Coherence theories of truth

This article introduces a novel solution to relativity’s time dilation dilemma using Coherence Gradients, derived from Jovan’s Theorem of Multidimensional Coherence™. It explores how time and distance can be restructured across divergent temporal frames to enable faster-than-light traversal without violating causality. Featuring a detailed astronaut scenario and a theoretical foundation, this article proposes an alternative framework for deep space exploration.

A fellow interlocutor here, for whom I have great respect, recently stated that, while recognizing the importance of the pragmatist tradition in philosophy, he thinks the pragmatist theory of truth (most famously espoused by William James (one of the three early trail blazers in American pragmatism as a school of philosophical thought) something of a conceptual muddle. I take it, from his comments, that he stands with those who favor a more straightforward explanation of truth, though I am not quite clear why . . .

Теоретические-философские модели истины
Резюме
Проблема истины занимает одно из главных и важных мест в теории познания. Этот статус, присвоенный истине, не случаен, он вытекает из той роли, которую она играет в познавательном процессе, и ее теоретико-эмпирического значения. В этом смысле в статье анализируются различные теоретические модели истины (классическая, когерентная и прагматическая). Также в статье отражены определения истины каждой из упомянутых в статье теорией, а также их недостатки и проблемы, с которыми они сталкиваются.
Ключевые слова: истина, классическая теория, теория соответствия, когерентная теория, прагматическая теория, релевантность, полезность, ценность, знание
Theoretical-philosophical models of truth
The problem of truth occupies one of the main and important places in the theory of knowledge. This status assigned to truth is not accidental, it follows from the role it plays in the cognitive process and its theoretical-empirical significance. In this sense, the article analyzes various theoretical models of truth (classical, coherent and pragmatic). The article also reflects the definitions of the truth of each of the theories mentioned in the article, as well as their shortcomings and the problems they face.
Keywords: truth, classical theory, correspondence theory, coherent theory, pragmatic theory, relevance, utility, value, knowledge
Xülasə
İdrak nəzəriyyəsində həqiqət problemi başlıca və mühüm yerlərdən birini tutur. Həqiqətə verilən bu status təsadüfi olmayıb, onun idrak prosesində oynadığı roldan, nəzəri-empirik əhəmiyyətindən irəli gəlir. Bu mənada məqalədə həqiqətin müxtəlif nəzəri modelləri (klassik, koqerent və praqmatik) təhlil olunmuşdur. Həmçinin məqalədə adı çəkilən nəzəriyyələrin hər birinin həqiqətə verdiyi təriflər, həmçinin çatışmazlıqları və qarşılaşdıqları problemlər öz əksini tapmışdır.
Açar sözlər: həqiqət, klasik nəzəriyyə, korrespondent nəzəriyyə, koqerent nəzəriyyə, praqmatik nəzəriyyə, uyğunluq, fayda, dəyər, bilik

In this paper, I discuss the currently most popular argument for alethic pluralism, maintaining that the so-called scope problem provides no compelling reason for abandoning the traditional view that truth is one and the same (substantive) property across the various regions of thought or discourse in which it is ascribed or denied to the things we think or say. I disarm the argument by showing that the scope problem does not arise for a number of non-deflationary, monistic views of truth that meet certain semantic and metaphysical constraints, for one can accept any of these views and provide a plausible account of the fact that mental and linguistic tokenings belonging to different regions of discourse involve radically different ways of engaging with reality ? from detecting pre-existing facts to constituting them.

