Strategic Behavior

The presence of venture capital in the ownership structure of U.S. firms going public has been associated with both improved long-term performance and lower underpricing at the time of the IPOs. In Japan, we find the long-run performance of venture capital-backed IPOs to be no better than that of other IPOs, with the exception of firms backed by foreign owned or independent venture capitalists. Many of the major venture capital firms in Japan are subsidiaries of securities firms that may face a conflict of interest when underwriting the venture capital-backed issue. When venture capital holdings are broken down by their institutional affiliation, we find that firms with venture backing from securities company subsidiaries do not perform significantly worse over a three-year time horizon than other IPOs. On the other hand, we find that IPOs in which the lead venture capitalist is also the lead underwriter have higher initial returns than other venture capital-backed IPOs. The latter result suggests that conflicts of interest influence the initial pricing, but not the long-term performance, of initial public offerings in Japan. Institutional Affiliation and the Role of Venture Capital: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings in Japan

De Finetti's (1974) theory of coherent 2-sided previsions serves as the basis for numerous IP generalizations. His 2-person, zero-sum prevision-game uses a class of bounded random variables X measurable with respect to some common space {Ω , B}. One player, the bookie, is required to post a "fair" 2-sided prevision P(X) for each X ∈ X. The bookie's opponent, the gambler, may choose finitely many non-zero real numbers{α i} where, when the state ω∈Ω obtains, the payoff to the bookie is Σ i α i( Xi(ω ) - P(Xi) ), and the opposite payoff, -Σ i α i( Xi(ω ) - P(Xi) ), is for the gambler. That is, the bookie is obliged either to buy (when α > 0), or to sell (when α < 0) |α |- many units of X at the price, P(X). Hence, the previsions are 2-sided or fair. The bookie's previsions are incoherent if the gambler has a strategy that insures a uniformly negative payoff for the bookie. Otherwise, the bookie's previsions are coherent. De Finetti's Fundamental...

We focus on downstream uses that combine multiple intellectual property rights and examine the effects of introducing an intellectual property clearinghouse that reduces transaction costs associated with licensing. We show that this causes equilibrium royalties to rise in some cases and may harm licensors due to the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’. Downstream welfare effects may also be positive or negative and we characterise the effects on downstream manufacturers and final con-sumers. We also show that total welfare is most likely to increase following a transaction cost reduction when the number of intellectual property rights per downstream use is small, or if rights are relatively substitutable in downstream use, but it is also possible for welfare to decrease. JEL: L24, O34.

This article reviews some of the basic institutional elements and empirical regularities of the U.S. electoral college system. Historical election results confirm the expected dominance of the winner-takeall allocation of electors within each state. Of greater interest is the array of state preferences for the electoral college given a national popular vote as the contemplated alternative. It is necessary to be clear about what is meant by a state’s preference. The concept explored here is sometimes referred to as a state’s a priori preference. A state prefers a priori the system that results in the greater potential influence of its voters, as represented by the state’s popular-vote majority, on the outcome of an election. In this context the term “a priori” means in consideration of only the system itself, without (a posteriori) considerations of actual or likely outcomes in particular elections (see Felsenthal and Machover 2004.) In addition, as discussed below, a state can be sa...

Traditional management of electricity portfolios is focused on the day-ahead market and futures of longer maturity. Market participants use these markets to trade any excess production or consumption in their portfolio and balance their total position. Within limits, market participants can also resort to the balancing energy market to close their positions. The energy transactions on the balancing energy market can be separated into fluctuations caused by unpredictable events and strategic positions. In this paper, we determine strategic positions and identify corresponding economic incentives in an analysis of the German balancing energy demand. The strategies discussed contribute to an effective functioning of the electricity market.

