Stag Hunt

Πίνακας Περιεχομένων :
1. Εισαγωγή
2. Βασικές ιδιότητες
3. Κλασικές Ανισότητες με Αποδείξεις
  3.1 Ανισότητα Τριγώνου
  3.2 Cauchy–Schwarz
  3.3 Minkowski
  3.4 AM–GM
  3.5 Jensen
4. Ανισότητα Hölder
5. Minkowski από Hölder
6. Εργαλειοθήκη Ανισοτήτων
  6.1 Titu/Engel
  6.2 Rearrangement
  6.3 Chebyshev
7. Τριγωνομετρικές Ανισότητες
8. Παραδείγματα
9. Ασκήσεις

ecology n. 1. The division of biology that treats of the relations betwe en organisms and their environment. 2. Sociol. The study of human populations in terms of physical environ- ment, spatial distribution, and cultural characteristics . Funk & Wagnalls Canadian College Dictionary, 1986. Do experiments with a single Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matr ix apply to all PDs? Do they

Game theory assumes that changing a game's payoff levels-by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs-should not affect behavior. However, if individuals seek to avoid losses, then such changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human-subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; when significant, these differences are always in the direction predicted by certain-and possible-loss avoidance. These differences persist over time. Our results carry implications for theories that select among multiple equilibria.

We present an incentivized laboratory experiment where a random sample of individuals playing a series of stag hunt games are forced to make their choices under time constraints, while the rest of the players have no time limits to decide. We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag-hunters as opposed to 52.32% when no time limits are imposed. These results offer the first experimental evidence on the role of intuition and deliberation in strategic situations that entail social coordination. In interpreting our findings, we provide a discussion on ruling social conventions in daily-life interactions. The recent literature in judgment and decision-making has shown an upsurge of interest to understand prosociality from a dual process perspective 1. Dual process theories of decision-making 2 are well established in cognitive and social psychology. They suggest that humans make decisions under two modes of reasoning, namely intuition, fast and relying on heuristics, and deliberation, slow and based on careful scrutiny of costs and benefits 3-5. Following this insights, a number of recent contributions have run incetivized experiments to investigate the effects that the mode of reasoning has on prosocial behavior in a variety of games 6,7 , such as: prisoner dilemmas and public good games 8,9 , dictator games 9-11 , ultimatum games 12,13 , deception games 14 , and allocation decisions 15. In this paper we consider the stag hunt game, which can be interpreted as a social dilemma involving prosociality 16. In the basic game, the opposition between coordination on stag and coordination on hare can be seen as a parable for social situations in which coordination can be pursued on two different levels: coordinating on better rewarding, but necessarily collaborative actions, and coordinating on less rewarding actions, which do not require collaboration. Accordingly, coordinated play on either action can be interpreted as a social norm, i.e., a social convention 17,18. Even if the stag hunt game has been widely investigated with experimental methods 19,20 , to our knowledge, there is no previous attempt to empirically assess the effects that the tension between intuition and deliberation has on the choice between stag and hare. Some experimental evidence is available for pure coordination games 21 , suggesting that intuition leads to rely more on culturally focal options. In this work, we manipulate the mode of reasoning by imposing a 10-second time constraint on decision-making 6,22. While response times are related to the mode of reasoning in important respects 23 , the interpretation of results obtained under time pressure requires careful consideration 9,24. As already noted 25 , different theories of dual process cognition identify different attributes to, respectively, intuition and deliberation 5,26. A large body of this literature relates intuition to automatic and unconscious processes that occur extremely fast, possibly in less than a second 27 ; several contributions on the relationship between prosocial behavior and ego depletion 10,13,28-30 or cognitive load 12,31 take this perspective. Other contributions define intuition as a mode of reasoning that is not fully unconscious and automatic, but entails some reflection in the form of heuristics 32-34 ; in these studies, intuition is assumed to be substantially slower than in the previous approach. Different definitions of intuition can, at least in part, explain opposing results in the analysis of intuitive behavior and prosociality 1,35,36. Indeed, while some researchers contend that intuition induces cooperative behaviors while reflection stimulates selfishness 8,33,37,38 , others argue that deliberation and reflection act as a hurdle to selfish impulses and lead to prosociality and cooperation 13,39,40. Finally, some studies find no effect of the adoption of intuition on cooperation 41,42. The interpretation of intuition as a mode of reasoning well fits our experimental setting where a 10-second time constraint is used to inhibit reliance on deliberation. According to this interpretation, the distinction between intuition and deliberation recalls the distinction between instinctive and contemplative decision-making, implying that both processes involve conscious reasoning and require a minimum amount of time and reflection 43. In

