour operator may be held liable. In most cases, the tour operator is merely packaging the services of independent third-party vendors, so control is rarely an issue. Second, if guests determine that the tour operator's descriptive brochures and collateral material created a false sense of security regarding the trip, those guests could then sue if they are hurt. Tour operators should therefore review their publications to ensure that they do not imply that the guest cannot be...

Sport administrators, sport coaches and physical educators in schools are expected to be well grounded in their profession. They are expected to work within their limit and minimize occurrence of accidents and severity of injuries if not out rightly eliminate it in physical education and sport settings. More than any other subject in the school curriculum, physical education and sport programmes expose students to risky situations, which sometimes result in accidents and injuries. These may sometimes result in litigations against the physical education teacher or the school authority, and if found guilty, a teacher may pay heavy damages for his negligence and may also lose his job. School authority may also be found to be vicariously liable with the burden of payment of heavy compensation. This paper presents an exposition of legal issues in the administration of physical education and sports in Nigeria schools. While this paper is not attempting to make an attorney out of a physical educator or sport administrator, the paper adopted a theoretical approach to explaining the need to be conscious of what

This study analyzes the responsibility framework for environmental risks from legal, economic, and philosophical perspectives, focusing on both individual and state-level accountability. Recognizing the need for proactive (ex-ante) risk management, we challenge the current frameworks that only respond after damage occurs. Tort liability, which operates on the damage-compensation axis, has disadvantages in terms of environmental protection. Besides, predetermined norms can lead to standards that are either excessively strict or too lenient than necessary before damage occurs. Moreover, the stochastic nature of environmental risks renders them unsuitable for purely normative consideration. We argue that pure normative approaches fail to consider the case-specific and dynamic nature of environmental risks. Instead, our study proposes probabilistic liability. The legal foundation of probabilistic liability lies in the recognition that the customary no-harm obligation encompasses the risk of harm as well. The research question of our study is: What is the legal consequence of causing a risk of harm? Drawing on insights from the theoretical arguments of the reality of risk, probabilistic causation, and risk attribution, we propose an innovative solution: courts mandating "judicial insurance" for those posing environmental risks. Courts may identify the coverage gap resulting from activities altering risk values and impacting sustainability in the incident under consideration. To address this gap, courts may enforce insurance obligations on operators under market conditions. This introduces a probabilistic liability model applicable to both states and individuals. This novel approach offers a more effective and adaptable mechanism for managing environmental risks while ensuring accountability and sustainability.

Epstein's strict liability model of tort law, first stated in 1973, relied on arguments derived from the history of the common law, starting with the late medieval period and extending into the nineteenth century. Since that seminal article was published, legal historical scholarship has deepened our understanding of earlier tort law and brought many new sources to bear, and it has also uncovered a pervasive if quiet Romanistic influence on doctrinal development. None of this new work overturns Epstein's historical intuitions, and his strict liability theory can continue to claim support in the practices of the older common law.

McBride (ibid, at 333, n 12) speculates that one of the causes of the catastrophe was the increased interest in legal academic circles with questions concerning the powers of the state and "what form the relations between the State and its citizens should take. As a result very little interest was paid to tort law -which was very much concerned with relations between citizens." We suspect that the rise of legal realist and functionalist analyses of law -analyses that malign or ignore traditional legal concepts and methodology but were dominant in academic discussions of private law until fairly recently -might also bear some of the responsibility; see Ernest Weinrib, "Can Law Survive Legal Education?" (2007) 60 Vand L Rev 401. 3 2011 ONCA 419, 332 DLR (4th) 641 [Antrim]. 7 McBride, supra note 1 at 335. 22 Antrim, supra note 3 at para 21, citing st Pierre, ibid. 23 [1962] SCR 624 [Loiselle]. 24 (1980), 29 OR (2d) 669, 114 DLR (3d) 477 (Div Ct) [Larson].

