Leo Strauss's Platonism

Lacanian psychoanalysis. In this recent work he explores concepts of love in psychoanalysis, philosophy, and literature, with an emphasis on the theories of Freud and Lacan. His wide-ranging approach takes up questions of desire, passion, infatuation, sexuality, durable love, and their cultural and historical variations. Along the way, he comments on popular culture and clinical material to convey the myths and mysteries of these universal human experiences. Fink does not attempt a comprehensive review of the subject, omitting, for example, Bergmann's important work on repetition and regression in relationships (1982, 1988) and Kernberg's object relations approach to love (1998). Nor does he cover the varied formulations suggested by Lacan over his long career. Fink focuses principally on Lacan's reading of Plato's Symposium in his Seminar VIII, in which he develops a model of transference love. Both Freud and Lacan had a lot of things to say about love and its role in psychoanalysis. Freud famously discussed love triangles, the tension between object love and narcissism, the separation of sexual from tender feelings, and the residues of oedipal conflicts in intimate relationships. In his early period, Lacan replaced libidinal motives with the phenomenological notion of a desire that cannot be reduced to drives or object relations, but is inherent in intersubjectivity. "Man's desire is the desire of the Other," he wrote, borrowing from Hegel's ambiguous phrase. To imitate or fulfill the Other's desire, however, evokes a childish wish for union, not the limited satisfactions of an actual relationship with another subject. In this regard, Lacan distinguished between imaginary love, seeking fusional mirroring of an ideal self, and symbolic love, which accepts incompleteness and separation. The tension between the two makes 695262A PAXXX10.

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In recent decades, a growing number of scholars have questioned the developmental approach to Plato that dominated scholarship during the 20th century. In this context, old strategies of reading the dialogues have been renewed and new approaches proposed. Basically, three different reading strategies the dialogues have been advocated: the still dominant Developmentalism, Unitarianism, and the Literary (or Dramatic) reading. These different approaches are still largely taken as competitors and there seems to be no methodology available that systematically integrates these different readings. In this paper, I work upon the “Perspective reading” proposed by Kahn (2005), and Gonzales (2016) in order to present a methodology that integrates some aspects of these different approaches in a systematic and coherent way. -- Original in English.

Pensar en lo sagrado en Platón lleva directamente a todo lector a tener en cuenta no solo lo que explícitamente se dice en el diálogo, sino los acontecimientos que lo atraviesan: las acusaciones de impiedad y la muerte de Sócrates. Leo Strauss consideraba que el escenario dramático de los diálogos configura otro argumento dentro de los mismos, permitiendo ver el conjunto de la obra platónica con otros ojos. Siguiendo tal idea el presente artículo pretende mostrar como la relación entre filosofía y religión configura los diálogos platónicos, en nexo con el acontecimiento por antonomasia que es la muerte de Sócrates.

This paper addresses the relationship between religion and science in terms of the link between social science and religion defined broadly as a commitment to a set of values. It takes as a point of departure Myrdal"s contention that "there is an inevitable a priori element in all scientific work". Varying a priori definitions of such key concepts as rationality, freedom, equality and of the nature of humankind, are embedded in all social science theories, and commonly serve to underpin disagreements between contending schools of thought. Hence the quip that the only prerequisite for the study of comparative economic systems is the study of comparative religion. Metaphysics and epistemology are therefore of uncommon importance, but their consideration is nonetheless commonly excluded from the training of social scientists. The social sciences are increasingly dominated by the view that the "big picture" epistemological and metaphysical debates have been resolved and that the way forward now is through empirical testing of specific hypotheses. Yet, as Sen puts it, the understanding of the public good implicit in much of the social sciences is very questionable, and "an incorrect theory can kill". Continuing controversies e.g. of the type between Myrdal and Bauer, Sen and the Washington Consensus, Galbraith and Krugman on US political economy, the need for free markets versus selective government intervention should make clear however that the role of economic philosophy and the need for grounding in it is irremovable. Especially in that sense, there is a need to be more willingly attentive to the link between religion (defined broadly in terms of metaphysics or faith in particular value systems) and social science. The roots of the controversy sparked by Pope Benedict XVI"s controversial 2006 Regensburg address are examined within the same framework. Important links are adumbrated between metaphysics and what evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker calls the new sciences of the mind and of human nature.

