China and Middle East

China has a long-standing diplomatic tradition rooted in Third Worldism. This ideological stance, centered on anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, cultivated a sense of shared experiences and mutual understanding among late-developing nations throughout the twentieth century. The Middle East holds a special place in the Third World because of the foundational roles played by these socio-political formations in setting key organizations. However, the Middle East and other intermediate zones in the Global South have been relatively neglected in the post-Cold War era. More recently, China has returned to Mao Zedong's view of the Middle East as a natural intermediate zone amid collective pressure from Western countries. This article aims to explore why China favors the Middle East as an intermediate zone and elucidates its efforts to approach the Middle East through various means, including economic initiatives, as well as political and diplomatic engagements. Despite its achievements in fostering a non-aligned stance within the region, China has encountered obstacles in fully implementing this novel approach to Third Worldism in the Middle East. By examining Sino-Middle Eastern relations through the lens of Third Worldism, this article seeks to contribute to debates about Sino-Arab relations and South-South cooperation.

The Middle East Region has been suffering serious economic difficulties and the governance deficit for a long time, which demands a global response. In this new era, China has become an important actor in the progression of the Middle East economic governance; the contents of China's participation in the Middle East economic governance include energy, trade, investment, finance and developmental governance. Participation of China to the Middle East economic governance has improved economic climate and the terms of trade for the Middle Eastern countries, and enhanced their sustainable development ability, and also responded to the criticism from the Western countries accusing China of being a free rider with real actions. Compared to the Western countries, China's participation to the Middle East economic governance exhibits its own characteristics in governance goals, ability, path, regime, contents and governance styles.

China has been engaged in many economic initiatives, like investing in Israeli high-tech start-ups, promoting tourism and developing infrastructure. The purpose of China taking these initiatives is to make better economic connections with countries to facilitate the peace-building process. China is using this economic strategy to resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine in contrast to the traditional diplomatic approach used by the United States. The above-mentioned economic development strategy of China creates a loop where good economic relations will lead to peaceful coexistence and economic prosperity. Therefore, this research aims to explore the “how” factor to understand the contribution of innovative strategy, based on economic incentives, to resolving conflicts specifically between Israel and Palestine. This research thoroughly analyzes China's economic development strategy for its relevance to conflict resolution in the Middle East. The study utilizes primary and secondary sources, including existing literature, policy documents, official statements, case studies, and data analysis. Special attention is given to the complex political landscape of the Israel-Palestine region, considering the involvement of various external actors and the deep-seated feelings of distrust between Israel and Palestine. The paper adopts a comprehensive approach to assess China's strategy as a potential avenue for conflict resolution.

Dopo le rivolte arabe del 2011, la regione del Mar Rosso è divenuta il centro della competizione geopolitica fra potenze mediorientali (Arabia Saudita; Emirati Arabi Uniti; Qatar; Iran; Turchia) e internazionali (Stati Uniti; Cina; Russia). Una dinamica che ha rafforzato l'influenza degli attori extra-occidentali nel quadrante. L'attacco di Hamas a Israele del 7 ottobre 2023 ha poi contribuito a spostare ancora più a est il pivot geopolitico del Mar Rosso. Un fenomeno acuito dall'inefficacia della deterrenza occidentale nei confronti degli attacchi degli houthi dello Yemen contro le navi commerciali e Israele. Questa regione, caratterizzata dall'attività di attori armati non statali nel settore Mar Rosso meridionale-Bab el-Mandeb-Golfo di Aden, registra attualmente due livelli di instabilità. Vi è un'instabilità sistemica, generata da perduranti tensioni politiche e/o militari interstatali (Etiopia e Somalia; Egitto ed Etiopia) e intra-statali (in Yemen; in Sudan; in misura minore in Somalia), e un'instabilità acuta, ossia la crisi derivante dal ´cigno nero` degli attacchi degli houthi contro le navi commerciali nel Mar Rosso meridionale-Bab el-Mandeb-Golfo di Aden, e contro Israele. In tale contesto, sono due le modalità di propagazione dell'instabilità nella regione. La prima è la competizione geopolitica tra stati, anche mediante interferenze nei conflitti civili (Yemen e Sudan). La seconda è la cooperazione tattica fra attori armati non statali, promossa dagli houthi e inquadrabile nel campo pro-iraniano e, più in generale, anti-statunitense e anti-israeliano. L'Arabia Saudita, che anche nel Mar Rosso necessita di stabilità per perseguire gli obiettivi di Vision 2030, mostra di avere una prospettiva economica per l'area, ma fatica ancora a elaborare una strategia di sicurezza bilaterale e soprattutto multilaterale. L'Iran sta invece rafforzando l'influenza nel Mar Rosso, in forma diretta (statale) e indiretta (tramite attori armati non statali), e qui potrebbe focalizzarsi dopo i recenti rovesci geopolitici nel Levante.