How is the human tendency and ability to collaborate acquired and how did it evolve? This paper explores the ontogeny and evolution of human collaboration using a combination of theoretical and empirical resources. We present a game theoretic model of the evolution of learning in the Stag Hunt game, which predicts the evolution of a built-in cooperative bias. We then survey recent empirical results on the ontogeny of collaboration in humans, which suggest the ability to collaborate is developmentally stable across a range of environments. Lastly, we use an account of innateness developed by Ariew (Philos Sci 63:S19-S27, 1996) and Sober (Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. Routledge, London, pp 794-797, 1998) to assess the extent that (1) the model predicts the fixation of innate collaboration and (2) the empirical studies show a human's ability to collaborate to be innate.

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game's payoff levels-by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs-should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the "payoffs" are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff-level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human-subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain-and possible-loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

In the 1840s and 1850s, agrarian improvement provided the dominant theme within public discussions of Exmoor, both in terms of the strategies required to deliver it, and as a moral imperative, to elevate the moor, its flora and fauna, and even its human inhabitants from their ‘uncivilised’ condition. These calls continued to be published in the 1860s and early 1870s, but they were soon overtaken by a new public narrative, which emphasized the value of Exmoor’s ‘wildness’, and which also depicted the encroachment of agriculture as a threat. Paradoxically, perhaps, in an age of mass publication and transport, it soon became evident that the publicity given to Exmoor’s unspoilt beauty was beginning to attract large numbers of middle-class tourists, who also threatened to extinguish the ‘wildness’ of Exmoor with their own brand of intrusive modernity.

This paper uses simple game theory to analyze a situation where two agents compete in the transport market. The modeling frame is that of a mode choice model, where the two mode options are boat or car transportation. The basic findings are that non pareto optimal (car, car) equilibrium outcomes, may occur in a surprisingly large amount of cases. Additionally, the possible different Nash equilibria outcomes are fairly large leading to a situation which may be hard both to model and predict for regulatory authorities. Finally, in certain situations, subsidizing boat transportation may not lead to increased use of boat as transport modal choice.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2 × 2 games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Stag-Hunt, and Chicken. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with the most occurrences is the "Grim-Trigger." In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria emerges as the one with the most occurrences. In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" and "Grim-Trigger" strategies are the ones with the most occurrences. Overall, the pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes, whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative outcomes.

This paper deals with the morphogenesis of spatialized cooperative relations and with the role of proximity in the evolution, persistence and coexistence of various local strategies. The first part is devoted to a presentation of the analysis of cooperative relations in the evolutionary game theory. In the second part of the paper are presented various simulations on the emergence and evolution of localized cooperative relations, based on endogenous mutations and genetic algorithms. They reveal that a cooperative behavior is a stable, even if complex strategy, and that its emergence and diffusion are favored by the spatial character of inter firms relations. In addition, the results confirm that various strategies can locally coexist and be maintained, generally temporarily.