We propose a dynamic econometric microstructure model of trading, and we investigate how the dynamics of trades and trade composition interact with the evolution of market liquidity, market depth, and order flow. We estimate a bivariate generalized autoregressive intensity process for the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades for 16 actively traded stocks over 15 years of transaction data. Our results show that both informed and uninformed trades are highly persistent, but that the uninformed arrival forecasts respond negatively to past forecasts of the informed intensity. Our estimation generates daily conditional arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades, which we use to construct forecasts of the probability of information-based trade (PIN). These forecasts are used in turn to forecast market liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads and the price impact of orders. We observe that PINs vary across assets and over time, and most importantly that they are correlated across assets. Our analysis shows that one principal component explains much of the daily variation in PINs and that this systemic liquidity factor may be We thank Mark Ready, Schmuel Baruch, and seminar participants at

In recent years the comply-or-explain approach for enforcing corporate governance norms has gained ground in regulatory parlance. The comply-or-explain approach has the advantage of tailoring governance norms to specific characteristics of individual companies which is believed to lead to more efficient corporate governance outcomes compared to the "one size fits all" approach that is often argued to be inherent in the comply-or-else approach. Yet, the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain approach presupposes the existence of many institutional conditions like ownership and control structure of companies, responsibility and transparency of their financial operations, efficiency of stock markets, and ability and incentives of shareholders to assess corporate behavior, all of which could take a long time to evolve and could be challenging especially for emerging economies. This article critically examines the relative advantages of the comply-or-explain approach vis-à-vis the more traditional comply-or-else approach and identifies the specific institutional conditions which are required for its success in achieving effective governance of companies.

In recent years the comply-or-explain approach for enforcing corporate governance norms has gained ground in regulatory parlance. The comply-or-explain approach has the advantage of tailoring governance norms to specific characteristics of individual companies which is believed to lead to more efficient corporate governance outcomes compared to the "one size fits all" approach that is often argued to be inherent in the comply-or-else approach. Yet, the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain approach presupposes the existence of many institutional conditions like ownership and control structure of companies, responsibility and transparency of their financial operations, efficiency of stock markets, and ability and incentives of shareholders to assess corporate behavior, all of which could take a long time to evolve and could be challenging especially for emerging economies. This article critically examines the relative advantages of the comply-or-explain approach vis-à-vis the more traditional comply-or-else approach and identifies the specific institutional conditions which are required for its success in achieving effective governance of companies.

Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.

Writing development involves changes that occur in children’s strategic behavior, knowledge, and motivation. The authors examined the effectiveness of self-regulated strategy development (SRSD), a strategy instructional model designed to promote development in each of these areas. Instruction focused on planning and writing stories and persuasive essays. The addition of a peer support component to SRSD instruction aimed at facilitating maintenance and generalization effects was also examined. SRSD had a positive impact on the writing performance and knowledge of struggling second-grade writers attending urban schools serving a high percentage of low-income families. In comparison with children in the Writers’ Workshop condition, SRSD-instructed students were more knowledgeable about writing and evidenced stronger performance in the two instructed genres (story and persuasive writing) as well as two uninstructed genres (personal narrative and informative writing). Moreover, the peer ...

In the absence of enforceable contracts, many economic and personal interactions rely on trust and reciprocity. Research shows that although this reliance often works well, sometimes it breaks down. Simple rules mandating minimum standards on reciprocation prevent the most egregious trust violations, but may also undermine behavior that would have otherwise produced higher overall economic welfare. We test the efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum return rules using experimental trust games. We find that rules fail to increase trust and trustworthiness. Thus low minimum standards significantly decrease economic welfare. Although sufficiently restrictive rules restore welfare, trust and trustworthy behavior never returns.