In a recent article, McBride suggests that our ability to understand, apply, and converse profitably about the law of tort was largely destroyed by a “catastrophe at some point in the twentieth century.”1 His argument is that, for reasons as yet unknown,2 our institutional memory – which once guarded and passed down an intuitive and largely unspoken sense of what tort law is and how it works – began to erode swiftly at some point in the last sixty years and has by now all but disappeared from contemporary judicial decisions. This catastrophe has been so complete that (as will be seen) even when modern judges are presented with evidence of the prior understanding they either miss its significance or mistake it as code for other things (such as evidence of the need for rigorous balancing or the implementation of hidden policy agendas). The argument of this case comment is that the recent Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in Antrim truck Centre Ltd v Ontario (minister of transportat...

Yet we lack a theory to explain the social function of the negligence concept and of the fault system of accident liability that is built upon it. This article attempts to formulate and test such a theory, primarily through a sample of 1528 American appellate court decisions from the period 1875-1905

Professor Fletcher challenges the traditional account of the development of tort doctrine as a shift from an unmoral standard
of strict liability for directly causing harm to a moral standard based on fault. He then sets out two paradigms of liability to
serve as constructs for understanding competing ideological viewpoints about the proper role of tort sanctions. He asserts that
the paradigm of reciprocity, which looks only to the degree of risk imposed by the parties to a lawsuit on each other, and to
the existence of possible excusing conditions, provides greater protection of individual interests than the paradigm of
reasonableness, which assigns liability instrumentally on the basis of a utilitarian calculus. Finally, Professor Fletcher
examines stylistic differences between the two paradigms which may explain the modern preference for the paradigm of
reasonableness.

This is part 2 of an article published in the Connecticut Trial Lawyers' Association's journal, the CTLA Forum, which discusses the confusion caused in Connecticut and elsewhere by the first and second Restatement of Torts' misdescription and lumping together of the actual causation and scope of liability elements of a tort liability claim under the question-begging and misleading phrases “substantial factor,” “legal cause” and “proximate cause and the Restatement Third's correction of most of the problems in the prior Restatements while still misstating or not completely understanding several issues. Part 1 is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=5291875. A complete and more readable version of the entire article is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=5130213.

In this part 2, I discuss the arguments in all three Restatements, which are implemented in the Third Restatement, that the superseding cause limitation on the scope of liability can and should be absorbed and replaced by the harm-risked (foreseeable consequences, harm matches the risk) limitation, despite the courts’ continued regular use of the superseding cause limitation and the Third Restatement’s having correctly replaced the harm-risked limitation with the risk playout (harm results from the risk) limitation. The Restatements fail to note the significant differences in the proper formulation and application of each limitation. The Restatement Third argues that the primary/sole rationale for the superseding cause limitation was mitigation of the inequitable allocation of liability among multiple responsible parties, which supposedly is no longer a concern given the modern practice of using comparative responsibility principles to allocate liability between plaintiffs and defendants and among defendants. Both parts of this argument are defective. First, the superseding cause limitation has never been based on a concern about inequitable apportionment of liability among multiple responsible parties in the absence of modern apportionment rules, but rather a concern that a defendant should not be deemed responsible at all for a harm that occurred only because of some highly unexpected or extraordinary conduct or event for which it would not be just to hold her responsible. Second, elimination of the superseding cause limitation would not change existing apportionment rules, none of which provide for comprehensive pure comparative responsibility and most of which would continue, in the absence of the superseding cause limitation, to impose substantial and even full legal responsibility on an actor for a harm that would not have occurred if not for the intervention of some highly unexpected or extraordinary conduct or event for which he should not justly be held responsible.

Part 2 concludes with a description and critique of the jury instructions, interrogatories and judicial opinions in Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. (Conn. 2019), as an example of the confusion generated by the Restatements, especially the first and second Restatements, which has yet to be fully clarified and resolved in the Restatement Third.