Game theory is commonly used to study social behavior in cooperative or competitive situations. One socioeconomic game, Stag Hunt, involves the trade-off between social and individual benefit by offering the option to hunt a low-payoff hare alone or a high-payoff stag cooperatively. Stag Hunt encourages the creation of social contracts as a result of the payoff matrix, which favors cooperation. By playing Stag Hunt with set-strategy computer agents, the social component is degraded because of the inability of subjects to dynamically affect the outcomes of iterated games, as would be the case when playing against another subject. However, playing with an adapting agent has the potential to evoke unique and complex reactions in subjects because of its ability to change its own strategy based on its experience over time, both within and between games. In the present study, 40 subjects played the iterated Stag Hunt with five agents differing in strategy: exclusive hare hunting, exclusiv...

The era of single processors had almost reached a saturation state, and the industry had moved to multi-core processors for the newer generation of many-core architecture. Interconnections between multiple cores with network on chip (NoC) surpass traditional bus architecture for its quality of service (QoS) and other additional services. Seamless communication among the cores is more significant for better performance and the proper utilization of the cores. The rise in the cores count in a semiconductor chip adds the complexity of the communication among cores. Cache misses request and packet transmission’s traffic possibly will reduce the performance of the architecture. A theoretical game-based methodology is proposed to improvise the performance and communication by routing the request packets in the NoC of the many core architectures and the throughput is maximized with reduced latency by using the stag-hunt game (SHG) model. The proposed communication algorithm routes the pack...

Why do privacy scholars have inconsistent attitudes about social norms? They mostly agree that social norms play a key role in ensuring adequate informational privacy, particularly “privacy in public.” But they ignore norms when making concrete proposals about how to preserve privacy. Advocates of Notice and Choice seek to empower individuals to make informed choices. Others seek to protect the privacy through privacy by design, proposals to make businesses and governments trustworthy collectors and users of information, or consumer protection laws that limit the ability to know and use information. None of the proposals assigns norms a key role and builds on that foundation. Why not?

Our explanation is that the foundation is incomplete. Patterns of scholarship have multiple explanations, but an incomplete foundation is a key factor in the case of privacy in public. You cannot build on what will not bear the weight. The missing foundational element is common knowledge. Common knowledge is the recursive belief state of two or more parties knowing, knowing they know, knowing they know they know, and so on potentially ad infinitum.

Appeals to common knowledge in the privacy literature are nonexistent. That lack of attention is of a piece with a general tendency to overlook common knowledge. Apart from game theory, philosophy, and sociology, common knowledge has had little visibility—even though, as an influential article notes, “much of social life is affected by common-knowledge generators, . . . [and] an acknowledgement of the role of common knowledge in enabling coordination can unify and explain a variety of seemingly unrelated and puzzling phenomena.”

Unifying and explaining is our goal as we show how to use norms to preserve informational privacy in the face of pervasive surveillance. Pervasive surveillance subverts the power of social roles to generate common knowledge thereby undermines coordination under informational norms thus reducing privacy in public and threatening self-realization. An essential step in preserving privacy is ensuring that social roles generate common knowledge that facilitates coordination under informational-privacy-creating social norms. We show how to take that step.

Coordination games provide ubiquitous interaction paradigms to frame human behavioral features, such as information transmission, conventions and languages as well as socioeconomic processes and institutions. By using a dynamical approach, such as Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), one is able to follow, in detail, the self-organization process by which a population of individuals coordinates into a given behavior. Real socioeconomic scenarios, however, often involve the interaction between multiple co-evolving sectors, with specific options of their own, that call for generalized and more sophisticated mathematical frameworks. In this paper, we explore a general EGT approach to deal with coordination dynamics in which individuals from multiple sectors interact. Starting from a two-sector, consumer/producer scenario, we investigate the effects of including a third co-evolving sector that we call public. We explore the changes in the self-organization process of all sectors, given the feedback that this new sector imparts on the other two.

