Philosophy Of Religion

Liberalism is a term employed in a dizzying variety of ways across the humanities and social sciences. This essay seeks to reframe how the liberal tradition is understood. I start by delineating different types of response – prescriptive, comprehensive, explanatory – that are frequently conflated in answering the question “what is liberalism?” I then discuss assorted methodological strategies employed in the existing literature: after rejecting “stipulative” and “canonical” approaches, I outline a contextualist alternative. On this (comprehensive) account, liberalism is best characterised as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, over time. In the remainder of the article I present an historical analysis of shifts in the meaning of liberalism in Anglo-American political thought between 1850 and 1950, focusing in particular on how John Locke came to be seen as a liberal. I also explore the emergence of the category of "liberal democracy". I argue that the scope of the liberal tradition was massively expanded during the middle decades of the twentieth century, such that it came to be seen by many as the constitutive ideology of the West. This capacious (and deeply confusing) understanding of liberalism was produced by a conjunction of the ideological wars fought against “totalitarianism” and assorted developments in the social sciences. Today we both inherit and inhabit it.

Sam Harris, in his book The Moral Landscape, argues that “science can determine human values.” Against this view, I argue that while secular moral philosophy can certainly help us to determine our values, science—at least as that word is commonly understood—must play a subservient role. To the extent that science can “determine” what we ought to do, it is only by providing us with empirical information, which can then be slotted into a chain of deductive (moral) reasoning. The premises of such reasoning, however, can in no way be derived from the scientific method: they come, instead, from philosophy—and common sense.

It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of children’s genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed ‘female genital mutilation’ or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed ‘male circumcision’). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children—whether female, male, or intersex—should be free from having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication.

This thesis examines the Solomonic grimoire manuscripts between 1400-1800. Grimoires, as books of magic materials, claim an ancient lineage from the time of King Solomon of Israel.  Modern scholarship has attempted to argue either for or against such a claim, but has not adequately addressed the meanings of imagery and alphabetic symbols contained within each grimoire as an indicator of origin. Through comparisons of several manuscript collections, the basic geometric shapes of circles and squares, that repeatedly form the templates for several objects to be constructed by the magus, are here examined, their various scripts deciphered, and their purpose contextualized for the early modern magician and conjuror. This thesis suggests that the genre of the Solomonic grimoires, in manuscript or printed form, possibly originated only from the 16th-century works of Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, a conclusion based on use of the Malachim alphabet. Furthermore, the thesis questions grimoire use beyond library transcriptions, the existence of any practice related to them, and the possible origins of the scientific experiment.

This report reviews and categorizes the enormous corpus of knowledge produced by American academic and policy institutions about U.S. relations with the Middle East and other Islamic actors in the international arena. The report identifies five epistemic communities – conservatives, neoconservatives, realists, liberals and the left – and analyzes their discourses and policy recommendations. Finally, the policies that these epistemic communities recommended are evaluated and assessed. The author recommends a mixed-paradigmatic approach that will not only make the United States more effective in the Middle East but also underscore its continuing relevance to the security and the stability of the region and the global order.

There is the verbal paradigm and there is the nonverbal unseen spiritual paradigm. This paper advocates a spiritual view. Sacred scripture tells us we can only please God if we try very hard (diligently) to seek Him. If you believe God is present here and now and surrounds you with Himself, you can pray that what you ask will be granted "only if it serves your purpose and brings you glory, in Jesus's name."  When you read sacred scripture, you are struck in every verse by the writers' constant awareness of God. This is in stark contrast with the secular life in which one merely seeks the good life in harmony with one’s neighbour but without any awareness of God. When a child is very young she is aware of God, then from pre-school to university, the secular worldview is taught, and the secular media and the secular workplace prohibit God, or place faith in a negative light.

Our lack of awareness of Being results in bewildering experience. The intrinsic inner radiance, the inner light of Being arises out of primordial luminous spaciousness, the unbound openness of unbound pure potentiality. When this primordial ground of Being is veiled and obscured by the lack of experiential awareness, we can be locked into dualistic experiences, and consequently the non-dual nature of the field of Being is experientially foreclosed. The sense of indivisibility of all phenomena and awareness is experientially foreclosed. The capacity to see into, feel into and see through the lucidity of phenomena as the very field of Being becomes foreclosed and densified. We then live contained in mind alone. There is no experience of the field of Being. Without the field of Being we easily become things and objects both to our self and to others.

