Philosophy of the Human Person

After World War II, analytic philosophy began to carry out investigations regarding the philosophy of mind. It was clear that it was necessary to reject mind-body dualism and begin to pay attention to psychology: fundamental is Thomism psychology. It is a bridging discipline between philosophy and psychoanalysis: this movement makes use of Aquinas’ investigations, recalling his investigations of the soul, and the clinical procedures of psychoanalysis. Therefore, acknowledging Thomist psychology’s importance is crucial to cementing a fruitful exchange between philosophy and psychoanalysis.

In the essay God as Reason, Vittorio Hosle attempts at sketching a rationalistic philosophy of religion where he provides a rationalistic interpretation of Christian theology. While such an attempt provides Christianity a place in rational secular society, it needlessly reduces the unique, divine figure of Christ into a mere historical figure, thereby dissolving the very foundation of Christian doctrine. Admitting to the difficulties of traditional Christology, Hosle openly resorts to such a reductive interpretation of the figure of Christ. This paper, however, proposes an interpretation that could salvage the figure of Christ in Hosle's rationalistic philosophy of religion. Drawing from Alain Badiou's interpretation of St. Paul, I argue that the Christ-event can be interpreted as inevitably exclusionary, rationally contradictory, and specifically divine without resorting to any fideistic interpretations. Therefore, a fully human and fully divine Christ can properly be maintained within a rationalistic philosophy of religion.

The customary way of interpreting the dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad-Gita is to consider it merely as an expression of the fear of the diffident Arjuna, who is depicted by almost all the commentators as being scared of fighting the battle, and Kṛṣṇa’s ingenuous solution to it. This paper argues that this common way of looking at the conflict leaves the central theme of the debate unattained and unsolved. The debate can also be viewed as a statement of the confrontation between two ethics and two notions of the self. The claim is not that the customary interpretation is false, or that the present one is the only possible interpretation. It rather makes a much moderate claim that it is possible to give the text an alternative reading, which sheds some light on the nature of Indian ethics as such. It is long debated as to whether India had ever had an ethics. This paper claims to give some insight into the debate. THE BHAGAVAD-GITA being the repository of the mainstr...

Il saggio esplora la questione della persona umana come nucleo centrale della riflessione filosofica, in risposta alle derive riduzionistiche della modernità e al predominio di approcci scientisti e naturalistici. Dopo aver ripercorso le radici storiche e teoriche del personalismo, l’autore sottolinea l’urgenza di un rinnovato umanesimo capace di custodire la dignità, la libertà e la verità dell’uomo. La persona, intesa come sostanza spirituale dotata di interiorità, autocoscienza e capacità di relazione, non può essere ridotta a semplice funzione biologica o sociale, ma va compresa come totalità concreta e irripetibile. In questa prospettiva, la riflessione metafisica appare essenziale per difendere l’irriducibile dell’umano contro il rischio del nichilismo e della “naturalizzazione integrale” dell’uomo. Particolare attenzione è rivolta alla connessione tra dignità e libertà, alla coscienza morale come fondamento del vivere umano e al ruolo dell’educazione come via privilegiata per una rinascita umanistica. Il testo si pone così come un appello a ricollocare la persona al centro del pensiero e della cultura, riaffermando la sua apertura all’Essere, al bene e al trascendente.

Abstract. Tra i teorici della psicologia della personalità vi è un ampio con-senso sul fatto che la personalità sia il risultato di molteplici cause. Vengo-no in particolare menzionate cause biologiche e ambientali. Tuttavia, non si riscontra tra di esse una teoria coerente della causalità in grado di spiegare la multi-causalità che incide sulla personalità. Questo articolo propone che la teoria aristotelico-tomistica della causalità possa fornire alla teoria della personalità il necessario quadro concettuale per una visione coerente e inte-grata di tale multi-causalità. Da questa prospettiva, il termine “causa” è ana-logo e possiede quattro significati principali: la causa materiale, la causa formale, la causa efficiente e la causa finale. Queste non sono cause scolle-gate, ma costituiscono un sistema in cui ciascuna di esse è reciprocamente dipendente dalle altre. Inoltre, queste quattro cause sono generali e conten-gono altre cause specifiche. In questo articolo si propone di assegnare a ciascun fattore che incide sulla personalità una di queste cause, evidenzian-do la capacità di questa teoria causale di contribuire alla teoria della perso-nalità e alla filosofia della psicologia da una prospettiva tomista. Dall’appli-cazione della teoria causale aristotelico-tomista alla personalità si propone, infine, una definizione completa del concetto di personalità, in cui ciascuna delle quattro cause viene assegnata, in confronto ad altre definizioni meno complete proposte da autori rilevanti per la Psicologia della Personalità.

