The context and the policy objective guiding the liberalisation of the electricity industry have changed significantly over recent decades. Policy priorities in favour of decarbonisation and maintaining security of supply have taken...
moreThe context and the policy objective guiding the liberalisation of the electricity industry have changed significantly over recent decades. Policy priorities in favour of decarbonisation and maintaining security of supply have taken centre stage on the policy agenda in many countries. The emergence of new decentralised and variable technologies and the change toward fixed cost technologies have profound implications for market dynamics. Yet the design of liberalised electricity markets has largely failed to evolve and be reconciled with these changes as well as with policy objectives. As a result the initial "energy market" model is being questioned and a number of reforms have been implemented around the world. The Chaire European Electricity Markets (CEEM) organised a conference at the Université Paris-Dauphine University in July 2015 in order to improve our understanding of the evolution required for electricity markets to satisfy the competing objectives of sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness, and to adapt to other changes including new technologies and change in the industry cost structure. For two days, leading scholars from Europe and the Americas discussed the issues raised by market failures and the short-comings of the initial "target model" market design. One of the key issues that emerged from the discussion is the question of the ability of market price signals to generate sufficient and adequate (i.e. in the optimal generation mix) investment, given the series of market and regulatory imperfections that prevail in current electricity markets, and the many types of policy interventions. Despite a great variety of points of view on specific issues, a consensus emerged that adding ad hoc "patches" to energy-only markets to address some market or regulatory failures and/or support some technologies is not a sustainable option. Reconciling public policy objectives and free price formation in electricity markets requires the theorisation and implementation of "hybrid market" regimes capable of reconciling public policy objectives and free price formation in a comprehensive and forward-looking fashion. The five articles in this special section all cover different aspects of these "hybrid market" regimes in order to respond to the issues raised by tensions between initial objectives of market liberalisation and the long-term policies goals of decarbonisation whilst maintaining security of supply. Since the liberalisation of the electricity industry in the 1990s in OECD countries, the underlying policy objectives have changed. The objective of the initial reforms was to improve the efficiency of the electricity industry which was then organised around public-or private vertically integrated monopolies. The rise of information technology and combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) enabled fragmentation of the value chain possible and the introduction of competition in retail and production activities. In the European Union, the liberalisation was also driven by the objective of creating an internal integrated market as the networks were sufficiently developed to facilitate competition between various producers on a large territorial scale. Investment was facilitated by the low capital-intensive profile of CCGT, and there was not much focus on security of supply as often most markets were in an overcapacity situation. In this context, the main focus of the initial reforms was on the efficient functioning of energy markets and the extension of retail competition in industrialized countries with mature demand. The experience in some developing countries with significant growth of demand and need for new investment in the early 2000s casted some doubts on the ability of energy markets to provide timely and efficient investment incentives. This led a number of Latin American countries, for instance, to reform the initial market designs and adopt capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM) and/or auctions for long term contracts to shift risks to consumers. Since the mid-2000s, new long term policy priorities have emerged in Europe and the US, as well as in other OECD countries: the decarbonisation of the electricity industry and security of supply. This has profound implications for the functioning and optimal design of electricity markets. Priority is given to investing in RES and low-carbon technologies and in peaking units and back-up technologies, whose share of CAPEX per MWh in the cost structure is high, casting a new light on the relationship between market design and the need to allocate risks efficiently in order to minimize financing costs. The use of long term arrangementsfeed in tariffs (FITs), fee-in-premium (FIPs), and contracts for difference (CfDs)to promote variable RES has enabled large-scale deployment of RES production with low variable cost. But as a result, the investment and coordination signals by market prices have been largely undermined, which raises a number of questions regarding the ability of the current market design to provide adequate operational and investment incentives. For this reason the market architectures of electricity markets must evolve and a number of countries have embarked on wide ranging reforms of their electricity markets. The energy, reserves and ancillary markets need to be improved to provide better scarcity signals in the short term, whilst mechanisms need to be introduced to facilitate risk transfers and provide long term signals to investors. Downstream, electricity demand must be made more priceresponsive to facilitate hourly adjustments and physical supply-demand equilibrium. On the grid side, price signals are needed which better indicate supply constraints in order to provide locational signals to new resources, and changes in the regulation of network tariffs are needed to facilitate their transformation into smart grids. In the conclusion of the workshop, the overarching question that remained was whether the different reforms point toward a common direction and reveal a structural mutation of the market regime of the power industry. Indeed we observe a great variety of reforms in response to regulatory