Voz universal, sensus communis e a universalidade da experiência estética na Crítica da faculdade de julgar Carolina Miranda Sena Sobre a alma e o corpo: proximidades nos pensamentos de Tomás de Aquino e Henri Bergson Edson Gonçalves da Silva O espanto contra o choque: experiência no horizonte Elias Francisco Fontele Dourado Liberdade e Alteridade na fenomenologia existencial de Frantz Fanon e Simone de Beauvoir Eloísa Benvenutti de Andrade De punição à penitencia: alguns aspectos da eticidade do trabalho no pensamento de Locke Flavio Gabriel Capinzaiki Ottonicar O debate acerca da conciliabilidade entre a mente estendida e o enativismo Gabriel Moreira Francisco A perfeição das espécies na hierarquia das substâncias separadas: Tomás de Aquino, ST I q. 55 art. 3 Gabriel Pedreira de Freitas Catapano A Doutrina da Essência na lógica de Hegel Gabriel Rodrigues da Silva As origens da vontade de verdade em Foucault Gláucia Silva do Nascimento A correspondência entre a relação eu-outro das Meditações Cartesianas e a relação mundo-natal-mundo-estrangeiro dos manuscritos de 1929-1933 Israel Rossi Milhomem Heidegger e a compreensão ontológica da linguagem Lucas Rafael Justino de Morais Wittgenstein e Strawson: análise terapêutica e análise gramatical Lyon Alves O tempo da consciência na filosofia bergsoniana: reflexões sobre a memória, o fluxo da vida interior e o ato de criação no pensar literário Maria Ester Martins Silva Como narrar as ações memoráveis de Sócrates? Um exame dos Banquetes socráticos à luz da censura platônica à poesia Mateus Lima dos Santos A Recepção Controversa de Amy Allen e Robin Celikates da Releitura Habermasiana da Psicanálise de Freud Paula Mariana Rech O papel da crítica da linguagem de Fritz Mauthner nas duas fases do pensamento Wittgensteiniano Paulo César Oliveira Vasconcelos Gregório Gruber e Constantin Guys: pintores da vida moderna Rafael do Valle Entre La Dissémination e La parole muette: um diálogo entre Jacques Derrida e Jacques Rancière ao redor do Fedro, de Platão Renan Ferreira da Silva Algumas observações sobre Bergson e Winnicott Yago Antonio de Oliveira Morais

In this paper, we attempt to answer this fundamental question that whether is any criterion of truth in Kant's transcendental philosophy or not? Through analysis of "transcendental deduction", and referring to Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the background of that term, and Robert Paul Wolff's formation of that, we try to illustrate the significance of this part of the first critique for establishing a wellformed and compatible theory of truth in Kant's philosophy. We claim since Kant believes that knowledge contains judgment and predication, in a word, a process of "synthesis", his theory of truth is a kind of "coherence theory of truth", although Kant himself, in a famous passage of critique, says the definition of truth is correspondence and also we concede that his coherence theory is a peculiar one. Eventually, in favor of Robert Hanna's reading of Kant's theory of meaning, we conclude that this theory involves a kind of scepticism, which we call "epistemological scepticism".

This paper is dedicated to the Hierarchy that strives in the ineffable name of Evolutionary Cosmic Harmony PREFACE Every atom that draws, by its motion, toward the chain of the Cosmic Magnet restores rhythm in the Cosmos. Each atom, in its motion, evokes a chain of other motions. The process of rhythm in Cosmos is seen as a rational shifting. The reconstruction of the world is not dependent upon human creativeness, but humanity is not excluded from the expanding spatial power. The bond linking man and Cosmos is inseverable. That which exits is expressed in forms predestined by the Cosmic Magnet, but man is also an expression of [EM existence]. Therefore, humanity is either a coherent force moving [rhythmically] with the Magnet or an incoherent obstructive force. (Infinity, 136) The acquirement of the cooperation of Cosmic forces [with coherent entrainment of bandwidths] brings us closer to the source of [First Cause] atomic energy. Our science can reach the tension of this energy if only the explosion of consciousness will occur.

1.  Einleitung  ………………………………..............……………….1
2.  Wahrheitsträger ………………………………............……… 1
3. Klassische Korrespondenztheorie ...................... 2
4.  Kohärenztheorie der Wahrheit ………………………….. 2
5.  Pragmatistische Theorien der Wahrheit …..……… 3
6.  Epistemische Theorien der Wahrheit  ……………..…3
7.  Formale Ansätze zur Wahrheit ………………………….. 4
8.  Deflationistische und minimalistische Theorien .5
9.  Entwicklungen in der Korrespondenztheorie ……. 6

Truth has been a central subject in religious, philosophical, political, and popular discussion ever since civilized societies first emerged. Many individuals, organisations, and societies have claimed to have discovered the truth about existence, and many more have professed their truthfulness. And certain key institutions, such as religious organisations, universities, the justice system, and the media, claim to be based on truth. Most of these claims are more than a little exaggerated. As Shakespeare's Hamlet might have said about truth: "it is a custom more honour'd in the breach than the observance". The truth is that truth is not central to the dynamics of human society. People prefer fantasy to truth, because truth undermines the desire to survive and prosper and, hence, endangers both the individual and the underlying life-system that I call the strategic logos. Two key aspects of truth are explored in this paper: seeking the truth about life; and telling the truth about motivations, actions, events, and situations. It is shown that these two aspects of truth are interrelated and have the same origins or causes. Where does the truth lie? There are two dimensions to this question, namely: Where is the truth distorted? And where does truth reside? Truth is distorted by the myth-makers, who are the perpetrators of the Great Lie-that relentless ideological attack on life and human society by the metaphysical interventionists. In contrast, the verifiable truth resides with the reality-seekers, who are life-affirming proponents. A wider context for this paper is provided by my recent book Ultimate Reality (Snooks 2015). ADDENDUM: The most egregious contemporary example of the violation of the truth (explained by this paper) is the global reaction to, and reporting of, the 2023/24 war between Israel and Hamas.