This contributed volume considers the notions of person and logos from different approaches. Although many treat them separately, this text focuses on their intricated interplay. Drawing upon diverse cultural traditions, including Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and Arab sources, this book engages philologists, philosophers, and theologians through captivating analysis that spans from ancient philosophical perspectives to contemporary scholarship. The genesis of this scholarly endeavor owes to a conference held at the Polis Institute in Jerusalem in October 2021, in collaboration with Johns Hopkins University, Notre Dame University, and the University of Hamburg. Out of fifty-seven presentations, fourteen were selected to compose this thought-provoking volume, ensuring a well-structured exposition on the subject.

El artículo busca realizar una interpretación de la persona humana a la luz de la filosofía de Lévinas y de Aristóteles sin pretender sujetarse estrictamente a sus palabras o sus pensamientos, sino que trata de integrar una visión nueva a partir de la lectura de los textos levinasianos reinterpretados a la luz de Aristóteles. Se define a la persona como relación pero que, sin embargo, no es pura relación sino también ontología. Se trata de interpretar a la sustancia como algo que existe por sí mismo, pero no de manera aislada, sino a través de sus accidentes. El obrar de la sustancia es condición de posibilidad de la existencia de la
sustancia misma. La persona es siendo. Así, la relación constitutiva de la persona es la gratuidad del llamado a la existencia donde el amor se establece como el fundamento y la realidad misma de esta relación. La persona es una relación a tres que encuentra su perfección en su encuentro con los demás; es contemporáneamente sociedad e individualidad y su perfección viene realizada en la comunidad.

Julián Marías (1914-2005) es uno de los grandes filósofos del siglo XX en lengua española. Discípulo de Ortega y Gasset, Manuel García Morente y Xavier Zubiri, su trayectoria vital y filosófica estuvo marcada por el compromiso con la verdad, la libertad y, sobre todo, con la persona humana.

Este libro ofrece un recorrido apasionante por su biografía intelectual, desde sus años de formación y el impacto de la Guerra Civil hasta su madurez filosófica y su papel como conciliador durante los años de la transición española. Pero más allá del relato vital, esta obra se adentra en el corazón de su pensamiento: una metafísica de la persona, una filosofía de la vida entendida como trayectoria biográfica, única e irrepetible. A través de temas corno el cuerpo, el amor, el tiempo, la muerte, el sentido y la felicidad, se despliega una visión profunda y luminosa de la persona.

Although the most common formulation of the Ultimate Why Question-'Why is there something rather than nothing?'-is attributable to Leibniz, its origin lies in Parmenides' denial of the very possibility of non-existence. If nothing can come from nothing and only being can come from being, is there any reason (other than the fact that something exists) for anything to exist? It is easy to see why British astrophysicist A. C. B. Lovell warned his fellow scientists to stay clear of the question as it raises problems that will 'tear the individual's mind asunder'.

Sembra che una delle sfide più importanti del nostro tempo sia quella di riconoscere, e soprattutto di fare esperienza, della dignità della persona umana. In un contesto in cui esistono non poche violazioni della dignità concreta delle persone e crescono la cosiddetta «epidemia della solitudine» (loneliness epidemic) e l’affermazione dell’impersonale, la nozione stessa di persona è non di rado messa in discussione, soprattutto da coloro che ritengono che essa comporti la svalutazione del corpo e la discriminazione tra persone e non-persone tra gli esseri umani. Un aiuto in questo senso viene certamente dalla cosiddetta «filosofia dialogica»: l’articolo ne presenta le caratteristiche principali e i pensatori che in maniera implicita o esplicita si riconoscono in tale corrente di pensiero.

I am pleased to announce the availability of my new book, The Foundations of Philosophy-Epistemological Self-Consciousness. This work is about philosophy and what makes a philosophy distinctively Christian in character, arguing that it is indeed possible for philosophy to be conceived of as first Christian and not just philosophy done by people that happen to be Christians. Christian philosophy is epistemologically self-conscious philosophy conducted in a manner honoring to the revelation of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. It is argued that philosophy should be transformative rather than just therapeutic or elucidatory. The author examines competing philosophical and scientific accounts from both the empiricist and rationalist schools, arguing they are coherent and successful only to the degree that they have imported, consciously or unconsciously, Christian transcendentals. He then applies this insight to explore the character and practice of a Christian political philosophy.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie bytowych braków w kontekście teo-rii sztuki sformułowanej w środowisku polskich neotomistów, mającej swoje podstawy w pismach Arystotelesa oraz Tomasza z Akwinu. Wychodząc od definicji sztuki obecnej w podejmowanym nurcie filozofii, autor wyodręb-nia i uszczegóławia poszczególne odmiany braków bytowych, opierając się na tekstach Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu oraz ich XX-wiecznych kon-tynuatorów z kręgu lubelskiej szkoły filozoficznej. Klasyfikacja odmian bra-ków bytowych umożliwia przedstawienie ogólnego, analogicznego sposobu działania sztuki, której ostateczną racją są owe braki, a jej istotnym celem ich uzupełnianie.