It is not easy to understand the nature of the guru and understanding the nature of the guru can be bewildering. There is often bewilderment about the guru. One source of the bewilderment is that people think that the guru is an individual person and for most people the understanding that the guru is not a person has been foreclosed. The guru is not a person. And when people see and believe the guru is a person, such a belief will create illusions about the person whom they think is the guru, and their own relationship with the person whom they see as the guru will fall into various forms of the psychology of transference. Moreover, the true and pervasive nature of the guru will be concealed and the power of the guru limited and anthropomorphized, and politicized. To use Heideggerian language the ontic dimension will become the focus and the ontological dimension becomes foreclosed. In fact, the guru is not an entity, the guru is not a thing, and the guru is not even a being. The guru is the field of Being. The guru is the field of Being's manifestation of understanding, manifestation of protection and manifestation of self-revelation. The guru is the radiance of primordial awareness. The contemporary master of Kashmir Shavism, Swami Muktananda would teach, using the language of theology, " the guru is the grace bestowing power of God. " He would also say " The guru is your own innermost awareness and you must get beyond your mind to experience the guru as your own awareness. " Vehicle-ness It is also equally true that a person can be vehicle of the guru. Even you and I can be a vehicle for the guru. The light of the guru can manifest and shine forth through you and me, and through everyone. The power of the guru does not manifest only through institutional religious teachers as some would like you to think, but most often this manifestation is through

Explicación del pensamiento escolástico y sus máximos representantes. Es un método filosófico-teológico desarrollado, difundido y cultivado en las escuelas de la Europa del Medievo desde el Imperio Carolingio al Renacimiento. Las escuelas filosóficas que albergaron este pensamiento se localizaron en catedrales y conventos para, más adelante y en especial durante el siglo XIII, pasar a las universidades. El movimiento escolástico se manifestaba a través de dos vertientes: la enseñanza y las formas literarias. La base de la enseñanza en las escuelas fueron las artes liberales, divididas en el trivium -gramática, dialéctica y retóricay el quadrivium -aritmética, geometría, música y astrología-. Uno de los principales métodos de la escolástica fue el uso de la lógica y el vocabulario filosófico de Aristóteles en la enseñanza, la demostración y la discusión. Otro importante método fue enseñar un texto por medio de un comentario de alguna autoridad aceptada. En filosofía, esa autoridad era atribuida de un modo casi mecánico y procedimental a Aristóteles. En teología, los textos principales eran la Biblia y el Sententiarum Libri Quatuor (Cuatro libros de Sentencias) del teólogo y prelado italiano del siglo XII Pedro Lombardo, una recopilación de las opiniones de los primeros Padres de la Iglesia sobre problemas de teología. Los primeros escolásticos empezaron asumiendo como ortodoxia intelectual el contenido de los textos que estaban comentando. Poco a poco, conforme la práctica de la lectura fue desarrollando su propio poder de crítica, FILOSOFÍA ArtyHum 10 116 ArtyHum, Revista de Artes y Humanidades introdujeron muchos comentarios suplementarios sobre algunos puntos que el propio texto no cubría o no había resuelto de forma adecuada. A partir del siglo XIII, esos comentarios suplementarios, que expresaban el pensamiento personal de los maestros, se convirtieron en la parte más amplia y trascendente de los textos, resultando así que la explicación literal del texto era reducida a un simple pasaje de cada exégesis. Junto con los comentarios contaba la técnica de discusión por medio del debate público. Cada profesor de una universidad medieval debía aparecer varias veces al año ante el cuerpo docente y los alumnos, reunidos BIBLIOGRAFÍA.

In this article, I outline a logic of design of a system as a specific kind of conceptual logic of the design of the model of a system, that is, the blueprint that provides information about the system to be created. In section two, I introduce the method of levels of abstraction as a modelling tool borrowed from computer science. In section three, I use this method to clarify two main conceptual logics of information (i.e., modelling systems) inherited from modernity: Kant's transcen-dental logic of conditions of possibility of a system, and Hegel's dialectical logic of conditions of in/stability of a system. Both conceptual logics of information analyse structural properties of given systems. Strictly speaking, neither is a conceptual logic of information about (or modelling) the conditions of feasibility of a system, that is, neither is a logic of information as a logic of design. So, in section four, I outline this third conceptual logic of information and then interpret the conceptual logic of design as a logic of requirements, by introducing the relation of " suffici-entisation ". In the conclusion, I argue that the logic of requirements is exactly what we need in order to make sense of, and buttress, a constructionist (poietic) approach to knowledge.

