Plant Cognition

This article presents Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī’s (d.991) view that sensation can be attributed to some
advanced plants. I argue that this view offers an alternative perspective to Plato and Aristotle’s respective
positions of universally affirming and negating plant sensation. Al-ʿĀmirī expresses this view in his
dialogue with young Avicenna under the context about the demarcation between nature and soul. What
is unique about Al-ʿĀmirī’s view is, as I argue, that the best criterion for demarcating between plants and
animals is a primitive and generic sensory power which underlies the sense of touch and other sensory
powers. Al-ʿĀmirī calls it the sensation of the thing (iḥsās bi-l-šayʾ) and attributes it to plants. The text
where this view is brought about is analyzed in detail. I elaborate on three possible interpretations about
the role of this unique sensory power and its relation to the sense of touch. I conclude the discussion
with the best explanation which reconciles the Aristotelian and Platonic elements in the text.

Plants are highly integrated ecoplastic interfaces whose electromic complexity reflects wide-ranging cognitive interactions such as long-distance communication, proprioception, learning, memory, or attention-like processes. These capacities, which have emerged over the course of evolution have enabled plants to accumulate precise knowledge of their singular milieu differentiated from the raw data of the environment, developing specific dynamical couplings and new forms of cognitive plasticity including perception-action loops, biosemiotic exchanges, and high value-added complex behaviors. The essential question that will be addressed here is why and above all how modular and sessile organisms like plants came to develop such sophisticated cognitive mechanisms compared to animals and humans? To answer this question, we propose a comparative analysis of the protoneural dynamics of plant electromes and the modes of cognition associated with them. It will be developed on four axes: 1/ the fundamental role of spontaneous EPGs as early markers of all the physiological states of the plant subjected to constant flows of information and stimuli from the environment; 2/ the nonlinear dynamic processes observed in oscillatory or synchronized bioelectrical plant networks such as low band frequencies waves or the spatiotemporal course of EPG signals compared to neural systems; 3/ the efficiency of plant electromic plastic interfaces in different cognitive scenarios (on-line vs off-line, explicit vs non-explicit, extended vs focused..); 4/ the description of a new form of plasticity, neither phenotypic nor ontogenetic, but mesologic, i.e. linked to the medial structure of plant bodies and their dynamic coupling at the plant-milieu interface. This mesological plasticity involving active perceptions, affordances or umwelts and plasticity complexes is presented as the keystone to the apparent contradiction between the high cognitive power of plants and their apparent absence of coordination. Used as a model of evolutionary biology to study plants as self-eco-organized structures, it could lead to the adoption of a new index of ecosensitivity permitting a better understanding of the electrical and cognitive-sensory dimension of plant life. Finally, this exploration conducted within a bottom-up transdisciplinary framework, could permit to reassess the scales of perception and cognition of living systems, and have a direct impact on our understanding of the emergence and singularity of intelligent behaviors in non-human living beings.

Classical cognitive science o en strips the inherent social character out of language, treating it as a system of internal mental representations, and so does Generative Linguistics. In contrast, post-cognitivist approaches to psychology reject representationalism but struggle with language's capacity to refer beyond sensory experience. Cognitive Linguistics addresses meaning and embodiment but remains somewhat isolated from broader post-cognitivist thought. The enactive approach overtly problematizes the concept of representation, but tends to marginalize language; when such focus is taken, a coherent account of semantic content remains an unresolved task. This paper surveys philosophical and linguistic perspectives on language within post-cognitivist frameworks and proposes a blueprint for future research based on four points: sociality and interaction, embodiment, ecological validity, and representation-as-praxis.