The rapidly improving ability of firms to collect, store, and analyze customer information opened up significant opportunities for personalized pricing and other personalized marketing activities. Customer loyalty programs provide a particularly important source of customer data. Such programs are widespread in the retail and airline

Using social networks, we examined the founder's in¯uence on key strategic behaviors in Mexican family business. First, we drew on a sample of 42 Mexican family businesses and 201 managers to show how founder centrality affects the top management group (TMG) members' cohesiveness. TMG members' cohesiveness was examined in terms of the ®rm's culture, its strategic vision, and strategic goals. Second, we examined how founder centrality and top management member group cohesiveness are related to performance in terms of ®nancial, social and family-oriented objectives. Signi®cant relationships were found between a founder's centrality and the TMGs strategic behavior. Further, signi®cant results connect different aspects of the founder's centrality and the TMGs strategic behavior to ®nancial, social and family-oriented objectives.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze sustainability issues of Japan's fiscal policy and then to discuss the debt management policy using theoretical models and numerical studies. We also investigate the desirable coordination of fiscal and monetary authorities toward fiscal reconstruction. We include a potential possibilities of the government bonds in our theoretical model The public bonds, therefore, cannot be sold when the issuance leads the amount of debt outstanding to be more than a certain level. In this respect, the fiscal authority has to take into account the upper limit of stocks of public debt. This possibility of debt default provides the fiscal authority to issue public bonds strategically in an earlier period. A strategic behavior of fiscal authority induces the monetary authority, in a later period, to boost output and raise seigniorage revenues to eliminate the distortion of resource allocation due to the limitation on debt issuance. Therefore, the monetary policy in a later period suffers from an inflation bias from the ax ante point of view. There are two ways to eliminate this distortion toward successful fiscal reconstruction. One of them is to make the monetary authority more conservative than society in the sense that the price stability weight of monetary authority is higher than that of society. The other way of eliminating the distortion of the resource allocation is to design an institutional ceiling on the debt issuance. The direct ceiling can provide a binding constraint of the public bond issuance for the fiscal authority of Japan because it has accumulated the debt outstanding much more than other countries.

While there is significant research regarding the impact of emotion at work there are few studies that examine anger in a work context. What is known is that men are more prone to expressions of anger at work than women. Given its links to greater employee frustration, stress and lower levels of performance understanding anger expressions of men at work is important. The aim of our research is to better understand anger triggers in the workplace. We present the preliminary data derived from interviews with 15 male respondents who had been referred to anger management intervention. Responses were coded and analysed using a grounded theory approach. Five main themes emerged for anger triggers. Practical implications of our research are discussed.

In this paper, we have proposed a new approach of routing and wavelength assignment algorithms, called Possible Available Wavelength (PAW) algorithm. The weight of a link is used as the main factor for routing decision in PAW algorithm. The weight of a link is defined as a function of hop count and available wavelengths. This function includes a determination factor of the number of wavelengths that are being used currently and are supposed to be available after a certain time. The session requests from users will be routed on the links that has the greatest number of link weight by using Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm. This means that the selected lightpath will has the least hop count and the greatest number of possible available wavelengths. The impact of proposed link weight computing function on the blocking probability and link utilization is investigated by means of computer simulation and comparing with the traditional mechanism. The results show that the proposed PAW algorithm can achieve the better performance in terms of the blocking probability and link utilization.

Binmore and Shaked (this issue) criticize model of inequality aversion. We present a considerable body of experimental research supporting the inequality aversion motive. Binmore and Shaked also urge experimentalists to adopt "a more skeptical attitude when far-reaching claims about human behavior are extrapolated from very slender data." It is true that experimental findings indicate that the standard neoclassical model fails to predict a considerable range of strategic behaviors widely observed in the laboratory, particularly under conditions where normative behavior is prevalent in every-day social life. This is indeed a "far-reaching claim," but one amply justified by an impressive and constantly growing body of evidence from experiments.

Cet article résume le déroulement du projet proposé par la société KeeSeeK dans le cadre de la Semaine d'Étude Maths-Entreprises (SEME) de Strasbourg organisée en novembre 2018. Ce projet porte sur la recommandation d'offres d'emploi dans un moteur de recherche en ligne. Nous nous plaçons dans le cas où le moteur de recherche doit proposer des offres d'emploi susceptibles de maximiser les clics des candidats. Ces offres ont été préalablement sélectionnées et l'utilisateur (possédant le moteur de recherche) souhaite améliorer sa sélection. Pour s'intéresser à ce problème, nous avons proposé une version revisitée d'un algorithme d'apprentissage par renforcement (Thompson-sampling) lorsque le nombre d'offres d'emploi disponibles est important (∼ 100). Mots-clés. Allocation dynamique, bandit manchot multi bras, système de recommandations, partial pooling et données réelles.