The article addresses the issue of ontic deficiencies within the framework of the theory of art developed by the Polish Neo-Thomist school, rooted in the philosophical traditions of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Beginning with the definition of art as articulated within this school of thought, the author identifies and elaborates on various types of ontic deficiencies, drawing on the texts of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and their 20th-century followers associ-ated with the Lublin Philosophical School. This classification provides a basis for presenting a general, analogical account of how art functions – namely, as a response to ontic deficiencies, with its ultimate purpose being their recogni-tion and its essential goal their supplementation.

This essay takes a fresh approach to a traditional Western philosophical account of anger, according to which anger is best defined as a desire for payback, namely, a desire to make an offender pay a price, in the currency of unwanted pain, for the pain he caused someone else. The essay focuses more specifically on the work of Thomas Aquinas, whose account of anger is often thought to center on a desire for 'just vengeance.' It analyzes and extends aspects of Aquinas's account that have previously been treated too narrowly. It distinguishes three forms of anger, each of which has important features in common, which justify characterizing it as anger. Only one of these forms involves a desire to make an offender suffer for what he did. Even as this essay argues for articulating different forms of anger, it emphasizes the fluidity of anger's forms, features, and relationships to other emotions. It briefly engages philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives while working principally in the domain of religious ethics and moral psychology.

Un nuovo testo, pubblicato nelle edizioni Germina, dopo il precedente intitolato "R . Allers, Il Cambiamento":' propone la tradizione di un altro testo di Allers, lo psicologo cattolico che, insieme ad altri amici, sto proponendo in italiano all'attenzione dei professionisti delle scienze umane e mediche. Questo testo studia il rapporto tra le filosofie di natura esistenziale e la psichiatria. In particolare indaga sulle prospettive che la filosofia del novecento apre non solo alla psichiatra ma anche alla psicologia e alla pedagogia; soprattutto mette in luce l'ampiezza di sguardo che la spiritualità cristiana e la teologia offre per una comprensione a tutti i livelli della personalità umana e ai suoi problemi. Per aiutare la comprensione del resto viene offerta una ampia introduzione e una appendice nelle quali si mostra l'apporto sostanziale che il cristianesimo dona a chi intraprende la missione di sostenere la crescita umana a tutti i livelli. In particolare, grazie anche alle ricche note al testo, viene messo un luce come la tradizione del pensiero cristiano, nelle sue espressioni più mature e complete, può aiutare a portare a maturazione le esigenze di bene e di salute proprie del cuore e dell'intelligenza umana. Si mostra così come sia possibile una psicologa profondamente e genuinamente cattolica, perché non censura nessun aspetto della realtà personale e sociale. Vene evidenziato in particolare la chiarezza di prospettiva che il pensiero di san Tommaso d'Aquino e degli altri autori cristiani offre alle moderne scienze umane.
                ORDINABILE ONLINE E NELLE LIBRERIE

Rudolf Allers
AUTENTICITA' E INAUTENTICITA'

Presentazione di Existentialism and Psychiatry A cura di Domenico Monteforte

GERMINA
Don Mimmo

Niniejszy artykuł traktuje o trudnościach metodologicznych i koncepcyjnych dotyczących fundamentalnych dla lingwistyki wyrazów znak i tekst oraz wiązanych z nimi (meta)lingwistycznych pojęć. Przyczynę tych trudności stanowi wyłączanie z aktualnych paradygmatów lingwistycznych realnych relacji transcendentalnych. Realizm tych relacji dotyczy bowiem struktury bytu w aspektach: intrapodmiotowym i transpodmiotowym, a ich absencja prowadzi we współczesnym modelowaniu lingwistycznym do redukcjonizmu. Redukcji ulega mianowicie przedmiot lingwistyki-indywiduum, jego własności konieczne i przypadłościowe. Przyczyn tego stanu rzeczy należy upatrywać w pozytywizmie, fenomenologii i filozofii analitycznej, jakkolwiek źródła lingwistycznego redukcjonizmu sięgają monizmu i dualizmu.

La pregunta por el significado de ser persona ha estado presente en toda la historia de la humanidad, surgiendo de una gran inquietud por investigar el origen del ser humano, las cualidades que lo hacen diferente a otros seres vivos, entre otras cuestiones. Por esta razón, el presente trabajo tiene como objetivo construir una revisión general sobre el concepto de persona, tema central en la filosofía de Robert Spaemann. Para ello, es importante repasar su pensamiento en temas sobre la naturaleza del ser, las razones por las que considera a todo hombre como persona y las cualidades exclusivas de esta misma.