In questo articolo ci si domanda se ricorrere a una qualche concezione di
rappresentazione per spiegare la cognizione delle piante sia utile o meno. Dopo aver richiamato una pluralità di visioni sul concetto di rappresentazione in vari approcci alle scienze cognitive, ci si soffermerà sull’eventuale presenza di una particolare concezione di rappresentazione – un tipo di rappresentazione molecolare – pertinente il caso vegetale. all’insegna di un approccio processuale e relazionale alla cognizione, ci si interrogherà sulla possibile relazione di aspetti rappresentazionali 1) con il ruolo svolto dalle reti biologiche di segnalazione chimico-elettrica interne ai corpi vegetali, e, in particolare, 2) con le capacità di rilevamento, memorizzazione e apprendimento dell’informazione ambientale da parte delle piante. Nello specifico, ci si chiederà se e che tipo di ruolo abbia la memoria vegetale, ai suoi vari livelli di operatività, con la capacità sia di
strutturare un insieme di elementi e di dinamiche processuali, sia con la capacità di richiamare tali elementi e dinamiche al ripresentarsi di situazioni simili. ci si domanderà se e che rapporto abbia la memoria delle piante con una possibile concezione molecolare di rappresentazione. la questione è aperta.

This article examines the growing impact that the cognitive behaviours of plants, sessile organisms without a nervous system, are having in various areas of philosophical research.
The consideration will focus primarily on spillovers into cognitive science, the philosophy of mind, and biosemiotics, although there are other areas that this new exploration of the capabilities of plants is touching upon. Some issues are ontological, related to our unconscious psychological tendencies to talk about a reality subdivided in hypersimplifying ways
and, on the other hand, to the rigorous metanalysis work of identifying, differentiating, and categorizing entities and processes. Others are epistemological, related to the ways and limits of knowing phenomena. Others regard the analyses of the perceptual sensitivity of plants based on a comparison with different systems of perception-action that offer
qualitatively different experiences. Finally, there are issues concerning the presence or absence of semiotic processes in the plant world, related to the production, transmission, and “interpretation” (non-conceptual) of signs in these organisms’ living and interacting environments. The article raises queries and considerations as a starting point for research that requires further investigation. The purpose here is not to delve into a focal debate or question but to offer an overview of the main challenges and most significant horizons in this field. This attempt should therefore be understood as a working map for a future research agenda.

This paper aims to propose a relational approach to the study of cognition that can offer a perspective on the cognitive behaviours of plants – sessile organisms without a nervous system – when considered in the reciprocal interrogation of philosophy and the cognitive and ecological sciences. When leveraging the inspiring, clarifying, and occasionally heuristic potential of different epistemic tools, plant cognition can be understood as the result of processes constantly shaped by multiple co-constructive
relationships between organisms and their ecological niches. Organisms and niches are conceivable as dense multi-functional systems of resources and information interchange. The concepts of network and  ramification are fruitful keys to frame forms of dynamic relationships between elements. In their alternatively iconical, metaphorical, and conceptual-modelling potentialities, networks and ramifications
have been used to identify different types of relationships and transmitted information. The explanatory and heuristic scope of these two concepts needs to be further investigated when linked to cognitive aspects, especially with regard the concept of ramification. Looking at the plant world, whilst much has been written about networks, relatively little has been said explicitly about ramifications (branching capacity, branching characteristics and habits) and their relationship with aspects related to plant behaviour and cognition.

"Taking into account Eduardo Kohn’s observation that “signs are not ex-
clusively human affairs. All living beings sign. We humans are therefore at
home with the multitude of semiotic life” (Kohn, 2013, p. 42), this chapter
explores how creative-critical translation practices, as norm-challenging ap-
proaches to translation across semiotic and sensing systems, can help articulate
and translate the Anthropocene experientially from non-traditional Western
perspectives on animacy and language (Hornborg, 2006). I contend that by
re-thinking communication boundaries beyond traditionally assigned national
and cultural linguistic ones, creative-critical translations invite a widening of
36 The Translation of Experience
our understanding of the Anthropocene to nationally indifferent terrestrial
life forms and non-verbal experiences. Through practice-based critiques of
traditionally ‘word-based’ translation norms, more-than-lingual experiential
translation practices recognize new planetary ‘borders’, limits and epistemic
thresholds in the context of translation studies, and in the becoming of lan-
guages and cultures which are endangered by climate change (Cronin, 2017,
p. 92). Informed by recent developments in the field of translation studies
(Cronin, 2016, 2017, 2020, 2023; Marais, 2019, 2020, 2023; Scott, 2018;
Sealey, 2019), eco-cosmopolitanism (Heine, 2008) and anthropology (Kohn,
2013; Todd, 2015, 2016; Viveiros de Castro, 2014), this chapter will explore
how experiential translations, as translations which translate not only across
languages but across different embodied experiences, operate as a critique of
a hermeneutic framework of translation traditionally centred around human
experience of communication between fixed linguistic categories (DesRoch-
ers, 2023; Grass, 2023). Inherited from the Enlightenment, this framework
of understanding privileges human language over other non-human forms of
communication and human thought over non-human semiosis. Widening the
ontological framework of translation theory through translation as creative
sign-making practice, I contend, performs more inclusive and diverse practices
of listening beyond fixed categories of national languages. Such experiential
translation practices summon imaginaries of ‘multinatural’ planetary contexts
and planetary diplomacies beyond internationalism by performing experiential
worlds in which not only humans sign, and not only humans translate"