This is part 1 of an article published in the Connecticut Trial Lawyer Association's journal, the CTLA Forum, which discusses the confusion caused in Connecticut and elsewhere by the first and second Restatement of Torts' misdescription and merging of the actual causation and scope of liability elements of a tort liability claim and the Restatement Third's correction of most of the problems in the prior Restatements while still misstating or not properly understanding several significant issues. Part 2 is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=5291799. A complete and more readable version of the article is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=5130213.

This part 1 discusses the substantial confusion regarding the required elements for tort liability caused by the the first and second Restatements’ misdescription and merging together of the actual causation and scope of liability elements under the question-begging and misleading phrases “substantial factor,” “legal cause” and “proximate cause.” It describes the first and second Restatements' defective treatments of actual causation, their unsupported adoption of the harm-risked (foreseeable consequences, harm matches the risk) limitation as a limitation on duty, and their unsuccessful attempt to make that limitation more consistent with the cases by excluding significant aspects of the foreseeable risks, acknowledging significant exceptions, and employing explanations that gutted the limitation by using hindsight rather than foresight. Many of the comments in the first and second Restatements employed normatively more attractive and descriptively more plausible risk playout (harm results from the risk) language rather than harm-risked language, without apparently being aware of the significant difference between these two formulations.

The Restatement Third abandons use of the “substantial factor,” “proximate cause” and “legal cause” terminology and clearly distinguishes the “factual causation” issue from the “scope of liability” issue. It adopts (except for the deficient blackletter in section 27) the proper NESS analysis as the comprehensive test of factual causation. It adopts Andrews’ position in the Palsgraf case that a duty is owed to everyone to exercise reasonable care when engaging in conduct that creates foreseeable risks to others, subject to categorical principle-or-policy-based limits in specific types of situations. It adopts the risk-playout limitation on the scope of liability in place of the previously adopted harm-risked limitation on duty, although it also does not seem to recognize the significant difference between the two limitations. It properly recognizes, as distinct limitations on the scope of liability, the “no worse off” and “trivial contribution” limitations.

Presentación ante la Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (ACIENPOL) de Venezuela el 19/06/2025 de una ponencia sobre el Proyecto de Código Orgánico de Derecho Penal Internacional (CODEPI), de mi autoría, a los fines de implementar el Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional y otros Tratados Internacionales como las Convenciones de la ONU contra el Genocidio, contra el Apartheid, de Ginebra y sus Protocolos entre otros instrumentos de Derecho
Internacional Penal y Humanitario
Este instrumento es fundamental para poner punto final a la mora legislativa en Venezuela respecto de la Convención de la ONU contra el Genocidio de 1948, de una mora de 77 años y del Estatuto de Roma de la CPI de 1998, entre otros. Se trata de una legislación sistemática e integral sobre las diversas materias de la jurisdicción penal internacional.

, in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court, considering a challenge to a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets, stated: We do not deal here with the wisdom or lack of wisdom of these . . . legislative enactments. The legislative history of these laws, in this state and others, demonstrates that they have dedicated proponents and equally dedicated opponents. The question before us is not what a legislature should do, but what the legislature can do. As has been said: "Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation ....

In defective design and warning cases, courts and commentators increasingly are questioning the substantive distinction between negligence and strict liability causes of action. In 1998, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability adopted a risk/utility analysis for defective design and warning claims that reflects a strong trend among jurisdictions in two ways. First, it advocated using the risk/utility test regardless of whether plaintiffs label their claims as negligence or strict liability (or, for that matter, implied warranty of merchantability). Second, the Restatement's risk/utility analysis draws from principles of reasonableness, making strict liability essentially subject to a negligence analysis. In light of courts' trend toward risk/ utility and the Restatement's position, commentators increasingly have wondered whether a plaintiffs choice between negligence and strict liability in design and warning claims largely amounts to a rhetorical preference. In this Article, Professors Richard L. Cupp Jr. and Danielle Polage present an empirical study of mock jurors that tests whether employing negligence versus strict liability language influences jury decisions when a substantively identical risk/utility standard is used. The authors found support for the perhaps counterintuitive argument that negligence language may favor plaintiffs by drawing on emotionally "hot" notions of fairness and fault, as opposed to the "cold" technical concepts of strict liability. The study found that jurors hearing the case under negligence language were more likely to find the defendant liable, and that they awarded, on average, almost twice the amount of damages compared to their strict liability counterparts. Indeed, although several findings showed advantages to using negligence language or disadvantages to using strict liability language, the study found no obvious rhetorical advantages to using strict liability language. The study thus presents a powerfid challenge to the notion that strict liability is generally a pro-plaintiff doctrine under courts' increasingly dominant approaches to design and warning cases.

