Horn logic

Standard belief change assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic. However, there are good reasons for considering belief change in less expressive logics as well. In this paper we build on recent investigations by Delgrande on contraction for Horn logic. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. This result stands in contrast to Delgrande’s conjecture that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate form of contraction for Horn logic. We then define a more appropriate notion of basic contraction for the Horn case, influenced by the convexity property holding for full propositional logic and which we refer to as infra contraction. The main contribution of this work is a result which shows that the construction method for Horn contraction for belief sets based on our infra remainder sets corresponds exactly to Hansson’s classical kernel contraction for belief sets, when restricted to Horn logic. This re...

We show that Booth et al.'s Horn contraction based on infra-remainder sets corresponds exactly to kernel contraction for belief sets. This result is obtained via a detour through Horn contraction for belief bases, which supports the conjecture that Horn belief change is best viewed as a "hybrid" version of belief set change and belief base change. Moreover, the link with base contraction gives us a more elegant representation result for Horn contraction for belief sets in which a version of the Core-retainment postulate features.

Abstract. In this paper we present the BPAL platform aimed at the management of Business Process Knowledge Bases. It includes a logic-based language for BP modeling and a reasoning mechanism providing support to BP designers in several services. Firstly, the definition of a BP meta-...

A recent direction within belief revision theory is to develop a theory of belief change for the Horn knowledge representation framework. We consider questions related to the complexity aspects of previous work, leading to questions about Horn envelopes (or Horn LUB's), introduced earlier in the context of knowledge compilation. A characterization is obtained of the remainders of a Horn belief set with respect to a consequence to be contracted, as the Horn envelopes of the belief set and an elementary conjunction corresponding to a truth assignment satisfying a certain body building formula. This gives an efficient algorithm to generate all remainders, each represented by a truth assignment. On the negative side, examples are given of Horn belief sets and consequences where Horn formulas representing the result of most contraction operators, based either on remainders or on weak remainders, must have exponential size.

A recent direction within belief revision theory is to develop a theory of belief change for the Horn knowledge representation framework. We consider questions related to the complexity aspects of previous work, leading to questions about Horn envelopes (or Horn LUB's), introduced earlier in the context of knowledge compilation. A characterization is obtained of the remainders of a Horn belief set with respect to a consequence to be contracted, as the Horn envelopes of the belief set and an elementary conjunction corresponding to a truth assignment satisfying a certain body building formula. This gives an efficient algorithm to generate all remainders, each represented by a truth assignment. On the negative side, examples are given of Horn belief sets and consequences where Horn formulas representing the result of most contraction operators, based either on remainders or on weak remainders, must have exponential size.

In this paper, we address the problem of applying AGMstyle belief revision to non-classical logics. We discuss the idea of minimal change in revision and show that for non-classical logics, some sort of minimality postulate has to be explicitly introduced. We also present two constructions for revision which satisfy the AGM postulates and prove the representation theorems including minimality postulates. K * α = (K − ¬α) + α This identitiy assumes the underlying logic to be closed under negation. However, this is not the case for many interesting logics which are used in practice. In the last decade, there was an effort to adapt the AGM paradigm to non-classical logics of interest in Artificial Intelligence, notably Description Logics (Flouris, Plexousakis, and Antoniou 2005

We slightly improve on characterization results already in the literature for base revision. We show that consistency-based partial meet revision operators can be axiomatized for any sentential logic S satisfying finitarity and monotonicity conditions (neither the deduction theorem nor supraclassicality are required to hold in S). A characterization of limiting cases of revision operators, full meet and maxichoice, is also offered. In the second part of the paper, as a particular case, we focus on the class of graded fuzzy logics and distinguish two types of bases, naturally arising in that context, exhibiting different behavior.

In classical, AGM-style belief change, it is assumed that the underlying logic contains classical propositional logic. This is clearly a limiting assumption, particularly in Artificial Intelligence. Consequently there has been recent interest in studying belief change in approaches where the full expressivity of classical propositional logic is not obtained. In this paper we investigate belief contraction in Horn knowledge bases. We point out that the obvious extension to the Horn case, involving Horn remainder sets as a starting point, is problematic. Not only do Horn remainder sets have undesirable properties, but also some desirable Horn contraction functions are not captured by this approach. For Horn belief set contraction, we develop an account in terms of a model-theoretic characterisation involving weak remainder sets. Maxichoice and partial meet Horn contraction is specified, and we show that the problems arising with earlier work are resolved by these approaches. As well, ...

Standard belief change assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic. However, there are good reasons for considering belief change in less expressive logics as well. In this paper we build on recent investigations by Delgrande on contraction for Horn logic. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. This result stands in contrast to Delgrande's conjecture that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate form of contraction for Horn logic. We then define a more appropriate notion of basic contraction for the Horn case, influenced by the convexity property holding for full propositional logic and which we refer to as infra contraction. The main contribution of this work is a result which shows that the construction method for Horn contraction for belief sets based on our infra remainder sets corresponds exactly to Hansson's classical kernel contraction for belief sets, when restricted to Horn logic. This result is obtained via a detour through contraction for belief bases. We prove that kernel contraction for belief bases produces precisely the same results as the belief base version of infra contraction. The use of belief bases to obtain this result provides evidence for the conjecture that Horn belief change is best viewed as a 'hybrid' version of belief set change and belief base change. One of the consequences of the link with base contraction is the provision of a representation result for Horn contraction for belief sets in which a version of the Core-retainment postulate features.

