Social Preferences

Using a laboratory experiment with minimal groups, we examined the extent to which the threats of costly punishments affect in-group favouritism behaviour. We studied three types of punishment separately: in-group, out-group, and third-party punishments. In line with previous studies, the majority of the allocators favoured their own group by allocating more money to each of the in-group members at the expense of the out-group in the baseline without punishment. In the in-group punishment treatment, we observed a slight increase in in-group favouritism behaviour. On the contrary, when only the out-group could punish the allocators, there was a significant drop in in-group favouritism behaviour as well as an increase in the equal division option. Finally, when faced with an independent third-party punisher the allocators continued to favour their own group. The threat of third-party punishment appeared to have no effect on their decisions. Our paper contributes to the literature on in-group favouritism and the nature of social norms by showing that the decision whether to favour one's own group is affected by the threats of in-group and out-group punishments and whether it leads to an increase or decrease in this behaviour depends on who has the punishment power. Parochial or in-group biased norm was enforced by the in-group members, whilst 'egalitarian sharing norm' (across groups) was enforced by the out-group members. We conclude firstly that people apply different 'self-serving' social norms depending on their own group identity. Secondly, unlike selfish or opportunistic behaviours, independent third-parties, who only observed this behaviour but were not directly affected by it, were not willing to punish this behaviour. JEL: D70, D73, C92.

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Many anthropologists and economists contend that humans are characterized by strong, universal, other-regarding equality preferences with deep evolutionary roots. Certain contemporary forager groups are indeed characterized by endemic foodsharing and proscriptions against resource monopolization. Some view these “egalitarian” practices as the consequence
of an intrinsic desire for fairness. The present study tests this using a one-player “give-or-take” experiment that better emulates the realities of forager sharing ecologies than previous giving experiments. We asked 117 Hadza participants in private to redistribute food resources between themselves and another camp member in response to both advantageous
and disadvantageous endowments. Although few participants were wholly self-interested, most did not seek equitable distributions. Instead, most participants tolerated inequality when it benefited them but were intolerant of inequality when it benefited others. Even when given advantageous endowments, only a minority (40.9%) chose to give, while a substantial fraction (30%) exacerbated inequality by taking more. Moreover, when given disadvantageous endowments, many participants took more than was necessary to achieve equality. The modal decision across tasks was to take
everything. We also observed sex and age differences, with men and younger individuals being more likely to share advantageous endowments. These results suggest that intrinsic, private other-regarding fairness preferences need not underlie widespread forager food-sharing, which could be maintained by self-interest enforced by others (i.e., “demand
sharing”) or by extrinsically maintained norms of fairness. Further, we find that individuals with greater exposure to cultures outside Hadzaland were more tolerant of unfavourable inequality, suggesting that marketization might promote not only greater material inequality but also stronger norms of tolerance toward disadvantageous inequality.

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Objectives: Cost-effectiveness analysis has been recom- mended by national health agencies worldwide. In the United Kingdom, the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence supports the use of generic health-related quality of life instruments such as EuroQol EQ-5D when quality- adjusted life-years are used to measure health benefits. Despite the urgent need for appropriate methodologies to improve the use of

Cost-effectiveness analyses are routinely based on data from group averages, restricting its generalizibility to those with below-or above-average risk. A pharmaco-economic model was developed that used individualised risks, taking as example bisphosphonates and prevention of fractures. METHODS: Data were obtained from a research database of general practitioners, comprising a sample of the UK general population of women >50 years (N = 330,000). Individual mortality and hip, vertebral, and other osteoporotic fracture risks were estimated by age, sex, body mass index, smoking and other clinical risk factors. Estimates on costs, EQ5D utilities and treatment efficacy were obtained from a UK national report (NICE) and outcomes were simulated over a ten-year period. RESULTS: There was a large variability in the cost-effectiveness with clinical risk factors. At age 60-69, the cost per QALY gained was ≤136 k in women with low fracture risk but ≤36 k with high fracture risk (data for women without fracture history). Patients with low body mass index (<20) had considerable better cost-effectiveness than patients with high BMI (≥26) (≤23 k versus ≤71 k at age 60-79 in women without fracture history). The same was found for different diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis or inflammatory bowel disease. Using a cost-acceptability ratio of ≤30 k per QALY gained, bisphosphonates became cost-effective for patients with a 5-year risk of 9.3% (95% CI 8.0-10.5%) for osteoporotic fractures and of 2.1% (95% CI 1.5-2.7%) for hip fractures. Including bone mineral density in the risk assessment, the cost per QALY gained was ≤35 k in women at age 60 with a fracture history and a T-score of -2.5 (at age 80, this was ≤3 k). CONCLUSIONS: A pharmaco-economic model based on individual long-term risks (as derived from a health care database) can improve the targeting in a cost-effective manner of therapy to patients.

