EU Competition Law

In this thesis, I have examined whether the current approach to competition policy is suitable for the distinct characteristics of the digital economy. It is particularly difficult to define the relevant market and rely on market share test as a proxy for market power in the digital economy mainly because of its dynamic nature. As the market boundaries shift so rapidly in dynamic markets, having a static perspective when defining the relevant market might fall short when assessing competitive constraints that an undertaking may face in the near future. In this regard, this thesis calls for a change in the traditional assessment of market power, and it proposes to replace the relevant market/market share paradigm with a more economic effects-based method, such as estimating the elasticity of residual demand. By doing so, competition authorities can assess competitive constraints from a broader perspective without necessarily being limited to a particular relevant market or any formalistic structure.

In order to identify the most suitable way to assess market power in the digital economy, this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II explains what digital economy is, how it emerged, and what makes it different from the rest of the economy by identifying its distinguishing characteristics. After providing an overview of the digital economy, Chapter III gives more theoretical insight to the concept of market power. First, it explains the importance of market power within the social market economy. In the second part, it introduces various definitions of market power as provided by different institutions and scholars, describing the defining characteristics of these definitions afterwards. Having explained the concept of market power, Chapter IV focuses on how market power is assessed. By doing so, it explains not only the traditional indirect assessment of market power, but also the direct assessment of the latter. After clarifying what the digital economy is, as well as the concept of market power and how it is assessed, Chapter V evaluates the suitability of current understanding of market power in the digital economy. Then it explains what the challenges of assessing market power in the digital economy are when applying conventional techniques. In the light of these findings, it finally suggests a blueprint of how to assess market power in the digital economy. Lastly, Chapter VI provides the summary of findings and the final conclusion.

The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, an empirical literature aimed at measuring in objective terms the effect of competition policy on economic growth is emerging, starting from narrow variables of interest, such as Gross Domestic Product and Total Factor Productivity. As a result, the principal aim of the current work is to contribute to this branch of research, focusing on broader indicators of market performance, in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, thus an effective utility, on the level of competition of a country. | Samà, Danilo (2013), The effectiveness of competition policy: an econometric assessment in developed and developing countries, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-50.

Better understanding of how public works are procured through policy, regulation and upon acquisition is increasingly important. This knowledge can shape how architects can effectively impact wider architectural culture through improving quality, social values and advice to clients, while more successfully obtaining such commissions. In the UK the application of these regulations, which cascades multiple impacts from RIBA Stage 0 through subsequent work stages and extends into the private sector, is in urgent need of reform. Architects need to improve their knowledge of procurement to ensure a more sustainable built environment is achievable and also need to engage in advising clients and industry better to effect the necessary changes in procurement, to deliver more appropriate, simpler, robust, accessible and innovative procurement. Reform has been long overdue but is now an absolute necessity.

Im April 2019 ist das Gesetz zum Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen („GeschGehG“) in Deutschland in Kraft getreten und hat die bisherigen Regelungen hierzu im Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb („UWG“) abgelöst. Was Geschäftsgeheimnisse eigentlich sind und warum man sie besonders schützen muss, soll hier kurz zusammengefasst werden. Dieser Beitrag ist am 31.8.2019 in Fuldaer Zeitung (Hessen, Deutschland) erschienen.

A recent fall in the labour share of income in some countries has stirred a debate
on monopsony and the market power of employers to reduce workers’ wages or
working conditions below competitive levels. The debate focused attention on the
role that competition agencies may have to help ensure efficient labour input
purchasing markets.
This paper sets out the economic drivers and effects of employer monopsony power
in labour markets. It analyses when the creation or exercise of monopsony power by
employers may infringe competition law and identifies the cases where competition
enforcement can effectively address monopsony power in such markets.
It also looks at how monopsony power is exercised in digital markets, examining
how the intermediation power of some big platforms may negatively affect wages
and working conditions of self-employed platform workers.
Whilst competition law enforcement has been so far limited, competition
authorities may have an increased role to play in labour input markets, particularly
in addressing anticompetitive agreements that artificially creates monopsony
power, abuses of monopsony power and merger transactions leading to increased
monopsony power.
Finally, the paper looks at some practical and analytical challenges to the
application of the traditional tools of competition enforcement analysis in these
markets. It then discusses ways to overcome such challenges and proposed
adjustments to these tools suggested in the recent literature, as well as competition
advocacy solutions to address monopsony power in these markets.

The Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 has recently come into force. The Commission Notifications related to merger control was published in the Royal Gazette on 28 December 2018. The author wrote this article to communicate with the readers who are interested in merger control under this Act. The Article is divided into two parts. Part one is about the mergers which may result in a substantial lessening of competition under Section 51 paragraph one. Part two is about the mergers which may result in a monopoly or a dominant business operator under Section 51 paragraph two. In part one, the author compares the said provisions with the International Competition Network Recommended Practices, Singapore and Taiwan merger control. The study shows that the merger under Section 51 paragraph one is not compatible with the ICN, Singapore, and Taiwan, especially the definition of 'a substantial lessen of competition.' This issue affects the Commission's capability to regulate business operations to maintain free and fair competition.

I diritti di traduzione, riproduzione e adattamento totale o parziale e con qualsiasi mezzo (compresi i microfilm e le copie fotostatiche) sono riservati per tutti i Paesi. Fotocopie per uso personale del lettore possono essere effettuate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/fascicolo di periodico dietro pagamento alla siae del compenso previsto dall'art.

A Google tem sido investigada em diversos países por práticas anticoncorrenciais. Entretanto, não é comum que a mesma seja punida nesses processos. As recentes condenações da Google na União Europeia chamam, portanto, atenção. O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a aplicação do Direito da Concorrência da União Europeia nos casos envolvendo a Google. Para tanto, foi realizada pesquisa bibliográfica, na literatura jurídica e econômica, com a finalidade de compreender seu modelo de negócio e como esses julgados se inserem no movimento de modernização do Direito da União Europeia. Além disso, foi realizada pesquisa documental na jurisprudência europeia, com intuito de elucidar os argumentos empregados pelas autoridades europeias na condenação da Google em três casos distintos, a saber, Google Shopping, Google-Android e Google Adsense. Foi possível constatar que o modelo europeu oferece contribuições originais para se pensar em uma função reguladora da inovação pela aplicação do Direito da Concorrência.

Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of this century. Due to the urgency of the issue and the
pressure on governments to act, the debate on climate change is moving quickly from the political level to
focused conversations on policy choices and implementation options.
This background paper discusses the role of competition policy and enforcement in supporting and
incentivising sustainable and pro-competitive business practices. It analyses the practical approaches that
competition authorities may take when assessing cases with an environmental dimension.
Looking at past experiences in cartels, co-operation agreements, abuses of dominance and merger
control, the paper explores the question of how competition authorities can integrate economic and noneconomic environmental effects into the competitive assessment from the legal and economic perspective.
It also identifies the challenges posed by the current legal and economic frameworks, highlighting best practices to overcome them.

The facilitators or informers have become important subjects in the field of Competition Law. However, just as they have served to fight against the cartels, they have also been used by the latter to facilitate and cover up their organization and activities.
In the present article, the author seeks to explain and analyze the first cases resolved by the national competition authority in which said facilitators have been immersed. Likewise, an analysis of the jurisprudence on the subject is made in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. Finally, the national legislation and jurisprudence on the subject is analyzed in the light of comparative law.

Los facilitadores o delatores se han convertido en importantes sujetos en el campo del Derecho de la Competencia. Sin embargo, así como han servido para la lucha en contra de los cárteles también se han usado por parte de estos para facilitar y encubrir su organización y actividades.
En el presente artículo, el autor busca explicar y analizar los primeros casos resueltos por la autoridad de competencia nacional en los cuales dichos facilitadores se han visto inmersos. De igual manera, se realiza un análisis de la jurisprudencia sobre el tema en Estados Unidos, Reino Unido y la Unión Europea. Finalmente, se analiza la legislación y jurisprudencia nacional acerca del tema a la luz del derecho comparado.