In recent decades, a growing number of scholars have questioned the developmental approach to Plato that dominated scholarship during the 20th century. In this context, old strategies of reading the dialogues have been renewed and new approaches proposed. Basically, three different reading strategies the dialogues have been advocated: the still dominant Developmentalism, Unitarianism, and the Literary (or Dramatic) reading. These different approaches are still largely taken as competitors and there seems to be no methodology available that systematically integrates these different readings. In this paper, I work upon the "Perspective reading" proposed by Kahn (2005), and Gonzales (2016) in order to present a methodology that integrates some aspects of these different approaches in a systematic and coherent way. Resumo Nas últimas décadas, a abordagem desenvolvimentista da obra de Platão, que dominou a academia durante o século XX, tem sido progressivamente questionada. Nesse contexto, antigas estratégias de leitura dos diálogos foram renovadas e novas abordagens, propostas. Basicamente, três estratégias de leitura dos diálogos foram defendidas: a, ainda dominante, leitura desenvolvimentista, o unitarismo e a leitura literária (ou dramática). Essas diferentes abordagens ainda são amplamente consideradas como concorrentes e parece não haver metodologia disponível que 288 Renato Matoso O que nos faz pensar, Rio de Janeiro, v.27, n.43, p. 287-301, jul.-dez. 2018 integre essas diferentes leituras. Neste artigo, desenvolvo a "leitura de perspectivista" proposta por Kahn (2005) e Gonzales (2016), a fim de apresentar uma metodologia que integre aspectos importantes das três abordagens acima citadas de maneira sistemática e coerente.

Jacques Lacan and Leo Strauss are two of the most influential and controversial thinkers of the last century.  Both are celebrated or reviled for their distinct modes of interpreting texts; both are accused by critics of themselves practicing 'esoteric' modes of speaking and writing.  Both engaged with what Strauss called 'fundamental alternatives': poetry versus philosophy, philosophy versus revealed religion, comedy versus tragedy, the ancients versus the moderns, and Eros and the Law. Both knew the eccentric Alexandre Kojeve, and gave seminars on Plato's Symposium proposing a non-metaphysial reading of Platonism and Platonic Eros, in 1959-60, then 1960-61.  Lacan even recommends in the early 1950s that his students read Strauss' Persecution and the Art of Writing, as an aid to understanding the formations of the unconscious.  Yet hitherto. Jean-Claude Milner is the one author who has considered the proximities and differences between the two thinkers.  These differences pivot around psychoanalysis' status as an eminently later modern endeavor, and Strauss' famous criticisms of modernity.  This draft chapter, written for an upcoming volume on Leo Strauss in conversation with other thinkers (with SUNY, 2019/20, ed. J.Bernstein & J.Schiff), aspires to present a propaedeutic to any future comparative study of the two 20th century figures.

This short paper reproduces section 1 of a larger paper titled ‘The Renewed Interpretation of the Platonic Corpus and the Qur’ān: How Formulating More Accurate Questions Leads to Finding Better Answers,’ to be presented to the 2018 Inarah Conference in Saarbrücken, March 8-11, 2018 (available online here: https://www.academia.edu/34630532/The_Renewed_Interpretation_of_the_Platonic_Corpus_and_the_Qur_ān_How_Formulating_More_Accurate_Questions_Leads_to_Finding_Better_Answers_2018_Upcoming_Conference_Paper).

Leo Strauss (1899-1973) was but one out of a number of German-Jewish thinkers emerging around 1930 who sought to return to the ancients, but no one expressed this idea more radically and with greater vigor. This paper examines Strauss's project of returning as it was formed around 1930 and subsequently clarified and expanded. The focus on " methodological " aspects indicates that the concern is not only with the question of why such a return seemed necessary for Strauss, but also how he sought to do it. After providing an outline of his principal considerations and their respective theoretical contexts , then, the article also seeks to examine the philosophical thinking and writing in action. The body of writings to be examined include two lecture manuscripts of 1930 and 1931, with a brief view towards Strauss's early master work Philosophy and Law (1935) and his lecture " Jerusalem and Athens " (1967).