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW OF TORT The law of tort is a branch of civil law that provides remedies to individuals who have suffered harm or injury due to the wrongful conduct of others. Unlike criminal law, which deals with offenses against the state, tort law focuses on the rights and duties of individuals in society and provides compensation for individuals harmed by the actions or omissions of others. A "tort" itself refers to a civil wrong that causes someone to suffer loss or damage, and tort law seeks to rectify these wrongs through various remedies, such as damages (financial compensation) or injunctions (orders to do or refrain from doing something). Tort law is foundational to the legal system as it helps regulate interactions between individuals, organizations, and society at large. It covers a broad range of conduct, from personal injury and property damage to defamation and interference with contractual or economic relationships.

An Individual Company is a new legal entity intended for Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) actors to obtain legal entity status. However, based on the taxation perspective, establishing an Individual Company raises the consequence of tax imposition on one party that is substantially the same entity, namely MSEs as Individuals and Individual Companies as Legal Entities. This study intends to examine the taxation responsibility attached to the Individual Company as a law entity so taxpayers can carry out their tax obligations. The study method used is normative juridical with descriptive-analytical research specifications and qualitative juridical data analysis. The results of this study indicate that MSE actors who establish themselves as Individual Companies are given Corporate Taxpayer status with all its legal consequences. Direktorat Jenderal Pajak (DJP) needs to make adjustments and relax the Rights and Obligations of Corporate Taxpayers in the form of Individual Companies so tha...

The authors consider the question of whether warranty law in Maryland now provides the plaintiff in a product liability case with a cause of action similar to that which would be available under the doctrine of strict liability in tort. The development of the strict liability doctrine is traced and its current scope and requirements for recovery are compared with those of the action for breach of the implied warranty provided in the Uniform Commercial Code. One of the most phenomenal events in product liability law has been the rapid adoption by most jurisdictions of "strict liability in tort." ' The courts in these jurisdictions have supplemented common law negligence remedies by creating a new theory of tort liability. This doctrine allows recovery by any person who was injured by a defective product, regardless of whether he was a party to the contract for its sale. 2 Maryland is not among the jurisdictions that have adopted strict liability in tort. 3 Yet the question arises of whether gradual changes in Maryland law have accomplished a similar result. This article will examine that question. A discussion of the origin and development of the doctrine of strict liability will be followed by a comparison of its current scope with the scope of the action for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code 4 [hereinafter referred to as the Code] as it now exists in Maryland.'

Legal and moral norms have expanded their protections of individual autonomy over the centuries. The emphasis and impressions by most scholars regarding this progress, however, have been misleading, in my view. It is not that we have developed better standards by which to protect a pre-existing conception of autonomy. This puts the endeavor backwards. It is, to the contrary, that our evolving rules and standards of rights and duties create and delineate what we mean by autonomy. Autonomy, in a nutshell, is that which is protected by adopted norms. In a prior article I examined the process by which substantive rights protecting autonomy are established. In this piece I turn to the process of adopting requital rights associated with the violation of particular substantive rights. Both substantive and requital rights are crucial to the delineation of a person’s range of autonomy.