The era of single processors had almost reached a saturation state, and the industry had moved to multi-core processors for the newer generation of many-core architecture. Interconnections between multiple cores with network on chip (NoC) surpass traditional bus architecture for its quality of service (QoS) and other additional services. Seamless communication among the cores is more significant for better performance and the proper utilization of the cores. The rise in the cores count in a semiconductor chip adds the complexity of the communication among cores. Cache misses request and packet transmission's traffic possibly will reduce the performance of the architecture. A theoretical game-based methodology is proposed to improvise the performance and communication by routing the request packets in the NoC of the many core architectures and the throughput is maximized with reduced latency by using the stag-hunt game (SHG) model. The proposed communication algorithm routes the packets in an adaptive way by detecting the congestion in routers. The SHG based oddeven routing algorithm is adaptive and can divert the packets towards less congested routers using the information gathered about congestion in the system, so that the overall performance of the system in terms of latency and throughput is improved.

We focus on privacy in public. The notion dates back over a century, at least to the work of the German sociologist, Georg Simmel. Simmel observed that people voluntarily limit their knowledge of each other as they interact in a wide variety of social and commercial roles, thereby making certain information private relative to the interaction even if it is otherwise publicly available. Current governmental surveillance in the US (and elsewhere) reduces privacy in public. But to what extent? The question matters because adequate self-realization requires adequate privacy in public. That in turn depends on informational norms, social norms that govern the collection, use, and distribution of information. Adherence to such norms is constitutive of a variety of relationships in which parties coordinate their use of information. Examples include student/teacher and journalist/confidential source. Current surveillance undermines privacy in public by undermining norm-enabled coordination. The 1950 to 1990 East German

Humans invest in fantastic stories -- mythologies.Recent evolutionary theories suggest that cultural selection may favour moralising stories that motivate prosocial behaviours.A key challenge is to explain the emergence of mythologies that lack explicit moral exemplars or directives. Here, we resolve this puzzle with an evolutionary model in which arbitrary mythologies transform a collection of egoistic individuals into a cooperative. Importantly, in finite populations, reflecting relative to contemporary population sizes of hunter-gatherers, the model is robust to the cognitive costs in adopting fictions. This approach resolves a fundamental problem across the human sciences by explaining the evolution of otherwise puzzling amoral, nonsensical, and fictional narratives as exquisitely functional coordination devices.

Smartphone use changes the landscape of social interactions, including introducing new social dilemmas to daily life. The challenge of putting down one's smartphone is an example of a classic coordination problem from game theory: the stag hunt game. In a stag hunt game, there are two possible coordination points, one that involves big payoffs for both partners (e.g., working together to hunt large game like stag) and one that involves smaller payoffs for both partners (e.g., individually hunting small game like rabbits) but is safer because it does not require that your partner choose that option as well. This is similar to the challenges of putting down smartphones to have a face-to-face interaction: you and your interaction partner might both prefer the higher payoff option of having a face-to-face interaction, but neither of you wants to put down your phone and risk not having anything to do in the meantime. It is also discussed how new technological innovations are changing the payoffs of face-to-face conversation versus side-by-side smartphone scrolling. Insights that come from applying game theory to this "social media dilemma" are discussed here and potential solutions that come out of a game theoretic analysis are offered.

We compare cultural learning and individualistic, belief-based learning in a class of generalized stag hunt games. Agents can choose from among multiple potentially cooperative actions or can take a secure, self interested action. We assume that a proportion of the cooperative actions prove effective, while others can be undermined by a predatory action. For this class of games, the set of stable equilibria is identical under the two learning rules. However, we show that the basins of attraction for the efficient equilibria are much larger for cultural learning. We further show that as the stakes grow arbitrarily large, cultural learning always locates an efficient equilibrium while belief-based learning never does.