The collaboration between the Japanese and British empires in the first two decades of the 20th century facilitated the soybean's migration out of Manchuria. When the two empires turned from collaborators to competitors prior to and during WWII however, the British Empire was forced to experiment with soybean cultivation in Egypt on its own in order to satisfy the demand of its vegetable oil crushing industry to make soap and detergent amongst other things. This article is not simply about the production and trade of soybean, but more importantly about the transformation of the commodity during the processes of trade, production and consumption outside its original zone of cultivation. Although soybeans provide significantly more protein per acre than most other uses of land, in Egypt the plant was classified as an inedible oilseed, such as cotton seeds, rather than an edible grain that can also produce oil, such as maize. As a result of such classification, the soybean was perceived as an industrial raw material, rather than a food item. Consequently, the simple food preparation technology that was intimately associated with the soybean as a human food in Manchuria did not embark on the journey to Egypt. During this process of global migration, the soybean was transformed from a human food item in Manchuria mainly consumed for its protein content to an industrial raw material in Egypt mainly utilized for its oil content.

As the People's Republic of China emerges as a power with global reach, understanding its interactions with the range of states comprising the modern MENA region has become more urgent. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review in depth the economic, political, and strategic dimensions of Chinese interactions with the modern Middle East. Instead, this China Institute Occasional Paper will briefly sketch the interactions between China and the states of the MENA region in the early 21st century. Although this paper includes a short historical survey of China-Middle East relations, the focus is the present and future of the relationship, and existing economic linkages with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Our hope is that gathering and publishing the core economic data will provide an important reference point for other researchers who are working on China -MENA relations. Both Noureddin Zaamout and I wish to thank CIUA members Christopher LaRoche, Tom Alton, Evan Oddleifson for their editorial support, Genevieve Ongaro and Vivian Chiew for their design and formatting contribution, and Jia Wang for her contributions on project coordination. As well, I wish to thank the reviewers of this paper, Mojtaba Mahdavi, Ferry de Kerckhove and David Drake for their assistance.

La disputa marittima tra Grecia e Turchia si intreccia a
questioni strategiche di confini, sovranità e risorse
energetiche, alimentando tensioni mai sopite nel
Mediterraneo orientale. Tra accordi bilaterali, guerre delle
mappe e infrastrutture bloccate, il rischio di un’impasse
duratura cresce. Si fa sempre più necessario un nuovo
approccio multilaterale, in cui l’Italia potrebbe giocare un
ruolo da protagonista

The rivalry between the US and China in the Middle East has significant implications for regional and global politics. This region is vital due to its natural resources and strategic location, making it a major source of energy for both countries. They have economic, strategic, and geopolitical interests in the Middle East, including access to oil and gas resources, trade, and alliances with key actors.While the US is more focused on security and defense cooperation, China’s engagement is primarily driven by its desire to secure its economic interests. However, China’s increasing military presence in the region has raised concerns among some US policymakers. Beijing is cautious about its security limitations and avoids picking sides in disputes. The US has close alliances with countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while China has been building closer ties with all these countries including Iran. Both countries have invested in infrastructure projects, such as ports and pipelines, to secure their access to trade routes and increase their economic influence in the region. However, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is viewed as a threat to US interests in the Middle East, particularly in terms of economic competition and the promotion of Chinese influence in the region.The US-China rivalry in the Middle East could exacerbate existing conflicts, lead to a regional arms race, and affect global governance and international institutions. As the competition intensifies, Middle Eastern countries are feeling growing pressure to join the efforts to contain China.To manage this rivalry, dialogue, cooperation, and compromise from all sides are necessary. This paper analyses the factors driving the US-China rivalry in the Middle East and its implications on the region. It examines the economic, political, and strategic interests of both countries, including their relationships with key actors. The paper also assesses the impact of the rivalry on the Middle East’s stability, security, and economic development. Ultimately, policymakers must find ways to minimize destabilizing effects on the region and the world.

