Multiculturalism, Charles Taylor

“Let me talk of another Canadian—Charles Taylor, the philosopher and invoke his beautiful book, The Language Animal. In this book he grapples with the centrality of language in the understanding of human beings. He mentions that language is intellectual, but it is also enacted in artistic portrayals, gestures, tones of voice, metaphors and the shifts of emphasis and attitude that accompany speech"
"...What does it mean when a language dies? It means a way of thinking dies with it. Language is not just words strung together with syntax and grammar. Beyond the rudimentary notion of communication, a language conveys its community’s mode of thinking, ability to forge associations with reality and most importantly, to imagine.

Stir Q&A: Zainub Verjee , the artist and activist’s Speech Acts explores artist’s labour talks about the death of languages, neon, and the status of the artist. Showing at Centre A
By Janet Smith August 15, 2021

According to this new book by Axel Honneth, our understanding of freedom is gravely impoverished. On one hand, the concept of freedom appears to be an empty universal, and we can no longer agree on its particular content. On the other hand, the failure of modern society to fulfill the normative promises of social liberty leads to the maintaining of the status quo and threatens societal fragmentation. By challenging this normative crisis, this book expands on Honneth's vision of social freedom, filling in the conceptual gaps and taking up anew the criticism raised by his earlier work Freedom's Right (2013).

Resumo: Este artigo discute como Charles Taylor reconstrói a era secular. A tese de Taylor é que a era secular não pode estar restrita à ideia da saída da religião do espaço público (secularidade 1), nem apenas pode significar a diminuição de crenças e práticas religiosas (secularidade 2). Taylor propõe uma nova leitura da era secular (secularidade 3), segundo a qual o pluralismo de crentes e não crentes seria a melhor descrição para um mundo que se seculariza, mas que, ao mesmo tempo, as doutrinas de fé ainda continuam influenciado o modo de vida das pessoas. Taylor enfatiza que a religião ainda se relaciona com a formação das diversas identidades, à medida que exerce, ao mesmo tempo, uma perspectiva de reconhecimento dos sujeitos, mesmo em sociedades modernas. Na parte final do artigo, são discutidas críticas à filosofia de Taylor, a partir das propostas teóricas de Jürgen Habermas e Nancy Fraser. A metodologia consistiu em análises das obras de Taylor (principalmente Uma Era Secular, como obra-chave deste artigo), bem como de seus intérpretes e estudiosos.

This paper addresses the conditions that need to be met for a human being to feel or, conversely, not to feel guilty of a wrongdoing against another human being. It does this in the light of Jaspers' understanding of metaphysical guilt as arising from inter-human solidarity. My claim is twofold. First, I claim that, while metaphysical guilt is not impossible, Jaspers does not offer an explanation of how it arises either in the Question of German guilt (Jaspers 2000) or in his other work on guilt in general. Secondly, despite metaphysical guilt's existence, it is, nevertheless, common for humans not to experience it, a phenomenon which Jaspers implicitly acknowledges but does not explain explicitly. I apply Axel Honneth's concept of recognition in order to supply the social component and the theory of dehumanisation to explain why, under some circumstances, metaphysical guilt does not arise.

This paper argues for a wider presentation of the term ‘recognition’ that includes ‘religion’ as a dimension of recognition. Toward this end, the author draws on the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, who considered whether religion might be a supportive context for the promotion of recognition. Recognition for Taylor includes recognition not only of sameness, but, significantly, recognition of difference. As the author of this paper highlights, Taylor’s argument for recognition of difference is an important resource in any theological reflection on the possibility of religious recognition.

I focus on the recent attempt by Habermas to provide a formal criterion for testing the legitimacy of group rights. Habermas argues that group-rights are legitimate only when they protect groups from discrimination by other groups. Group rights that aim to preserve groups against their own members, by contrast, are illegitimate. In my opinion, this way of drawing the distinction overlooks the link between anti-discrimination and preservation. Furthermore, I argue that preservation of a group identity can be legitimate so long as the group in question allows freedom of exit from the group. Indigenous peoples and old-order religious sects are often praised as proponents of sustainable collectivist economies that respect nature and community against the rapaciousness of capitalism. These groups sought – and acquired – special rights to self-governance and exemptions regarding education, property, and business. These rights, however, also protect cultural patterns that sometimes reinfor...

The themes of respect, confidence and self-esteem emerging in the interviews undertaken as part the RANLHE research project have been both striking and thought provoking. This has forced us to reconsider what is at stake when students talk about studying in university. The students we spoke to were clearly not seeking status or prestige alone but rather recognition, which touches on both one’s ‘private’ sense of self and one’s ‘public’ self. Intersubjective recognition has emerged as a key theme in our data and has been central in students’ accounts of their motivation for applying to college and their determination ‘to stay the course.’ This has offered us some new insights about the successful formation of learner identity, student motivation and retention. We are in the process of identifying the broader pedagogical, institutional and social implications. What is not being proposed is that all the issues that have emerged from a grounded examination of the data can be understood ...