While the author cannot speak for churches of Christ, common among them are unique ways of understanding sacred scripture, believed to have been written by apostles and prophets of the Lord before the destruction of Jerusalem (70 A.D.) and circulated among the early Christian communities (e.g. A letter called First Clement in about 95 A.D., refers to at least ten New Testament books), then collected as a volume by the self-identified Christian community of the second century A.D. or earlier, e.g. the list of Marcion (140 A.D.)

Also see MEANING THERAPY here
https://issuu.com/collegeofmentalhealth/docs/meaning_therapy3

The most original and shocking interpretation of Lucretius in the last 40 years.

Thomas Nail argues convincingly and systematically that Lucretius was not an atomist, but a thinker of kinetic flux. In doing so, he completely overthrows the interpretive foundations of modern scientific materialism, whose philosophical origins lie in the atomic reading of Lucretius' immensely influential book De Rerum Natura.

This means that Lucretius was not the revolutionary harbinger of modern science as Greenblatt and others have argued; he was its greatest victim. Nail re-reads De Rerum Natura to offer us a new Lucretius--a Lucretius for today.

The political reality of many countries in the Muslim World is untenable and reforms and change is absolutely necessary. This article argues that use of force and violence for political change is making things worse as one can witness in Syria and Iraq. The article advances a Qur'ānic perspective on the desirability of peace as a goal and peaceful means as instruments of change. The article acknowledges that the Qur'ānic sanction for use of force to defend religious freedom prcludes the advocacy of pacifism but nevertheless the article does make a strong case for privileging peace over use of force.

Carl Jung describes how the human unconscious is the hidden cosmological archetypal dimension of our being in the world. There is the personal unconscious that reflects personal history and experience either forgotten or foreclosed. There is another unconscious that is more primary, pre-reflective and cosmological in origin. In the language of the ancient Phenomenological Dzogchen tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, this existential dimension of archetypal manifestation is called the Sambogakaya realm of experience. This is the subtle realm of lucid forms of light and energy and vortices. These forms of light and energy field configurations become everything and anything. The Sambogakaya dimension manifests the Nirmanakaya dimension. The Nirmanakaya dimension is the actual experience of our self in contextual situations, unfolding through time and space as well as our unfolding of our personal psychological experience. Nirmanakaya is the dimension of our ordinary life world. Nirmanakaya is our being in the world. There is one more dimension. This dimension is the primordial foundational ground of everything and anything. In the ancient tradition of Dzogchen this is named as the Dharmakaya. Dharmakaya is the existential dimension of pure potentiality, pure creativity from which everything and anything manifests. Dharmakaya manifests the Sambogakaya. Dharmakaya is ground awareness, the ground of being. Dharmakaya is Being. Being is not a being but Being manifesting being as infinite numbers of numerous beings. All beings are the manifestation of Being. Dharmakaya is not an entity but manifests infinite numbers of entities.

The collection "Art and Religion of Ancient Societies" is a continuation of the series of the scientific publications which is devoted to the problems of study of the spiritual culture in the primitive societies. The previous edition "Art and Ritual of Ice Age", that was published in 2005, covered a circle of questions directly connected with the theory and practice of study of the Paleolithic Art. In this collection we also address to the same problematic. However, taking into account that the understanding of the most ancient culture stages of the human society is connected to a wide circle of questions of the study of the traditional communities, we think it is necessity to expand the edition’s subjects. Therefore we have tried to capture not only questions directly connected with field and basic study of the ancient art, but also practical analysis of the cultural and ethnographic facts. The questions of the aesthetics and theory of development of the early forms of art are considered as separately subjects in works. The published materials enable the reader to familiarize with the questions and methods of their analysis more in details, which are submitted in works of the researchers from Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Germany, Canada, USA, Australia.

This article offers a fresh critique of the work of political scientists and historians who have propagated the Eurocentric history of democracy. The paper argues that such work can be dissected and critiqued along several key lines: their reliance on a distinctly patriarchal discourse riddled with prejudices; the assertion that one can understand the history of democracy via the etymology of the word itself; and the deeply Eurocentric
roots of the study of democracy’s past embedded in the canon of Western political thought. The paper concludes by calling on contemporary political scientists and political historians concerned with the history of  democracy to be careful in re-iterating this deeply flawed history of democracy and to instead work towards a history of democracy that retrieves the silenced histories and the forgotten democratic moments that lay behind the roar of Western power.