The study employed a thematic review to explore the development and research landscape of international Chinese education from overseas and domestic perspectives. The findings reveal China's strong commitment to promoting the Chinese language globally, with domestic research noted for its high professionalism and depth, particularly in areas such as Chinese teaching and professional development driven by prominent institutions. In contrast, while still developing, international research shows steady growth and an increasing global interest, particularly in learner diversity and specific challenges faced in the field. These complementary strengths highlight the importance of fostering global collaboration, strengthening research networks, and leveraging the expertise of both domestic and international scholars to advance the discipline. Furthermore, addressing key challenges, such as improving Chinese researchers' academic English writing skills and expanding research into cultural dimensions, innovative technologies, and integrated teacher-learner development, will be critical for fostering future collaboration and innovation in international Chinese education.

This article examines China's soft power strategy in the Mena region, which i argue is qualitatively unsubstantial, quantitatively limited, and inherently selective. As part of its broader aspirations to become a/the leading global power, china seeks to enhance its soft power. however, its efforts in this domain across the region primarily focus on lightweight educational collaborations rather than comprehensive and deep knowledge integration that reflects its global ambition. in this context, the prefix 'non' in the title signifies the gap between China's aspiration for global cultural outreach and the reality of its slow-moving initiatives, which often fall short of achieving the depth and scope expected of a truly transformative soft power strategy. using Joseph Nye's conceptualization of soft power as a benchmark, the research highlights the establishment of Confucius Institutes, cultural agreements, and university collaborations to examine China's soft power strategy that basically prioritizes partnerships with specific countries, such as Israel and Egypt, based on economic and technological considerations. Within this examination of the scope and depth of China's soft power endeavors, the article critically explores whether China's selective approach-choosing specific 'cultural partners'-represents an inherent limitation or a pragmatic strategy for navigating the region.