Answering law scenario examination questions requires a structured, logical, and methodical approach to ensure you cover all the necessary aspects of the case. Here's a step-by-step guide on how to effectively answer a law scenario exam question: 1. Read the Question Carefully Understand the Facts: Read the scenario multiple times to understand the key facts. Identify the parties involved, the events that occurred, and the legal issues raised. Identify the Legal Issue(s): Law exam scenarios typically present a situation that involves a legal dispute. Determine the main legal issue or issues in the scenario this could be a question of negligence, contract law, tort law, criminal law, etc. Example: If the question is about a negligence case, the legal issue might be whether a duty of care was owed, whether that duty was breached, and whether the breach caused harm.

The theory and doctrine of proximate cause has been too easily dismissed.
Two primary errors underlie this dismissal: a misunderstanding of “causal
proximity,” and a mistaken inference from the correct observation that
effects have multiple causes, to the claim that there is no hierarchy between
proximate and more remote causes. This article defends the classic
conception of proximate causation as causally grounded by reconstructing
the doctrine and articulating an underlying concept of proximate causation
in which proximity is relative (though still objective).
Proximate causation is a relation between two causes and an effect, when
one cause mediates the effects of another. This idea informs the doctrines of
proximate cause, which, following Bacon’s Maxim, trace back from the
injury to its causes, in sequence. along the paths of causation, until
responsibility is absorbed, at which point the process terminates. Causal
chains “break”: not because the cause and effect are too remote, but because
a set of causes that are proximate, relative to these remote causes, are
sufficient to absorb responsibility. With responsibility absorbed, there is
nothing further to trace back. This is missed if tracing is from cause to injury,
rather than in reverse, from injury to cause.
As a matter of responsibility, the responsibility of remote actors—those
that act through the agency of others, or those that fail to prevent the
wrongdoing of others—is always subordinate to that of the causally
proximate actor. This does not mean that the proximate actor always bears
greater responsibility than the remote one, but when responsibility is
transmitted remotely, it must be in virtue of a justifying or excusing condition
for the proximate actor’s act. The order of justification follows the order of
causation.
Properly understood, proximate cause is essentially a defense that asserts that the defendant is not the most proximate cause to the harm, and that someone (or something) else is. The implications for both liability and contribution are discussed.

In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.' the Supreme Court of California helped lead the country into the wonderland of strict products liability. That court has now rendered a decision 2 that, by its clear explication of why strict products liability should not apply to prescription drugs, demonstrates with equal clarity that products liability should not be viewed as a species of strict liability. Instead, products liability should be viewed as a hybrid of negligence and warranty law. This thesis-that strict products liability is not so strict-is not particularly novel. 3 Indeed, this exact observation was

An efficient international system for the prevention of oil marine pollution is dependent upon the provision of effective deterrence mechanisms. Effective and adequately severe sanctions should be part of this system. Growing concerns regarding accidents causing extensive oil marine pollution have led to criticism regarding the lack of a deterrence effect for the international civil liability regime. French criminal courts in the Erika case have interpreted the international civil and criminal liability regimes in a radical, though inspiring, way. This article analyzes the approach of the French courts with regard to criminal liability for oil marine pollution, channelling of civil liability and claims for environmental damage per se. It concludes by identifying the impact of these judgments on the future of the international liability regimes for oil pollution damage, especially considering their role as mechanisms for the prevention of oil marine pollution.

Professor Gregory Keating's framework for understanding Tort Law shares some of the structural problems found in the economic theories he rejects. This is brought out here through a discussion of the nature of "corrective justice" theories, tort law's distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and the structure of instrumental explanation. Contrary to Keating's own view, his theory of torts is instrumentalist.