Writing development involves changes that occur in children’s strategic behavior, knowledge, and motivation. The authors examined the effectiveness of self-regulated strategy development (SRSD), a strategy instructional model designed to promote development in each of these areas. Instruction focused on planning and writing stories and persuasive essays. The addition of a peer support component to SRSD instruction aimed at facilitating maintenance and generalization effects was also examined. SRSD had a positive impact on the writing performance and knowledge of struggling second-grade writers attending urban schools serving a high percentage of low-income families. In comparison with children in the Writers’ Workshop condition, SRSD-instructed students were more knowledgeable about writing and evidenced stronger performance in the two instructed genres (story and persuasive writing) as well as two uninstructed genres (personal narrative and informative writing). Moreover, the peer ...

Recently national, state, and local governments from many countries have been attempting to reform their administrative structure, processes, and regulatory frameworks. E-government can be seen as a powerful approach for government administrative reform. The dynamics and evolution of egovernment is a complex process resulting from strategic behavior, development of rules and standards, and appropriation of those rules and standards by the international community. The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical and analytical framework that explains how this e-government evolution has taken place. Based on a literature review about the study of rules and principles from both institutional and principal-agent theories, a dynamic feedback-rich model is developed and a number of lessons are presented and discussed.

Do human resource Departments aDD value to organizations in the inDustrial zone in Duitama anD sogamoso in Boyacá? agregam valor as áreas De gestão humana Das organizações Do setor inDustrial De Duitama e sogamoso (Boyacá)? resumen El objetivo de esta investigación es determinar si las áreas de gestión humana aportan a los resultados finales de las empresas ubicadas en el corredor industrial de Duitama y Sogamoso, Boyacá. El enfoque que se utilizó es deductivo cuantitativo. La muestra del estudio corresponde a diez empresas, cinco nacionales y cinco multinacionales, que tuvieran más de 150 trabajadores y cuyas áreas de recursos humanos estuvieran estructuradas. Los instrumentos que se utilizaron fueron: encuesta, entrevista personal estructurada y observación directa desarrollada a los jefes del área de recursos humanos. Como resultado se observa que la dimensión de liderazgo crea un ambiente en la organización que permite aprender, crecer y desarrollarse, así como desarrollar competencias alineadas con la estrategia de la organización, también se evidencia que la proyección organizacional asegura prácticas de recursos humanos alineadas con la cultura deseada, así como la identificación de la misma para cumplir la estrategia de las empresas del presente estudio. La investigación permite concluir que las áreas de gestión humana agregan valor en las empresas ubicadas en el corredor industrial de Duitama y Sogamoso, Boyacá. Valor agregado, áreas de gestión humana, comportamiento estratégico, estrategia de la empresa, competencias alineadas.

This paper presents an analysis of environmental policy in imperfectly competitive markets. We investigate how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a precommitment policy game and their e§ects on social welfare. The paper also examines the potential impacts of the regulatoris environmental conscience on policy setting. We start the analysis with a benchmark model where all players are environmentally dirty in the marketplace. We then extend the model to the case in which the market is composed of a mix of dirty and clean strategic players. We show that, in both cases, the regulator must necessarily trade o§ between regulation of environmental quality and the industry production ine¢ ciency problems. Furthermore, the results show how higher levels of concern for environmental issues outweigh the under taxation problem that arises in order to avoid further reductions in welfare. Finally, we show that the existence of clean players produces positive social externalities. U...