Il ruolo dell'Iran e delle milizie nel terrorismo in Medio Oriente https://secondotempo.cattolicanews.it/news-il-ruolo-dell-iran-e-delle-milizie-nel-terrorismo-inmedio-oriente L'Iran ha consolidato la propria influenza in Medio Oriente attraverso il sostegno a gruppi militanti, combinando pragmatismo strategico, impegno ideologico e interessi legati alla sicurezza nazionale. Grazie al finanziamento, all'addestramento e alla fornitura di armi a organizzazioni come Hezbollah, le milizie sciite irachene, gli Houthi in Yemen e diversi gruppi siriani, Teheran ha potuto espandere la propria rete di alleati evitando un coinvolgimento diretto nei conflitti armati. Questa strategia ha indebolito la sovranità degli stati della regione, alimentato tensioni settarie e prolungato le guerre per procura. L'Arabia Saudita, contrapposta all'Iran in una rivalità geopolitica di lunga data, ha adottato una strategia simile finanziando gruppi militanti sunniti, contribuendo così alla radicalizzazione e all'escalation dei conflitti regionali. La competizione tra Teheran e Riyadh ha dunque avuto un effetto destabilizzante, internazionalizzando il terrorismo e aggravando le crisi del Medio Oriente. Hezbollah nacque nei primi anni '80 con il sostegno dell'Iran e della Guardia Rivoluzionaria Islamica come risposta all'invasione israeliana del Libano del 1982. Inizialmente concepito come un movimento di resistenza, nel tempo si è trasformato in un attore politico e militare di primo piano, con una forte influenza sia in Libano sia in Siria. Ideologicamente, Hezbollah si ispira alla rivoluzione islamica iraniana del 1979 e adotta il concetto di Vilayat-e-Faqih. Il Vilayat-e-Faqih è un concetto rivoluzionario che fonde la teologia sciita con il governo politico, centrale per l'identità dell'Iran ma controverso sia a livello nazionale che nel più ampio discorso islamico. Sin dagli esordi Hezbollah ha condotto attacchi suicidi, rapimenti e operazioni contro obiettivi israeliani e occidentali, tra cui il devastante attentato del 1983 contro la base dei Marines statunitensi a Beirut, in cui morirono 241 soldati americani. Negli anni, il movimento ha consolidato il proprio ruolo in Libano, partecipando alle elezioni parlamentari dal 1992 e sviluppando un'estesa rete di servizi sociali, tra cui scuole e ospedali, che gli ha garantito un ampio consenso tra la popolazione sciita. Parallelamente, ha rafforzato il proprio arsenale e ha partecipato ai conflitti in Siria a sostegno del regime di Bashar al-Assad (terminato in Siria nel dicembre 2024/gennaio 2025) e nello Yemen in supporto ai ribelli Houthi. Il possesso di missili di precisione e le frequenti tensioni con Israele rappresentano una costante minaccia alla stabilità regionale. Considerato un'organizzazione terroristica da Stati Uniti, Unione Europea e altre nazioni, Hezbollah ha visto i propri finanziamenti limitati e il Libano ulteriormente isolato sulla scena internazionale. Gli Houthi dello Yemen, noti anche come Ansar Allah (sostenitori di Dio), sono un gruppo armato sciita zaidita attivo nel paese da diversi decenni. Iran e Hezbollah hanno fornito un ampio supporto militare e finanziario al movimento, che dal 2015 ha progressivamente ampliato il proprio controllo su due terzi del territorio yemenita. Il gruppo emerse negli anni '90 e si radicalizzò ulteriormente dopo l'uccisione del suo fondatore, Hussain al-Houthi, nel 2004. L'Iran ha sostenuto gli Houthi fornendo missili balistici, droni e tecnologia avanzata, intensificando il conflitto contro la coalizione a guida saudita. Le azioni militari del gruppo hanno avuto un impatto significativo sul commercio internazionale, con attacchi a navi commerciali e petroliere nel Mar Rosso che hanno colpito circa il 12% del traffico marittimo globale. Inoltre, nell'ambito del conflitto israelo-palestinese, gli Houthi hanno lanciato missili e droni (senza colpirlo) contro Israele. In risposta, l'Unione Europea ha avviato nel 2024 l'Operazione ASPIDES per difendere la navigazione commerciale, mentre Stati Uniti e Regno Unito hanno effettuato attacchi mirati contro obiettivi Houthi per proteggere le rotte marittime strategiche. È recente un riavvicinamento tra gli Houthi e Al Qaida in quadro di sofferenza costante della popolazione yemenita. Le milizie sciite in Iraq, note come Forze di Mobilitazione Popolare (PMF), affondano le proprie radici nella resistenza contro il regime di Saddam Hussein e hanno beneficiato del supporto iraniano

Il Medio Oriente è tornato al centro dell'attenzione globale e della politica internazionale, catalizzando un interesse che va ben al di là della dimensione regionale. L'attacco di Hamas nel sud di Israele il 7 ottobre 2023 ha innescato un'escalation senza precedenti, con una vasta azione militare israeliana che ha causato una grave crisi umanitaria. In questo contesto, la diplomazia e le relazioni internazionali giocano un ruolo cruciale nel tentativo di risolvere il con!itto e alleviare una crisi che riunisce tutte le dimensioni della politica. Tuttavia, le divisioni e gli interessi contrastanti tra gli attori coinvolti rendono dif"cile raggiungere una soluzione duratura. In questa intervista a Michele Chiaruzzi, docente di Relazioni internazionali presso il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali dell'Università di Bologna, analizziamo i nodi cruciali di questa guerra, provando a fare chiarezza sulle sue dinamiche. Per farlo partiremo da alcune basi teoriche utili a cogliere le diverse prospettive. La disciplina delle Relazioni internazionali si occupa di analizzare le interazioni tra Stati e, sempre più spesso, tra agenti transnazionali come organizzazioni, società multinazionali, movimenti globali e singoli individui. Quali sono le origini storiche e intellettuali di questa disciplina fondamentale per capire i con!itti attuali? Quali eventi o pensatori hanno maggiormente in!uenzato la nascita delle Relazioni internazionali come campo di studi autonomo? M Mi ic ch he el le e C Ch hi ia ar ru uz zz zi i: A seguito della Prima guerra mondiale, a fronte di un con!itto così devastante, emerse l'esigenza di analizzare le cause ed elaborare soluzioni. Fu in questo contesto che nacque la disciplina delle Relazioni internazionali, in particolare per iniziativa di David Davies, un mecenate che "nanziò l'Università di Aberystwyth, nel Galles, per istituire la prima cattedra dedicata a questo campo di studi. Lo scopo di Davies era quello di comprendere le ragioni per cui la guerra continua a occupare un ruolo centrale nelle relazioni tra Stati. Per rispondere a questa domanda sull'origine della guerra, il teorico Kenneth Waltz identi"cò tre ipotesi principali. La prima individua l'origine della guerra nella natura umana, attribuendola a caratteristiche psicologiche, caratteriali o comportamentali, che sarebbero responsabili dell'emergere dei con!itti. La seconda ipotesi sposta l'attenzione dagli individui agli Stati, sostenendo che il problema risiede nelle loro con"gurazioni interne, come il regime politico, il sistema economico o l'ideologia dominante. Questa prospettiva solleva però un dilemma: è opportuno intervenire in quegli Stati considerati "difettosi" oppure è meglio rispettare il principio di autodeterminazione, anche se ciò comporta instabilità? Secondo Waltz, entrambe queste visioni sono riduttive, poiché ignorano il ruolo del sistema internazionale. Qui si colloca la terza ipotesi, che riguarda proprio l'anarchia del sistema internazionale, caratterizzata dall'assenza di un governo mondiale o di un'autorità sovranazionale in grado di regolare le relazioni tra Stati. Questa anarchia permette e favorisce il ricorso all'uso della forza come strumento di autodifesa o, in alcuni casi, di offesa, rendendo la guerra una possibilità sempre presente nella risoluzione delle controversie. Queste tre prospettive -la natura umana, quella degli Stati e l'anarchia del sistema internazionale -non si escludono a vicenda, ma si integrano, offrendo una visione articolata e multidimensionale delle cause della guerra.

