Cognitive Agent Models

For agent-based modelling of collective phenomena individual agent behaviours can be modelled either from an agent-internal perspective, in the form of relations involving internal states of the agent, or from an agentexternal, behavioural perspective, in the form of input-output relations for the agent, abstracting from internal states. Illustrated by a case study on collective decision making, this paper addresses how the two types of agent models can be related to each other. First an internal agent model for collective decision making is presented, based on neurological principles. It is shown how by an automated systematic transformation a behavioural model can be obtained, abstracting from the internal states. In addition, an existing behavioural agent model for collective decision making incorporating principles on social diffusion is described. It is shown under which conditions and how by an interpretation mapping the obtained abstracted behavioural agent model can be related to this existing behavioural agent model for collective decision making.

We present the input to the discussion about the computational framework known as Common Model of Cognition (CMC) from the working group dealing with the knowledge/rational/social levels. In particular, we present a list of the higher level constraints that should be addressed within such a general framework.

We present the input to the discussion about the computational framework known as Common Model of Cognition (CMC) from the working group dealing with the knowledge/rational/social levels. In particular, we present a list of the higher level constraints that should be addressed within such a general framework.

We present the input to the discussion about the computational framework known as Common Model of Cognition (CMC) from the working group dealing with the knowledge/rational/social levels. In particular, we present a list of the higher level constraints that should be addressed within such a general framework.

This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to in- deterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of infor- mation, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We deflne a rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent's goals play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revi- sion options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also investigated.

In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from condi- tional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In

We present the input to the discussion about the computational framework known as Common Model of Cognition (CMC) from the working group dealing with the knowledge/rational/social levels. In particular, we present a list of the higher level constraints that should be addressed within such a general framework.

A rational agent adopts (or changes) its desires/goals when new information becomes available or its "desires" (e.g., tasks it is supposed to carry out) change. In conventional approaches on goal generation a desire is adopted if and only if all conditions leading to its generation are satisfied. The fact that certain beliefs might be differently relevant in the process of desire/goal generation is not considered. As a matter of fact, a belief could be crucial for adopting a given goal but less crucial for adopting another goal. Besides, a belief could be more influent than another in the generation of a particular goal.

In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from conditional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In this paper we consider the role of goals in reasoning about beliefs. Though we assume that goals do not play a role in the belief generation problem, we argue that they play a role in the belief selection problem. We show the rationality of the use of goals in belief selection, in the sense that there are cases in which agents that take their goals into account in selecting a belief set from a set of alternatives outperform agents that do not do so. We also formally distinguish between the rational role of goals in belief selection and irrational wishful thinking.

In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from conditional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In this paper we consider the role of goals in reasoning about beliefs. Though we assume that goals do not play a role in the belief generation problem, we argue that they play a role in the belief selection problem. We show the rationality of the use of goals in belief selection, in the sense that there are cases in which agents that take their goals into account in selecting a belief set from a set of alternatives outperform agents that do not do so. We also formally distinguish between the rational role of goals in belief selection and irrational wishful thinking.

This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to indeterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of information, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We define a rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent's goals play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revision options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also investigated.

In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from conditional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In this paper we consider the role of goals in reasoning about beliefs. Though we assume that goals do not play a role in the belief generation problem, we argue that they play a role in the belief selection problem. We show the rationality of the use of goals in belief selection, in the sense that there are cases in which agents that take their goals into account in selecting a belief set from a set of alternatives outperform agents that do not do so. We also formally distinguish between the rational role of goals in belief selection and irrational wishful thinking.

This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to indeterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of information, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We define a rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent's goals play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revision options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also investigated.

We propose a general framework to represent changes in the mental state of a rational agent due to the acquisition of new information and/or to the arising of new desires; fundamental postulates and properties of the function which generates the goal set are also provided.

We propose a general framework to represent changes in the mental state of a rational agent due to the acquisition of new information and/or to the arising of new desires; fundamental postulates and properties of the function which generates the goal set are also provided.

This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to indeterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of information, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We define a rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent's goals play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revision options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also investigated.