In this paper I sketch the emergence of transcendence and immanence to the binary pair of opposites we know today. I show that such usage doesn't stretch back beyond Kant and that its real career only takes off in the 1830s. Major influences on this development are the debate about Spinoza's 'pantheism', Hegel's idealism, and the place of religion in the modern world. In a second part, I look at some historical scholarship of the time to illustrate how the duality of transcendence and immanence began to inform the reading of earlier religious history. I end by pointing to some new contexts that are beginning to emerge at the turn of the 20th century, notably Catholic thought, and which ensured that the popularity of that duality continued to grow.

Disgusted with ISIS, some Kurds turned away from Islam following the fall of Mosul in 2014. Many became atheists, while others sought comfort in Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism, according to converts, was the “original” religion of the Kurds before they embraced Islam. In 2015, two Zoroastrian centers opened in Sulaimani, both of which are recognized by the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. Notably, neither has tried to recreate Zoroastrianism the way it is currently and has been historically practiced in Iran and South Asia. Instead, they have created their own versions of Zoroastrianism, which is nationalist, postmodern, and liberal. Kurdish Zoroastrians argue that the reason Kurds are “backward” is Islam. They seek to rectify the present situation through a Kurdish “authenticated” and “original” form of Zoroastrianism. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork at these two centers, the present article examines this new religious movement in Sulaimani, an important city in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. It analyses the rise and distinctiveness of Kurdish Zoroastrianism looking at how Zoroastrian Kurds articulate their views on Islam, women’s rights, human rights, and Kurdish independence.

This essay was published in The Bible and Early Trinitarian Theology, edited by Christopher A. Beeley and Mark E. Weedman, for the CUAP Studies in Early Christianity (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2018); this is the uncorrected proofs. Exploring the humanity and divinity of Jesus, the Son's relation to the Father, and the agency of the Holy Spirit, it is one of five essays suggesting Johannine contributions to trinitarian discussions in the early church.

Embodiment or embodied awareness is a way of understanding the body. The body is not simply the external body, the body is the lived body. Both the 10 th century Kashmir philosopher Abhinavagupta and the contemporary French phenomenologist Merleau Ponty have a similar view of the lived body, or better 'lived' embodiment. A person may have a most beautiful external objective body but minimally lived in. Embodiment allows us to understand and conceive of the body as a way of living, experiencing and of perceiving through the medium of our embodiment. The body is the medium of the field. A person perceives not simply through eyes and ears alone, but through the whole body. Our body is an instrument of perception. Our body is an instrument of knowingness. The embodiment of awareness is the lived embodying of primordial awareness that liberates our being in the world. The embodiment of awakened awareness pulsates in resonance with and within Being itself.

Kata filsafat berasal dari Bahasa Yunani yakni "philosophia". Kata philosophia merupakan gabungan dari dua kata, yakni "philo" yang berarti cinta dan "sophos" yang berarti kebenaran atau kebijaksanaan. Sehinga philosophia diartikan mencintai kebijaksanaan atau kebenaran (love of wisdom). 1 Kata philosophia dari Yunani tersebut diserap ke dalam Bahasa Arab menjadi falsafah. Penyerapan kata tersebut terjadi dengan adanya penerjemahan karya-karya teks Yunani ke dalam Bahasa Arab yang dilakukan pada abad ke-2 hingga abad ke-3 Hijriah. Falsafah dimaknai sebagai pengetahuan tentang segala yang ada dan tentang ilahiah dan insaniah. 2 Pondasi mengenai filsafat dibangun oleh Plato (427-347 SM) dan Aristoteles (384-322 SM). 3 Plato merupakan murid dari Socrates (470-399 SM), yang sebelumnya juga telah memberikan pengajaran mengenai filsafat khususnya filsafat moral. Namun Socrates tidak meninggalkan karya tulis apapun, jadi pemikirannya diambil dari muridnya. Plato kemudian menjadi guru Aristoteles. Ketiga tokoh tersebut, Socrates, Plato, dan Aristoteles merupakan tokoh-tokoh kunci dalam filsafat. Plato mendefinisikan filsafat sebagai pengetahuan tentang segala hal yang ada. Sedangkan muridnya, Aristoteles mendefinisikan filsafat sebagai ilmu pengetahuan yang meliputi kebenaran, yang di dalamnya terkandung metafisika, logika, retorika, ekonomi, 1

We have two ways of knowing. Our mind knows forms, things, both subtle and gross. Faces, hands, buildings, trees, math formulas, mind knows subject and the mind knows otherness. The mind knows dualities, the mind knows me and you, us and them, and this and that. Mind knows time, mind knows the past, the present and the sense of the future. The mind knows things and entities, the mind knows beings, infinite numbers of beings and things. The mind knows difference. The mind thinks conceptually, feels affectively, imagines through imagery, the mind has sense and the mind has memory. The mind knows dualistically.