As it does in other regions, China’s approach to the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) is radically different to that of the United States. Whereas the U.S. focuses on security issues and military interventions, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) avoids becoming involved in regional geopolitics and instead builds relations with MENA countries through investments and trade under the broad umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). This economics-led approach, accompanied by a form of diplomacy
based on the Chinese concept of guanxi (personal ties) centred around building relationships with leaders and elites in individual countries persuades many countries that China’s long-term mantra of political non-interference is meant sincerely despite doubts about its legitimacy on the part of some observers.

Turchia si fa abilmente avanti con la nuova Siria di Ahmad al-Shara per consolidare la propria posizione nel mar di Levante, oltre che acquisire un alleato contro la comunità curda. La questione riguarda più in generale i limiti delle Zee del Mediterraneo orientale; in particolare concerne quelli tra la Turchia e la Siria che riguardano da vicino Cipro.

Grande è, nel 2020,  l’attivismo della Grecia per affermare i suoi spazi di giurisdizione, dai confini con Italia e Albania a quelli con Egitto e Cipro. Naturale il paragone con lo slancio nazionalistico che un secolo fa le procurò i vantaggi del Trattato di Sèvres. Ankara si è mossa per prima a fine 2019, concordando il limite della Zona economica esclusiva (Zee) con Tripoli; le sue pretese complessive forse sono ispirate alla dottrina della “Patria Blu” che teorizza un’altrettanto ampia visione marittima.

There is no denying that 9/11 attacks severely impacted global geopolitics, but the 7/10 Hamas strikes might have serious long-term implications for the world's security architecture, the Western rules-based order and may engender a Cold War redux leading to a wider conflagration.

Quale ruolo giocherà il “super-genio” Elon Musk nell'America targata Trump? Sicuramente si prenderà delle rivincite contro chi l’aveva ostracizzato, come tutto il mondo di Davos. Ma ne approfitterà per accelerare i suoi progetti più estremi. Non possiamo pensare a lui come al “cavaliere bianco”, ma un ragionevole ottimismo non è fuori luogo perché sta contrastando nei fatti la narrazione del Grande Reset.

The suspension of the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) during the Trump Administration was a significant moment in the economic relationship between China and Iran. In China and Iran Readjust Relations: Economic Implications of the Suspended Nuclear Deal, Shirzad Azad, an independent scholar with a doctorate in international relations, leverages his extensive academic background to analyze the Sino-Iranian relationship.