In the opening section, the author outlines basic intuitions that underscore the philosopher’s need to reflect not only on numerical singularity, but also on genuine individuality. He then briefly examines four distinct modes of individuality: anything that exists, the universe, the person, and the Absolute. In each of these cases, however, one can posit an irreducible entity—true individuality—that cannot be fully articulated.
The subsequent part develops the idea of a person’s individuality as intrinsically linked to a continuous act of self-creation. The essence of this act lies in the radical differentiation of the person from every other human being, as well as in the generation of one’s own absolute personal otherness. A more precise—and largely speculative—characterization of this act reveals the need to reconceptualize such categories as duty, responsibility, and trust.

Is the question of a person’s identity a special case of the question of the identity of anything at all? Or should one perhaps first inquire into identity in its most fundamental sense—the identity that presumably belongs to the Absolute? In any event, the question of the identity of anything seems to hinge on the answer to the question of identity as such. Yet can we contemplate identity as such—that is, not as the identity of something that is one, but as the very moment that constitutes the unity of the one? To begin, let us try to determine the most fundamental marks of identity.

La pensee et l'activite scientifiques du philosophe italien Cornelio Fabro (1911-1995) sont encore mal connues en France. Cet article tâche d'introduire le lecteur aux œuvres de jeunesse de Fabro; il etudie le debut de ses recherches, dans les annees 1968-1958, et analyse le lien etroit que ces premiers ecrits eurent avec le projet neo-scolastique de l'Institut superieur de philosophie de l'Universite de Louvain. Les travaux dans le domaine de la psychologie de la perception et de la phenomenologie eurent une grande importance sur l'evolution de sa pensee et, notamment, sur l'interpretation de l'ontologie du Docteur angelique mise en rapport avec la phenomenologie heideggerienne. En ce sens, cet article constitue egalement l'etude d'un cas de figure du rapport entre phenomenologie et ontologie qui, par sa valeur intrinseque, merite encore notre attention.

Former President of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte, irritated by questions on the alleged human rights violations of his regime, argued that he is for human lives rather than for human rights.  This raises the question as to whether, in some cases, human rights may be violated to save lives.  Other issues come into play such as the supposed suppression of rights by Lee Kuan Yew that paradoxically led to the economic success of Singapore.  President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., in the Second Summit for Democracy, contrary to his predecessor, vowed to establish a human-rights-based approach to his governance.  But how would this be made differently from the previous regime?  To clarify the interplay of human nature and rights, this article will first expound on the contemporary complexities in the application of human rights by governments utilizing local and international law, exposing the weaknesses of some theories such as positivism.  Second, it would expound on the argument of St. Thomas Aquinas that human rights ought to be founded on justice.  Third, an attempt would be made exposing the argument that such a concept can be further enhanced by tracing the necessary implications of agency leading to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) by Alan Gewirth.  In other words, it is hoped that obscurities surrounding human nature, agency, and rights could be clarified by considering that justice as a virtue links human rights to the person as its subject whose acts lead to the generic rights of freedom and well-being as universalized for all by the PGC.

Phenomenological method seeks to understand or interpret the experience of an existent being. In the case of this paper, I pose a question on the search for the essence of being a woman using a phenomenological method: How does finding the essence of a woman using a phenomenological method become an objectification of such a creature? When one looks at the woman as a phenomenon, one tends to objectify the very being of a woman. There is a so-called phenomenological objectification of the woman as an object of study. This paper criticizes the way phenomenological method deduces woman study into an objectified entity. It does not disregard the contribution of phenomenological studies to the understanding of being a woman. However, every time a woman is defined, she is deduced into something else other than what she wills to become. As a critique, this paper argues the implication of emphasizing the phenomenological method in finding the essence of a woman. Furthermore, it offers a different way of understanding a woman without any prejudices. The starting point of understanding proceeds from the fact of the very being of a human being who is free and equal with other human beings. That starting point is a result of the critique of phenomenological reduction of a woman as such. Thus, this paper contests the phenomenological result of the study of a woman that leads to the objectification of a particular human person.

Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menampilkan gagasan St. Thomas Aquinas mengenai jiwa manusia. Selain itu, tulisan ini merupakan suatu respon atas berbagai kesalahpahaman tentang jiwa manusia. Jiwa, bagi St. Thomas, bukan hanya sebagai prinsip kehidupan, aktivitas dan organisasi tubuh tapi lebih dari itu yakni sebagai prinsip dari eksistensinya. Jiwa sebagai prinsip eksistensi yang memiliki karekter intelektual atau spiritual adalah substansi tidak lengkap yang memiliki kecenderungan natural untuk bersatu dengan tubuh membentuk substansi manusia lengkap. Kesatuan jiwa dan tubuh adalah kesepadanan partikular yang tidak dapat ditransmisikan kepada yang lainnya. Sebagai substansi, jiwa adalah immortal; ia tidak dapat hancur karena eksistensinya berasal dari eksistensi sang Absolut. Untuk tiba pada pencapaian gagasan Aquinas mengenai jiwa maka metode yang digunakan adalah analisa teks, historisme dan ekplanasi.

