Philosophy of Sex

Nel saggio viene analizzata la costruzione del discorso sessuale in età illuminista, soffermandomi su alcuni testi di Diderot, Morelly, Kant. Centrale emerge lo slittamento dei dispositivi costitutivi di tale discorso: dall’orizzonte del naturalismo di Morelly e, nella sua veste problematizzata, di Diderot, alla loro formalizzazione attraverso la sussunzione all’imperativo della legge morale in Kant e il loro inquadramento all’interno del concetto di umanità.

Nel saggio  ho cercato di offrire una trama di percorrenze attraverso le quali intendere il dibattito rinascimentale attorno alla sessualità; un dibattito che, negli autori considerati, si è alimentato certamente della riscoperta di Platone, ma muovendosi anche con una chiara consapevolezza dei mutamenti socio-economici che stavano investendo le istituzioni del tempo, in particolare la famiglia, con l’emergenza del problema del disciplinamento e del governo di sé.

Lo studio è improntato attorno all’esame della tassonomia dei rapporti sessuali, presentata nello Ierone, e integrata con rinvii ad altri testi di Senofonte, con particolare riferimento al Simposio, per quanto riguarda l’amore omosessuale, e all’Economico per la relazione matrimoniale.

Lo studio della tematizzazione della sessualità nelle opere di Esiodo è condotto alla luce di due elementi: l’approccio multiplo che caratterizza la descrizione esiodea della donna; il problema della definizione del tempo opportuno per il matrimonio e la generazione della discendenza

Rainer Maria Rilke fjallaði um skuggahliðar tilvistarinnar á ólíkan hátt í Stundabókinni, Minnisbókum Maltes Laurids Brigge og Dúínó tregaljóðunum og má þar merkja afgerandi þróun í átökum hans við myrkrið. Sjá hugras.is/2016/10/hinn-myrki-rilke/

In order to explain suffering in contemporary romantic relationships, Eva Illouz (2012) looks at the consequences of the detachment of erotic and romantic encounters from committed relationships such as marriage. While this detachment is often referred to as a triumph of free choice and liberal loving, Illouz argues that it causes systemic inequalities between male and female agents. The article takes Illouz’s analysis as an incentive and a basis to study deregulated sex-positive spaces with regards to their risk to involuntarily reproduce features of socio-political domination. The discussion is driven by an interest in the question how options to explore sexual and romantic relationships can be developed without reproducing systemic disadvantages of heteronormative culture.

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The paper considers and rejects two arguments against the performance ofsexual reassignment surgery. First, it is argued that the operation is not mutilating, butfunctionally enabling. Second, it is argued that the operation is not objectionably deceptive, since, ifthere is such a thing as our 'real sex', we do not know (ordinarily) what it is. The paper is also intended to shed light on what our sexual identity is and on what matters in sexual relations. The American Psychiatric Association's official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (third edition), popularly known as DSM-III, includes transsexualism as a diagnosis, listing it in a section on 'Psychosexual Disorders' under the subcategory of 'Gender Identity Disorders'. To be diagnosed as a transsexual, DSM-III requires a patient to meet five criteria. A. Sense of discomfort and inappropriateness about one's anatomic sex. B. Wish to be rid of one's own genitals and to live as a member of the other sex. C. The disturbance has been continuous (not limited to periods of stress) for at least two years. D. Absence of physical intersex or genetic abnormality. E. Not due to another mental disorder, such as Schizophrenia (1). Psychiatrists do encounter patients meeting all five criteria. For such patients the clinical outlook is bleak. Chronicity is the norm. No presently known psychiatric treatment modalities have been regularly successful in (re)aligning transsexuals' self-conceived sexual identity to an identity ordinarily deemed to be congruent to their anatomical sex. Nor, for that matter, have present treatment modalities worked well in alleviating the transsexual's subjective distress (2).

This essay aims to compare two notions of objectification: on the one hand, Buber's distinction between I-thou relations (which he models on the appropriate treatment of humans) and I-it relations (which he models on the treatment of objects), 1 and on the other hand, the contemporary notion of objectification. When discussing Buber's notion of objectification one can rely, of course, on Buber's work. Notwithstanding the common use of the contemporary notion, however, it has received relatively little scholarly attention and analysis till now. I will mostly rely here on

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of academic studies on the impact of technological advancements on human life, including possible transformations and changes in human sexuality following the development of sex-related devices, such as sex robots. In this context, terms such as posthuman sexuality, digisexuality, and techno-sexuality have emerged, signaling possible new understandings of sexual, intimacy, and emotional practices. It is important to note that ancient history shows that humankind has for a long time been fascinated with their relationship to non-living things, mostly human-like figures, such as dolls. The Ningyo (人形, the Japanese term for doll) has a long history of usage, and has deep religious and animistic significance in the Japanese context—there are records of sexual use as early as the 18th century. With this context in mind, this paper focuses on three Japanese examples, aiming to shine a light on beyond-human relationships, which include ...