Em vários artigos de Análise Econômica do Direito sobre responsabilidade civil extracontratual ênfase tem sido dada a uma suposta diferença entre responsabilidade objetiva e subjetiva. Na responsabilidade objetiva o ofensor é responsável pelas perdas de uma vítima independentemente de seu nível de cautela. Já no caso de responsabilidade subjetiva, o ofensor não é responsabilizado se tomou, ao menos, o nível de cautela juridicamente exigido. De acordo com a literatura predominante na AED, essa característica da responsabilidade subjetiva criaria uma descontinuidade nos custos privados esperados do ofensor. Nesse artigo, argumento que essa descontinuidade inexiste na realidade, pois os Tribunais, ao aplicarem a responsabilidade subjetiva, exigem que a negligência seja a causa necessária do acidente. Assim sendo, se o modelo adotado na análise econômica da responsabilidade civil não reflete a essência do desse corpo de regras, não será capaz de gerar previsões adequadas ou recomendações úteis.

In dit artikel onderzoeken wij met behulp van inzichten uit de rechtseconomie of beperking van de aansprakelijkheid van toezichthouders wegens falend toezicht wenselijk is. Omdat er redenen zijn om te vrezen dat onbeperkte aansprakelijkheid tot excessief toezicht leidt, betogen wij dat de aansprakelijkheid inderdaad beperkt moet worden. Deze beperking moet niet bestaan in een maximumbedrag waarvoor de toezichthouder aansprakelijk kan zijn, maar in een soepeler gedragsstandaard, zoals 'opzet of grove schuld'. Aansprakelijkheid voor toezichthouders, en de eventuele beperking daarvan, is al enige tijd een hot topic. In de discussies die over dit onderwerp gevoerd worden, verschillen de meningen sterk en worden veel argumenten pro en contra aansprakelijkheid, en pro en contra beperking van die aansprakelijkheid aangevoerd. 1 Het zal niemand verbazen dat de toezichthouders zelf voorstander zijn van een beperking van hun aansprakelijkheid. In de notitie 'Effectief Markttoezicht' betogen verschillende martktoezichthouders dat de dreiging van schadeclaims onder omstandigheden een verlammende werking kan hebben op het toezicht. 2 Deze gewenste beperking van aansprakelijkheid is voor één categorie van toezichthouders realiteit geworden. Op 1 juli 2012 is namelijk de Wet aansprakelijkheidsbeperking DNB en AFM en bonusverbod staatsgesteunde ondernemingen in werking getreden. Deze wet introduceert een expliciete wettelijke beperking van de aan-1 Zie bijvoorbeeld I. Giesen, Toezicht en aansprakelijkheid: een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar de rechtvaardiging voor de aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad van toezichthouders ten opzichte van derden, Deventer: Kluwer 2005; A.A. van Rossum, Civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van toezichthouders (Preadvies Nederlandse Juristenvereniging), Deventer: Kluwer 2005; C.C. van Dam, Aansprakelijkheid van Toezichthouders. Een analyse van de aansprakelijkheidsrisico's voor toezichthouders wegens inadequaat handhavingstoezicht en enige aanbevelingen voor toekomstig beleid, British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2006; I. Giesen, Regulating regulators through liability. The case for applying normal tort rules to supervisors, Utrecht Law Review (2006) vol. 2, issue 1; D. Busch, Aansprakelijkheid van financiële toezichthouders, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2010; D. Busch, Naar een beperkte aansprakelijkheid van financiële toezichthouders?, Deventer: Kluwer 2011. Zie ook de brief (FM 2005-02 345 U) van 11 oktober 2005 van de minister van Financiën betreffende Kamervragen over de aansprakelijkheid van de AFM. 2 Notitie Effectief Markttoezicht, inbreng van Markttoezichthoudersberaad AFM, Consumentenautoriteit, CBP, DNB, NMa, NZa en OPTA voor de herziening van de Kaderstellende Visie op Toezicht (KVOTIII), 5 september 2011, p. 17 (<www.nza.nl/104107/137001/Effectief_Markt toezicht.pdf>). 22 Tijdschrift voor Toezicht 2012 (3) 4 Dit artikel uit Tijdschrift voor Toezicht is gepubliceerd door Boom juridisch en is bestemd voor Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 500266