Philosophical personalism has placed special emphasis on the dynamic dimension of man, identifying his actions (conscious, voluntary, and free) with his very essence. However, little or no attention has been given to the “passive” dimension, that is, the receptive and needy aspect that also characterizes the essence of the person. This study aims to recover the dimension we will call “pathetikós,” which provides elements for not only a balanced or integral view of the person but also justifies the social and cultural dimensions that are intrinsically linked to human nature in an essential way.

Cet ouvrage est la première étude portant exclusivement sur la personne humaine selon Duns Scot. Il s’attache à expliciter l’expression apparemment énigmatique par laquelle le théologien écossais caractérise la personne humaine : ultima solitudo. À rebours des interprétations négatives qui, depuis le siècle dernier, ont voulu voir dans cette expression la naissance de l’individualisme moderne, de l’homme moderne affirmant son indépendance en se clôturant sur soi et en se fermant à toute transcendance, il montre que l’ultima solitudo est éminemment positive puisqu’elle est la plus haute indépendance, celle d’une personne humaine qui est une volonté autodéterminée. À ce titre, il examine comment ce penseur a répondu au défi posé par l’introduction au XIIIe d’une pensée qui ignorait tout de la personne, de la volonté libre, de la décision et du libre choix, celle d’Aristote, et comment cette réponse a conduit à l’élaboration d’une morale de la liberté irréductible à l’éthique, c’est-à-dire à la théorie du caractère élaborée par les Grecs qui s’avère incompatible avec la volonté libre. Aussi Duns Scot nous apprend-il non seulement qu’être une personne humaine n’est pas être un individu humain, mais aussi qu’une personne humaine n’est en rien réductible à un caractère équipé de vertus.

Se explora la comprensión del carácter irremplazable del ser personal en adultos mediante un estudio cualitativo con grupos focales. Los sujetos habían visto un capítulo de Black Mirror en el que una persona reemplaza por un androide a su pareja fallecida. Siguiendo los lineamientos de la Teoría Fundamentada se construyeron estas categorías: lo negativo o shock; irrealidad; temporalidad; espontaneidad; un todo; algo más; irreemplazabilidad. Surgió la referencia a algo fundamental en la persona, no comprendido en sus cualidades. Enmarca el estudio una reflexión sobre la relevancia de estudios cualitativos en la llamada filosofía experimental.

Artykuł ten jest refleksją nad rekapitulacją myślenia o osobie ludzkiej – rekapitulacją, która była zamierzeniem Karola Wojtyły w sytuacji narastającego sporu o człowieka. W tekście ukazane zostały strategie metodologiczne, którymi posługiwał się ten myśliciel, i co do których żywił nadzieję, że dadzą początek nowemu podejściu badawczemu do osoby. Wskazane zostały takie pary pojęć, jak: fenomenologia–metafizyka, natura – osoba, racjonalność – świadomość oraz osoba – społeczność. Umiejętne ich łączenie oraz ich dopełniająca funkcja sprawiły, że Wojtyła nie tylko uzyskał nowy typ oglądu osoby, ale także wypracował nowe racje tłumaczące tę bogatą rzeczywistość. W artykule podjęto te tropy badawcze i zasygnalizowano, na ile mogą być one przydatne dzisiaj, wobec współczesnych sporów o osobę ludzką. Umiejętne i kreatywne wykorzystanie Wojtyłowskich strategii metodologicznych może być pomocne tak w dalszym odsłanianiu osoby, jak i w poszukiwaniu racji tego, co się jawi. Osoba ludzka jest bowiem rzeczywistością wciąż niewystarczająco poznaną, a zmieniające się warunki, w których żyje, stwarzają okazję, by odsłonić i przemyśleć nowe aspekty jej istnienia.

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The development of psychic powers in Christian saints is closely linked to their intense faith and moral training. This faith, coupled with virtues like love and humility, allowed them to access divine knowledge and perform miracles. Their methods of concentration, often paralleling Eastern teachings, involved focusing on the inmost center of their being and discarding sensuous images.

The teachings of St. Hugo, Richard of Saint Victor, and Saint Theresa share similarities in their descriptions of the stages of contemplation and the mystical experience. St. Hugo and Richard emphasize the importance of the “Eye of Contemplation” and the division of the soul into three heavens, while Saint Theresa outlines four degrees of prayer, culminating in the transformative experience of ecstasy. These mystics, influenced by Eastern and Western traditions, offer profound insights into the nature of the divine and the human quest for union with it.