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.

An animal's social position within a group can influence its ability to perform important behaviours like eating and resting, but little is known about how social position affects the ability to express what are arguably less important but still rewarding behaviors, such as grooming. We set out to assess if dominance measured at the feeder is associated with increased use of a mechanical brush. Over a 2-year period, 161 dry cows were enrolled in a dynamically changing group of 20 individuals with access to a mechanical brush. We determined dominance using agonistic behaviors at the feeder and retrospectively analyzed brush use for the 12 most, and 12 least dominant individuals during the week before calving. Cows that were more dominant at the feeder used the brush more, especially during peak feeding times. Agonistic interactions at the brush did not differ between dominants and subordinates and were not related to brushing duration. These findings indicate that social position, calculated using competition for feed, affects mechanical brush access such that subordinates use the brush less than dominant cows independent of competition or time of day. Changes in some behaviors can be used to assess health and affective states in animals 1,2 . In contrast to behaviors such as feeding and resting, grooming is typically considered to be a less urgent 3 behavior and less essential for survival (perhaps similar to other rewarding behaviors such as play 4 ). It has been suggested that these behaviors are more likely to be suppressed early on when animals become sick 5 or otherwise experience suboptimal living conditions 6 . On commercial dairy farms, mechanical brushes are increasingly used to provide cows with selfgrooming opportunities, promoting naturalistic cleaning and scratching behaviors. Cows are motivated to use a mechanical brush 7 indicating that they find brushing rewarding. Previous research found reduced brush use in cattle with poor health , stress after calving 12 , and after social mixing 13 , an experience known to be stressful . However, despite the widespread use of mechanical brushes in dairy cow groups, the influence of social position on brush use is not well understood. We propose that complex social interactions in cattle may influence brush use. When dairy cattle are housed in groups, individual access to resources is regulated by dominance hierarchies , representing the overall network of dyadic dominance relationships between individuals 20 . In addition to the group-level hierarchy and dyadic relationships, dominance can be considered a trait of the individual . Dominant cows use physical and non-physical agonistic interactions to displace subordinates, influencing time budgets and behavioral patterns, limiting access to resources, and increasing stress . In nature, animals can benefit from group membership 24 , and in these cases dominance relationships reduce the need for potentially dangerous agonistic interactions 25 . However, farm animals often have little agency in group formation , and high stocking rates can cause increased competition for resources making it difficult for subordinate animals to avoid interactions with dominants. Previous work has reported that, when housed in a freestall barn, the majority of agonistic interactions take place in the feeding area 18,29 (i.e., feed bunk). Although displacements also occur in other areas of the pen 30,31 , feed related competition has been validated to be a practical proxy to measure dominance in captive dairy cow groups 32 . To avoid receiving aggressive interactions, subordinate cows can use a variety of strategies, including feeding at less competitive times . During competitive times, some cows may also make concessions, choosing to utilize an alternative resource that is currently available instead of a preferred resource (e.g., brush instead of feed). However, it is unknown how dominance affects access to less essential resources, like a brush. The primary aim of this study was to investigate if dominance affected access to a mechanical brush in dairy cows. We also set out to compare brush use patterns of dominant and subordinate cows over the day and to determine if variation in brush use was related to direct competition for the brush. We hypothesized that (1) dominant individuals (as per their competitive behavior at the feeding area) will spend more time using the brush than subordinate individuals, (2) the number of displacements performed and received at the brush will influence individual brush usage with dominant individuals performing more and receiving fewer displacements

