Legislative Override

This white paper tries to logically break the idea of intentional displacement, and fails to do so breaking all  logic chains and all escape hatches. We know scientifically know that the ommision of the empathy data from the IRI was intentional.

הדיון על סמכות המחוקק להתגבר על חוקי היסוד או על פסיקת בית המשפט המפרשת אותם רווי יצרים פוליטיים. על הפרק עומדת ההכרעה בשאלה למי מסור כוח המילה האחרונה בתחום ההגנה על זכויות האדם בישראל: האם יימסר לבית המשפט או למחוקק הישראלי? הדיון מתנהל כאילו כל הסוגיות פתוחות למקח וממכר פוליטי, החל בעצם הסמכות להתגבר וכלה בעיצובה של פסקת ההתגברות. מאמר זה מציע זווית חשיבה אחרת. הוא מציע כי סמכות ההתגברות של המחוקק מתיישבת עם ההיסטוריה החוקתית של מדינת ישראל, במסגרתה התגבר המחוקק דרך קבע על סעיף 4 לחוק יסוד: הכנסת לפני המהפכה החוקתית ובית המשפט אישר מספר פעמים בהזדמנויות שונות את הלגיטימיות של כלי זה. סמכות זו גם מתיישבת עם המופעים השונים של התגברות בחוקה הישראלית לאחר חקיקת חוקי היסוד בדבר הגנה על זכויות האדם. לשיטתו של השופט חשין בפרשת בנק המזרחי, סמכות ההתגברות מסורה כבר כיום למחוקק הישראלי בכלל חוקי היסוד, אף בהעדר פסקת התגברות מפורשת. השופט חשין היה נכון לקרוא פסקת התגברות שיפוטית לתוך חוק יסוד: כבוד האדם וחירותו. יתר על כן, בית המשפט אחראי במידה רבה ללידתה ולניסוחה של פסקת ההתגברות המפורשת בחוק יסוד: חופש העיסוק. זו נולדה כחלק מתקופה היסטורית (1995-1992) שבמסגרתה הנוסחה הפוליטית הייתה תמיכה בתהליך השלום בתמורה לסטטוס קוו בענייני דת, כשמנגנון היישום היה התגברות, בין בדרך של פסקת התגברות מפורשת ובין בדרך של הסכם ולנר הידוע לשמצה. מנגנון ההתגברות "תואם" אפוא את אופייה של החוקה הישראלית. עם זאת, יש חשש מוצדק כי אימוצה כמנגנון מפורש כללי יביא לזילות ההגנה על זכויות האדם בישראל. לפיכך, המאמר מציע כי סמכות המחוקק להתגבר תחומה במגבלות אינהרנטיות הניתנות לאכיפה על ידי בתי המשפט. מגבלות אינהרנטיות אלה נובעות מאופייה של ההתגברות ככלי לפגיעה בחוקה על ידי המחוקק הרגיל, ולא ככלי לשינוי חוקתי באמצעות מתקן החוקה.

Scholars traditionally deduce the nature of judicial review (whether weak or strong) in a given country from the text of constitutional provisions (e.g., notwithstanding clause, incompatibility framework). They generally contrast the strong-form judicial review exercised under the U.S. model with weak-forms of judicial review exercised under the new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism. This article argues, however, that the strength of judicial review is mainly dictated by the method used for constitution-making. As such, it challenges conventional accounts of how models of constitutionalism come about and which systems should be classified as belonging to the new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism.

This article further asserts that the process of constitution-making has practical implications for a country’s present and future constitutional development. It explores how the various theories ascribed to a country’s process of constitution-making lead to different resolutions of such fundamental issues as: (1) the implications of using "notwithstanding" language to overcome constitutional enactments; (2) the effectiveness of legislative self-entrenchment provisions; (3) the legitimacy of using referenda to decide constitutional matters; and (4) the "unconstitutional constitutional amendment" doctrine. The article shows that the process used for adoption and amendment of a constitution defines the nature of constitutionalism in a given country more than any text included in the constitution itself.

This article explores the oft-neglected relationships between constitution-making (including amendment) mechanisms and constitutional infringement mechanisms, by focusing on the override as one of the possible tools to infringe upon the Constitution. Scholars commonly assume that the override or ‘notwithstanding clause’ is a Canadian invention. They further argue that the tool fell into disuse in Canada because Quebec’s exercise of it led to public disdain. Scholars suggest that Israel is the only country to have followed the Canadian example by adopting the override as a transplant to “notwithstand” one constitutional right — freedom of occupation. Although Israeli political branches adopted this tool originally to enable the prohibition on importation of non-Kosher meat to Israel, scholars suggest that the legislature is further considering adopting the tool as a general mechanism applicable to all its Basic Laws, thus enabling the legislature to override all constitutional rights. Israeli right-wing politicians attempt to justify this possible decision by arguing that “what is good for Canada is good enough for Israel.”

This article suggests that there are two types of override: a ‘commonlaw override,’ which is not uniquely Canadian, and a ‘sunset override.’ The commonlaw override evolves in judicial decisions of a given country when the courts require the legislature to explicitly take responsibility for an action. Under the commonlaw override, we may couple together phenomena that are not typically connected, including a means of protecting commonlaw rights, a judicial presumption against delegation of power to administrative agencies, or mechanisms of dealing with procedural or substantive legislative entrenchment. In contrast, the sunset override is a Canadian invention. For the tool to be part of the infringement mechanisms of a country's Constitution, it must be provided for explicitly in that Constitution, and its exercise must be temporary.