A Teoria da Tripartição de Poderes, fundada na divisão de órgãos constitucionalmente constituídos para exercer funções básicas, desenvolvida desde Aristóteles, visava, a princípio, assegurar o direito de liberdade de seus cidadãos quanto aos abusos de governos totalitários, hoje, apesar de continuarmos nos valendo dessa Teoria, consagrando-a inclusive como cláusula pétrea em nossa lei maior, os objetivos de sua adoção mudaram, o seu alvo, agora, é assegurar o Estado Democrático de Direito. Palavras-Chave: Tripartição de poderes. Independência e harmonia. Freios e contrapesos. Funções Típicas e Atípicas. O presente trabalho tem por finalidade analisar a Teoria da Tripartição dos Poderes, a luz da evolução histórica da humanidade, destacando os filósofos que grandemente contribuíram para a elaboração da mesma, bem como sua adoção na estrutura do atual Estado Democrático de Direito, que apesar de passados tantos séculos, a adota como princípio estruturante e necessário para que não voltemos a viver em um Estado tirânico e abusivo.

We consider the strategic behavior of secondary users (SUs) in a cognitive radio system where SUs opportunistically share a single primary user (PU) band over a coverage area. The service of an SU can be interrupted by a PU in a preemptive manner, and the interrupted SU may abandon the system or wait until the PU band is sensed available. In the latter case, if spectrum sensing errors occur, they will cause misdetections and false alarms which impact the system's performance heavily. In this paper, we model this problem as a retrial queueing system with server breakdowns and recoveries in which the interrupted SUs are treated as retrial customers. They will retry for using the PU band after some period of time due to interruptions or misdetections. The arrival of a PU during service of an SU is modeled as a server breakdown, and the recovery time is equivalent to the service time of this PU. We focus on the behavior of arriving SUs who can make decisions on whether to join the system or to balk based on a natural cost structure and the delays caused by PUs' interruptions, which can be studied as a non-cooperative game. The equilibrium and optimal strategies of SUs are both derived. Furthermore, to bridge the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies, a novel strategy of imposing an admission fee on SUs to join the retrial group is proposed. Finally, some numerical examples are presented to show the effect of several key parameters on the system performance.

The initial public offering (IPO) is a critical milestone in a company’s transition from private to public ownership, offering increased capital access and liquidity. However, the long-term performance of IPOs remains debated, with many firms underperforming market benchmarks over extended periods. While initial IPO returns often reflect investor enthusiasm which highlights consistent underperformance over three to five years, attributed to over-optimism, information asymmetry, and risks inherent in young firms. Sector-specific dynamics also play a role, with technology and biotech sectors experiencing higher volatility, while more established industries like financial services and utilities show stable, yet slower growth. Timing and market conditions further influence IPO outcomes, with firms launched in "hot markets" facing long-term corrections. Firm-specific factors, such as governance and insider ownership, also impact performance. This study examines the long-term IPO performance across various sectors, focusing on key industries and identifying factors driving success or failure, offering insights for investors and policymakers navigating IPO challenges and opportunities.

This paper explores a game-theoretic model for task allocation in distributed systems, where processors with varying speeds and external load factors are considered strategic players. The goal is to understand the impact of processors' strategic behaviors on workload management and overall system efficiency, focusing on the attainment of a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE). The research rigorously develops a formal mathematical model and validates it through extensive simulations, highlighting how NE ensures stability but may not always yield optimal system performance. The adaptive algorithms for dynamic task allocation are proposed to enhance efficiency in real-time processing environments. Results demonstrate that while NE provides stability, the adoption of optimal cooperative strategies significantly improves operational efficiency and reduces transaction costs. The findings contribute valuable insights into the strategic interactions within computational frameworks, offering guidelines for developing more efficient systems. This study not only advances the theoretical understanding of strategic task allocation but also has practical implications for system design and policy-making in areas such as cloud computing and traffic management.

We use the new procedure developed by to estimate the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN), based on the volume imbalance: Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN). Unlike the previous method, this one does not require the use of numerical methods to estimate unobservable parameters. We also relate the VPIN metric to volatility measures. However, we use most efficient estimators of volatility which consider the number of jumps. Moreover, we add the VPIN to a Heterogeneous Autoregressive model of Realized Volatility to further investigate its relation with volatility. For the empirical analysis we use data on an exchange traded fund (SPY).