In this study, we aim to examine the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from various perspectives. The prevailing attitude in the West interprets the BRI almost exclusively from a
geopolitical standpoint, viewing it as a tool of China’s power ambitions. The reality is far more complex; the BRI has numerous aspects and dimensions, and it is a concept that changes over
time, as exemplified by the outcomes of the Third Belt and Road Forum in 2023. Below, we will explore the characteristics of the BRI not according to the mainstream interpretation but based
on its different dimensions. We will discuss the external economic dimension, the domestic political dimension, and the strategic dimension of the BRI. We believe that this approach will
provide a much more objective and realistic picture of the initiative. At the end of the study, we will present the responses of rival powers, which primarily focus on the strategic and geopolitical dimension of the BRI. In this section, we will introduce two initiatives that can be considered ‘counter-BRIs’ as case studies, and we will try to determine whether the parallel existence of various similar initiatives constitutes a zero-sum game or if they can complement each other.

BRI is a non-profit think-tank launched by independent experts aiming to provide a local and international audience with analysis, opinion, surveys, and research on a variety of issues in Azerbaijan, including social and religious issues, the economy, and history. BRI collaborates with both local and international experts specializing in Azerbaijani studies and those interested in the region.

Over the past two decades, the Chinese language has emerged as a global language. Gulf Cooperation Council countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have integrated Chinese language into their educational systems and established Confucius Institutes to promote Chinese language and culture. In Qatar, interest in Chinese language education has risen, though not as pronounced as its neighbouring countries. This article, grounded in a Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education (CCPEE) approach, provides a comprehensive overview of Chinese language and education policy in Qatar, utilising a mix of primary and secondary sources, and insights from the second author’s role as a Chinese language coordinator in Qatar. The article examines cultural, political, and economic aspects related to Qatar-China ties and the Chinese community in Qatar, the role of China during the World Cup, Chinese language in the linguistic landscape, Chinese language education policies, and the state of a Confucius Institute in Qatar. Finally, it offers some implications in terms of the future of Chinese language education in the country and some fruitful directions for further research.

Dal 2007 i partenariati a Sud (MD ed ICI) sono stati gradualmente e sistematicamente tralasciati, benché avessero raggiunto dei successi significativi, per precise scelte di diminuzione della priorità politica da parte
della NATO, perdendo quindi d’ attenzione strategica significativa. Nemmeno l’aperto intervento russo in Siria (2015, subito dopo la crisi in Crimea) e quello crescente in Libia (2017, cinque anni prima dell’invasione dell’Ucraina) è servito a cambiare l’impostazione presa. Tutto l’insieme delle crisi che
avvolgono la Regione Sud della NATO ed il Vicinato Europeo è stato sottovalutato sino alla stagione dei putsch in Sahel ed alla guerra di Gaza. Recuperare questo svantaggio strategico richiede un cambio di
visione politica ed analitica che proponga un’Alleanza più flessibile ed efficace in un rapporto paritario e di proiezione di sicurezza con i partner (NATO 2.0) e che si appoggi su presupposti analitici aderenti alle
realtà mediterranee, del Golfo e del Sahel.

Küresel Kalkınma Girişimi, Küresel Güvenlik Girişimi ve Küresel Medeniyet Girişimi, sırasıyla 2021, 2022 ve 2023 yıllarında Çin tarafından önerilen üç önemli girişimdir. Bu girişimler; insanlık için paylaşılan bir gelecek topluluğu oluşturmak temel amacıyla kalkınma, güvenlik ve medeniyet olmak üzere başlıca üç alana yoğunlaşmaktadır ve Çin’in küresel zorluklara yönelik çözümlerini ifade etmektedir. Küresel Medeniyet Girişimi, dünya medeniyetlerinin bahçesini yeşertmektedir. Küresel Kalkınma Girişimi kapsamında, Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi, tüm ülkelerin ortak kalkınmasını teşvik eden bir motor haline gelmiştir. Küresel Güvenlik Girişimi açısından, Suudi-İran uzlaşısı, Çin’in Ortadoğu’da bir güvenlik yönetim sistemi oluşturma çabası kapsamında önemli bir girişimdir. Ortadoğu Çin için giderek daha fazla önem kazanmaktadır. Ancak bu durumun, Çin’in söz konusu girişimler üzerinden bölgede zorunlu olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile stratejik rekabete gireceği anlamına gelmediği belirtilmelidir. Çin, büyük güç rekabeti tuzağına düşmeyecektir

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The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Global Taiwan Institute. To view web sources cited in the published papers (underlined in printed text), visit https://globaltaiwan.org/issues/vol-9-issue-9/.