W 2013 r. wybitni polscy dokumentaliści, Marcel i Paweł Łozińscy, ojciec i syn, postanowili zrealizować wspólny film będący relacją z podróży z Warszawy do Paryża. Wyprawa miała też mieć znaczenie terapeutyczne – pomóc w wyjaśnieniu nieporozumień i naprawić ich wzajemne relacje. Zamysł nie do końca się powiódł. Wspólny projekt nie został zrealizowany, a zamiast niego, na podstawie tych samych materiałów zdjęciowych, powstały dwa niezależne filmy: Ojciec i syn P. Łozińskiego oraz Ojciec i syn w podróży M. Łozińskiego. Autorka definiuje te filmy jako przykłady kina osobistego (personal documentary) i „kina w pierwszej osobie” (first person documentary), a także sytuuje je w szerszym kontekście – na linii relacji między ojcem i synem – postpamięci nawiązującej do historii rodziny i jej żydowskich korzeni oraz dylematów wynikających z uprawiania przez ojca i syna tej samej profesji.

Immanuel Kant offers definitions of "sexual desire" and "sexual use" in the Metaphysics of Morals that occasion an inconsistency within his moral system, for they entail that sexual desire, as a natural inclination that is conditionally good, is also categorically objectifying, and thus per se immoral according to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Following Alan Soble, various attempts to resolve the inconsistency are here criticized before more suitable, and suitably Kantian, definitions of these terms are offered. It is argued that these new definitions resolve the inconsistency. "To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing other than to present morality stripped of any admixture of the sensible and of any spurious adornments of reward or self-love. By means of the least effort of his reason everyone can easily become aware of how much virtue then eclipses everything else that appears charming to the inclinations, provided his reason is not altogether spoiled for abstraction."-Immanuel Kant 1 There came to me in a dream a stuttering crone, squint-eyed, clubfooted, both her hands deformed, and her complexion like a whitewashed stone. I stared at her; and just as the new sun breathed life to night-chilled limbs, just so my look began to free her tongue, and one by one drew straight all her deformities, and warmed her dead face, till it bloomed as love would wish it for its delight.-Dante 2

This article has two main points: 1) there are no reasons why sexual ethics should be excluded from fashionable "applied ethics" and "bioethics" investigations, and 2) that the key concepts of "sexual discourse"especially the concept of "perversion"deserves full philosophical attention. As an example, the author offers a brief analysis of the reasons why, despite the ruling "libertarian paradigm", the concept of "perversion" should be kept in ordinary language.

Over the last three decades the sexual morality of many Western societies has changed beyond recognition. Most of the prohibitions which made up the traditional, extremely restrictive outlook on sex that reigned supreme until the fifties–the prohibitions of masturbation, pre-marital and extra-marital sex, promiscuity, homosexuality–are no longer seen as very serious or stringent or, indeed, as binding at all. But one or two traditional prohibitions are still with us. The moral ban on prostitution, in particular, does not seem to have been repealed or radically mitigated. To be sure, some of the old arguments against prostitution are hardly ever brought up these days; but then, several new ones are quite popular, at least in certain circles. Prostitution is no longer seen as the most extreme moral depravity a woman is capable of; but the view that it is at least seriously morally flawed, if not repugnant and intolerable, is still widely held. In this paper I want to look into some of...

Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. (2009): “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In:Journal of Social Philosophy40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa (2017): “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In:Journal of Social Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orie...

The ‘body’ as intentionally (significatively) constituted in action|experience is a key theme in phenomenological philosophy & psychology. Bodies as sexed\gendered — sexuation (Irigaray) — is a further facet of embodiment & enaction (bringing-forth) of interest in phenomenology. There are parallels in the ‘inner alchemy’ traditions of Daoism, in which the the transmutation of the person|body into a non-sexuate ‘immortal’ (without death) are developed.