The adoption of automated, data-driven decision making in an ever expanding range of applications has raised concerns about its potential unfairness towards certain social groups. In this context, a number of recent studies have focused on defining, detecting, and removing unfairness from data-driven decision systems. However, the existing notions of fairness, based on parity (equality) in treatment or outcomes for different social groups, tend to be quite stringent, limiting the overall decision making accuracy. In this paper, we draw inspiration from the fairdivision and envy-freeness literature in economics and game theory and propose preference-based notions of fairness-given the choice between various sets of decision treatments or outcomes, any group of users would collectively prefer its treatment or outcomes, regardless of the (dis)parity as compared to the other groups. Then, we introduce tractable proxies to design margin-based classifiers that satisfy these preference-based notions of fairness. Finally, we experiment with a variety of synthetic and real-world datasets and show that preference-based fairness allows for greater decision accuracy than parity-based fairness. An open-source code implementation of our scheme is available at:

The adoption of automated, data-driven decision making in an ever expanding range of applications has raised concerns about its potential unfairness towards certain social groups. In this context, a number of recent studies have focused on defining, detecting, and removing unfairness from data-driven decision systems. However, the existing notions of fairness, based on parity (equality) in treatment or outcomes for different social groups, tend to be quite stringent, limiting the overall decision making accuracy. In this paper, we draw inspiration from the fair-division and envy-freeness literature in economics and game theory and propose preference-based notions of fairness -- given the choice between various sets of decision treatments or outcomes, any group of users would collectively prefer its treatment or outcomes, regardless of the (dis)parity as compared to the other groups. Then, we introduce tractable proxies to design margin-based classifiers that satisfy these preference...

Land conflicts can be detrimental. An important goal of development policy is to help define and instill respect for borders. This is often implemented through mandatory and expensive interventions that rely on the expansion of government land administration institutions. We bring to the table a new policy that, in theory, promotes neighborly relations and equitable divisions at low cost. The salient features of this policy would be the existence of a regulatory institution and the option to bypass regulation in favor of a cooperative solution. Such a policy is particularly relevant when the government formally owns the land but tenure rights are about to be individualized. The key idea combines the logic of forward induction with the insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems. As a first and low-cost pass at empirical evaluation, we conduct a framed field experiment among farmers in the Ethiopian highlands, a region exhibiting features typical of many countries where borders are often disputed.

The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual's best response strategy is thus defined based on this projection, adding additional stability conditions to strategic choice and increasing the set of potential equilibria beyond pure Nash equilibria. Yet, the original Conflict Analysis approach lacks the ability to genuinely model dynamic repeated games, in which past play defines the condition for future interactions. This article will illustrate how the original model can be adapted to include endogenous individual preferences that are defined by the strategic choice of players during past play, allowing to model the reciprocal connection between preferential change and best response play in repeated games. A dummy game serves as an exemplar and helps to visualise the results obtained from this extension.

Monetary valuations for mortality and health risk reductions, elicited through stated preference surveys, have been shown to include values placed on others' welfare. Less attention has been paid to how these altruistic concerns, and hence willingness to pay (WTP), are affected when the public good is to be provided through taxation. We set up a theoretical framework to investigate this issue and show that when we move away from a first-best tax, WTP becomes distorted. However, once a 'Veil of Ignorance' is introduced into the model, this distortionary impact is reduced. We test this empirically using a laboratory experiment and confirm our theoretical findings, generating WTP values that are closer to the social optimum.

This study measures the relative importance of selfishness and social capital motives using resource allocation data collected in hypothetical surveys and non-hypothetical experiments. Social capital motives allow an agent's well-being to be influenced by his sympathetic relationships with others. The assumption that selfishness can explain nearly all resource allocations is rejected.