In this paper we analyze the controversy within the field of plant cognition from both philosophical and anthropological perspectives. We reconstruct the debate in botanical science and examine its interpretations as offered in analytic philosophy of mind. Our focus is on Gagliano’s work on plant cognition, which calls for a thorough reconsideration of how culture, science, and society are intertwined. She advocates for the integration of Western experimental paradigms with insights from Indigenous knowledge. In this context, the article advances an anthropological perspective that complements the approach of plant scientists and (especially analytic) philosophers, who often prioritize ontologies and conceptual abstractions over situated practices and their politics. In this respect – the article concludes – there is potential for dialogue between philosophical pragmatism and anthropology.

Increasingly, plants and especially linked forest trees are seen as capable of cognition and even literary “plant writing.” Simultaneously, scholars have identified Thoreau’s writing as a form of “radical empiricism,” highlighting his rejection of taxonomy. I bring these two streams together to suggest Thoreau’s “radicle empiricism,” gesturing to the plant’s taproot, or “radicle,” as a model for a more robust scientific practice that incorporates the empiricism of the plants themselves. Turning to vegetal entries in Thoreau’s Journal, I demonstrate how “radicle empiricism” attends to plants’ minor empirical perspective while also encouraging the reader to continue the root-like experimental process.

Given the recent turn to literary and cultural plant studies and forest research that illuminates tree communication and even tree cognition, this paper re-evaluates Henry David Thoreau's arboreal writing in his Journal as a model for thinking with the forest. I argue that Thoreau speculatively thinks and writes with trees in a way that promotes their agency in co-producing meaning. Drawing on the aphorism, not as a short, pithy statement of accepted truth, but rather as an open-ended method of thinking that uses ambiguity to demand constant reinterpretation, this paper suggests that many of Thoreau's entries in the Journal, particularly where he discusses trees, may be productively read as aphoristic. Ultimately, I claim that Thoreau's aphoristic writing communicates an a ective arboreal encounter to the reader, thus modelling a more sustainable speculative practice for forest thinking.

The argument is based on the premise that method follows subject matter. A representational view of methodology is discussed, arguing that a natural-scientific approach based on variabilization and subdivision of mental life is epistemically insufficient. Subjectivity as the subject matter of psychology must be studied with methods that are capable of addressing wholistic entities and integrating a mostly sociohistorical object, which can be addressed through the psychological humanities. The methodologism of psychology leads to a representational self-misunderstanding that simulates knowledge about human subjectivity but is based on artificial distinctions that are embedded in research practices removed from psychosocial reality. The case is made for representational as well as nonrepresentational psychologies that are grounded in the idea that parts of subjectivity address what is possible and not only what exists. It is concluded that psychology needs a much broader knowledge base and methodological canon, including armchair reflection, for an understanding of human mental life.

Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural phenomenon can be enriched by drawing from different fields and disciplines, including niche construction theory in evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and ecological and enactive views in embodied cognitive science, on the other. But these insights have so far been explored in separation from each other, without clear indication of whether they can work together. Moreover, the focus on particular practices, however insightful, has tended to lack consideration of potential further implications for a naturalized understanding of science as a whole (i.e., above and beyond those particular practices). ...