In  einem  kürzlich  erschienenen  Artikel  argumentiert Almut v. Wedelstaedt überzeugend, warum Zustimmung zwar „die Bedingung für die Legitimation von Sex“ ist (2020, 127), dass die moralische Güte von Sex aber nur dann ein-zuschätzen ist, wenn wir darauf achten, ob die Beteiligten der Handlung sich auf Au-genhöhe begegnen. Die Idee ist: Es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch gut sind, und es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch besser sind. Hier möchte  ich  die  Idee  des  besseren  Sexes  genauer ausloten. Während v. Wedelstaedt  von moralisch gelungenem Sex spricht und somit auf der Ebene der moralischen Be-wertung von Sex bleibt, möchte ich die Frage danach stellen, was Sex qualitativ gut macht. Tatsächlich wird in der Zustimmungsdebatte meist davon ausgegangen, dass diese zwei Fragen wenig gemeinsam haben; ob eine sexuelle Handlung legitim ist, hat zunächst nichts damit zu tun, ob diese auch gut ist. Ich werde drei Argumente liefern, warum  wir  legitimen  Sex  und  qualitativ  guten  Sex  zusammen  betrachten  sollten  –  und es wird sich zeigen, dass die gegenwärtige philosophische und rechtstheoretische Debatte Zustimmung verkürzt diskutiert und daher alleingenommen wenig hilfreich ist, stattdessen benötigt die Zustimmungsdebatte auch eine Untersuchung von qua-litativ gutem Sex.

Introduction * A good philosophical account of human sexual love requires an account of our animalistic desires. Although certain aspects of sexual desires don't require such a reference-for example, some aspects can be analyzed by reference to our imaginative minds and social senses of self-a full account of human sexual desires is impossible without an account of our animality. After all, sexual desire is something we feel in a distinctly embodied, animalistic way: when I-that is, subjectively, from an internal, self-conscious first-personal point of view-feel sexual desire very strongly, I feel my body very strongly. When I feel my body in this way I strongly want or long for the attention, and typically touch, of another, along with some kind of intimacy and/or physical union with them. Conversely, when I am experiencing sexual frustration, I may, for example, feel my body as a little in the way, as annoyingly and persistently demanding attention, or as betraying me by making me focus on something I don't really want to focus on, namely sexual satisfaction in

The debate about speech acts in sexual contexts has been dominated by discussions of consent and refusal, two illocutions strictly connected to definitions of sexual assault and rape, which constitutes a crucial step in fighting male sexual violence against women. Many authors have recently claimed that this emphasis has a distorting and harmful impact on our understanding of sexual communication-for it highlights only its negative aspects (mostly how to avoid unwanted sex). Moreover, an account in terms of consent and refusal seems to presuppose a default asymmetrical scenario, with men actively requesting sexual activities and women passively consenting or refusing. The aim of my paper is to assess the different speech-act accounts modelling communication in sexual contexts. I will first summarize the philosophical discussion on consent and refusal in sexual contexts and underline its connections with the debate on hate speech. I will then explore the model of initiations of sex in terms of requests and requests for permission, and analyse the asymmetry and benefit objections. I will present the models in terms of invitations, gift offers, and proposals, advocated by Kukla 2018, Gardner 2018 and Caponetto 2021b for their collaborative nature: invitations and proposals are illocutions presenting the sexual activity as beneficial for both parties and framing sex as a joint activity. My main goal is to criticize such Collaborative Models: I will show that conceiving of initiations of sex in terms of invitations, offers and proposals does not remove but rather actually masks the asymmetry.

[Vassar College Fall 2022] — This course focuses on contemporary and perennial questions about love and sexuality. What is love, and why are our romantic relationships so important to us? Are friendships and romantic relationships really that different? What, if any, is the relationship between love and sex? Are our current norms and practices surrounding sex good ones to have, or are there other ways we should be approaching sexuality? We will explore topics such as romantic love, friendship, the nature of sex and sexuality, sexual ethics, taboos, and sexual identity through student-led discussions and deep engagement with philosophical texts.

[Franklin & Marshall College, Spring 2022] — After having spent much of the 20th century in the philosophical shadow of certain other thinkers in the existentialist tradition (most notably her partner, Jean-Paul Sartre), Simone de Beauvoir is now thought to be one of the most insightful and influential writers and theorists of the era. Her phenomenological approach to the situation of women in The Second Sex has long been recognized as foundational within feminist theory, but the wider philosophical significance of her work (both as a feminist theorist and as an existential phenomenologist) remains underexplored. In this class, we will read and discuss De Beauvoir’s central philosophical works, including but not limited to The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex. We will situate her work in conversation with other existential phenomenologists of the era (in particular Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), and consider its significance for contemporary philosophical concerns.