We run an eye-tracking experiment to investigate whether players change their gaze patterns and choices after they experience alternative models of choice in one-shot games. In phase 1 and 3, participants play 2 × 2 matrix games with a human counterpart; in phase 2, they apply specific decision rules while playing with a computer with known behavior. We classify participants in types based on their gaze patterns in phase 1 and explore attentional shifts in phase 3, after players were exposed to the alternative decision rules. Results show that less sophisticated players, who focus mainly on their own payoffs, change their gaze patterns towards the evaluation of others' incentives in phase 3. This attentional shift predicts an increase in equilibrium responses in relevant classes of games. Conversely, cooperative players do not change their visual analysis. Our results shed new light on theories of bounded rationality and on theories of social preferences.

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. This paper studies how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy-the caste system -affects individuals' willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although the analysis controls for individual wealth, education, and political participation, This paper-a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the behavioral foundations of economics. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at . The author may be contacted at khoff@worldbank.org. low-caste individuals exhibit a much lower willingness to punish norm violations that hurt members of their own caste, suggesting a cultural difference across caste status in the concern for members of one's own community. The lower willingness to punish may inhibit the low caste's ability to sustain collective action and so may contribute to its economic vulnerability.

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. This paper studies how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy-the caste system -affects individuals' willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although the analysis controls for individual wealth, education, and political participation, This paper-a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the behavioral foundations of economics. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at . The author may be contacted at khoff@worldbank.org. low-caste individuals exhibit a much lower willingness to punish norm violations that hurt members of their own caste, suggesting a cultural difference across caste status in the concern for members of one's own community. The lower willingness to punish may inhibit the low caste's ability to sustain collective action and so may contribute to its economic vulnerability.

We examine the game theoretic properties of a model of crime first introduced by Shortet al.(2010Phys. Rev. E82, 066114) as the SBD Adversarial Game. We identify the rationalizable strategies and one-shot equilibria under multiple equilibrium refinements. We further show that SBD&#39;s main result about the effectiveness of defecting-punishers (“Informants”) in driving the system to evolve to the cooperative equilibrium under an imitation dynamic generalizes to a best response dynamic, though only under certain parameter regimes. The nature of this strategy&#39;s role, however, differs significantly between the two dynamics: in the SBD imitation dynamic, Informants are sufficient but not necessary to achieve the cooperative equilibrium, while under the best response dynamic, Informants are necessary but not sufficient for convergence to cooperation. Since a policy of simply converting citizens to Informants will not guarantee success under best response dynamics, we identify alterna...

The relationship between corporate social responsibility and consumer's behavior is more and more strong today: so it influences management of ethical and social effects of companies. The aim of the study is to investigate to what extent the socially responsible behaviors of companies influence consumer purchasing decisions and, moreover, the possible willingness to pay higher prices for good practice products. A choice experiment was conducted in Italy for this purpose on ready-made foods, where socially responsible initiatives of companies are compared with four levels of price and the presence or absence of a known brand. The analysis shows a positive relationship between socially responsible initiatives of companies and attitudes of consumers towards them and their products. However, by investigation, only few people adopt corporate social responsibility as choice criterion for purchases still, because traditional purchasing criteria continue to prevail, in particular the price. The conclusions are also a matter for thought for further discussion.

This article presents results from an experiment into attribute perception and relevant levels for management of woodland and mountain areas typical of the Iberian Peninsula&#39;s Atlantic region. The aim, which the authors argue has been robustly reached, was to identify those aspects of forestry policy clearly perceived by citizens. This is useful for defining enlargement of areas protected under Natura 2000 Network. Results show clear preference for an increase in woodland to over half the current surface area, with replanting of traditional trees, in woodlands of low density and trees of different age and, preferably in irregular shaped plots.

We investigate whether individuals’ self-stated privacy behavior is correlated with their reservation price for the disclosure of personal and potentially sensitive information. Our incentivized experiment has a unique setting: Information about choices with real implications could be immediately disclosed to an audience of fellow first semester students. Although we find a positive correlation between respondents’ willingness to accept (WTA) disclosure of their private information and their stated privacy behavior for some models, this correlation disappears when we change the specification of the privacy index. Independent of the privacy index chosen we find that the WTA is significantly influenced by individual responses to personal questions, as well as by different decisions to donate actual money, indicating that the willingness to protect private information depends on the delicacy of the information at stake.