A coherence theory of truth states that a proposition is true by virtue of its coherence with a seamless web of propositions. The objective of this paper is to explain the thesis that coherence theories in science and law are prone to manipulation for various agenda. The first part shall discuss three assumptions shared by coherence theories in science: the importance of testing for the compatibility of propositions, their depiction of knowledge as mind and conceptdependent, and the view that the unit of validation in any scientific experiment is never a single hypothesis, but an entire theory. The second shall introduce Ronald Dworkin's theory of adjudication known as Law as Integrity, which states that the law, in being comprised of black-letter rules and the moral principles that figure into their soundest justifications, can be made to "speak with one voice". It shall then be argued that the model of adjudication that is derived from it undermines the objectivity of judges in deciding cases. The final part shall apply the objections to Dworkin's theory to coherence theories in science by demonstrating how they are susceptible to similar forms of manipulation: that scientists may distort the interpretation of scientific evidence, select arbitrary standards of validity, conceal anomalies, and invent rescue hypotheses when their theories fail. The paper concludes by relating these insights to controversies surrounding the interpretation of COVID-19-related data in the Philippines and the government's decision to procure twenty-five million doses of the Sinovac vaccine despite the lack of data pertaining to its safeness and efficacy.

The article explores the most common disagreements and misunderstandings concerning truth, in philosophical as well as extraphilosophical debates, then reflects on the notion of "post-truth era", reverting the diagnosis, and suggesting that in the recent history of the concept of truth we may find some positive opportunities that deserve to be taken into account.

During the 1920s and early 1930s, scientifically minded philosophers (in particular, the positivists of the Vienna Circle) regarded the notion of truth with considerable suspicion, not only on account of the liar paradox, but also because the quasi-mystical connection between language and the world in virtue of which true statements are true looked like the sort of thing properly empirical-minded philosophers ought to avoid. Alfied Tarski1 sought to dispel these worries by showing that the notion of truth could be defined in terms of other notations whose scientific respectability was unquestioned. Let me qualify that. Tarski didn't define a general notion of truth, but rather he showed how, for a large class of languages ' Sf, one could define a notion of truth in ' Sf, applicable to the sentences of Sf. The languages involved were all formalized languages. As we shall see, the same methods cannot be used to define a notion of truth applicable to a natural language. Here we shall illustrate Tarski's methods by defining truth in the language of arithmetic. A puzzle arises at the outset. Our current understanding of the notion of truth is insufficiently clear and precise, so we'd like to clarify the notion by providing a definition in terms that we already fully understand. But unless we already fully understand the notion of truth, how are we going to know whether the proposed definition actually succeeds? We're looking for a corrrect definition of truth, but unless we already understand the notion of truth, how will we know when we've found one? 1

The article explores the most common disagreements and misunderstandings concerning truth, in philosophical as well as extraphilosophical debates, then reflects on the notion of "post-truth era", reverting the diagnosis, and suggesting that in the recent history of the concept of truth we may find some positive opportunities that deserve to be taken into account.

2. Truth-bearers                                         1
3.    Classical Correspondence Theory            2
4. Coherence Theory of Truth                 2
5. Pragmatist Theories of Truth                 3
6. Epistemic Theories of Truth                 3
7. Formal Approaches to Truth                 4
8. Deflationist and Minimalist Theories 5
9. Developments in the Correspondence Theory 6

Davidson do not defend that truth is a subjective notion. He thinks that it can be found in the inter-subjective area between the triangularation of three varieties of knowledge. These three kinds of knowledge are; our knowledge of the nature, the other minds and our own mind. According to Davidson, it is a mistake to suppose that these three can be collapsed into two, or taken in isolation. They are not only mutually irreducible, they are irreducible.

Davidson has a project which attempts to show how ‘coherence yields correspondence’. He believes that coherentist understanding of truth includes unavoidable ‘corresponding’ elements: According to him there are important weaknesses of both theories that should be redefined with new approaches. This could be achieved by eliminating the existing presumptions as obstacles on the way to gain a new view. Davidson has serious objections for the corresponding theory. According to him nothing can usefully and intelligibly be said to correspond to a sentence. Beliefs are states of people with intentions, desires, sense organs; they are states that are caused by, and cause, events inside and outside the bodies of their entertainers. But even given all these constraints, there are many things people do believe, and many more that they could. For all such cases, the coherence theory applies. Although Davidson mentions that he is a ‘mild coherentist’ he seems to be close to a special kind of coherentist theory of his own which is not similar to common view coherentist theory.