Ágrip Í þessari ritgerð skoða ég nokkur möguleg svör við spurningum um persónusamsemd. Það eru spurningar sem velta því fyrir sér hvað gerir mig að mér og hvernig, eða hvort, það helst í gegnum tíma. Ég mun byrja á því að fara í gegnum helstu hugtök og grunnhugmyndir varðandi persónusamsemd til að skapa ákveðin grundvöll fyrir umraeðu. Svo mun ég einbeita mér að tveimur kenningum sem mér finnst áhugaverðar og rýna í þaer og skoða kosti og galla þeirra. Þetta eru kenningar Derek Parfit og Eric T. Olson. Kenning Parfit leggur áherslu á sálraena þaetti þegar kemur að persónusamsemd. Hann telur að þeir séu grundvallar atriði í varðveislu persóna. Olson einbeitir sér hins vegar að líkamlegum og líffraeðilegum þáttum og setur fram kenningu sem hann kallar dýreðlishyggja (e. animalism) sem heldur því fram að við séum í grunvallaratriðum dýr. Í lokin mun ég svo gera samanburð á þessum kenningum Parfit og Olson og athuga hvort þaer samrýmist hvor annari að einhverju leiti og skoða hvar þá greinir á. Einnig mun ég setja fram mitt mat á hugmyndum þeirra og gera tilraun til að leggja grunn að mögulegri kenningu sem sameinar þaetti úr báðum þessum kenningum.

Głównym temat artykułu jest próba przyjrzenia się kinu polskiemu czasów przełomu w kontekście licznie pojawiających się w nim odniesień do tematyki erotycznej i scen nagości. Druga połowa lat 80. i początek lat 90. to bowiem w Polsce okres silnej pornografizacji rodzimej kultury popularnej. Z jednej strony zjawisko to może świadczyć o trwającej wówczas w naszym kraju transformacji ustrojowej i dynamicznie zmieniającej się wtedy sytuacji społecznej, obyczajowej czy politycznej. Z drugiej natomiast można je bez trudu powiązać także z wpływami zachodnich tekstów popkultury (np. kaset wideo czy pism zawierających treści pornograficzne), które coraz śmielej zaczęły przenikać w tamtym okresie do Polski. W rezultacie trwająca wtedy na Zachodzie tzw. druga fala porno-chicu w wyraźny sposób wywarła również wpływ na kształt rodzimego kina, stając się tym samym jednym z ważniejszych katalizatorów rozpoczynającej się wówczas w Polsce rewolucji wyobraźni. W niniejszym artykule analizie zostały w...

Tym razem mała ciekawostka z cyklu "Jak redaguje się gazety". Odcinek "Listy do redakcji". Naturalnie nie będę wam tłumaczył jak dzieciom, że w każdej gazecie sporą część listów do redakcji pisze sobie sama redakcja, bo to oczywistość. List do redakcji jest bowiem bardzo wygodną formą literacką. Można na przykład napisać w nim coś bulwersującego, pod czym redakcja wolałaby się nie podpisywać, a tak może potem to bulwersujące skomentować z troską lub oburzeniem.

Immanuel Kant offers definitions of “sexual desire” and “sexual use” in the Metaphysics of Morals that occasion an inconsistency within his moral system, for they entail that sexual desire, as a natural inclination that is conditionally good, is also categorically objectifying, and thus per se immoral according to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Following Alan Soble, various attempts to resolve the inconsistency are here criticized before more suitable, and suitably Kantian, definitions of these terms are offered. It is argued that these new definitions resolve the inconsistency.

Teksty przedstawione na konferencji poruszały kwestie intymności we wszystkich rodzajach i w wielu gatunkach literackich, ukazując różnorakie sposoby wyrażania i nazywania zagadnień intymnych. Wszechobecność elementów intymistycznych w literaturze pozwala wysnuć wniosek o uniwersalności i znaczącym wpływie pierwiastków intymnych na każdy artystyczny proces twórczy. Od intymności w literaturze nie sposób uciec. Najbardziej intymna, prócz procesu twórczego, jest bowiem sama lektura, obcowanie czytelnika oko w oko z tekstem - efektem wyrażania intymności Innego

The liberal view that valid consent is sufficient for a sex act to be morally legitimate is challenged by three major philosophies of sex: the Catholic view of sex as ordained for procreation and properly confined to marriage, the romantic view of sex as bound up with love, and the radical feminist analysis of sex in our society as part

In my thesis, I am arguing that cybersex does bring real and actual benefits to some
individual women in terms of expansion of their sexual autonomy, but these benefits (for the moment at least) affect only some individual women in their online life. However, the negative phenomena of cybersex such as rape, sexual objectification, and coerced prostitution systematically affect women as a social group both in their online and offline lives.