Humans invest in fantastic stories -- mythologies.Recent evolutionary theories suggest that cultural selection may favour moralising stories that motivate prosocial behaviours.A key challenge is to explain the emergence of mythologies that lack explicit moral exemplars or directives. Here, we resolve this puzzle with an evolutionary model in which arbitrary mythologies transform a collection of egoistic individuals into a cooperative. Importantly, in finite populations, reflecting relative to contemporary population sizes of hunter-gatherers, the model is robust to the cognitive costs in adopting fictions. This approach resolves a fundamental problem across the human sciences by explaining the evolution of otherwise puzzling amoral, nonsensical, and fictional narratives as exquisitely functional coordination devices.

With this research paper, we aim to analyse the effectiveness of Game Theory in Water Resource Allocation through simple twoby-two symmetric water resource games. The results of examples using three kinds of game theory icons are scanned to compare cooperative and non-cooperative game players. The highest payoff is achieved when both the players cooperate hence this paper explains how decision makers’ rational behaviour, who are trying to maximize their own objectives, might result in overall Pareto-inferior outcomes. Keywords— Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken game, Stag Hunt

In multi-agent coordination, one would normally like to find a satisfactory solution that is stable, fair and optimal to all agents. According to traditional game theory, Prisoner's dilemma, no or more than one Nash equilibrium games are situations that are difficult to find such a satisfactory solution. In human society, it often involves a trusted third party in the negotiation process among agents to ensure the cooperation and commitment of agents. In this paper, we describe how the trusted third party can be involved in the negotiation of multi-agent coordination to deal with many difficult game situations. We introduce two communication actions into the traditional game-theoretical reasoning: asking guarantee and offering compensation for agents to use in negotiation. Asking guarantee from agents and depositing it at the trusted third party can ensure the agents to keep their commitments, while offering compensation can allow finding a fair and compromised solution for all agents. We show how the negotiation communication protocols can be proceeded using these two communication actions to reach a compromised and stable agreement in all different game situations.

A simple, evolutionary game-theoretic model yields the surprising prediction that cooperation can evolve without deliberate intention in a minimal social situation (MSS). This phenomenon was discovered in dyads by Sidowski (1957) and generalized to larger groups by Coleman, Colman, and Thomas (1990). Predictions about the multi-player minimal social situation (MMSS) remain untested. The primary objective of the proposed research is to test them.

This study is aimed at analyzing conflict resolution using a Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) approach. The research object is waste pollution case in Majalaya's textile industry in the upstream area of Citarum river in Bandung regency. GMCR is used to describe the agreed optimal solution based on the preferences of each party involved in the conflict, namely the government of West Java province, the residents of Majalaya, the textile industry, and the independent environmental expert in the city of Bandung. From the results of stability analysis, it is discovered that there are only two stable scenarios (equilibrium) for all parties, namely scenario 6 (happy ending) and 9 (bad ending). Scenario 9 is called a bad ending scenario, because the local residents ultimately held a demonstration against the textile industry since the government did not give them a strict punishment for causing waste pollution as they have not maximized their WWTP functions, thus it would cause an operational disruption of the textile industry. While scenario 6 is called happy ending scenario because the textile industry eventually maximized their WWTP functions, the local people would not go on demonstration, and the environmental experts would not make negative publicity about the textile industry. In conclusion, based on sensitivity analysis, scenario 6 was more expected to occur by a textile industry as the conflict resolution over the Majalaya's waste pollution case. However, to achieve scenario 6, some compensations should be given by other parties to the local residents of Majalaya and to the independent environmental experts. If the compensations were not given then it is very likely that scenario 9 would happen and it would become the resolution of conflict for the textile industry waste pollution case in Majalaya.

A simple, evolutionary game-theoretic model yields the surprising prediction that cooperation can evolve without deliberate intention in a minimal social situation (MSS). This phenomenon was discovered in dyads by Sidowski (1957) and generalized to larger groups by Coleman, Colman, and Thomas (1990). Predictions about the multi-player minimal social situation (MMSS) remain untested. The primary objective of the proposed research is to test them.