We use the new procedure developed by to estimate the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN), based on the volume imbalance: Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN). Unlike the previous method, this one does not require the use of numerical methods to estimate unobservable parameters. We also relate the VPIN metric to volatility measures. However, we use most efficient estimators of volatility which consider the number of jumps. Moreover, we add the VPIN to a Heterogeneous Autoregressive model of Realized Volatility to further investigate its relation with volatility. For the empirical analysis we use data on an exchange traded fund (SPY).

A set of agents arrive simultaneously to a service facility. Each agent requires the facility for a certain length of time and incurs a cost for each unit of time spent in queue. Attached to each agent is an index, which is the ratio of her waiting cost rate to processing time. Eciency dictates that the agents be served in decreasing order of their indices. If monetary compensations are disallowed, fairness suggests that agents be served in a random order, each ordering of the agents being equally likely. The ecien t ordering is unfair to agents with low indices; the random service order is typically extremely inecien t. It is well-known that this gap can be bridged by using monetary compensations. This paper is motivated by the need to design compensation schemes that are fair to all the agents. To that end, we propose two solution concepts (RP and CRP cores), which serve to place upper bounds on the cost share of any coalition of agents. The solutions dier in the denition of the e...

We present a model in which two of the most important features of the long-run growth process are reconciled: the massive changes in the structure of production and employment; and the Kaldor facts of economic growth. We assume that households expand their consumption along a hierarchy of needs and firms introduce continuously new products. In equilibrium industries with an expanding and those with a declining employment share co-exist, and each such industry goes (or has already gone) through a cycle of take-off, maturity, and stagnation. Nonetheless macroeconomic aggregates grow pari passu at a constant rate.

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly, we show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can cycle. Despite the possibilities of cycles, we prove that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. We then show that verifying whether a given profile is a pure Nash equilibrium is coNP-complete, and computing a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. For two agents, we present a linear-time algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium which yields the same assignment as the truthful profile. Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate the quality of the equilibria that exist under the PS rule, finding that the vast majority of pure Nash equilibria yield social welfare that is at least that of the truthful profile.

A possibilidade de que a opiniao publica possa exercer influencias no processo decisorio dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal motivou o desenvolvimento deste trabalho. Para que o assunto possa ser bem analisado e compreendido, faz-se um aprofundamento no estudo sobre a consolidacao da democracia brasileira, fundamentada na teoria da triparticao de poderes, para em seguida verificar se a divisao de funcoes entre os entes do legislativo, executivo e judiciario permite o bom funcionamento do sistema de freios e contrapesos. Em sequencia sao apresentados os fenomenos da judicializacao da politica e do ativismo judicial, alvos de criticas sob o argumento de que falta deferencia institucional aos demais poderes do governo. Sem almejar julgar a legitimidade da atuacao judicial, que deve ser pensada em cada caso, a preocupacao e que a expansao do Poder Judiciario coloca o Supremo Tribunal Federal sob intensa exposicao e, de certo modo, vulneravel a pressao da opiniao publica, expressa ...

The research presents an alternative to the classical method of measuring financial risk in funding a project. The goal of the model described in the paper implies identifying" risky areas" within the financial balance of the project. The model analysis the financial risk ...

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that there are certain circumstances in markets with a hyperbola-shaped demand function that support Porter’s incompatibility hypothesis. Functions that are shaped like hyperbolas are present in markets characterised by strongly differentiated (meaning pricy) products while at the same time a wide range of very low-priced products is available. The methodology is such that the turnover function is derived from the demand function which resembles the shape of a hyperbola. This does not lead to – in contrast to what has been taught so far – a reverse U-shape but a wavelike turnover function characterised by a U-shaped valley. This effect, caused by the price elasticity of demand, should contribute - in connection with economies of scale - to the phenomenon of being “stuck in the middle” in markets where a similar demand function is present. The value of the paper is that a phenomenon caused by the price elasticity of the demand is shown, w...