I am defending my thesis by, firstly, giving the definition of cybersex and researching how it affects our understanding of sexuality. Secondly, I am considering all positive effects that cybersex brings to women and arguing that they can be summarized as the expansion of women's sexual autonomy. Thirdly, I am researching negative phenomena of cybersex and how they are limiting women's sexual autonomy. Fourthly, I am describing other feminist views on cybersex (the empowerment approach by Doring and the relative indifference view by Collins) to show how they are different from my view.

Birth control has re-emerged as a political, legal and constitutional conundrum-maybe obsession-echoing its first such emergence fifty years ago, in the middle of the 1960s. Underlying the legal battles culminating in the Hobby Lobby 1 decision from last term, is a "culture war" that features familiar antagonisms-antagonisms that some of us might have thought-wrongly-had abated-that first rose to constitutional prominence in Griswold v Connecticut 2 and Eisenstadt v Baird, 3 in 1965 and 1972 respectively. The parallels are striking. Thus, today, as then, social conservatives assert a religious or moral commitment to a traditional understanding of the nexus between marriage, sexuality and child-raising, and fear that birth control technologies threaten that nexus, while women seeking enhancement of their health and control over their fertility, as well as couples and individuals seeking sexual expression freed of the anxieties of conception and pregnancy, find birth control both fully adequate, and necessary, to the fulfillment of both ends. Today, as then, one side or the other in this cultural war first uses ordinary law to protect or reflect their interests: then, opponents sought to ban the use of birth control through state laws criminalizing its prescription or use, 4 and

This article has two main points: 1) there are no reasons why sexual ethics should be excluded from fashionable “applied ethics” and “bioethics” investigations, and 2) that the key concepts of “sexual discourse” – especially the concept of “perversion” – deserves full philosophical attention. As an example, the author offers a brief analysis of the reasons why, despite the ruling “libertarian paradigm,” the concept of “perversion” should be kept in ordinary language.

Liberal legal theory primarily, and liberal feminist legal theory derivatively, have jointly shaped much of our contemporary understanding of the various relations between sex and law. At the heart of that familiar liberal legalist paradigm is the distinction between consensual and non-consensual sex. That distinction serves two central purposes. First, the absence or presence of consent demarcates, broadly and imperfectly, sex that should be regarded as criminal from that which should not. Nonconsensual sex, generally, ought to be regarded as rape, or, if not rape, as a lesser but still quite serious sexual assault. 1 To whatever degree, and it is still considerable, the law fails to criminalize non-consensual sex, to that degree, according to liberal legal theorists and reformers, the law should be criticized and changed. So for example, not only forcible, violent sex between strangers, but also (liberals argue) non-consensual but non-violent sex between dates or cohabitants, non-consensual marital sex, sex coerced through particularly egregious fraud, sex imposed upon unconscious, intoxicated or mentally incapacitated victims, and sex coerced through implied threats of future violence, or of a nonviolent violation of rights-all of this sex should be understood as some degree of criminal sexual assault, regardless of whether or not the sex is accompanied by force, regardless of whether or not the woman resisted, and-at least for some liberal reformers-regardless of whether or not she verbally expressed her non-consent. Liberal feminists from Harriet Taylor and John S. Mill 2 from the nineteenth century to Susan Estridge, Michelle Anderson and Stephen Shulhofer of the twentieth and twenty-first 3 have

This paper considers why obtaining and sustaining a good sexual life tends to be so challenging and why the temptation to settle for a bad one can be so alluring. We engage these questions by cultivating ideas found in the traditions of feminist philosophy and the philosophy of sex and love in dialogue with the works of two unlikely, canonical bedfellows—Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt. We propose that some sources of these challenges and temptations are patterned and manifold in that they involve trying to transform, develop, integrate certain unruly emotional structures in oneself, including together with others. Other equally patterned and unruly sources track inherited oppressive or oppressed behaviors and feelings that make emotionally healthy, morally responsible realizations of sexual ways and being more difficult for all parties involved. In contrast to these patterned challenges, some difficulties that face us stem from the fact that humans are genuinely different from one ...