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir duas versões e alguns problemas das teorias da verdade como correspondência (CR). Pretendemos focar-nos particularmente nas versões mais contemporâneas das CRs formuladas para acomodar fatos como portadores de verdade, comumente referidas como fact-based. Dentro desse espectro, há ainda uma distinção entre CRs de dois tipos. O primeiro caracteriza a relação de correspondência pela ideia de congruência, e o segundo, pela correlação. Tendo isso em mente, propomos caracterizar as especificidades de cada uma das formulações consideradas paradigmáticas na literatura secundária para cada um desses tipos, a saber, ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to discuss two versions and some main problems concerning the correspondence theories of truth (CR). We wish here to focus primarily on the fact-based contemporary versions of CRs. In this area, there's still a bifurcation concerning the two main variations of the CRs. The first of them gives an account of the correspondence relation in terms of congruence, and the second, in terms of correlation. We'll thus try to articulate the specificities of each one as portraited in Russell's and Austin's versions of correspondence theories, which are taken as paradigmatically representing this distinction. Our final goal is also to discuss some implications and objections often raised to CRs and its theorists.

The article explores some of the most usual misunderstandings and verbal disagreements about the concept of truth. It is argued that there is no way to cope with "the post-truth condition" as long as these misunderstandings and false controversies are active.

Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth are better situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth than the correspondence theory.  Nietzsche’s thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he  believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.

This is an offshoot of the idea that physics as we understand it is inevitably 3-d, and that the unification of every physical dimension is what may be called METAphysics. Just as universe is an extension of galaxy, so too, metaphysics is a dimensional extension of physics, which has real properties, or at least real relations of properties. Through the concept of multiple physics, the role of entities is explained as a kind of causal root structure of physical variation. The following writing is radical, in that it supposes that the 3-d reality is not the limitation of physics, and that the ultimate realization of physics implies some properties that we would call metaphysical. The grand critique is that failing to realize metaphysical dimensions is also failing to realize PHYSICAL dimensions. Therefore, this is a scenario where if there was a God, he would ignore human ideas at his own peril, or what is implied is a decisive vanguard against the realization of physical theory. In this way, metaphysics is not non-physical. Indeed, it is only a more general and recondite theory of physics.

Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch's "one and many" strategy to other debates, I try show to how his argumentative steps can be used to solve—not just the controversy pertaining to truth—but any controversy that surrounds a "What is X?" question.

ABSTRACT: The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views about truth, such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention, and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these views are in agreement in at least one fundamental respect: they are all alethic monists. They endorse the thesis that there is only one property in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea: there are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first to focus specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. One additional reason to examine truth pluralism is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature---particularly debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates.

ABSTRACT: Two decades ago, there was a great flurry of work on the subject of truth, which subsequently set much of the agenda for future debates. Interest in the subject of truth remains unabated at all levels of inquiry, both within philosophy and from without, in both academic and popular guises. But while truth continues to be of focal interest, it seems that there have been remarkably fewer new directions since then. New Waves in Truth offers eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty of the most promising young scholars working on truth today. Contributions to the volume span truth ascriptions, deflationism, realism and the correspondence theory, the value of truth, and kinds of truth and truth-apt discourse. The research programs of the contributors are beginning to reset that agenda, and each is positioned to make new waves throughout the subject.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

Across multiple societies, we see a shift from regimes of truth (ROT) to “regimes of
posttruth” (ROPT) characterized by proliferating “truth markets.” ROT corresponded
to disciplinary society, tighter functioning between media/political/education apparatuses, scientific discourses, and dominant truth-arbiters. ROPT corresponds to societies of control, where power exploits new “freedoms” to participate/produce/express (as well as consume/diffuse/evaluate). These developments further correspond to postpolitics/ postdemocracy, where issues, discourses, and agency for sociopolitical change remain constrained, despite the enabling of a new range of cultural and pseudopolitical participation around, among other things, truth. ROPT emerge out of postpolitical/postdemocratic strategies common to control societies where especially resource rich political actors attempt to use data-analytic knowledge to manage the field of appearance and participation, via attention and affect.