John of the Cross, a Catholic mystic, describes a process of spiritual unclothing and union with the Divine through three nights: the Night of the Senses, the Night of the Spirit, and the Night of the Memory and Will. This process involves the soul shedding its human faculties and attachments to attain a divine state of being. The ideas of John of the Cross echo those of Eastern mystics, such as the teachings of Yoga and the Bhagavad Gita, highlighting the universal nature of the mystical experience.

In the Kaizo papers, Husserl defines renewal as an active dynamic towards a systematic rationalization of the individual and the community, aimed especially at preventing future axiological disappointments (‘devaluations’). However, in these articles he does not explicitly describe the method for achieving such a task, which casts doubt on its feasibility. The goal of the present work is to fill this gap with the help of other Husserlian material, especially the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I argue that renewal consists concretely in a critical and genetic procedure that tests our axiological convictions by ensuring that they do not originate in affective biases. I specifically examine three of these biases, namely fortuitous associations, tradition, and moods, before demonstrating how they can be overcome through a series of deconstructions and decenterings that culminate in the originary experience in which the value at stake is affectively given ‘in person’.

Philosophical personalism has placed special emphasis on the dynamic dimension of man, identifying his actions (conscious, voluntary, and free) with his very essence. However, little or no attention has been given to the “passive” dimension, that is, the receptive and needy aspect that also characterizes the essence of the person. this study aims to recover the dimension we will call “pathetikós,” which provides elements for not only a balanced or integral view of the person but also justifies the social and cultural dimensions that are intrinsically linked to human nature in an essential way.

I will call "totalitarian" any form of political society that sets no moral limits on the powers of the State. Such societies are well defined by Mussolini's formula: "Nothing outside of the State, above the State, against the State; everything to the State, for the State, in the State." I will call "democratic" any non-totalitarian form of political society. A democratic society does not deny the authority of the State as representative of the body politic and enforcing laws in view of the common good, but it recognizes the presence, in human beings, of something that is outside of the State, above the State, and which it may become necessary to protect against the encroachments of the State. As an instance of such things, I would cite truth. -Étienne Gilson 1 Laws may be promulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us. They are thus known as effectually, as by words or by writing: indeed they are thus known in a manner more noble and exalted. For, in this manner they may be said to be engraven by God on the hearts of men: in this manner, he is the promulgator as well as the author of natural law. Despotism by an artful use of "superiority" in politicks; and skepticism, by an artful use of "ideas" in metaphysicks, have endeavoured-and their endeavours have frequently been attended with too much success-to destroy all true liberty and philosophy. By their baneful effects, the science of man and the science of government have been poisoned to their very fountains. But those destroyers of others have met, or must meet with their own destruction.

Etica y virtudes. Entrevista de Patricia Pintado Mascareño a Leonardo Polo, en Atlántida Madrid 14 (IV-VI.1993) 80-92. Reproducida en El Mercurio, Santiago de Chile, 29 de agosto de 1993; pp. 14-5. Se corresponde con la mitad de una conversación con Polo en Rialp el 31.I.1993, grabada y transcrita: Reflexiones sobre la ética, la empresa y la persona; 29 pp.

Der Autor gibt Einblick in seine Überlegungen zu gelungenen Abschiedsprozessen am Lebensende unter Einbezug medizinischer Maβnahmen. Er stellt die Frage, wie ein gutes Sterben gelingen kann, wenn man annimmt, dass ein guter Abschied dazugehört. Im Kontext medizinischer Maβnahmen betrifft dieses Sterben und Abschiednehmen ebenso das ärztliche Ethos, dessen Kern in der Wiederherstellung der Beziehungsfähigkeit der Person besteht. Eine solche Beziehungsfähigkeit findet in Paul Ricoeurs Verständnis der „reconnaissance“ einen hilfreichen Anhaltspunkt.

Karol Wojtyła as a personalist was interested in an approach to the human person which allows for its entirety and complexity. He drew on the Aristotelian method of induction, which leads to seeing the whole in particulars - epagoge. However, this understanding of induction is in tension with the modern concept, particularly employed by empiricist philosophy. In this article, this Aristotelian stance is presented and contrasted with the position typical for the modern philosophy and then with the method devised within phenomenology. It turns out that Aristotelian proposal has something in common with the attempt by phenomenologists but offers a more realist and comprehensive tool to investigate the wholeness and complexity of the human person. Karol Wojtyła sticks to a phenomenological approach to the human person but he enriches it with the achievements of the ancient philosopher and in this way contributes to realist personalism. All in all, we need both particular and general knowledge on the person, although the latter is demanding and requires a strong reference not only to the description of the human person and its phenomenology but to the metaphysics of the person.