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share is exogenously fixed. Responders can accept or reject the proposal, with game types differing in the consequences of rejection: all four combinations of (not) self-harming and (not) other-harming are considered. We find that envy leads responders to reject high proposer claims, especially when rejection harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict and results in a considerable loss of efficiency.

This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. Standard practice investigates the shape of the optimal tax schedule that is consistent with a given social welfare function, a statistical distribution of individual productivities that fits available data on labour incomes and given preferences between consumption and leisure. The argument in this paper goes in the opposite direction. It starts from the observed distribution of gross and disposable income within a population and from observed marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. This provides an alternative way of reading marginal tax rates calculations routinely provided by tax-benefit models. In this framework, the issue of the optimality of an existing tax-benefit system may be analysed by considering whether the social welfare function associated with that system satisfies elementary properties. A detailed application is given in the case of France, Spain and UK.

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

We investigate the role of affect and deliberation on social preferences. In our laboratory experiment subjects decide on a series of mini Dictator games while they are under varying degrees of cognitive load. The cognitive load is intended to decrease deliberation and therefore enhance the influence of affect on behavior. In each game subjects have two options: they can decide between a fair or an unfair allocation. We find that subjects in a high-load condition are more generous -they more often choose the fair allocation than subjects in a low-load condition. The series of mini Dictator games also allows us to investigate how subjects react to the games' varying levels of advantageous inequality. Low-load subjects react considerably more to the degree of advantageous inequality. Our results therefore underscore the importance of affect for basic altruistic behavior and deliberation in adjusting decisions to a given situation.

We investigate the role of affect and deliberation on social preferences. In our laboratory experiment subjects decide on a series of mini Dictator games while they are under varying degrees of cognitive load. The cognitive load is intended to decrease deliberation and therefore enhance the influence of affect on behavior. In each game subjects have two options: they can decide between a fair or an unfair allocation. We find that subjects in a high-load condition are more generous -they more often choose the fair allocation than subjects in a low-load condition. The series of mini Dictator games also allows us to investigate how subjects react to the games' varying levels of advantageous inequality. Low-load subjects react considerably more to the degree of advantageous inequality. Our results therefore underscore the importance of affect for basic altruistic behavior and deliberation in adjusting decisions to a given situation.

Given the foundational nature of infant visual attention and potential cascading effects on later development, studies of individual variability in developmental trajectories in a normative sample are needed. We longitudinally tested newborns (N = 77) at 1-2 and 3-4 weeks, then again at 2, 4, 6, 8 and 14 months of age, assessing individual differences in their attention. Newborns viewed live stimuli (facial gesturing, rotating disk), one at a time, for 3 min each. Older infants viewed a 10-s side-by-side social-nonsocial video (people talking, rotating disk). We found short-term developmental stability of interindividual differences in infants' overall, social, and nonsocial attention, within the newborn period (1-4 weeks), and within the later infancy period (2-14 months). Additionally, we found that overall attention, but not social and nonsocial attention, was developmentally stable long term (newborn through 14 months). This novel finding that newborn overall attention predicts later overall attention through the first year suggests a robust individual difference. This study is a first step toward developing individual difference measures of social and nonsocial attention. Future studies need to understand why newborns vary in their attention and to identify the potential impact of this variability on later social and cognitive development.

In this paper we aim to disentangle the effects on in-group favoritism driven by beliefs from those stemming from group identity, with the final goal of testing the relative power of three potential explanations of this bias: The Beliefs Driven Explanation (BDE), the Group Identity Explanation (GIE) and the Belief-mediated Group Identity Explanation (BGE). The BDE suggests that in-group favoritism is only driven by the desire not to let others' expectations down. The GIE claims that people have a preference, per se, for members of their group. According to the BGE, people also have a preference for members of their group, but this is mediated by their second-order beliefs. To this aim, we built an experimental design able to produce exogenous variations in both group membership and expectations, hence providing a genuine test for the rationale of in-group bias. The results of our experiment suggest that beliefs per se are not a significant explanation of in-group favoritism and hence do not provide support to the BDE. Our experimental evidence does not provide support also to the BGE. We conclude that our experiment suggests to single out the GIE as the most powerful explanation of social identity.