This article follows the different possible uses of the commonlaw override. It shows that Israel has vast experience with the commonlaw override that may shed light on Israel's future possible exploitation of the sunset override. The article then shows that Israel has adopted the sunset override following the Canadian example. When the Rabin government adopted the tool as part of an exchange deal with the ultra-Orthodox religious political party Shas, the terms of the deal included Shas' acquiescence to the peace process in exchange for Rabin government's use of the override to protect religious status-quo from judicial intervention. In addition, the Israeli justices played an active and unique role in the birth and formulation of the Israeli override. As has happened with the Canadian Charter, supposedly these circumstances should have made the override illegitimate in Israel. But, this article argues that it is not the political uses of the override that lead to its lack of use. Rather, the determining factor is the override’s compatibility with the constitution-making process in a given country. From a normative perspective, it is easier for the Israeli legislature to override its own prior enactments, even those titled Basic Laws, than it is for the Canadian legislature to override the People's enactment of the Charter. Thus, it is expected that Israel might more freely deploy the sunset override were it to become a general mechanism embodied in the Basic Laws, while, in contrast, the sunset override has fallen into disuse in Canada.

This comment reviews Bruce Ackerman's We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution. It traces the major innovations suggested in the book and explains the motivation for writing the book. It then looks at Ackerman's work through the eyes of comparative constitutional law. It suggests that while Ackerman embarked on an American historical journey, his work makes the U.S. Constitution less "exceptional" and more accessible and even relevant in comparative terms. Ackerman's work blurs the fundamental distinctions between the "formal" and the "material" constitution. The comment argues that this blurring results from the need to supplement formal mechanisms of constitutional amendment with common law ones that may exist in any constitutional system that is based on popular sovereignty. But while accepting that the U.S. Constitution may be amended via extra-constitutional means, the comment questions whether the landmark statutes identified by Ackerman are amendments to the Constitution or present mere override of judicial decisions.

States compare asylum and immigration policies. The Israeli immigration and asylum regime influenced American law, and was also directly influenced by it. This Article offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of the Israeli case law on the rights of undocumented migrants, at the core of which is a series of cases on immigration detention. Three times within a two year period, the Israeli Supreme Court invalidated immigration detention laws and the legislature complied with increasing frustration. Our argument is that although the Court courageously protected the undocumented migrants’ rights, it also resorted to strategic ambiguity as a means of institutional survival in light of legislative threats to incorporate a general legislative override clause and executive attempts to “pack” the Court with conservative justices. This high stakes dialogue is unprecedented in the Israeli context and uncommon in comparative law. We argue that courts must not only protect the constitutional and international human rights of undocumented migrants, but also bring the political branches to accountability. They should force states to conduct refugee status determinations in a timely manner rather than be satisfied with temporary protection regimes. They should further recognize that rights may accumulate as a result of a prolonged presence of an undocumented migrant in a country. The article discusses the Israeli judicial techniques used to reduce the conflict with the representative branches, including the use of constitutional avoidance and comparative law, and juxtaposes them with the American approach evident in Zadvydas v Davis and Jennings vs. Rodriguez. The harsh implications of a policy that leaves people in an indeterminate state of mere protection from removal are manifest in the Israeli story and should serve as a warning to the US courts as they formulate their reaction to the recent asylum ban.

Retrata-se o empoderamento judicial no âmbito da interpretação do texto constitucional, averiguando-se a necessidade de devolução da Constituição ao povo. Neste contexto, destaca-se a necessidade de revisão das regras democráticas, questionando-se a respeito a legitimidade do Judiciário como autoridade última quanto à interpretação da Constituição. Esta revisão bibliográfica teórica e qualitativa utiliza o método dedutivo de análise. Conclui-se que a última palavra a respeito da significação do texto constitucional pertence legitimamente ao povo. Deve-se restaurar a supremacia popular em contraposição à judicial e lembrar ao povo que ele é soberano em face do Legislativo, do Executivo e também do Judiciário.

O “novo modelo de constitucionalismo da Comunidade Britânica” se refere a uma estrutura ou abordagem geral comum subjacente às cartas de direitos introduzidas no Canadá (1982), Nova Zelândia (1990) e Reino Unido (1998). Como um experimento recente e contínuo em design constitucional, o novo modelo da Comunidade Britânica pode ser algo inédito. Ele representa uma terceira abordagem à estruturação e institucionalização de disposições constitucionais básicas que ocupa o ponto intermediário entre as duas tradicionais opções de supremacia legislativa e judicial, que se excluíam mutuamente. Ele também provê técnicas novas e – pode-se argumentar – melhores para proteger direitos dentro de uma democracia por meio da realocação de poderes entre cortes e legislaturas, o que estabelece maior equilíbrio que qualquer desses dois modelos assimétricos. Dessa forma, o novo modelo da Comunidade Britânica promete ser para os modelos de constitucionalismo o que a economia mista é para formas de organização econômica: uma terceira via distinta e atraente, entre dois extremos mais puros, porém falhos.