The standard theory of belief revision was developed to describe how a rational agent should change his beliefs in the presence of new information. Many interesting tools were created, but the concept of rationality was usually assumed to be related to classical logics. In this paper, we explore the fact that the logical tools used can be extended to other sorts of logics, as proved in (Hansson and Wassermann, 2002), to describe models that are closer to the rationality of a real agent. 1 A consequence operator Cn is supraclassical iff for any set of formulas A, Cn0(A) ⊆ Cn(A), where Cn0 is the classical consequence operator. Special Issue On Belief Revision Dedicated to Sven Ove Hansson on the Occasion of his 50th Birthday Edited by Erik J. Olsson

Standard belief change assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic. However, there are good reasons for considering belief change in less expressive logics as well. In this paper we build on recent investigations by Delgrande on contraction for Horn logic. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. This result stands in contrast to Delgrande's conjecture that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate form of contraction for Horn logic. We then define a ...

Traditionally, belief change is modelled as the construction of a belief set that satisfies a success condition. The success condition is usually that a specified sentence should be believed (revision) or not believed (contraction). Furthermore, most models of belief change employ a select-and-intersect strategy. This means that a selection is made among primary objects that satisfy the success condition, and the intersection of the selected objects is taken as outcome of the operation. However, the select-and-intersect method is difficult to justify, in particular since the primary objects (usually possible worlds or remainders) are not themselves plausible outcome candidates. Some of the most controversial features of belief change theory, such as recovery and the impossibility of Ramsey test conditionals, are closely connected with the select-and-intersect method. It is proposed that a selection mechanism should instead operate directly on the potential outcomes, and select only one of them. In this way many of the problems that are associated with the select-and-intersect method can be avoided. This model is simpler than previous models in the important Ockhamist sense of doing away with intermediate, cognitively inaccessible objects. However, the role of simplicity as a choice criterion in the direct selection among potential outcomes is left as an open issue.

The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosopical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.

This work present an connection between partial meet contractions (AGM: Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson) and kernel contractions (Hansson). We present a way to define incision functions (used in kernel contractions) from selection functions (used in partial meet contractions). We present some properties of both kinds of functions and their relations.

We slightly improve on characterization results already in the literature for base revision. We show that consistency-based partial meet revision operators can be axiomatized for any sentential logic S satisfying finitarity and monotonicity conditions (neither the deduction theorem nor supraclassicality are required to hold in S). A characterization of limiting cases of revision operators, full meet and maxichoice, is also offered. In the second part of the paper, as a particular case, we focus on the class of graded fuzzy logics and distinguish two types of bases, naturally arising in that context, exhibiting different behavior.

A recent direction within belief revision theory is to develop a theory of belief change for the Horn knowledge representation framework. We consider questions related to the complexity aspects of previous work, leading to questions about Horn envelopes (or Horn LUB's), introduced earlier in the context of knowledge compilation. A characterization is obtained of the remainders of a Horn belief set with respect to a consequence to be contracted, as the Horn envelopes of the belief set and an elementary conjunction corresponding to a truth assignment satisfying a certain body building formula. This gives an efficient algorithm to generate all remainders, each represented by a truth assignment. On the negative side, examples are given of Horn belief sets and consequences where Horn formulas representing the result of most contraction operators, based either on remainders or on weak remainders, must have exponential size.

The authors show that Booth et al.'s Horn contraction based on infra-remainder sets corresponds exactly to kernel contraction for belief sets. This result is obtained via a detour through Horn contraction for belief bases, which supports the conjecture that Horn belief change is best viewed as a “hybrid” version of belief set change and belief base change.

When modeling an ontology, one very often wants to add new information and keep the resulting ontology consistent. Belief Revision deals with the problem of consistently adding new formulas to a knowledge base. In this paper, we present some steps towards applying belief revision methods to ontologies based on description logics. We depart from the well known AGM-paradigm and show how it can be adapted in order to be applied to description logics.

Ontology management and maintenance are considered cornerstone issues in current Semantic Web applications in which semantic integration and ontological reasoning play a fundamental role. The ability to deal with inconsistency and to accommodate change is of utmost importance in realworld applications of ontological reasoning and management, wherein the need for expressing negated assertions also arises naturally. For this purpose, precise, formal definitions of the the different types of inconsistency and negation in ontologies are required. Unfortunately, ontology languages based on Description Logics (DLs) do not provide enough expressive power to represent axiom negations. Furthermore, there is no single, well-accepted notion of inconsistency and negation in the Semantic Web community, due to the lack of a common and solid foundational framework. In this paper, we propose a general framework accounting for inconsistency, negation and change in ontologies. Different levels of negation and inconsistency in DL-based ontologies are distinguished. We demonstrate how this framework can provide a foundation for reasoning with and management of dynamic ontologies.

Standard belief change assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic. However, there are good reasons for considering belief change in less expressive logics as well. In this paper we build on recent investigations by Delgrande on contraction for Horn logic. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. This result stands in contrast to Delgrande’s conjecture that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate form of contraction for Horn logic. We then define a more appropriate notion of basic contraction for the Horn case, influenced by the convexity property holding for full propositional logic and which we refer to as infra contraction. The main contribution of this work is a result which shows that the construction method for Horn contraction for belief sets based on our infra remainder sets corresponds exactly to Hansson’s classical kernel contraction for belief sets, when restricted to Horn logic. This result is obtained via a detour through contraction for belief bases. We prove that kernel contraction for belief bases produces precisely the same results as the belief base version of infra contraction. The use of belief bases to obtain this result provides evidence for the conjecture that Horn belief change is best viewed as a ‘hybrid’ version of belief set change and belief base change. One of the consequences of the link with base contraction is the provision of a representation result for Horn contraction for belief sets in which a version of the Core-retainment postulate features.