The philosophical reflection stemming from actual scientific practice has been proven to have the potential to inform ethical thinking and political practice with a more robust foundation than those not necessarily linked to scientific developments. This is not, of course, to argue for an alleged preeminence of science over speculative philosophical reflection, nor that scientific practices should remain untouched by science-informed philosophy. On the contrary, history and anthropology of science function as antidotes to similar unfounded views. Recent scientific and technological discoveries require a stronger role for philosophy in public and institutional discussions. Their practical consequences for humans and non-humans cannot be ignored.

This paper will serve two functions. First, as a foreword to the other essays that compose this monographic issue of the journal. It will also provide a critical discussion on two major issues that emerged in the general. The first consists in seeing the philosophical outcomes of new developments in science through the lens of the language that is used to describe them. The second pertains to the metascientific level of the disagreement, as this new evidence challenges the established understanding of scientific practice and its philosophical foundations. The case of plant cognition will be examined in some detail to illustrate both issues.

Editorial on the Research Topic Enaction and Ecological Psychology: Convergences and Complementarities The past several decades in cognitive science have seen an increasing recognition of the importance of the body, and of the relationship between the body and the environment, to our understanding of the mind. Forms of this recognition have varied substantially, with some seeing it important to add a role for the body into existing computational and representational accounts of cognition (e.g., Clark, 2007; Shapiro, 2011; Barsalou, 2015), while others finding in the body a different approach altogether, one which produces quite a different picture of the mind than those accounts which have formed the mainstream and traditional forms in the cognitive sciences. Some of these more radical forms of embodied cognitive science have developed fairly independently of one another, but nevertheless have come to share some core theoretical characteristics-accounts that emphasize the role of action for perception and that do not involve computation or representations in explanatory roles. In their place we find discussions of skilled bodily activity in providing accounts of the performance of cognitive tasks. Two well-developed such approaches are those of ecological psychology, deriving substantially from the work of psychologist Gibson (1966, 1986), and that of enactive cognitive science, building largely on foundations laid by Varela et al. [1991; see also Thompson (2007)]. Both approaches have continued to expand and diversify in their accounts of psychological and cognitive phenomena, framing significant empirical and theoretical work within the cognitive sciences to date (e.g.,

At first glance, plants seem relatively immobile and, unlike animals, unable to interact with the surroundings or escape stressful environments. But, although markedly different from those of animals, movement pervades all aspects of plant behaviour. Here, we focused our investigation on the approaching movement of climbing plants, that is the movement they perform to reach-to-climb a support. In particular, we examined whether climbing plants, similarly to humans and other animals, evolved a motor accuracy mechanism as to improve the precision of their movement. For this purpose, by means of three-dimensional kinematical analysis, we investigated whether climbing plants have the ability to correct online their movement by means of secondary submovements, and if their frequency production is influenced by the difficulty of the task. Results showed, not only that plants correct their movement in flight, but also that they strategically increase the production of secondary submovement...

Claims that plants have conscious experiences have increased in recent years and have received wide coverage, from the popular media to scientific journals. Such claims are misleading and have the potential to misdirect funding and governmental policy decisions. After defining basic, primary consciousness, we provide new arguments against 12 core claims made by the proponents of plant consciousness. Three important new conclusions of our study are (1) plants have not been shown to perform the proactive, anticipatory behaviors associated with consciousness, but only to sense and follow stimulus trails reactively; (2) electrophysiological signaling in plants serves immediate physiological functions rather than integrative-information processing as in nervous systems of animals, giving no indication of plant consciousness; (3) the controversial claim of classical Pavlovian learning in plants, even if correct, is irrelevant because this type of learning does not require consciousness. Finally, we present our own hypothesis, based on two logical assumptions, concerning which organisms possess consciousness. Our first assumption is that affective (emotional) consciousness is marked by an advanced capacity for operant learning about rewards and punishments. Our second assumption is that image-based conscious experience is marked by demonstrably mapped representations of the external environment within the body. Certain animals fit both of these criteria, but plants fit neither. We conclude that claims for plant consciousness are highly speculative and lack sound scientific support.