This paper focuses on moral, legal and constitutional issues arising from debates and political conflicts centered on identity, human dignity, recognition and identity politics. In his 2018 book, Identity, the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Stanford University political scientist Francis Fukuyama addresses themes which may properly be considered matters of political philosophy and the philosophy of law: How are we to navigate between traditional, often ethnic-racial, and unitary conceptions of the nation-state on the one hand, and the threat of identitarian fragmentation on the other? Though Fukuyama affirms the importance of the concepts of human dignity and identity, he also criticizes contemporary identity politics-which he views as a danger to liberal democracy. "The rise of identity politics in modern liberal democracies," writes Fukuyama, "is one of the chief threats that they face;" and moreover, "unless we can work our way back to more universal understandings of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict." Fukuyama's criticism of identity politics has more recently found some parallels in the writings of George Packer and his 2021 book, Last Best Hope. Drawing on Fukuyama's arguments and Packer's complementary criticism from the center-left, this paper raises a related question of whether the well reasoned case against identity politics as a threat to liberal democracy, national unity and purpose does not create greater room for skepticism of fast-paced and ambitious ("Wilsonian"), liberal-internationalist goals and globalization. Greater emphasis on political consensus at home may strengthen the hand of American foreign policy in support of liberal democracy, though we now look back with well founded skepticism on neo-conservative interventionism and "forever wars." There are just and needed limits on globalizing internationalism imposed by and implicit in the criticism of identity politics. Having lost the unity of purpose of Cold-War liberalism, we are yet to find a "golden mean" avoiding divisive ethnic nationalism and political fragmentation.

This paper addresses the conditions that need to be met
for a human being to feel or, conversely, not to feel guilty
of a wrongdoing against another human being. It does
this in the light of Jaspers’ understanding of metaphysical
guilt as arising from inter-human solidarity. My claim is
twofold. First, I claim that, while metaphysical guilt is
not impossible, Jaspers does not offer an explanation
of how it arises either in the Question of German guilt
(Jaspers 2000) or in his other work on guilt in general.
Secondly, despite metaphysical guilt’s existence, it is,
nevertheless, common for humans not to experience it,
a phenomenon which Jaspers implicitly acknowledges
but does not explain explicitly. I apply Axel Honneth’s
concept of recognition in order to supply the social
component and the theory of dehumanisation to
explain why, under some circumstances, metaphysical
guilt does not arise.

In this article, we argue that the usual restriction of critical theory to modern’ norms is subject to problems of coherence, historical accuracy and moral obligation. First, we illustrate how critical theory opposes itself to societies designated as pre-modern, through a summary of Honneth’s recognition theory. We then show how an over-emphasis on modernity’s normative novelty obscures counter-currents in ethical life that threaten the unity of the modern era. Those two steps prepare the main analysis: that the ‘exceptionalist’ modernism of critical theory distorts our view of history and ignores normative dimensions of the past. We show how medieval and early modern societies in Europe experienced many conflicts and possessed institutions that create
illuminating configurations with modern norms. As a result, we articulate several kinds of moral and political link to the past that should lead critical theorists to expand the historical reach of their analyses.

This is a revision in progress of my dissertation, completed in 1999 at the University of Pittsburgh, under the guidance of Lisa D. Brush, Bill Scheuermann, Eric O.Clarke, and Roland Robertson.

Permission granted for public use. Please cite properly. Comments and Criticisms encouraged:

lackanthony4@gmail.com

This paper reconsiders the Hegelian notion of recognition in terms of discursive action, reformulating some of the central Habermasian points at this regard. The post-metaphysical justification of human rights which is here presented, is based upon a two-step argument: illocutive speech acts give place to two sorts of validity claims, on the one hand they raise a claim for universal recognition as right-bearers, whereas on the other hand they raise a claim of universal exemplarity. From this, it follows that valid illocutive speech acts respecting such two constraints do indeed give place to a form of pluralistic universalism. The dialectic process of recognition considers that from an immediate fulfilment of a formal standard of recognition, it follows a negativity moment represented by an exemplar pluralism of contrasting views. The aim of a political community, then, becomes that of producing an all encompassing new exemplar universality in order to obtain a dialectically mediated form of reflective unification.

The  question  “Who”  means  much  more  for  people  as  individualization  and  cultural differences  became  more  observable  than  ever.  Turkish  author,  Sabahattin  Ali,  who  had  been  murdered  afterwards,  had  stated  that  “Nothing  could  ever  scare  me  more  than  obligation  of  changing  an  opinion  about  me”.  Ali's  death, was  completely  about  the  wall  of  prejudgements  caused  by  sovereign  political  and  cultural  atmosphere  surrounding  him.  Today,  not  only  people  like  him,  but  also  ethnic,  cultural  and  other  types  of  groups  are  under  the  threat  of  destruction  that  is  an  outcome  misrecognition  or  lack  of recognition.  Also  this  destructive  potential  is  not  a  simple  result  of  violence  but  also  a  triggering  factor  of  self  destruction  of  a  culture.  Charles  Taylor  (1994: 25)  states  that “Nonrecognition  or  misrecognition  can  inflict  harm,  can  be  a  form  of  oppression,  imprisoning  someone  in  a  false,  distorted,  and reduced  mode  of  being.”  By  the  reference  of  his  words,  we  can  clearly  state  that  in  order  to  clarify  our  identity  in  right  way,  we  need  recognition.  However,  when  the  subject  is  recognition  of  a  group  and  its  rights  by  a  state,  since  there  must  be  reconsideration  of  social  order,  there  comes  a  tension  between  “politics  of  universalism”  and  the  “politics of difference”  and  rises  the  key  question  of  this  article:  Does  each  culture  deserve  total  respect  and  what  or  who  determines  if  a  culture  is  worth  respect  or  not  with  reference  to  which  universal  principles?