Last year, the sixth International Conference on Competitions, a Scandinavian initiative by origin, took place in Leeds (UK). This edition sought to offer insight into current interdisciplinary research on the topic of architecture competitions. In this context the organizers hoped to raise awareness and pinpoint current social, political, and technological issues intertwined with the urban condition. These issues are topical around the world and call for new solutions in which younger generations are engaged. The question, increasingly, is how social challenges can be translated into physical terms. The central concern is how the city, as opposed to buildings, is used. The themes concern sustainability, energy, climate resilience, water safety, mobility, population decline and growth, vacancy levels, and redevelopment. In addition, issues relating to health, food, ageing population, and refugee accommodation, as well as terrorism, need to be addressed. The (built) consequences are the result of a well-considered process with clear management and realistic financial support and, in the most favourable case, based on an ambitious concept produced by interdisciplinary teams. Competitions, or more specific design contests, could offer new solutions. Competition Culture in Europe: Albania Main portal: www.competitions.planifikimi.gov.al Case studies: 1/ Vlora Waterfront: www.vlorawaterfrontcompetition.al 2/ Durana: www.competitions.planifikimi.gov.al 3/ Tirana Cultural Quartet: www.competitions.planifikimi.gov.al

This LLM dissertation provides an analysis of how EU competence to regulate sport post-Bosman has been significantly developed through a 'spill-over' of EU competition competence. In doing so, the core focus of the ensuing discourse is dedicated to analysing EU competition law's application to the sports pay-TV broadcasting market and the granting of State aid for the construction and renovation of sports infrastructure.

Using objective measures of investor protections in 170 countries, I establish that the level of investor protection matters for cross-country differences in GDP growth: countries with stronger protections tend to grow faster than those with poor investor protections.

The topic of this dissertation is the analysis of buyer power and its treatment in EU competition law. The aim of the study and its main research question are connected to identifying, synthesizing, discussing, and evaluating the buyer power regulation in EU competition law. To do so, my research seeks to clarify what buyer power is, how it is legally treated, and whether there is a consistent and coherent buyer power competition policy and legal regulation in EU competition law.

Buyer power represents the other side of competition law, focusing on buying conducts and how a buyer can exert its market power to the detriment of competition. Buyer power is an umbrella concept that groups different forms of buying and bargaining over purchasing prices: monopsony and bargaining power (sensu stricto). I define buyer power as the market power possessed by a buyer (or a coordinated group of buyers) that allows said undertaking to reduce the purchasing prices it pays for an input in a profitable manner below the supplier’s standard selling price. This price reduction can be obtained by either withholding purchases – monopsony – or through bilateral negotiations and pure competitive bargaining to reduce the supplier’s prices and obtain better contractual conditions. In both cases, the buyer captures a higher share of surplus when negotiating with the supplier that would have been retained by this, absent buyer power. These better terms and conditions can be the result of efficient outcomes, as occurs with bargaining power.

The strict relation between broadband development and economic growth and its central importance in modern economies is nowadays a demonstrated fact. Cheap and ubiquitous high-speed internet access promises to accelerate economic growth, to create new jobs and industries, to advance education and lifelong learning, to improve health care decision making, and to raise living standards; conversely, foregone broadband access imposes high economic and social costs.
In the global competition context, the U.S. and Europe have used different methods to reach the level of broadband efficiency and diffusion already existing in the Asian countries. In fact, while on one hand the US followed a deregulatory approach directed to improve infrastructure-based competition, this even with the support of private investments, on the other hand, the European Sate aid regulation tried to channel public resources with the aim to ensure service-based competition and – consequently – to improve consumers’ welfare.
In this picture, the article will analyse the European State aid policy in the broadband field – specified in the Guidelines published in 2014 – and the U.S. recent policy trends for the diffusion and implementation of broadband. As result of the compared analysis, a slow convergence of the two policies will appear, even confirmed by the Federal Communication Commission approach, now recognizing the importance of effective broadband affordability and showing, at the same time, the intention to improve service-based competition through supporting programs and a new central role for local municipalities. Given the above, according to the author’s view, the European experience in State aid policy would now provide useful e analytical tools to the American policymakers, actually engaged with the attempt to lower prices and to improve service-based competition in the American broadband market.

In its judgment delivered on 12 June 2014, the General Court dismissed in its entirety the appeal brought by Intel against a Commission decision whereby Intel was found to have abused its dominant position by means of exclusivity rebates and direct payments to its customers. In this judgment, the General Court took a clear negative stance against the Commission’s “new” method of analysing rebates in its Guidance Paper and instead reaffirmed the established case law on rebates since the Hoffmann La Roche judgment of 1979. Apart from merely being a yet-another judgment on rebates, the Intel judgment has important implications for the future of the modernisation of Article 102 TFEU, as well as for the enforcement of the Guidelines on the Assessment of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings in Turkey. This article is divided into five parts: It summarises the established case law on rebates in EU competition law in Part 1, discusses the Commission’s “new” method of analysing rebates in its Guidance Paper in Part 2, critically analyses the Intel judgment of the General Court and in particular whether the judgment offers any guidance to dominant undertakings when designing their rebate schemes in Part 3, examines the effects of the judgment on the modernisation of Article 102 TFEU in Part 4 and finally gives reflections on the implications of the judgment for Turkish competition law in Part 5.

