Early Modern Political Philosophy

China in Later Enlightenment Political Thought examines the ideas of China in the works of mid- to late-eighteenth century European Enlightenment political thinkers.

Like its predecessor volume, China in Early Enlightenment Political Thought, this book is distinctive in providing in-depth comparative analyses of works by seminal late Enlightenment thinkers that specifically link their views on China to their political concerns. It traces the shifts between metaphysical, naturalistic, economic, technological, cultural, idealist, and materialist accounts, and philosophical histories of Chinese politics, society, and culture. It argues that, unlike earlier thinkers, most of the later Enlightenment authors assessed in this book—including Christian Wolff, Voltaire, François Quesnay, Adam Smith, contributors to the Encylopédie, Abbé Raynal, Denis Diderot, and Johann Gottfried Herder—developed conceptions of history which increasingly depicted China as unprogressive and even stagnant. Even later Enlightenment enthusiasts of China such as Voltaire were deeply ambivalent about the lessons European societies could draw from China when viewed in relation to progressive visions of world history. The book also discusses the ways in which later Enlightenment theorists who were critical of aspects of European imperialism, especially Diderot and Herder, nevertheless regarded China as backwards and despotic and concludes with the influence of Enlightenment conceptions of China on the philosophies of G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx, as well as Mao Zedong’s reappropriation of post-Enlightenment philosophy of history.

This book will appeal to scholars and advanced students of Chinese history, Chinese philosophy, Chinese politics, and political philosophy more generally.

Carl Schmitt's well-known declaration that "all significant" modern political concepts are "secularized theological concepts" has sometimes been treated as hyperbole: a metaphorical axe aimed at the frozen sea of legal positivism, a provocation rather than a thesis. In this article, I demonstrate the fecundity of this thesis by applying it to secularism, a concept undeniably central to the Liberal state; crucially, however, I do so in the context of early modern South Asian history and ongoing debates over the secularism of premodern Mughal polity. As I argue, Jalāl ud-Dīn Akbar (1542-1605 CE)a monarch of the Mughal dynasty often cast by South Asian secularists as a precocious emblem of the neutral statewas, in fact, an ideal type of Schmittian sovereign, who nonetheless stands equidistant from both Schmitt and his Liberal opponents in his stance toward religious pluralism. The theological correlate to Akbar's "secularism" was an Islamicate theology of religions, which provided a contentful religious justification for religious pluralism, very different from contemporary "post-metaphysical" arguments. The final section of the article takes a critical turn, as I examine Akbar's legendary reputation in the present, my intervention into his "secular" mythos, and the special difficulties involved in applying Schmittian concepts to an early modern, non-Western sacred king.

An unpublished paper by André Robinet, which is dated February 5th, 2005 and focuses on Leibniz's theory of law and justice, is edited and introduced by some preliminary remarks and clarifications. An explanation is proposed concerning Robinet's claim according to which Leibniz's use of the French noun 'gubernation' justifies speaking of a cybernetic model in his political and law philosophy. His 1994 book on Leibniz's political thought, which is presupposed, has been consulted to clarify some aspects of Robinet's article, which is devoid of footnotes. Some of the main texts by Leibniz on the subject have been identified, which are underlying in Robinet's article.

Carl Schmitt's well-known declaration that "all significant" modern political concepts are "secularized theological concepts" has sometimes been treated as hyperbole: a metaphorical axe aimed at the frozen sea of legal positivism, a provocation rather than a thesis. In this article, I demonstrate the fecundity of this thesis by applying it to secularism, a concept undeniably central to the Liberal state; crucially, however, I do so in the context of early modern South Asian history and ongoing debates over the secularism of premodern Mughal polity. As I argue, Jalāl ud-Dīn Akbar (1542-1605 CE)a monarch of the Mughal dynasty often cast by South Asian secularists as a precocious emblem of the neutral state was, in fact, an ideal type of Schmittian sovereign, who nonetheless stands equidistant from both Schmitt and his Liberal opponents in his stance toward religious pluralism. The theological correlate to Akbar's "secularism" was an Islamicate theology of religions, which provided a contentful religious justification for religious pluralism, very different from contemporary "post-metaphysical" arguments. The final section of the article takes a critical turn, as I examine Akbar's legendary reputation in the present, my intervention into his "secular" mythos, and the special difficulties involved in applying Schmittian concepts to an early modern, non-Western sacred king.

An unpublished paper by André Robinet, which is dated February 5th, 2005 and focuses on Leibniz's theory of law and justice, is edited and introduced by some preliminary remarks and clarifications. An explanation is proposed concerning Robinet's claim according to which Leibniz's use of the French noun 'gubernation' justifies speaking of a cybernetic model in his political and law philosophy. His 1994 book on Leibniz's political thought, which is presupposed, has been consulted to clarify some aspects of Robinet's article, which is devoid of footnotes. Some of the main texts by Leibniz on the subject have been identified, which are underlying in Robinet's article.