Building on the work of thinkers from an older tradition, Catholic personalist philosophers and theologians in the twentieth century (such as Dietrich von Hildebrand, Romano Guardini, Gabriel Marcel, and Josef Pieper) developed a view of the virtue of gratitude that particularly emphasized its place in an excellent human life. If we synthesize their views, the account of gratitude that emerges holds that it is only through the experience and act of being grateful that we fully understand our relationship to God and our place in the cosmos. Gratitude is such an excessive act that it cannot remain as a mere interior attitude or exhibit itself as a single statement of thanks. It must and should manifest itself in other acts and attitudes, especially wonder, joy, festivity, and hope

En la modernidad se desarrolla una antropología del equilibrio que exagera el afán humano de libertad y provoca una crisis antropológica materializada en el principio del resultado. Con ánimo de superar ese reduccionismo, el presente artículo retoma la narrativa del don —primero social, luego moral— para enriquecerla con una propuesta trascendental. El objetivo es mostrar que, aunque el hombre es un ser necesitante, lo más radical —en cuanto ser trascendentalmente abierto y respaldado donalmente— es su capacidad donal. Este respaldo antropológico puede conducir a una renovación de la economía, capaz de abrir nuevas alternativas.

Da lungo tempo è in atto dovunque una grande controversia sull'humanum. Diverse concezioni dell'uomo sono in lotta in una crisi filosofica e culturale che ci avvolge ed interpella. Mai come oggi l'essere umano, la persona sono in gioco ed a rischio sin dalle fondamenta. Per questo l'importanza decisiva del "problema persona" non ha fatto che aumentare nel '900: il suo crescente rilievo è dovuto alla molteplicità dei lati da cui la persona stessa è posta in questione 1 . La portata del personalismo si è molto ampliata al di là dei suoi temi classici ed investe oggi con le biotecnologie, le neuroscienze e le scienze cibernetiche il nucleo della persona, la sua manipolabilità, mentre cresce la diffusione della tesi materialistica e deterministica. Il compito del personalismo nella modernità e tarda modernità appare dunque decisivo da ogni lato, in quanto sulle sue spalle grava la responsabilità di contribuire a ricomporre le fratture epocali che attraversano l'epoca moderna. Tra loro primarie sono la frattura gnoseologica tra mente e mondo all'insegna di un elevato dualismo, la frattura tra scienza e sapienza col primato attribuito alla prima, la frattura tra uomo e Dio dovuta alla negazione della Trascendenza od al conflitto di principio tra libertà creata e libertà increata, e la frattura antropologica tra idea sostanziale e idea funzionale della persona, che include anche il Artículo fue recibido el 21 de septiembre de 2013 y aceptado para su publicación el 21 de octubre de 2013. 1 Al tema della persona ho dedicato numerosi lavori, e in specie: Il Nuovo Principio Persona, e L'uomo postmoderno. Religione politica tecnica. L'elaborazione svolta in queste opere ha avuto diramazioni notevoli in campo bioetico (cf. La rivoluzione biopolitica. La fatale alleanza tra materialismo e tecnica.) e in campo giuridico, Nichilismo giuridico. L'ultima parola?

One of the perennial questions that is sought to be answered in philosophy is the question of ‘who a human person is?’ Philosophers from various time frames have sought to answer this question in their own way, for instance, Protagoras stated that “Men is the measure of all things” thus establishing a notion that the human person is a meaning maker. Shakespeare, an English dramatist states in his play Hamlet, "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty! In form and moving, how express and admirable! In action, how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god! The beauty of the world, the paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?"(Shakespeare et al., 2016) Scott Heron Gill states, "Men is a complex being, he makes desert bloom and lakes dry” thus establishing a paradoxical nature that humans possess. There are so many others who have their views on human beings.
As this quest for understanding developed, there came various trends in understanding the human person such as psychology, anthropology, sociology etc. One of the philosophers who studied the human person through the lenses of philosophical anthropology was Helmuth Plessner, a German having a Jewish ancestry born in the year 1892. He has been a victim of both world wars and has seen the human person in the decadence of the values and the traditional structure of Christianity. His academic qualification includes biology, medicine and philosophy. Being from a Jewish ancestry he had to face a lot of challenges, and having lived in the war he saw humans in their despondent and helpless situation. He brought his philosophical anthropology into this paradigm thus showing humans a practical purpose. In this paper the author is bringing forth his conception of ‘eccentric positionality’ as a way to understand the human person better. To better equip the author has chosen one of his works namely, ‘Levels of Organic Lives and Human Person’. The author through the work of Plessner wants to bring in a way of understanding the human person. (Plessner & J. M. Bernstein, 2019)

The thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas is commonly considered not only as one of the great syntheses of Catholic theology, but also as one of the most important metaphysical doctrines in history. This second affirmation nevertheless conceals a series of considerable paradoxes, since the writings of the Aquinate seem to contain notable differences on key points of the philosophia prima, in particular according to whether they are comments on Aristotle or theological works. We draw up an inventory of these apories, and then we present the two ways in which they can be considered. The first is that of the deconstruction or dissolutio, in the line of Michel Foucault; it would claim to draw a statement of incoherence which would reduce to nothing all the Thomassian speculation on the ens inquantum ens. The second, on the other hand, is that of resolutio, for which the diversity of texts manifests complementarities rather than insoluble contradictions. We justify to conclude this last approach, and we expose its implications for the architecture of metaphysics.