The European Commission has been exercising and documenting its actions in favour of competition and the construction of the internal market for more than forty years. The control of state aid has become a key element within these policies to ensure fair competition. Member states sometimes use public resources to promote or protect certain economic activities. Despite state aid being prohibited by the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, there are certain exceptions that are justified by objectives of common interest

The GDPR is the Magna Carta of data protection, the importance of which cannot be overstated. Yet, as this article shows, the price of data protection through the GDPR is much higher than previously recognized. The GDPR creates two main harmful effects on competition and innovation: it limits competition in data markets, creating more concentrated market structures and entrenching the market power of those who are already strong; and it limits data sharing between different data collectors, thereby preventing the realization of some data synergies which may lead to better data-based knowledge.

To illustrate its claims, the article analyzes the competitive dynamics created by the GDPR, focusing on how it affects the options available to firms for amassing the data necessary for their operations, and their resultant ability to realize economies of scale and scope in data analysis. It identifies seven main parallel and cumulative market dynamics that may limit data collection and data sharing, only some of which have been recognized so far. As shown, under some market conditions the GDPR has unintended and so far unrecognized effects on competition, efficiency, innovation, and the resultant welfare.

The dynamics identified in this article offer partial explanations for some of the troubling empirical evidence regarding investment in EU data-driven markets following the adoption of the GDPR. Furthermore, the analysis enables us to identify which effects are short-term and which are here to stay.

The effects on competition and innovation identified may justify a reevaluation of the balance reached to ensure that overall welfare is increased. The article suggests some means of reducing harmful competitive effects, while still protecting the vital goal of privacy, including reaching a better balance between data protection and competition law, reducing uncertainty in the GDPR, creating certification mechanisms for GDPR compliance, and structuring of mandatory data-sharing obligations under other laws in a way which is sensitive to the dynamics of data markets.

This reflection paper focuses on European competition law by a technological perspective. Tech companies have started to increase their impact in European market. However their businesses are not compatible with traditional market definition.
On the other hand, possession of personal data by these tech companies brought a new dimension to competition law. Relation between data protection and competition law had just started, but will cause much ink to flow.
In its decision of 6 February 2019, the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) prohibited Facebook Inc.’s data processing policy, which imposes on its users for collecting and combining their data. Even though this decision is in consequence of the violation of the German Competition Act (GWB), it’s a case that melted technology and law at the same pot.

Search engines are crucial for locating and accessing the vast amount of digital content. Hence they are subject to close scrutiny by the media, governments and scholars. On November 30, 2010, the European Commission opened an antitrust investigation into allegations that Google Inc. has abused a dominant position in online search in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 102 TFEU). The investigation sparked an ongoing debate in relation to the potential for anticompetitive conduct by search engines, in particular the potential for abuse of dominance. Through an analysis of the history and development of the search industry, search engine business models and the characteristics of the online search market, this paper investigates whether the characteristics of the free internet search and search advertising market may encourage anti competitive behaviour. Furthermore, the Article briefly analyses whether the European competition framework, in particular Article 102 TFEU, is well equipped to deal with challenges in relation to search.

Seit es wissenschaftlich nachgewiesen ist, dass Rauchen die Gesundheit schädigt, haben Regierungen versucht, Gesetze zu verabschieden, um das Rauchen einzu- dämmen. So wurde mit der Begründung, dass die Gesundheit der Bevölkerung geschützt werden müsse, eine Reihe von Nichtraucherschutzgesetzen in der ganzen EU eingeführt. Die Tabakhersteller tun jedoch alles, um sich dieser Gesetzgebung zu entziehen und nutzen dabei juristisch alle Mittel, indem sie weder vor Verfassungs- beschwerden noch vor Investitionsschutzklagen zurückschrecken. Der neueste von der WHO propagierte Trend gegen das Rauchen lautet Einheitsverpackung (Plain Packaging), welcher jegliche Marken verbietet und ein standardisiertes Aussehen vorschreibt. Der nachfolgende Beitrag widmet sich der Vereinbarkeit von solchen Einheitsverpackungen mit dem europäischen Primärrecht.