İnsanların oluşturduğu kültür, toplumsal etkileşimlerin sonucunda ortaya çıkmış ve gelişmiştir. Müzik, bu kültür oluşumunun en başından beri insanlıkla birlikte gelişmiş, toplumla şekillenmiş, ihtiyaçlara göre değişmiş ve değiştirmiştir. Müzik insanın yarattığı kültürün bir değişkeni olarak, siyaset, din, ekonomi gibi pek çok kurumla birlikte yaşamıştır. Müzik biçimleri, türleri, sorunları iç içe yaşadığı bu alanlarla biçimlenmiştir.

İçinde bulunduğu toplumun kültürel özellikleriyle şekillenen müzik; gelişmesine imkân tanıyan ve gelişmesine imkân sağladığı, kimi zaman sözlü mesajlardan daha etkili olduğu siyaset ile; doğumundan itibaren birlikte olduğu, bazen onun sayesinde, bazen ona rağmen geliştiği din ile; seslendiricisi, tüketicisi ile gitgide daha çok iç içe olduğu ekonomi ile bir bütün olmuştur. Tarihsel süreç içinde yaşanan her olay, savaşlar, yasaklar, kurallar, refah, bolluk, toplumun birbirine bağlı tüm organlarını dolayısıyla müziği derinden etkilemiştir.

Toplum yaşamının temel yapı taşlarından olan siyaset, din ve ekonominin müziğin hangi işlevlerinden yararlandığını, müziği nasıl etkilediğini ve
müzikten nasıl etkilendiğini tarihsel süreç içinde incelemek bu çalışmanın amacıdır.

Against the backdrop of the problem of the meaning of life as constructed in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, this article asks the question of what the supposed meaning(s) of the biblical character of Moses' life were assumed to be. By comparing a variety of contemporary philosophical perspectives on life's meaning with what appears to be related nascent metaphysical presuppositions in the world(s) of the biblical text, the pros and cons of reading with an anachronistic philosophical-theological metalanguage are clearly demonstrated. It is concluded that what Moses' life might have meant cannot be reduced either to a singular purpose or a unified teleology. Given the complex construction of his character's personal identity over time, the point of it all remains fragmented, plural and elusive.

Toleration is one of the fundamental principles that inform the design of a democratic and liberal society. Unfortunately, its adoption seems inconsistent with the adoption of paternalistically benevolent policies, which represent a valuable mechanism to improve individuals’ well-being. In this paper, I refer to this tension as the dilemma of toleration. The dilemma is not new. It arises when an agent A would like to be tolerant and respectful towards another agent B’s choices but, at the same time, A is altruistically concerned that a particular course of action would harm, or at least not improve, B’s well-being, so A would also like to be helpful and seeks to ensure that B does not pursue such course of action, for B’s sake and even against B’s consent. In the article, I clarify the specific nature of the dilemma and show that several forms of paternalism, including those based on ethics by design and structural nudging, may not be suitable to resolve it. I then argue that one form of paternalism, based on pro-ethical design, can be compatible with toleration and hence with the respect for B’s choices, by operating only at the informational and not at the structural level of a choice architecture. This provides a successful resolution of the dilemma, showing that tolerant paternalism is not an oxymoron but a viable approach to the design of a democratic and liberal society.

This study analyzes the contested relationship between Sufism and the Shariah and Shāh Walī Allāh's problematic of waḥdat al-wujūd. Some Sufis describe Sufism or taṣawwuf as the inner reality of the Shariah while others see it as the inward dimension of Islam. Drawing on a variety of classical sources, Walī Allāh stresses that accepting waḥdat al-wujūd does not mean one is being less faithful to the tenets of the Shariah, as it safeguards God's transcendence vis-à-vis the world. Walī Allāh belabors to clarify various misconceptions that bedevil it. His views on waḥdat al-wujūd are largely in alignment with that of the school of Ibn ʿArabī, although he seems to add new dimensions to it at times. He also asserts that a Sufi sage's (ḥakīm) understanding of the term differs from that of the uninitiate. In addition, he affirms that waḥdat al-wujūd does not negate the multiplicity of the cosmos, even though wujūd is one.