Tekst stanowi krytyczną analizę filmu Pawła Łozińskiego pt. Pani z Ukrainy (2002), dokonaną z perspektywy krytyki postkolonialnej. Łoziński, który chciał stworzyć ciepły portret psychologiczny gastarbeiterki z Ukrainy, bezrefleksyjnie uruchomił zachowania językowe i obyczajowe, przy pomocy których podkreśla dysproporcje między statusem własnym i bohaterki filmu. Specyficzna metoda twórcza, którą zastosował dokumentalista, polegająca na wprowadzeniu siebie jako drugiego bohatera filmu, wytworzyły dojmujące poczucie nierówności dwojga bohaterów-niewidocznego na ekranie reżysera (pana domu i pracodawcy) i Ukrainki pozostającej pod uważną obserwacją kamery. Tylko pozornie struktura filmu została oparta na rozmowie. To raczej "odsłuchiwanie" gosposi, które ujawnia w całej okazałości nierówność pozycji, w jakiej znaleźli się interlokutorzy. Obraz cenionego dokumentalisty można potraktować jako dowód na istnienie w rodzimej kulturze pokusy do deprecjonowania, wykluczania i wywyższania, stanowiącej konsekwencje kolonialnej i jednocześnie kolonizującej przeszłości.

, where she works in continental philosophy, feminist philosophy, and critical theory. Her current research reflects on the existential significance of recent evolutionary theory, particularly epigenetics, mobilizing Kierkegaard's existential texts (and interpretations of Kierkegaard by Habermas, Arendt, and Derrida) in order to explore the critical, queer, disability, and post-secular implications of evolutionary thought and science studies.

The paper considers and rejects two arguments against the performance of sexual reassignment surgery. First, it is argued that the operation is not mutilating, but functionally enabling. Second, it is argued that the operation is not objectionably deceptive, since, if there is such a thing as our 'real sex', we do not know (ordinarily) what it is. The paper is also intended to shed light on what our sexual identity is and on what matters in sexual relations.

Cieśliński Marek Kosma, Destrukcja jako tworzywo. Ikonogra!a ruin Warszawy w polskim kinie dokumentalnym po II wojnie światowej [Destruction as a material. Iconography of the ruins of Warsaw in Polish documentary cinema a#er the Second World War]. “Images” vol. XXVII, no. . Poznań . Adam Mickiewicz University Press. Pp. –. ISSN -X. DOI ./i.... .e image of Warsaw in ruins a#er World War II is an important motif in Polish documentary and feature cinema in the years –. In the text, I discuss the images of the city captured by the 0rst chroniclers as ‘basic’, which then became archetypical icons of the city’s destruction. I point out that the aesthetics of destruction, recorded in Andrzej Panufnik’s early 0lm Ballada f-moll [Ballade in f minor], Jerzy Bossak’s Most [Bridge] and Tadeusz Makarczyński’s Suita warszawska [Warsaw Suite] proved to be exemplary for other artists. I show that the destruction of urban and architectural structures was ins...

This paper considers why obtaining and sustaining a good sexual life tends to be so challenging and why the temptation to settle for a bad one can be so alluring. We engage these questions by cultivating ideas found in the traditions of feminist philosophy and the philosophy of sex and love in dialogue with the works of two unlikely, canonical bedfellows—Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt. We propose that some sources of these challenges and temptations are patterned and manifold in that they involve trying to transform, develop, integrate certain unruly emotional structures in oneself, including together with others. Other equally patterned and unruly sources track inherited oppressive or oppressed behaviors and feelings that make emotionally healthy, morally responsible realizations of sexual ways and being more difficult for all parties involved. In contrast to these patterned challenges, some difficulties that face us stem from the fact that humans are genuinely different from one another and evolving—individually, jointly, and collectively—in their sexual needs and wants.

Campbell's target article is a stimulating attempt to extend our understanding of sex differences in risk-taking behaviors. However, Campbell does not succeed in demonstrating that her account adds explanatory power to those (e.g., Daly & Wilson 1994) previously proposed. In particular, little effort was made to explore the causal links between survival (staying alive) and reproduction.

This article has two main points: 1) there are no reasons why sexual ethics should be excluded from fashionable "applied ethics" and "bioethics" investigations, and 2) that the key concepts of "sexual discourse"especially the concept of "perversion"deserves full philosophical attention. As an example, the author offers a brief analysis of the reasons why, despite the ruling "libertarian paradigm", the concept of "perversion" should be kept in ordinary language.

Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place “without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws.” Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary thinkers: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoxical, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. Finally, the paper advances the discussion beyond marriage. Drawing on Kant's conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context.