In dit Nederlandse proefschrift luidt de centrale vraag: wat zijn de juridische gevolgen van het mededingingsrecht en het vrije verkeer van diensten in geval van marktwerking voor instellingen belast met belangen op het gebied van sociale zekerheid. Het antwoord op deze vraag is niet alleen relevant voor de betrokken instellingen, het bepaalt ook in hoeverre de overheid de markten voor deze instellingen kan reguleren. Het onderzoek richt zich specifiek op zorg- en pensioenbelangen die worden behartigd door ziekenfondsen en bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen. Het boek presenteert op overzichtelijke wijze en in heldere bewoordingen het antwoord. Ook bevat het aanbevelingen voor de Nederlandse wetgevings- en beleidspraktijk.

The principal objective of this paper is to raise cluster managers’ awareness about antitrust laws and enforcement. The paper points to the clash between concept of clusters and cluster policies with the antitrust laws and competition policies. The authors discuss various forms of cooperation and explain why they may get clusters into trouble with antitrust enforcement authorities. A short summary of best practices for avoiding any antitrust issues is provided. Examples from EU antitrust enforcement history are used to convince the reader of the seriousness of the matter in contrast with the relative inattention it receives among the cluster community.

The contribution explores the role of CJEU case law in relation to the Ankara Agreement and, more broadly, the right of Turkish citizens to free movement of workers. Network analysis is used to group, isolate, and rank CJEU decisions in the field. The examination shows how network analysis can be used to approach and better understand the case law of the CJEU in an empirical manner. The contribution also provides substantive insight to the law in the particular field in question and its relationship to other fields.

EU law is relevant to CAS arbitration insofar as it sets forth mandatory rules of law (“lois de police”, “lois d’application immédiate”), i.e. rules of a public law nature which are enacted to protect public policy interests and need to be respected and applied irrespective of the law applicable to the case. EU mandatory rules relevant to sports are notably internal market rules (free movement of workers, right of establishment and freedom to provide services) as well as competition law prohibitions against anticompetitive agreements and abuses of a dominant position. The most challenging and controversial issues arise from the
application of EU competition law to sports matters, particularly within the context of arbitration at the Court of Arbitration for Sports.

Analiza przedstawia ekonimczne podstawy przepisów o pomocy publicznejw  UE i Polsce. W toku wywodu omówione zostały podstawy prawne systemu pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej i w Polsce oraz przedstawiona definicja pojęcia „pomocy publicznej”. Następnie ukazane zostały rodzaje pomocy publicznej stanowiące wyjątki od generalnego zakazu udzielania pomocy publicznej. Po zidentyfikowaniu tych wyjątków możliwe stało się wskazanie podstaw ekonomicznych prawa pomocy publicznej. W możliwie szerokim zakresie zostało uwzględnione orzecznictwo Komisji, ukazujące praktyczny wymiar omawianych zagadnień. Należy zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że w pracy nie odróżnia się, zasadniczo, europejskiego i krajowego prawa pomocy publicznej, wychodząc z założenia, że po 1 maja 2004 roku podział taki stracił wcześniejsze znaczenie, przynajmniej jeżeli chodzi o źródła prawa oraz podstawowe konstrukcje i rozwiązania.  Należy podkreślić, że ramy artykułu uniemożliwiają wyczerpanie tematu i szczegółowe omówienie wszystkich kwestii związanych ze wskazanym wyżej  przedmiotem wykładu, stąd wiele problemów zostałojedynie zasygnalizowanych.

For the first time, the European Commission's Horizontal Guidelines of 2011 contain a section exclusively dedicated to the competition law analysis of 'pure' information exchanges, i.e., information exchanges that do not underpin any other anti-competitive behaviour. By way of a counterfactual analysis, this article aims at clarifying whether the Guidelines merely codify the Court of Justice's quite controversial case law in this area, or whether and to what extent they introduce a more refined - and economics-based - approach to the assessment of information sharing. For this purpose, the Guidelines' framework of analysis is set out before applying it to four leading cases on information sharing: John Deere, Asnef-Equifax, T-Mobile Netherlands, and most recently , Dole.