Segundo-Ortin & Calvo's (2023) target article takes a less speculative and more evidence-based approach to plant sentience than did previous works promoting that idea. However, it retains many of the idea's longstanding difficulties such as starting from a false dichotomy (plants must be either hardwired or sentient), not accepting the full burden of proof for an extraordinary claim, confusingly redefining accepted cognitive terms, implying cell consciousness, not adopting the most parsimonious explanations for plant behaviors, and downplaying all the counterevidence. We advise rectifying these problems before plant sentience can become a full-fledged scientific domain.

General anesthesia, its nature, and how exactly it works are still poorly understood. Plants can also be anesthetized and lose their responses to external stimuli. Interestingly, plants are known to produce endogenous anesthetic compounds to deal with stress. Plants offer an excellent model object for studies on anesthetics and anesthesia.

We are in basic agreement with Crump et al. that animal welfare, particularly with regard to the experience of pain, is a topic of importance. However, we come to the issue from a different perspective, one in which all species are sentient and can feel pain. The implications of this theory are discussed.

Key (2016) claims fish that fish do not feel pain because they lack the necessary neuronal architecture: their responses to noxious stimuli, according to Key, are executed automatically without any feelings. However, as pointed out by many of his commentators, this conclusion is not convincing. Plants might provide some clues. Plants are not usually thought to be very active behaviorally, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, in stressful situations, plants produce numerous chemicals that have painkilling and anesthetic properties. Finally, plants, when treated with anesthetics, cannot execute active behaviors such as touch-induced leaf movements or rapid trap closures after localizing animal prey. František Baluška baluska@uni-bonn.de does research on plant signaling, plant behavior, and evolution of the eukaryotic cell at IZMB, University of Bonn. He founded the journals Plant Signaling & Behavior and Communicative & Integrative Biology, and he edits the book series Signa...

At first glance, plants seem relatively immobile and, unlike animals, unable to interact with the surroundings or escape stressful environments. But, although markedly different from those of animals, movement pervades all aspects of plant behaviour. Here, we focused our investigation on the approaching movement of climbing plants, that is the movement they perform to reach-to-climb a support. In particular, we examined whether climbing plants evolved a motor accuracy mechanism as to improve the precision of their movement and how this eventually differs from animal species. For this purpose, by means of three-dimensional kinematical analysis, we investigated whether climbing plants have the ability to correct online their movement by means of secondary submovements, and if their frequency production is influenced by the difficulty of the task. Results showed, not only that plants correct their movement in flight, but also that they strategically increase the production of secondary submovements when the task requires more precision, exactly as humans do. These findings support the hypothesis that the movement of plants is far cry from being a simple cause-effect mechanism, but rather is appropriately planned, controlled and eventually corrected.

This is a response to the nine commentaries on our target article “Unlimited Associative Learning: A primer and some predictions”. Our responses are organized by theme rather than by author. We present a minimal functional architecture for Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) that aims to tie to together the list of capacities presented in the target article. We explain why we discount higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness. We respond to the criticism that we have overplayed the importance of learning and underplayed the importance of spatial modelling. We decline the invitation to add a negative marker to our proposed positive marker so as to rule out consciousness in plants, but we nonetheless maintain that there is no positive evidence of consciousness in plants. We close by discussing how UAL relates to development and to its material substrate.

I'm a herpetologist specializing on exotic animals and exotic plants psychology and behavior. I was travelling around Japan and through my travels I was lucky to spot an interesting history and use of a specific type of cactus. The city called Cactus City in Japan were the community celebrating and promoting the health benefits and to eat cactus and, they managed to pass a bill to introduce cactus as a food in schools. This unusual devotion towards to xerophytes, coming from a natural disaster which has put part of Japan in a position where they had to explore the unknown. I found not only an interesting story but a unique approach to life through nature and community.

This is a response to the nine commentaries on our target article "Unlimited Associative Learning: A primer and some predictions". Our responses are organized by theme rather than by author. We present a minimal functional architecture for Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) that aims to tie to together the list of capacities presented in the target article. We explain why we discount higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness. We respond to the criticism that we have overplayed the importance of learning and underplayed the importance of spatial modelling. We decline the invitation to add a negative marker to our proposed positive marker so as to rule out consciousness in plants, but we nonetheless maintain that there is no positive evidence of consciousness in plants. We close by discussing how UAL relates to development and to its material substrate.