'Take care, stay alive', zo eindigde Fish, de favoriete zanger van mijn in 1996 overleden broer Abel, zijn concerten altijd. Dit motto is een kernachtige samenvatting van het basisidee uit mijn proefschrift: door zorgvuldig te zijn, kunnen mensen ongevallen en alle -soms fatale -gevolgen van dien proberen te voorkomen. Ik vind het spijtig dat Abel en mijn in 1983 overleden moeder mijn promotie niet meemaken. Gelukkig zijn er veel mensen die er wel bij zijn. Een aantal van hen wil ik bedanken voor de hulp die zij, op welke manier dan ook, bij mijn promotie hebben geboden. Allereerst mijn twee promotoren, Heico Kerkmeester en Roger Van den Bergh. Ik bedank hen voor de geboden begeleiding, de discussies die we over uiteenlopende onderwerpen hebben gevoerd en de commentaren die ze op eerdere versies van het proefschrift hebben geleverd. De overige leden van de kleine promotiecommissie bedank ik voor hun opbouwende commentaar. Datzelfde geldt voor mijn paranimfen, Hanneke en Jason. Ook bedank ik Jason voor zijn hulp bij de vertaling van de samenvatting. Mijn collega's van het Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, het RILE, bedank ik voor de vriendschappelijk werkomgeving die ze creëren en waar het prettig werken is. Ik wil Roger Van den Bergh bedanken voor de manier waarop hij voor het RILE strijdt, telkens als dat nodig is. Lang leve de RILE spirit! En ik bedank Wicher Schreuders voor het lezen en becommentariëren van het manuscript. Voor wat betreft mijn familie beperk ik mij tot twee mensen, omdat het voorwoord anders langer wordt dan de hoofdtekst. Mijn broer Jan Kees heeft mij lang geleden gelukkig overtuigd om toch vooral naar de universiteit te gaan en mijn vader heeft het, samen met mijn moeder, altijd belangrijk gevonden om al hun kinderen een goede opleiding mee te geven. Daar ben ik hen dankbaar voor. Ook bedank ik Jan Kees voor zijn hulp bij de vormgeving van mijn proefschrift. Een bijzonder bedankje gaat naar 'de band', in de verschillende samenstellingen die er inmiddels zijn geweest. Niets werkt zo ontspannend als een avondje herrie maken met een groep vrienden. Tenslotte mijn eigen gezin. Hoe kan ik jullie nou bedanken? Elke opsomming schiet schromelijk tekort bij wat jullie voor me betekenen. Om dan toch iets te noemen wat met het werk te maken heeft: bedankt Jeroen en Emma, voor jullie inspiratie bij de colleges speltheorie. Ik heb nooit meer verlegen gezeten om voorbeelden betreffende het doeltreffend blokkeren van strategisch gedrag door het onmogelijk maken van communicatie: keihard gillen of je vader gewoon negeren. En nogmaals bedankt Hanneke, voor de eindeloze discussies en gesprekken die we hebben over de meest zinnige en onzinnige dingen. Bedankt voor het aanhoren van mijn zoveelste redenering, mijn zoveelste onduidelijkheid, mijn zoveelste oplossing. Ik draag dit boek aan jou op. vii

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk provided by Erasmus University Digital Repository Michael Faure is verbonden aan het Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE) van de Erasmus School of Law (ESL). Hij is daarnaast ook verbonden aan de Universiteit Maastricht. * Louis Visscher is verbonden aan het Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE) van de Erasmus School of Law (ESL). ** Onze dank gaat uit naar Marina Jodogne (Maastricht) en Marianne Breijer (Rotterdam) voor redactionele ondersteuning. Zie desbetreffend onder meer W. van Boom & M. Loos (red.), Collective enforcement of consumer law, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2007; J. Steele & W. van Boom (red.), Mass justice, challenges of re-Zie desbetreffend onder meer M. Faure & F. Weber, 'Dispersed losses in tort law -an economic analysis',