In the clinical and economic evaluation of health care, the value of benefit gained should be determhred from a public perspective. The objective of this study was to establish relative valuations attached to different health states to form the basis for a 'social tariff' for use in quantifying patient benefit from health care. Three thousand three hundred and ninety-five interviews were conducted with a representative sample of the adult British population. Using the EuroQol health state classification and a visual analogue scale (VAS), each respondent valued 15 health states producing, in total, direct valuations for 45 states. Two hundred and twenty-one re-interviews were conducted approximately 10 weeks later. A near complete, and logically consistent, VAS data set was generated with good test-retest reliability (mean ICC = 0.78). Both sociai class and education had a significant effect, where higher median valuations were given by respondents in social classes Ill-V and by those with intermediate or no educational qualifications. These effects were particularly noticeable for more severe states. The use of such valuations in a social tariff raises important issues regarding the use of the VAS method itself to elicit valuations for hypothetical health states, the production of separate tariffs according to social class and/or education and the appropriate measure of central tendency.

While social relationships play an important role for individuals to cope with missing market institutions, they also limit individuals' range of trading partners. This paper aims at understanding the determinants of trust at various social distances when information asymmetries are present. Among participants from an informal housing area in Cairo we find that the increase in trust following a reduction in social distance comes from the fact that trustors are much more inclined to follow their beliefs when interacting with their friend. When interacting with an ex-ante unknown agent instead, the decision to trust is mainly driven by social preferences. Nevertheless, trustors underestimate their friend's intrinsic motivation to cooperate, leading to a loss in social welfare. We relate this to the agents' inability to signal their trustworthiness in an environment characterized by strong social norms.

Sociometric nominations and ratings assessed peers' perceptions of supportive and conflicted teacher-student relationships, evaluations of children's positive and negative attributes, and peer-rated liking. Participants were 993 third-and fourthgrade children. Girls obtained higher Teacher Support and lower Teacher Conflict scores compared with boys. The pattern of correlations between teacher-student relationship scores and other peer evaluations was comparable across genders. Both Teacher Support and Teacher Conflict made independent contributions to peer evaluations of children's competencies and acceptance of children. Teacher Support contributes to the prediction of social preference scores beyond that predicted by peer nominations of aggression. Teacher ratings of aggression were available for a subsample of 71 behaviorally at-risk children. For this subsample, Teacher Support predicted social preference scores after controlling for both peer nominations of aggression and teacher ratings of aggression. Peers' perceptions of Teacher Support may function as an "affective bias," influencing both perceptions of child competencies and liking for the child. Implications of these findings for classroom-based interventions with peer-rejected children are discussed.

We conduct an experimental study on behavior and cognition in prisoner's dilemmas with and without role-switching from the perspective of inductive game theory (IGT). It is basic for our study that subjects have no prior knowledge about any payoffs, even their own; they may learn them by repeated play. Without role-switching, many subjects learned relevant payoffs successfully and played a dominant strategy consistently with predictions of IGT. With role-switching, IGT makes two behavioral predictions: one is a Nash equilibrium, and the other is maximization of the sum of payoffs. These two alternatives were observed for many matched pairs of subjects. We study subjects' understandings of payoffs by analyzing their answers to a questionnaire given after the experiment, and look into the relations to behaviors; we find that behavior is often determined by the learned payoffs. We present a model of individual behavior based on the basic postulates of IGT, which allows us to conduct various statistical hypothesis tests for the behavior data. One test shows some statistical (history-) independence of subjects' behavior. Our study not only supports but also sharpens the basic postulates of IGT.

抄録: We conduct an experimental study on behavior and cognition in prisoner&#x27;s dilemmas with and without role-switching from the perspective of inductive game theory (IGT). It is basic for our study that subjects have no prior knowledge about any payoffs, even their ...