Reciprocal cooperation can be studied in the Centipede game, in which two players alternate in choosing between a cooperative GO move and a non-cooperative STOP move. GO sustains the interaction and increases the player pair's total payoff while incurring a small personal cost; STOP terminates the interaction with a favorable payoff to the defector. We investigated cooperation in four Centipede games differing in their payoffs at the game's end (positive versus zero) and payoff difference between players (moderate versus high difference). The games shared the same game-theoretic solution, therefore they should have elicited identical decision patterns, according to orthodox game theory. Nevertheless, both zero-end payoffs and high payoff inequality were found to reduce cooperation significantly. Contrary to previous predictions, combining these two factors in one game resulted in a slight weakening of their independent deterrent effects. These findings show that small changes in the payoff function have large and significant effects on cooperation, and that the effects do not combine synergistically.

Humans invest in fantastic stories -- mythologies.Recent evolutionary theories suggest that cultural selection may favour moralising stories that motivate prosocial behaviours.A key challenge is to explain the emergence of mythologies that lack explicit moral exemplars or directives. Here, we resolve this puzzle with an evolutionary model in which arbitrary mythologies transform a collection of egoistic individuals into a cooperative. Importantly, in finite populations, reflecting relative to contemporary population sizes of hunter-gatherers, the model is robust to the cognitive costs in adopting fictions. This approach resolves a fundamental problem across the human sciences by explaining the evolution of otherwise puzzling amoral, nonsensical, and fictional narratives as exquisitely functional coordination devices.

Social capital theory is exemplary in attempting to integrate both individual and institutional perspectives in the study of governance, but interactions between the individual and institutional components remain underexplored and unspecified in many situations. We extend the theory from its focal attention on prisoners dilemma games to an important and understudied class of collective action problems of critical concern for governance— coordination tasks ranging from simple matching games to more complex tasks involving conflict (battle of the sexes) and assurance problems (stag hunt). Laboratory experiments provide a means of observing the impact of institutional influences (bridging and bonding network capital), individual predispositions (trust and risk aversion), and their interaction on the ability to coordinate in these settings. The results confirm that neither individual nor institutional components alone can explain coordination, and that interactions between these compone...

Question: How can the evolution of turn-taking be explained in species without language? Features of model: Using a genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossover, we studied noisy decision making in three repeated two-player games in which we predicted on theoretical grounds that cooperative turn-taking would evolve and three games in which we expected synchronized cooperation to evolve. Ranges of key variables: We set population size to 20, number of rounds to be played by each pair in each generation to 200, and number of evolutionary generations to 2000, and we repeated each simulation 10 times to check the stability of the results. Results: Cooperative turn-taking and (unexpectedly) a form of double turn-taking evolved in the alternation games, and joint cooperation evolved in the synchronization games. We propose a mechanism to explain how cooperative turn-taking can evolve mechanically, even without communication or insight, as it did in our simulations.

This research examines transboundary water conflict resolution mechanisms. The academic literature has brought various mechanisms for resolving transboundary water conflicts. However, there has been a gap between these theoretical mechanisms and the techniques used in reality. This research maps this theorypractice gap and identifies the reasons behind it. To bridge this gap, the study recommends that researcher use various resolution mechanisms when analyse any particular conflict. This allows them to provide practitioners dealing with this conflict with various settlement options. This set of options would help practitioners to identify the most convenient mechanism to address the conflict in question.

Question: How can the evolution of turn-taking be explained in species without language? Features of model: Using a genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossover, we studied noisy decision making in three repeated two-player games in which we predicted on theoretical grounds that cooperative turn-taking would evolve and three games in which we expected synchronized cooperation to evolve. Ranges of key variables: We set population size to 20, number of rounds to be played by each pair in each generation to 200, and number of evolutionary generations to 2000, and we repeated each simulation 10 times to check the stability of the results. Results: Cooperative turn-taking and (unexpectedly) a form of double turn-taking evolved in the alternation games, and joint cooperation evolved in the synchronization games. We propose a mechanism to explain how cooperative turn-taking can evolve mechanically, even without communication or insight, as it did in our simulations.