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO2 abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO2 of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.

Les cahiers de la série scientifique (CS) visent à rendre accessibles des résultats de recherche effectuée au CIRANO afin de susciter échanges et commentaires. Ces cahiers sont écrits dans le style des publications scientifiques. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners.

Overview of the Missouri Republican Caucus/Convention process for 2024, introduction to parliamentary law and caucus/convention related portions Robert's Rules of Order,  plus a bibliography for sources and additional reading. This document comprised the handout of the morning session of classes taught in late 2023 to early 2024 (afternoon sessions included viewing portions of historical events and practical exercises), adapted from materials written and taught in 2016.
These materials were scheduled to revert to a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license after August of 2024. The PDF slide deck is a separate document, a condensed version of these same materials, and is available on request. This version of the document (v 2.1.2) reverts several diagrams which were corrupted in the 10 February 2024 presentation but otherwise contains identical material.

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in ÿxed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on o er change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instrument to reward aggressive bidding and enhance expected revenue. A ÿxed supply may not be optimal even when accounting for the cost to the seller of issuing a quantity di erent from her target supply.

This article delves into the strategic logic behind Donald Trump's unconventional political behavior, particularly his approach to trade policy and international negotiations. Trump's often unpredictable and seemingly irrational actions—ranging from abrupt policy reversals to controversial statements—are examined through the lens of the "Madman Theory," originally popularized by President Richard Nixon. This theory suggests that such erratic behavior may be a deliberate strategy designed to enhance one's negotiation power by exploiting the belief that irrational actions may lead adversaries to make concessions to avoid escalation. The paper explores the potential effectiveness and risks of this strategy in the context of Trump’s neo-mercantilist approach, which seeks to reduce trade deficits and restore American dominance, especially in light of global competition from China. It also discusses the potential dangers of a leader employing the Madman Strategy in a globalized world, where miscalculation could lead to catastrophic outcomes, such as nuclear conflict. Finally, the article proposes strategic responses for international actors, drawing on game theory and historical examples, including the concept of "generous tit for tat" and the benefits of de-escalating protectionist policies to foster global cooperation and peace.

Abstract. This paper discusses the meaning of the term “transition ” and its implications for policy making. It is suggested that an Austrian view would enhance a better understanding of what has been happening in Central and Eastern Europe in the past decade. Within this framework, the analysis should be based on three criteria: acquisition of knowledge, individual responsibility, free entry. It concludes that future transition analysis should devote more attention to the way a number of subjectivistic features drive institutional change, as well as to the features of the new opportunity sets made available to individuals. JEL classification: P20, A11, B41. 1. The End of Transition and its Consequences Central and Eastern-European Countries (CEECs) are still referred to as “transition economies”. In this context, the term “transition ” is of course meant to convey the notion of continuous structural change, say from a central-planning archetype to a free-market ideal. Yet, ten year...

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that material self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence in recent years, however, that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that concerns for altruism, fairness, and reciprocity strongly motivate many people. Moreover, several theoretical papers demonstrate that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories then induced a first wave of experimental research which offered exciting insights into both the nature of preferences and the relative performance of competing fairness theories. The purpose of this chapter is to review these developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. We also discuss recent neuroeconomic evidence that is consistent with the view that many people have a taste for mutual cooperation and the punishment of norm violators. We further illustrate the powerful impact of fairness concerns on cooperation, competition, incentives, and contract design.

The article presents a model of social norm evolution, which suggests how the increase in optimal and actual first response times (FRT) of economics journals can be related. When the optimal FRT and the norm about how much time refereeing should take increase, it seems that the existence of a norm increases the average refereeing time. The model suggests the surprising result that this is not necessarily true. I also discuss applications of the model in other contexts, differences in the optimal FRT between disciplines, the effects of the FRT on the tenure process, and strategic behavior of referees.