We are in basic agreement with Crump et al. that animal welfare, particularly with regard to the experience of pain, is a topic of importance. However, we come to the issue from a different perspective, one in which all species are sentient and can feel pain. The implications of this theory are discussed.

While subcellular components of cognition and affectivity that involve the
interaction between experience, environment, and physiology —such as
learning, trauma, or emotion— are being identified, the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness remain more elusive. We are interested in exploring whether ancient, simpler organisms such as nematodes have minimal consciousness. Is there something that feels like to be a worm? Or are worms blind machines? ‘Simpler’ models allow us to simultaneously extract data from multiple levels such as slow and fast neural dynamics, structural connectivity, molecular dynamics, behavior, decision making, etc., and thus, to test predictions of the current frameworks in dispute. In the present critical review, we summarize the current models of consciousness in order to reassess in light of the new evidence whether Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode with a nervous system composed of 302 neurons, has minimal consciousness. We also suggest empirical paths to further advance consciousness research using C. elegans.

This article discusses the possibility of plant decision making. We contend that recent work on bacteria provides a pertinent perspective for thinking about whether plants make choices. Specifically, the analogy between certain patterns of plant behaviour and apparent decision making in bacteria provides principled grounds for attributing decision making to the former. Though decision making is our focus, the discussion has implications for the wider issue of whether and why plants (and non-neural organisms more generally) are appropriate targets for cognitive abilities. Moreover, decision making is especially relevant to the issue of plant intelligence as it is commonly taken to be characteristic of cognition.

David.I.Bacsek is a herpetologist specializing on exotic animals and exotic plants psychology and behavior. I was travelling around Japan and through my travels I was lucky to spot an interesting history and use of a specific type of cactus. The city called Cactus City in Japan were the community celebrating and promoting the health benefits and to eat cactus and, they managed to pass a bill to introduce cactus as a food in schools. This unusual devotion towards to xerophytes, coming from a natural disaster which has put part of Japan in a position where they had to explore the unknown. I found not only an interesting story but a unique approach to life through nature and community.

Julius Sachs (1875) defined cells as follows: "The substance of plants is not homogeneous, but is composed of small structures generally indistinguishable by the naked eye; and each of these, at least for a time, is a whole complete in itself, being composed of solid, soft, and fluid layers, different in their chemical nature, and disposed concentrically from without inwards. These structures are termed Cells." 1.1 When? About 250 years before Sachs's definition of the cell, Robert Hooke observed cells for the first time on cork. Not only did Hooke's observations start a new wave in the study of plant biology, but it also gave us the term "cell" (Hooke 1665; Gest 2009). The etymological roots of the term lie in the Latin word cellulae, which means hexagonal cells of the honeycomb (Mazzarello 1999). Soon after Hooke made his observations and coined the term "cell," Antony van Leeuwenhoek discovered motile microorganisms (

Cellular circadian clocks represent ancient anticipatory systems which co-evolved with the first cells to safeguard their survival. Cyanobacteria represent one of the most ancient cells, having essentially invented photosynthesis together with redox-based cellular circadian clocks some 2.7 billion years ago. Bioelectricity phenomena, based on redox homeostasis associated electron transfers in membranes and within protein complexes inserted in excitable membranes, play important roles, not only in the cellular circadian clocks and in anesthetics-sensitive cellular sentience (awareness of environment), but also in the coupling of single cells into tissues and organs of unitary multicellular organisms. This integration of cellular circadian clocks with cellular basis of sentience is an essential feature of the cognitive CBC-Clock basis of cellular life.

Plants are not only sensitive to exogenous anaesthetics, but they also produce multitudes of endogenous substances, especially when stressed, that often have anaesthetic and anelgesic properties when applied to both humans and animals. Moreover, plants rely on neurotransmitters and their receptors for cell-cell communication and integration in a similar fashion to the use of neural systems in animals and humans. Plants also use their plant-specific sensory systems and neurotransmitter-based communication, including long-distance action potentials, to manage stress via cognition-like plant-specific behaviour and adaptation.