According to the  prevalent history of Bharata varsha as told by western scholars the Indus valley civilisation belonged to the
Dravida/Munda people and the vedic people(Aryans) reached India around 1900 BCE only . But in reality the Indus civilisation is vedic and the vedic people were in the Indus Valley at least from 6000BCE as seen from the excavations.
If an unknown script can explain the known myth and known history of a nation,what more proof is required to show that the script belongs to the same people.The script of Egypt explains
their myth and history.The script of Sumer,Akkad or Elam does the same.So it is natural for the Indus script to denote the myth
and history of the Hindu/Sindhu / Sarasvati/ vindu/vipra/sura/ bhuusura/bhudeva/bharata/kuru/pancala/Somaka  people.Hence in this article we shall try to understand a bit of Indian history through the Indus script.We shall presently see  a few evidences pointing to the existence of the Aryans in the Indus Valley several millennia prior to the so called Aryan
arrival in the Indus valley.
In the last  article we have looked into the writing of the Harappans in the early Ravi/Kot Diji phases and concluded that they are the same vedic people of the mature Harappan phase.
We have also compared an inscribed  Ravi sherd showing  presence of the Pancalas/ Bharatas in the Indus valley before 3300BCE and a Taxila coin showing their presence in Taxila around 200 BCE confirming the continuity of the vedic civilisation in the Indus Valley from the early Harappan days.We have also seen how an indus seal
portray the story of Ahalya described in later literature.
In this article we are exploring the universal idea of the mount of the dead Concept In The  Worship Of The Sun God -Pancala-Bharata-Somaka-Moksha-Kosala-Kurukshetra-Dharmakshetra concept-in the solar worship as was practised in the IVC and elsewhere. What are the linquistic and ritual logics employed in the practice? Religions are dependent on rituals and rituals are dependent on languages.Hinduism depends on Bharata/pitR/ deva/rava/veda/Sanskrit/Jina-kshetra/pan-caala language.Budhism depends on the Paali/vaaNi /heli language.Judaism depends on Hebrew/bruuhi language.Christianity depends on Greek/Latin Lnaguage.Islam depends on Arabic languge.All the religions of the world were dependent on words formulated by the priests of those religions as linquistics played a key role in formulating the belief and ritual tenets of their followers.All these religions and the languages owe a great deal to one religion and langage which was the religion of Gobekli Tepe and its language which is the pitR/Bharata /deva/veda language.The Bharatas of Pancala Ruled The known Ancient World By Using The Mound Of The Dead Concept In The  Worship Of The Sun God.

There are many ways of understanding the nature of philosophical questions. One may consider their morphology, semantics, relevance, or scope. This article introduces a different approach, based on the kind of informational resources required to answer them. The result is a definition of philosophical questions as questions whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement, ultimate but not absolute, closed under further questioning, possibly constrained by empirical and logico-mathematical resources, but requiring noetic resources to be answered. The article concludes with a discussion of some of the consequences of this definition for a conception of philosophy as the study (or “science”) of open questions, which uses conceptual design to analyse and answer them.

This essay is a Foreword by Paul N. Anderson to Ernst Käsemann's The Testament of Jesus, translated by Gerhard Krodel, The Johannine Monograph Series,  Vol. 6 (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2017) xi-xxxviii. It considers the life story of Ernst Käsemann, including his resistance to Nazi Germany and liberal theology, while at the same time analyzing critically his controversial claims in this book and the ensuing discussions among New Testament scholars over the next half century--with important implications for church leadership and Christian discipleship. Uncorrected proofs, here.

In the mid-90s, Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement and the Iranian Ayatollah Khamene’i both banned bloody forms of self-flagellation such as tatbir (cutting the forehead with a sword), calling them backward and un-Islamic. They argued that Shi‘a Muslims ought to imitate Husayn by actively fighting against oppressors rather than passively mourning Husayn’s martyrdom. This prohibition has not been unanimously applied in all Muslim
countries, including Syria, where such practices persisted until the Arab Spring (when virtually all Shi‘a Muslims left the shrine-town where these practices were performed). By closely reading the linguistic, conceptual, and juridical discourses that circulated in Syria in order to justify this position, the paper shows that the performers of tatbir conceived of these rituals in revolutionary, rather than reactionary, terms. By examining the performance and reception of flagellation processions in terms of differing modalities of affect, the paper opens up spaces for rethinking ‘revolution’ and ‘redemption’ in contemporary Twelver Shi‘ism.