Late medieval concepts of the human being were fueled by certain developments in medicine, which paved the way for new understandings of humanness by illumining how the body and the mind interacted and to what extent the senses and/or the intellect jeopardized the freedom of the human will. Paradoxically, developments in mathematical physics, logic, and semantics also encouraged new approaches in debating the human being, regarding both the issues addressed and the methodological tools employed to examine the mind-body relation, the freedom of the will, and the theory of action. Our conference explores major tendencies and minor issues in late medieval philosophy that grew out of and around the recurrent thematic preoccupations concerning the human. We invite papers on the notions of the human being, human faculties, mind and body, will and intellect, and virtues and vices, reflecting on a variety of ideas and approaches that bred the late medieval concepts of the human.

En este artículo se muestran las fuertes analogías entre Hegel y Rosmini sobre la relación alma-cuerpo, haciendo referencia a sus textos. Entre el 1807 y el 1830, Hegel va más allá de una lógica dualista y explica la identidad del sujeto, a pesar de todas sus modificaciones. Él valoriza la corporeidad, reconociendo el instinto como finalidad, aunque dentro de un horizonte finito. Además, según el filósofo alemán, el alma y el cuerpo no pueden estar sin un yo y se superan simultáneamente en el espíritu, donde el sujeto toma conciencia de sí mismo como libertad autónoma. En su madurez, Rosmini se ocupa de estos mismos temas y, aunque critica a Hegel, plantea una dialéctica análoga entre cuerpo, alma y espíritu humano. Sin embargo, se aclara que el enfoque ontológico rosminiano es antitético al hegeliano. De hecho, en Hegel el individuo se resuelve en ser un momento del Espíritu; en Rosmini la presencia del ser inicial permite captar la dignidad del sujeto como ser finito y completo, de manera que el hombre, reconociendo el ser inicial, vuelve a sí mismo.

The article deals with the ontological status of AI. Is this a person or a thing or maybe an entity between the human and material worlds? The concept of borderline person is considered as to a possible conceptual place to adopt AI and its future realizations. The concept of the borderline person was originally coined in bioethical research with an application to higher animals. In the post-Lockean understanding of the person the borderline person is an inclusive term and it leads to treating AI as if it were a person. In the post-Boethian philosophy of the human person, the borderline person has a negative character and acts as an excluding term; it maintains AI and all its incarnations as a highly developed tool, which maybe reaches the borders of the human world but never enters it. Practical predictions about the applicability of AI suggest that the latter approach is more appropriate.

I progressi tecnologici e scientifici hanno prodotto cambiamenti radicali nella concezione dell'uomo e della vita stessa. Oggi, l'essere umano non si percepisce come "uno", ma riconosce a fatica la propria identità. La scrittrice e psicanalista Catherine Ternynck definisce tale stato "uomo di sabbia", sottolineando lo smarrimento della stessa identità da parte di individui cresciuti in un mondo che ha trasformato le grandi conquiste culturali, economiche e sociali in "gabbie di solitudine e fragilità". Il diffuso senso di insoddisfazione e di infelicità, nonostante il mito del progresso tecnologico, dimostra che l'uomo non è la somma delle sue parti e che la sua felicità non può essere ridotta a desideri contingenti e passeggeri. Il vissuto degli uomini e delle donne dell'era postmoderna richiede l'individuazione di un principio unitario, che consenta di riscoprire l'anelito alla felicità e alla relazionalità, che costituisce la verità più profonda dell'essere umano. Tale principio è individuabile nell'anima, come principio dell'essere e forma sostanziale del corpo, che distingue l'uomo in quanto uomo dagli altri esseri viventi. Da essa hanno origine le operazioni, definibili come "atti secondi", che si realizzano intorno ad un oggetto e causate dall'anima attraverso le sue differenti facoltà. L'uomo condivide le facoltà vegetative e tendenziali con gli altri viventi, le facoltà motorie e le facoltà conoscitive sensibili con gli animali, ma a lui solo appartengono l'intelletto, la volontà e la capacità di scelta, che si realizza nella libertà. Solo nel composto perfetto di anima e corpo si ha l'essere umano, che, in quanto essere sussistente di natura razionale, è capace di orientarsi al bene, conoscendolo, e, al tempo stesso, di realizzare il bene per il resto della natura.