We study social preferences in a three-person ultimatum game experiment with one proposer and two responders. Any responder can unilaterally punish the proposer. In three treatments, we vary the pecuniary consequences of rejection in such a way that upon rejection of one responder the other responder is (i) affected negatively, (ii) not affected, and (iii) positively affected. We collect complete strategies and are able to classify (almost) all of them in intuitively plausible strategy types. Half of the responders submitted strategies that are sensitive to the relative standing with respect to the proposer and the other responder. The other half of responders submitted strategies with an acceptance threshold concerning the own material payoff, only. Moreover, we observe a treatment effect. A responder is more likely to reject a proposal if this does not negatively affect his relative standing with respect to the other responder. Recently developed models of social preferences are not able to organize our data.

UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam () UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Responder behavior in three-person ultimatum game experiments Riedl, Arno; Vyrastekova, Jana Publication date 2003 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Riedl, A., & Vyrastekova, J. (2003). Responder behavior in three-person ultimatum game experiments. Unknown Publisher. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website.

We address a puzzle in welfare economics - the possibility that rational people may be simultaneously against two apparently con‡icting forms of &quot;tyranny.&quot; In fact the two types of tyranny can be reconciled but at the possible cost of con‡ict with other standard welfare principles. We examine whether such con‡icts do arise using a questionnaire-experimental study. Our study shows that both tyrannies are rejected by a majority of the parti- cipants, and in many cases also pose a practical problem in moral reasoning

We explore a unifying explanation for prosocial behavior in which people care not about others' payoffs per se, but whether their own behavior accords with social norms. Individuals who are sensitive to norms will adhere to them so long as they observe others doing the same. A model formalizing this generates both prosociality (without relying on explicit distributional preferences) and well-known context effects (for which simple distributional preferences cannot account). A simple experiment allows us to measure individual-level normsensitivity and to show that norm-sensitivity explains heterogeneity in prosociality in public goods, dictator, ultimatum, and trust games.

Cultural traits play a significant role in the determination of economic outcomes and institutions. This paper presents evidence from laboratory experiments on the cultural integration of individuals of Chinese ethnicity in Australia, focusing on social preferences, risk attitudes, and preferences for competition. We find that greater exposure to Western culture is in general associated with a convergence to Western norms of behavior. Specifically, the share of education an individual receives in the West has a strong negative impact on altruism, trust towards individuals of Chinese ethnicity, and trustworthiness, while it has a significant and positive impact on trust towards Australians. For risk and competitive preferences, our results are gender-specific. These findings have important implications for policy making and institution building in multicultural societies.

This paper puts three of the most prominent specifications of 'other-regarding' preferences to the experimental test, namely the theories developed by Charness and Rabin, by Fehr and Schmidt, and by Andreoni and Miller. In a series of experiments based on various dictator and prisoner's dilemma games, we try to uncover which of these concepts, or the classical selfish approach, is able to explain most of our experimental findings. The experiments are special with regard to two aspects: First, we investigate the consistency of individual behavior within and across different classes of games. Second, we analyze the stability of individual behavior over time by running the same experiments on the same subjects at several points in time. Our results demonstrate that in the first wave of experiments, all theories of other-regarding preferences explain a high share of individual decisions. Other-regarding preferences seem to wash out over time, however. In the final wave, it is the classical theory of selfish behavior that delivers the best explanation. Stable behavior over time is observed only for subjects, who behave strictly selfish. Most subjects behave consistently with regard to at least one of the theories within the same class of games, but are much less consistent across games.

We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution always finishes on top, there is no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered; in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bottom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specifics of the bargaining setup.

We test the robustness of recent findings on the benefits of explicit contracts framed as penalties to the complex environments typical of B2B (and B2G) procurement, where penalty contracts are common. In our framework, matching is endogenous and competitive, there are contractible and non-contractible tasks, subjects play repeatedly and maintain their identity so that reputation-based relationships can form. We find that the introduction of explicit incentives boosts efficiency, strongly increasing effort in the contractible task while only mildly crowding it out in the non-contractible one. Bonuses and penalties are equiv-alent for efficiency and crowding-out, but different in distributional effects: sellers ’ surplus increases significantly with bonuses as buyers ’ offers become more generous. Consistently, buyers tend to prefer penalties, which may help explaining why they are so widespread in

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