A person's own inner most awareness and the movements within their awareness field bring forth their direct personal experience of their cosmological archetypal field of awareness. This spontaneous event is given to us within the archetypal realm of awareness. The archetypal dimension manifests itself as us, and reveals itself to us through our experience of its self-manifestation.

I am still on the first stretch of this nomadic exploration, but I think I can begin to answer the question that is guiding this exploration—'how can the Natural-Indigenous Worldview support our understandings of the potential for an anarchist society (i.e. for social order without hierarchical domination)?' The key of Natural-Indigenous Worldview that opens the lock of an anarchist society, of a society without hierarchical domination, comes in the Natural-Indigenous Worldview's spiritual ecology. When we develop the four R's (responsibility, reciprocity, respect, relationships [Young 2015]) through relating to the world in a manner that is facilitated by the spiritual ecology that rises from the Natural-Indigenous Worldview and thus ascribes spirit to all things without regard for the Colonial Modernist Worldview's distinction between 'animate' and 'inanimate', we come to see the world as a single, living, conscious being. The illusion of a discrete distinction between self and other breaks down and we come to see the self (and other selves) as strands in the unified, conscious web of creation. We come to care for all of creation as we would care for our children, for our partners, for our parents and for our self. Transcending the illusion of discrete individuality we develop a lovingly reciprocal, responsible, respectful and relational orientation to the world that begets virtuous thought, feeling, behavior and being without recourse to hierarchical authority (to punishment and fear of punishment). Engaging with the world through the spiritual ecology that rises from the Natural-Indigenous Worldview allows the sprouts of human nature to grow to fruition without recourse to hierarchical domination (i.e. without recourse to attempts to 'help sprouts grow' by pulling on them and the death of the sprouts of human nature portended by such hierarchical folly [Meng Zi 2016, 2A2]).

The phenomenology of the unfolding elaboration of our capacity to know Being directly and as well as our experience to know Being through beings is the focus of this paper. I will focus on the phenomenological elaboration of our knowing of mind; the phenomenological knowing of direct awareness and the consequent simultaneous intertwining of knowing through mind and through awareness. This union of our mind and our awareness allows the knowing of Being through beings and knowing the indivisibleness of beings and Being. As the Dakini said to Dudjom Lingpa " You and I are indivisible. " Our paper begins with a phenomenological elaboration of the Two Ways of Knowing. This is a necessary and a most useful distinction for our knowing of both beings and Being simultaneously. The Two Ways of Knowing: Mind Knowing Form and Awareness Knowing Being Mind Knows Form! Our mind knows forms, and things, both subtle and gross. Our mind knows beings and things. Our mind knows subject and our mind knows otherness. Our mind knows dualities .Our mind knows me and you, us and them and this and that. Mind knows time. Our mind knows the sense of the past, the sense of present and a sense of the future. The mind knows entities. Our mind knows difference. Our mind thinks conceptually, feels affectively, imagines through images, the mind senses sensation and the mind has memory. The mind always knows dualistically. Our mind thinks and knows through thoughts, our mind feels and knows through feelings, our mind has sensations, knows through sensation and our mind has fantasy and knows through imagination. The knowledge of our mind is mediated through conceptualization and representational thinking. Our mind can even know the mind of others. However, our mind cannot know Being and our mind cannot know the Being-ness of beings. Our mind cannot experience Being. Our mind cannot know Being directly. Awareness Knows Being! Our awareness directly knows Being and our awareness can directly know the Being-ness of beings. Being itself is not a being and Being manifests beings, infinite numbers of beings. Being manifests Being within beings as their own being. Being itself is not an entity and Being is not a being. Being is not a thing. Being is non-duality. Being knows the non-duality of everything and anything. Being is oneness and pervasiveness. Being is openness, and Being self-manifests as radiant light. Being is compassionate creative resonance. Being manifests presence. Our awareness can know the indivisible presence of the Being-ness of beings within beings and between beings. Being manifests duality, although Being is completely non-dual. By becoming aware of awareness, we experience primordial awareness which is the ground of being, which is Being itself. Awareness is Being. Awareness is Being knowing Being. Being knows Being and is the Being-ness of all the beings. Awareness can be timeless as well as awareness can be in time. Awareness can be timelessness and in time simultaneously.