Common possession of the earth was a prominent idea in seventeenth-century modern philosophy. In this paper I will argue that Kant not only provides a secularized version of common possession of the earth but also radically departs from the conception of his natural law theory predecessors. I argue that Kant's account of cosmopolitan right seeks to address the same problem as Grotius' right of necessity, namely the implausibility of assuming inflexible acquired rights when this would go against the rationale for introducing these rights. However, while Grotius intended to excuse violations of private property in cases of necessity, Kant restricts his discussion to the right of host peoples to reject entrants in their territory. I show that in Kant's account, to deny life-saving occupation of space to another being who is in principle just as entitled as anyone else to any place of the earth is to contradict the very justification for the territorial rights of states. This is because the permission to control territory and the right of the involuntary visitor to be admitted are based on the same legal foundation or Rechtsgrund, namely, the original community of the earth.

An unpublished paper by André Robinet, which is dated February 5th, 2005 and focuses on Leibniz's theory of law and justice, is edited and introduced by some preliminary remarks and clarifications. An explanation is proposed concerning Robinet's claim according to which Leibniz's use of the French noun 'gubernation' justifies speaking of a cybernetic model in his political and law philosophy. His 1994 book on Leibniz's political thought, which is presupposed, has been consulted to clarify some aspects of Robinet's article, which is devoid of footnotes. Some of the main texts by Leibniz on the subject have been identified, which are underlying in Robinet's article.

La carità non avrà mai fine. Le profezie scompariranno, il dono delle lingue cesserà e la conoscenza svanirà. Infatti, in modo imperfetto noi conosciamo e in modo imperfetto profetizziamo. Ma quando verrà ciò che è perfetto, quello che è imperfetto scomparirà. Quand"ero bambino, parlavo da bambino, pensavo da bambino, ragionavo da bambino.

In ‘The Internet: State of Nature or Artificial State? A Modern Reflection on Hobbes and Rousseau’, Eva Miléna van Reeven questions Internet governance from an early modern perspective, and highlights the importance of net neutrality in the global economy. Reflecting on Thomas Hobbes’ concept of the State of Nature, as introduced in his famous Leviathan, and on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the corruption of the state, van Reeven concludes that the Internet carries elements of both philosophies. Governance in the digital realm may not resemble any traditional form of governance from the physical realm, but the Internet is subject to governance nonetheless. The preservation of net neutrality is crucial, for net neutrality could very well be the only thing keeping the Internet from resembling a Hobbesian State of Nature.

What does it mean to speak of a “just society”? Does justice entail equality, or are some social inequalities both necessary and beneficial? Does social justice demand the redistribution of wealth? Is  justice the same thing as “fairness”? What are rights,
and how do we know that we have them? What is law, and how are laws justified? Is it right for the state to execute those who commit murder or other crimes? Can torture ever be justified? This course explores these and other issues, touching on current controversies and perennial questions.

Esej z 2009 roku, dotyczący polskiej debaty nad dziedzictwem politycznym I Rzeczypospolitej w kontekście idei republikanizmu, polityki historycznej/polityki pamięci i „neosarmatyzmu”. Podsumowuje najważniejsze wątki dyskusji z lat 2004 – 2008. Poruszane wtedy tematy i zajmowane stanowiska zachowały ważność także w kolejnych latach. Tekst niepublikowany.

An essay written in 2009, concerning the Polish intellectual debate on the political heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It touches topics like the idea of republicanism and its validity, policy towards the past, memory studies. The covered period extends roughly from 2004 to 2008, but the discussed ideas, opinions and standpoints remained important also in the next years. Unpublished.

In sharp contrast to prevailing divine right theories of national monarchies, the Spanish Thomists of the Counter-Reformation seem to have anticipated certain crucial limitations of absolutism, namely: the relation of private property rights to secular authorities, the existence of normative criteria governing intercultural encounters between culturally dissimilar others, as well as the establishment of an international society encompassing all national monarchies, irrespective of religious and cultural beliefs. The paper comments on the premisses of political sovereignty in Christian societies, which are at odds with Machiavelian reason of state, and argues that this ideal of Christian universalism, viewed as the process of making the common good subservient to the need for eternal salvation, was ultimately realized in the Roman Catholic Church as an overarching  soteriological institution.

Hobbes’s political philosophy starts from a number of premises that are supposed to be self-evident, supplemented by various observations from experience. These statements are examined critically and in their interrelatedness in order to find out to what extent Hobbes provides a convincing system of thought. The importance of the basis of man’s actions, his self-interest, is inquired, since it serves as the basis of his practical philosophy. After this, Hobbes’s views on ‘moral’ notions are expounded. As it turns out, Hobbes maintains a number of concepts that have such a connotation, but interprets these in a specific way. The article is concluded with a modest systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s main thoughts in practical philosophy.