Proceedings of the International Symposium "the Formation of the Relationship between Modern Japan and the Islamic World" organized on December 9-10, 2023, at TOYO University (2), contained with the second day speakers: Sayoko NUMATA, Yoshiaki FUKUDA and Nurullah SAT, as ACRI research Paper Series 37
【ISBN:978-4-904279-39-7】

La crisi nel Mar Rosso: contesto e implicazioni globali Gennaio 2024 CRISI NEL MAR ROSSO e SUE IMPLICAZIONI GLOBALI Pag. I Crisi nel Mar Rosso e sue implicazioni globali-valutazioni e contribu RELATORI Sergio Biraghi, VADM (R), Italian Navy 1961 Enlisted in the Navy, I.N. Academy in Leghorn, In his career he alternated commands on board ships with assignments in Intelligence centers, in close coopera on with allied Navies and in par cular the US Navy: he was one of the protagonists in the reorganiza on of the Intelligence Services; at the me of the establishment of SISDE (Italian Civil Secret Service) he took care of the project of the Central Informa on System and its implementa on.

La crisi nel Mar Rosso: contesto e implicazioni globali Gennaio 2024 CRISI NEL MAR ROSSO e SUE IMPLICAZIONI GLOBALI Pag. I Crisi nel Mar Rosso e sue implicazioni globali-valutazioni e contribu RELATORI Sergio Biraghi, VADM (R), Italian Navy 1961 Enlisted in the Navy, I.N. Academy in Leghorn, In his career he alternated commands on board ships with assignments in Intelligence centers, in close coopera on with allied Navies and in par cular the US Navy: he was one of the protagonists in the reorganiza on of the Intelligence Services; at the me of the establishment of SISDE (Italian Civil Secret Service) he took care of the project of the Central Informa on System and its implementa on.

Who would have expected that the BRICS nations could rise and become the potential rival of the G7 countries, the World Bank and the IMF combined? That once seemingly distant possibility now has real prospects which could change the equilibrium of world politics. The more successful BRICS becomes, the weaker Western hegemony over the South will be. Although some Western politicians and media insist on downplaying the group's role in shaping the new world order, the change seems real and irreversible. Even before the Ukraine war commenced in February 2022, much evidence pointed to the fact that Russia and China's goal was hardly temporary or impulsive. The very language of multipolarity has defined both countries' discourse for years, a discourse that was mostly inspired by the two countries' displeasure with US militarism from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, their frustration with Washington's bullying tactics whenever a disagreement arises, be it in trade or border demarcations, the punitive language, the constant threats, the military expansion of NATO and much more. While it is too early to determine, with any degree of certainty, the winners and losers of this new configuration, it is almost certain that a US-westerndominated world is no longer possible.

Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these puzzles, and in many of the most intractable territorial disputes, such a belief may arise from the claim of historical ownership over these territories. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we investigate whether historical ownership engenders in respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and whether such a belief contributes to more hardline policy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that historical ownership does play a significant role in the respondents’ perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with an alternative scenario involving no such prior ownership. Furthermore, those who hold a belief in indivisibility are more likely to support hardline poli...

This article analyses, the complex relationship between Tehran, Beijing and Washington on the Iranian nuclear issue. Indeed, China's policy towards Iran has often been described as ambiguous, in supporting Washington, on the one hand, while protecting Tehran, on the other hand. In this article, we argue that, in fact, Beijing policy vis-a-vis Tehran depends on the state of its relationships with Washington. Indeed, a closer analysis shows that China is using Iran as a bargaining chip with the United States on, among others, two key security issues, i.e., Taiwan and the oil supply. The guarantee of a secured oil supply from the Middle-East in addition to a comprehensive policy of the US with regard to Chinese security interests in Taiwan as well as the use of smart sanctions against Tehran, which would thus take into account, to a certain extent, Beijing economic interests in Iran, are, indeed, the guarantee of Beijing's support to the US policy towards Iran.