We analyze the 78 2 × 2 distinct strict ordinal games, 57 of which are conflict games that contain no mutually best outcome. In 19 of the 57 games (33%), including Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, a cooperative outcome-one that is at least next-best for each player-is not a Nash equilibrium (NE). But this outcome is a nonmyopic equilibrium (NME) in 16 of the 19 games (84%) when the players start at this outcome and make farsighted calculations, based on backward induction; in the other three games, credible threats can induce cooperation. In two of the latter games, the NMEs are "boomerang NMEs," whereby players have an incentive to move back and forth between two diagonally opposite NMEs, one of which is cooperative. In Prisoners' Dilemma, the NE and one NME are not Pareto-optimal, but we conjecture that in all two-person games with strict preferences, there is at least one Pareto-optimal NME. As examples of NMEs that are not NEs, we analyze two games that plausibly model the choices of players in international relations: (i) no first use of nuclear weapons, a policy that has been adopted by some nuclear powers; and (ii) the 2015 agreement between Iran, and a coalition of the United States and other countries, that has forestalled Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons.

We show that a cooperative outcome-one that is at least next-best for the players-is not a Nash equilibrium (NE) in 19 of the 57 2 2 strict ordinal conflict games (33%), including Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken. Auspiciously, in 16 of these games (84%), cooperative outcomes are nonmyopic equilibria (NMEs) when the players make farsighted calculations, based on backward induction; in the other three games, credible threats induce cooperation. More generally, in all finite normal-form games, if players' preferences are strict, farsighted calculations stabilize at least one Pareto-optimal NME. We illustrate the choice of NMEs that are not NEs by two cases in international relations: (i) no first use of nuclear weapons, chosen by the protagonists in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and since adopted by some nuclear powers; and (ii) the 2015 agreement between Iran, and a coalition of the United States and other countries, that has been abrogated by the United States but has forestalled Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons.

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game's payoff levels-by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs-should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when "payoffs" are actually money amounts. Loss avoidance is a phenomenon where payoff-level changes matter when they change the signs of payoffs: gains become losses or vice versa. We report the results of a human-subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find strong evidence of behavior consistent with certain-loss avoidance in the experiment. We also find evidence of possible-loss avoidance, though weaker than that for certain-loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for theorists modeling real-life situations with game theory, and for experimenters attempting to test theory and interpret observed behavior in terms of theory.

The essential problem in the empirical analysis of the repeated games is to know what strategies are used by the players. We propose a simple algorithm to reconstruct strategies from the observed sequence of play. The algorithm accounts for the possibility of measurement and decision making errors. It stays agnostic about equilibrium restrictions. We apply the algorithm to both experimental and observational data. Using the experimental data, we provide conclusive evidence that players use strategies of memory no more than one period. Using the observational data, we support the hypothesis that Australian gas stations learn to tacitly collude for weekly price cycles using the day of the week as a coordination device.

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game's payoff levels-by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs-should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the "payoffs" are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff-level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human-subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain-and possible-loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Game theory assumes that changing a game's payoff levels-by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs-should not affect behavior. However, if individuals seek to avoid losses, then such changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human-subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; when significant, these differences are always in the direction predicted by certain-and possible-loss avoidance. These differences persist over time. Our results carry implications for theories that select among multiple equilibria.

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to investigate the conditions that promote the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of logical stimulus-response devices is maintained over successive generations with selection based on individual fitness. The reward for selfish behavior is varied across a series of trials. Simulations indicate three distinct patterns of behaviors in which mutual cooperation is inevitable, improbable, or apparently random. The ultimate behavior can be reliably predicted by examining the payoff matrix that defines the reward for alternative joint behaviors.