It will be seen that the Guidelines try to strike a balance between 'just enough economics' and 'just enough legal certainty'. They limit the finding of a restriction of competition by object to a very narrow set of cases and want to provide companies in the internal market with incentives to share those kinds of information that will indeed enhance efficiencies and ultimately benefit consumers.

Almost fifteen years after its adoption, the system of decentralized enforcement laid down in Regulation 1/2003 has shaped competition law in a way that could hardly be predicted, in terms of both magnitude and quality of the activities of National Competition Authorities. More recently, the so-called ‘ECN+ Directive’ was adopted to address the shortcoming of such system, namely a perceived lack of independence and accountability of several NCAs and a certain degree of divergence within the European Competition Network. In this scenario, the Italian Competition Authority has frequently been depicted as a well-equipped, independent and effective enforcer and – with a few notable exceptions – the international debate concerning such reform has mostly overlooked its possible impact within the Italian legal system. This paper aims to assess whether, and to what an extent, the ECN+ Directive should affect the enforcement of competition law in Italy and, in particular, those fundamental guarantees of independence and effectiveness that form the core of the rule of law in the field of EU competition law.

Minority share acquisitions between competitors have been mistakenly considered of concern only in case they result in a change of control. First the economic theory, closely followed by courts and doctrine, explained and demonstrated that even the acquisition of non-controlling shareholdings may distort competition and requires a close scrutiny by competition authorities. This article analyzes the impact of minority shareholdings on the incentives of rival firms and ascertains whether the authorities are provided with adequate tools to investigate and address the potential anti-competitive effects. The results of the economic theory are the starting point to assess whether the legal treatment of minority shareholdings under the EU and US antitrust systems is appropriate and adequate.

This paper was co-authored with Niamh Cassidy and Mariska Neefjes. This short paper discusses the issue relating to decisive influence within European Union competition law and it's supposedly rebuttable nature in relation to parent and subsidiary companies.

We hypothesised that due to the nature of the parent and subsidiary company relationships and the demands of EU law in relation to decisive influence, it is practically impossible to rebut. We highlighted this inherent problem and discussed some possible reforms to eradicate this problem.

One of the challenges before competition law today is to develop criteria for market definition in platform markets. This is because the old tests for market definition do not neatly apply to platform markets, given that these markets have certain peculiarities. For instance, should platform markets be defined as one or separate markets on each side of the platform? As platforms are of different types, it is difficult to develop rules that can account for the diversity of various platforms. Platforms markets are also dynamic and our understanding of them is evolving. For this reason, with a few exceptions, competition authorities have been hesitant to lay down rules on how platform markets should be defined-to the point that market definition has been left open in many cases. However, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which is an active antitrust enforcer, has defined platform markets or given its opinion on market definition of platforms in a number of cases. However, there is limited literature on the CCI's market definition practices. This presents an interesting opportunity to examine the extent to which Indian competition law is ready for the challenges presented by digital markets and to analyse the CCI's decisional practice with specific focus on market definition. The paper first provides a framework within which such an analysis can be conducted by highlighting the key issues identified in academic scholarship for defining platform markets. It then applies this understanding to the analysis of recent CCI orders. The study finds that the CCI has not changed the way it defines markets to account for the particularities of multi-sided platforms. The CCI's approach has failed to consider the interdependencies operating on both sides of a platform which has led the CCI to make errors in assessing the competitive constraints operating on market participants, to make its subsequent analysis of dominance and abuse ambiguous and ultimately to make the process of market definition redundant. At the same time, CCI's recent telecom market study report presents some hope that its approach is evolving with the times.

Le projet de développer une régulation international de la concurrence est ancien et protéiforme car il s'est manifesté tant l'enceinte du GATT / OMC, que de la CEE / UE, de l'ONU ou de la CNUCED. Au carrefour de l'histoire économique et de l'histoire globale, cet article reconstitue une ambition ancienne, portée par des individus aux motivations variées, des pays du Sud réclamant un contrôle des entreprises du Nord, aux néolibéraux souhaitant promouvoir la mondialisation libérale. En particulier, un certain nombre d’acteurs européens, en particulier des juristes inspirés par l’expérience allemande, ont tenté de faciliter la mise en place d’une régulation mondiale de la concurrence, fondée en partie sur l’expérience européenne, dans les années 1990, sans succès.