Anthropocentrism, which includes assumptions like 'man has the right to dominion over the earth', 'humans are superior to animals', reality is divided into a de-spiriting animate/inanimate binary, etc., can clearly be attributed to the supremacist ontology of A.D. Worldview(s). As ) took care to note, power is not just exerted by what is said but by what is therefore not said, by what is necessarily rendered as untrue by a given regime of truth. What truth exists beyond the chains of Anthropocentrism?

RESUMEN:
La psicología analítica es la obra de Carl Gustav Jung y sus seguidores. También conocida como psicología de los complejos, el término aparece oficialmente en 1913 para designar una ampliación del psicoanálisis, razón por la cual se la tiene tanto por una escuela de psicoanálisis como por una tendencia de la psicología profunda, según la expresión de Bleuler para caracterizar a toda psicología que parta de la hipótesis de la existencia de una psique inconsciente.
Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) era un joven psiquiatra ya reconocido por la profesión cuando asumió la defensa de la obra de Freud, tanto en los foros psiquiátricos como en su propia obra, iniciada en 1902. Su estrecha colaboración desde 1907 se rompería en 1913 a instancias de Freud, para quien los desarrollos Junguianos del psicoanálisis no resultaban acordes con su propia teoría. Atrás quedarán los años en los que Jung fue el presidente de la Asociación Psicoanalítica Internacional desde su fundación en 1910 hasta el inicio de la primera Guerra Mundial. Una época en la que se constituye y alcanza una dimensión internacional (Europa y Estados Unidos) el movimiento psicoanalítico nacido en Viena alrededor de Freud a partir de 1900.
Entre el inmenso legado de Carl Jung, aquel que ha pasado a la historia por sus teorías y métodos revolucionarios en el mundo de la psicología, hay un tema que sobresale y ha sido su herencia más duradera: La Teoría de los Arquetipos.
Jung busca e investiga a los arquetipos en las doctrinas de las tribus primitivas, en las doctrinas secretas esotéricas, en las religiones, en los mitos y leyendas, en los símbolos del Tarot, en las imágenes de la Alquimia y muy especialmente en los sueños, en los que se apoya para la psicoterapia.
Hay que empezar por decir que Jung pensaba que no venimos al mundo como una tabula rasa, no venimos ‘en blanco’ como planteaba Freud, el ser humano según Jung, ya nace con información y ciertas creencias: “no existe una sola idea o concepción esencial que no posea antecedentes históricos”. Estos antecedentes históricos llegan a nosotros inconscientemente, y otros los vamos aprendiendo por medio de mitos, leyendas y la experiencia.
Es fácil identificar diferentes tipos de patrones de conducta en los mitos y leyendas de las culturas antiguas, todas tienden a tener un mismo héroe y trama, tienden, básicamente, a repetirse. Esta continua repetición de historias con los mismos personajes y el mismo guión es lo que llamamos Arquetipos.
Dr. ADOLFO VÁSQUEZ ROCCA

This article claims to uncover the core problematics that have made the debate on defining and conceptualizing " religion " so difficult and argues that this makes it possible to move beyond radical deconstruction towards reconstructing the concept for scholarly purposes. The argument has four main steps. Step 1 consists of establishing the nature of the entity " religion " as a reified imaginative formation. Step 2 consists of identifying the basic dilemma with which scholars have been struggling: the fact that, on the one hand, definitions and conceptualizations do not seem to work unless they stay sufficiently close to commonly held prototypes, while yet, on the other hand, those prototypes are grounded in monotheistic, more specifically Christian, even more specifically Protestant, theological biases about " true " religion. The first line of argument leads to crypto-theological definitions and conceptualizations, the second to a radical deconstruction of the very concept of " religion. " Step 3 resolves the dilemma by identifying an unexamined assumption, or problematic " blind spot, " that the two lines of argument have in common: they both think that " religion " stands against " the secular. " However, the historical record shows that these two defined themselves not just against one another but, simultaneously, against a third domain (referred to by such terms as " magic " or " superstition "). The structure is therefore not dualistic but triadic. Step 4 consists of replacing common assumptions about how " religion " emerged in the early modern period by an interpretation that explains not just its emergence but its logical necessity, at that time, for dealing with the crisis of comparison caused by