People who are members of a group, and identify with it, behave differently from people in isolation. The way in which the behavior differs depends in subtle ways from the way in which the nature of the group is perceived, as well as its saliency, and also on the way in which people perceive that the behavior of others is affected by the group. We study these hypotheses in a strategic experimental environment. Participants are allocated randomly to two groups (Row and Column players), and a room is assigned to each group. The saliency of the group membership is manipulated by making the group present as an audience in the corresponding room, or not. We use two stage games, the Battle of the Sexes and Prisoner’s Dilemma. We show that the saliency of the group affects behavior of members, as well as the behavior of people in the other group, and that participants anticipate these effects. Group membership increases the aggressive stance of the hosts (people who have their group member...

This paper deals with how to transform the bargain into a pure cooperation: It is argued that Governing dynamics prevail in negotiationespecially in a bargain-over the competitive perception Thus, we focus on the integrated negotiation instead of the distributive Rational Choice and Nash Bargaining are analyzed in order to define the rational market behavior The aim is to define a tripartite sef-question (what is the best for me, for you, for the community) based on governing dynamics on and during of any bargain (interaction), by maximizing the triple utility for bargainers and the community. This could be done by focusing on Interests, Not Positions The bipolar, conflict and cooperation which characterized the human bargaining behavior are analyzed by the Win-Win (good for you, great for me) versus Win-Lose Negotiation and then by the win-win-win (papakonstantinidis model) (good for us, great for the community) versus win-win The Win-Win Negotiation could be achieved by the concept of "Different Cultures, Shared Meals", but the win-win-win could be achieved by the concept of "active participation" Coalitions and the ultimatum game are examined as by product of the win-win-win approach A case-study on Wyoming ranchers is examined. Social dilemma and social choices are the basic arguments to redefine social behaviors, in close relation with the Tripartite Transferred Utilities (TTU). It is proved that Cooperation is based on tripartism, rather than empathy Identity-Rules-Recognition-Social Motives are the main arguments for a win-win-win tripartism approach Finally, the philosophical side, knowledge creationbehavior synthesizes and the Negative externality are given as additional argumentation on bargaining behavior

With this research paper, we aim to analyse the effectiveness of Game Theory in Water Resource Allocation through simple twoby-two symmetric water resource games. The results of examples using three kinds of game theory icons are scanned to compare cooperative and non-cooperative game players. The highest payoff is achieved when both the players cooperate hence this paper explains how decision makers’ rational behaviour, who are trying to maximize their own objectives, might result in overall Pareto-inferior outcomes. Keywords— Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken game, Stag Hunt

With this research paper, we aim to analyse the effectiveness of Game Theory in Water Resource Allocation through simple twoby-two symmetric water resource games. The results of examples using three kinds of game theory icons are scanned to compare cooperative and non-cooperative game players. The highest payoff is achieved when both the players cooperate hence this paper explains how decision makers’ rational behaviour, who are trying to maximize their own objectives, might result in overall Pareto-inferior outcomes. Keywords— Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken game, Stag Hunt

The author argues that the theory of moves, which has gained popularity in recent years as an alternative to game-theoretic analysis of strategic interaction, is fundamentally flawed. The theory's adherents argue that it makes theoretical progress by endogenizing the structure of games and introducing new ways of analyzing repeated interactions. The author analyzes the theory of moves from a game-theoretic perspective and challenges its theoretical claims. The author then reanalyzes several recent articles that have used the theory of moves, showing that its application to empirical cases is strained and that game theory can provide models that do a better job of fitting the stories the authors tell about them.

We investigate a simple stochastic model of social network formation by the process of reinforcement learning with discounting of the past. In the limit, for any value of the discounting parameter, small, stable cliques are formed. However, the time it takes to reach the limiting state in which cliques have formed is very sensitive to the discounting parameter. Depending on this value, the limiting result may or may not be a good predictor for realistic observation times.