Gazing over a barren, pristine landscape surrounded by mountains, divorced from the brutal forces of the socialist dystopia that seeks to crush his individuality and repress his intellect, Prometheus – the hero of Ayn Rand’s (1905-1982) novella Anthem – ponders with exhilaration his new life away from civilization. “This, my body and spirit, this is the end of the quest,” he says. “I wished to know the meaning of things. I am the meaning.” The image of Prometheus standing alone in the wilderness constitutes an enduring symbol of Rand’s work. In this context, the pursuit of political excellence and universal goodness remains incidental to human virtue. Man lives for his own sake. The quest for happiness, for righteousness, for meaning, begins and ends not with the common good, but with the individual good.

Rand’s decision to name Prometheus after Aeschylus’s ill-fated hero amounts to a particularly apt expression of her story’s central theme. The classical Prometheus’s disobedience of the gods corresponds to Rand’s contention that neither religion nor tradition – let alone the state – can function as a standard of morality. Only an individual’s happiness, which man advances through reason, may serve as a bellwether of virtue. For Rand, Greek authors such as Aeschylus and Aristotle provide the first moral worldview that grounds itself not in institutions or authority, but in an individual’s untrammeled use of his cognitive faculty. Thus, to develop the philosophy she calls Objectivism, Rand seeks to explore the thought of classical Athens, the originator and incubator of the philosophic enterprise.

The philosophy of ancient Greece paves the groundwork not only for Rand’s worldview, but also for the thought of Leo Strauss (1899-1973), a contemporary of Rand who sees the classics as the architects of the concept of natural right, which in modern times finds its most eloquent expression in the Declaration of Independence. While neither Strauss nor Rand exhibits any awareness of each other’s thought in their voluminous writings, their respective approaches to classical philosophy, modern philosophy, and ethics bear striking resemblances. Both believe that modern philosophy, by rejecting reason as a definitive means of approaching reality, has gone tragically astray. Both advocate revisiting the classics to rediscover concepts like virtue, truth, morality, objectivity, and the good. Both ground their worldviews in the belief that objective morality remains a distinct possibility, that reason even in the absence of God can lead to truth grounded in natural law. And both cite authorities like Aristotle in their efforts to explicate a philosophical system that rejects the fact-value distinction postulated by modern thinkers like Weber and Heidegger.

Yet even as Rand and Strauss appeal to identical sources in the formulation of their respective philosophies, their specific conceptions of truth and natural law stand at starkly dissimilar poles. Both, in all likelihood, would have strenuously rejected each other’s worldview. Still, while scholars have yet to advance significant comparative analyses of Rand and Strauss, the striking overlaps in their ideological paradigms demand a more in-depth study of their approaches to political philosophy. Indeed, the bitter controversy and recriminations that often surround even a casual reference to Strauss and Rand in public life have inhibited a balanced and dispassionate examination of their thought. This essay aims to explore the differences between the respective philosophies of Leo Strauss and Ayn Rand, with a particular focus on their application to the relationship between the individual and the state. In this respect, I seek not to mount a comprehensive investigation of their oeuvres, but rather to consider their writings with regard to several political-philosophical questions that lie at the heart of their worldviews and of classical political philosophy. What role does the concept of natural right play in political governance? How should we define morality and virtue in politics? Is it possible to reconcile the tension between the individual and the state? In addressing the approaches of Rand and Strauss to these problems, I intend to advance a critique of Rand’s position on the basis of Strauss’s views. By demonstrating that Strauss employs a more accurate and comprehensive use of classical thinkers than Rand does, I seek to uncover the flaws in Rand’s perception of human nature, the state, and natural right, and to show why her political philosophy remains inconsistent with the classical sources she quotes selectively to justify it.