Recent denial of fish sentience is at variance with the fact that all living organisms need environmental awareness in order to survive in a continuously fluctuating environment. Moreover, fish sentience-like plant sentience-is also strongly supported by the sensitivity of fishes and plants to diverse anesthetics.

In soil, plant roots grow in heterogeneous environments. Plant roots are always facing the difficulty of searching effectively the patchy natural resources, such as water, oxygen, ions and mineral nutrition. Numerous studies reported that root apex navigation enables roots to explore complex environments. In this short communication, we characterize how growing maize roots explore narrow space available with two experimental settings: tactile exploration of narrow glass tube and circumnutation in free space. We also discuss root growth in the soil in terms of foraging behavior guided by the sensory root apex.

According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, (i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the need for at least a small “miracle” in his and others’ models to instantiate sentience, I applaud a bottom-up approach such as Reber’s for our scientific investigation of consciousness.

After being subjected to years of debates regarding the possibility that plants possess some form of intelligence, many admit to needing to close their eyes and to breathe mindfully when having to listen to the same arguments yet again [...]

This article discusses the possibility of plant decision making. We contend that recent work on bacteria provides a pertinent perspective for thinking about whether plants make choices. Specifically, the analogy between certain patterns of plant behaviour and apparent decision making in bacteria provides principled grounds for attributing decision making to the former. Though decision making is our focus, the discussion has implications for the wider issue of whether and why plants (and non-neural organisms more generally) are appropriate targets for cognitive abilities. Moreover, decision making is especially relevant to the issue of plant intelligence as it is commonly taken to be characteristic of cognition.

Because water is essential to life, organisms have evolved a wide range of strategies to cope with water limitations, including actively searching for their preferred moisture levels to avoid dehydration. Plants use moisture gradients to direct their roots through the soil once a water source is detected, but how they first detect the source is unknown. We used the model plant Pisum sativum to investigate the mechanism by which roots sense and locate water. We found that roots were able to locate a water source by sensing the vibrations generated by water moving inside pipes, even in the absence of substrate moisture. When both moisture and acoustic cues were available, roots preferentially used moisture in the soil over acoustic vibrations, suggesting that acoustic gradients enable roots to broadly detect a water source at a distance, while moisture gradients help them to reach their target more accurately. Our results also showed that the presence of noise affected the abilities o...

• Background and Aims Anaesthesia for medical purposes was introduced in the 19th century. However, the physiological mode of anaesthetic drug actions on the nervous system remains unclear. One of the remaining questions is how these different compounds, with no structural similarities and even chemically inert elements such as the noble gas xenon, act as anaesthetic agents inducing loss of consciousness. The main goal here was to determine if anaesthetics affect the same or similar processes in plants as in animals and humans. • Methods A single-lens reflex camera was used to follow organ movements in plants before, during and after recovery from exposure to diverse anaesthetics. Confocal microscopy was used to analyse endocytic vesicle trafficking. Electrical signals were recorded using a surface AgCl electrode. • Key Results Mimosa leaves, pea tendrils, Venus flytraps and sundew traps all lost both their autonomous and touch-induced movements after exposure to anaesthetics. In Venus flytrap, this was shown to be due to the loss of action potentials under diethyl ether anaesthesia. The same concentration of diethyl ether immobilized pea tendrils. Anaesthetics also impeded seed germination and chlorophyll accumulation in cress seedlings. Endocytic vesicle recycling and reactive oxygen species (ROS) balance, as observed in intact Arabidopsis root apex cells, were also affected by all anaesthetics tested. • Conclusions Plants are sensitive to several anaesthetics that have no structural similarities. As in animals and humans, anaesthetics used at appropriate concentrations block action potentials and immobilize organs via effects on action potentials, endocytic vesicle recycling and ROS homeostasis. Plants emerge as ideal model objects to study general questions related to anaesthesia, as well as to serve as a suitable test system for human anaesthesia.