Conoscenza e verità sono due temi principali nella ricerca di Paolo Parrini. Paolo si richiama a Immanuel Kant e alla ricerca di questi sulle condizioni di possibilità della conoscenza, ma ritiene che non esistano «condizioni formali di conoscibilità di natura universale e necessaria». 1 La sua posizione riprende dunque, e aggiorna, quelle di neokantiani come Ernst Cassirer e di neoempiristi influenzati da Kant come Rudolf Carnap e Hans Reichenbach, e sfiora senza sottoscriverlo l'empirismo radicale di Willard van Orman Quine. Paolo si ferma, insomma, a un passo dalla dissoluzione del kantismo, riconoscendo, seppure categoria dal «carattere vuoto», 2 la verità come idea regolativa e come valore da cui originano delle prescrizioni.

1. irudia. Sinesmak eta usteak. Zentzu komunaren alde argitalpenaren azala. Liburuaren hasiera-hasieratik aurkezten du egileak lehenengo tesi garrantzitsua: «… zerbait uste (edo sinesten) dugunean, zerbait hori egiazkotzat hartzen dugu» (17. or.). Ildo UZTARO 77, 107-113 107 Bilbo, 2011ko apirila-ekaina SINESMENAK ETA USTEAK. ZENTZU KOMUNAREN ALDE Agustin Arrieta -Urtizberea Alberdania, 178 or. Irun, 2010

Lucas and Redhead ([2007]) announce that they will defend the views of Redhead ([2004]) against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). They certainly re-state the main claims of Redhead ([2004]), but they do not give any real arguments in their favour, and do not provide anything that would save Redhead's argument from the serious problems pointed out in ). Instead, Lucas and Redhead make a number of seemingly irrelevant points, perhaps indicating a failure to understand the logico-mathematical points at issue.

As the first illustration of a potential satisfier for the 'platitudes for truth' in the appendix to his engaging recent discussion of the concept of truth (Wright 1999), Crispin Wright has proposed a notion of 'truth conceived as coherence' for arithmetic.

It is argued that Yablo's Paradox is not strictly paradoxical, but rather 'ωparadoxical'. Under a natural formalization, the list of Yablo sentences may be constructed using a diagonalization argument and can be shown to be ω-inconsistent, but nonetheless consistent. The derivation of an inconsistency requires a uniform fixed-point construction. Moreover, the truth-theoretic disquotational principle required is also uniform, rather than the local disquotational T-scheme. The theory with the local disquotation T-scheme applied to individual sentences from the Yablo list is also consistent.

Science is often considered as a set of propositions referring to an objective world existing independently of the human mind. Due to their very being, propositions are either true or false. This ultimately means that theories in which science is equated with a certain whole of propositions, must rely on a correspondence theory of truth. But when we try to incorporate the role of human knowledge into the scientific process, we discover that the correspondence theory simply breaks down. This leaves us with a coherence theory of truth, in which it are not propositions but judgements that form the most fundamental elements of a scientific theory. When examining the nature of judgement, we come to the conclusion that the notion of truth used in a coherence theory is fundamentally different from the one used in a correspondence theory. It is a primitive notion that cannot be defined or analysed, since the coherence theory has ‘bracketed’ the validity of the world of objective axioms and propositions. But examples of it can be given, such as the law of non-contradiction which brings our whole edifice of judgements into a coherent, non-contradictory whole. Nevertheless, the truth-standards of a coherence theory are not merely formal. They are in fact driven by a certain ‘telos’ toward an ever clearer disclosure of the world as it is in itself. But then it might be interesting to examine the very origin of this ‘telos’ or ‘drive’. Husserlian phenomenology, for instance, has searched for this drive in the notions of ‘transcendental subjectivity’ and ‘the lifeworld’. But even these notions are not self-sufficient in the sense that they can provide an adequate explanation of the directedness of our intentional life. And this ultimately leads us to the inevitable realm of the philosophy of God.

Abstract: I challenge the assumption that the pragmatist-, coherence-, identity- and deflationary theories of truth are essentially incompatible and rival views to the correspondence theory, without endorsing pluralism. With the exception of some versions of the identity theory, the alternative theories only appear to genuinely contradict the correspondence theory, either when they are wedded to a rejection of an objective reality, or when it is assumed that a ‘theory of truth’ is a theory of the function of the truth-predicate. I argue that the correspondence theory should not be understood as a theory about the function of the truth-predicate, and that the core ideas of the alternative views, once separated from any anti-realist convictions, are best understood as complementary views about different aspects of a fairly complex phenomenon, notably of how our beliefs relate to their subject matter and how we reason and talk about that relation.