Plants such as climbers characterized by stems or tendrils need to find a potential support (e.g., pole, stick, other plants or trees) to reach greater light exposure. Since the time when Darwin carried out research on climbing plants, several studies on plants’ searching and attachment behaviors have demonstrated their unique ability to process some features of a support to modulate their movements accordingly. Nevertheless, the strategies underlying this ability have yet to be uncovered. The present research tries to fill this gap by investigating how the interaction between above- (i.e., stems, tendrils, …) and below-ground (i.e., the root system) plant organs influences the kinematics of their approach-to-grasp movements. Using three-dimensional (3D) kinematic analysis, we characterized the movements of pea plants (Pisum sativum L.) as they leaned towards supports whose below- and above-ground parts were characterized by different thicknesses (i.e., thin below- thick above-groun...

In this article we adapt a methodology customarily used to investigate movement in animals to study the movement of plants. The targeted movement is circumnutation, a helical organ movement widespread among plants. It is variable due to a different magnitude of the trajectory (amplitude) exhibited by the organ tip, duration of one cycle (period), circular, elliptical, pendulum-like or irregular shape and the clockwise and counterclockwise direction of rotation. The acquisition setup consists of two cameras used to obtain a stereoscopic vision for each plant. Cameras switch to infrared recording mode for low light level conditions, allowing continuous motion acquisition during the night. A dedicated software enables semi-automatic tracking of key points of the plant and reconstructs the 3D trajectory of each point along the whole movement. Three-dimensional trajectories for different points undergo a specific processing to compute those features suitable to describe circumnutation (e...

At first glance, plants seem relatively immobile and, unlike animals, unable to interact with the surroundings or escape stressful environments. But, although markedly different from those of animals, movement pervades all aspects of plant behaviour. Here, we focused our investigation on the approaching movement of climbing plants, that is the movement they perform to reach-to-climb a support. In particular, we examined whether climbing plants, similarly to humans and other animals, evolved a motor accuracy mechanism as to improve the precision of their movement. For this purpose, by means of three-dimensional kinematical analysis, we investigated whether climbing plants have the ability to correct online their movement by means of secondary submovements, and if their frequency production is influenced by the difficulty of the task. Results showed, not only that plants correct their movement in flight, but also that they strategically increase the production of secondary submovement...

A sizable body of scholarship has been unfolding the presence and the significance of the vast repertoire of sensory channels and communicative techniques natural processes take up to hold communities of non- human and non- animal organisms together. The Overstory observes and creatively voices these recent trends in the biochemistry and community ecology of plant behavior. It threads these themes through a series of human characters
to whom the trees themselves are calling out: “The most wondrous products of four billion years of life need help” (O, 165). Richard Powers’ novel offers a fictional reflection on new modes of cross- species understanding by placing its human characters at the margins and in milieux where other species share the same medium and invite them to consort with their symbiotic neighbors. Critical responses to The Overstory novel have already explored a wide range of recent research in plant cognition and communication.
This essay discusses these connections through considerations of animacy, animism, and processes of origina-tion and metamorphosis, as these themes take on form within the narrative. It then draws on Carla Hustak and Natasha Myers’ presentation of “involutionary momentum” as that concept is brought into focus by an episode in the novel’s adaptation of the recent history of forest ecology. In this instance, The Overstory retails this scientific discipline’s struggle out of the grip of neo- Darwinist orthodoxy in order to clear ontological space for the natural dynamics of ecological communication across species and kingdoms, culminating in the depiction of a human character receiving arboreal enlightenment.

According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a notion of intention seems to be motivated by the widespread assumption that intentions should be understood as internal states with representational content. This assumption goes against two main tenets of ecological psychology: its anti-representationalist stance and its claim that perception is direct (in the sense of not being mediated by inferential processes). Ecological psychology thus needs a different answer to the question what intentions are. In this paper, we aim to show that Elizabeth Anscombe's theory of intention can be fruitfully brought to bear on an ecological theory of agency. We will argue that Anscombe's account can meet the two challenges of bringing intentions into the framework of ecological psychology: firstly it can explain what intentions are, if not representational states; and, secondly, it can show how our perception of affordances is guided by intention without undermining the idea of direct perception.