Xi Jinping's Power and Powerlessness: Leadership Challenges in the Implementation of China's New Economic Model Xi Jinping is assumed to be China's strongest leader since Deng Xiaoping-even since Mao, some argue. It might therefore be expected that Xi Jinping, at the top of a oneparty state, has the power and ability to reform China. This article analyses how structural constraints limit Xi Jinping's power and freedom of action using his ability to implement a new course for the country's economic policy as case. To avoid being caught in the middle-income trap, China must adjust its investment and export-driven model to a more innovation, consumer and welfare-based development model. We use the school of historical institutionalism as framework, and examine how (i) path dependency, (ii) informal structures, norms and values, (iii) institutional autonomy, and (iv) institutional capacity in different ways limit and constrain the power and ability of Xi Jinping to implement a successful restructuring of the country's economic model.

The purpose of this study is to clarify and provide new information regarding the Japanese approach to handling territorial issues involving the Senkaku Islands. By applying the Negotiation and Mediation theory by Dean G. Pruitt and Peter J. Carnevale to evaluate and further explain the types of negotiations between Japan and China to resolve the territorial issues of the Senkaku Islands, it will explain the process of Japan's strategy for doing so. The study discovered that both countries went through several dynamics in their negotiating process using the Negotiation and Mediation theory. To identify the best way to develop a solution, Japan and China used two strategies: the first was the contesting strategy, which took place at the start of the negotiating process, and the second was the yielding or concession strategy. Finally, carry out the problem-solving plan whereby both parties agreed to host a Joint Development to put an end to the territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands.

Rotem Kowner, Yoram Evron, and P.R. Kumaraswamy, eds. East-West Asia Relations in the 21st Century: From Bilateral to Interregional Relationships. London: Routledge, 2024.

This book examines the changing relations between the Asian part of the Middle East and the rest of the continent during the 21st century. Written by leading experts, this ground-breaking volume utilizes a comprehensive and multi-dimensional perspective to offer a novel and unique outlook on the evolving shape of East-West Asia relations and their global impact. Critically, it demonstrates that the intensification and diversification of East-West Asia relations since the 1990s have altered them from a set of separated bilateral ties into complex interregional relations.

The book presents a nuanced, comparative look at Asian countries’ responses to global developments, and China’s rise in particular, and offers a new perspective on the very concept of Asia itself. It will be of interest to scholars, students, and practitioners working in the fields of International Relations, Asian Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies.

Welcome to volume , number , the winter/spring issue of JTMS. As always, JTMS aims at bringing you interdisciplinary discussions on territorial and maritime issues. In this issue, there are five research articles. Each of these articles provides timely discussion of a variety of topics for those who research international issues on land and at sea. In this issue especially, we offer scholarly articles on issues from around the world including Central and South America, Northeast Asia, and the South China Sea. First, Nuno Morgado analyzes Brazil's geopolitical design and, at the same time, brings us an empirical test to the concept of geomisguidance. Starting with the assump tion that Brazil can be assessed as a maritime country, he argues that the South American integration maneuver, which is Brazil's priority in terms of geopolitical design, stands in opposition to a grand strategy of Brazil as a seapower. Second, Horia Ciurtin reconceptualizes the underlying tenets of Westphalian links between sovereignty and territoriality, showing how an "exported" Eurocentric doctrine actually functions in a distinct legal environment-post-imperial China-and the manner in which a protracted political-ontological dispute can or cannot make use of established Western-based legal mechanisms. By focusing on the cross-strait dilemma of overlapping claims to sovereignty upon a "greater" China-advanced both by the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan)-Horia Ciurtin attempts to show how volatile (and fragile) the functionality of Westphalia actually is. Third, Krista E. Wiegand questions how leaders choose to divert the populace's attention from domestic problems to foreign disputes and whether there are peaceful options to pursue diversion rather than use of force. Building on diversionary force theory and foreign policy substitutability, she tackles the continuing debate about how domestic unrest could lead to diversions and what constitutes diversionary behavior. The theory presented is that leaders of states claiming disputed territory can use demands for peaceful dispute resolution (negotiation, mediation, etc.) to divert attention from moderate domestic unrest, initiating a militarized interstate dispute (MID) in the territorial dispute more likely to occur under severe domestic unrest, and economic unrest has no effect. Fourth, Dennis V. Hickey examines the South China Sea as one of the most disputed areas of sea in the world. He compares and contrasts the approaches and strategies adopted by the Republic of China (Taiwan) during the administrations of President Ma Ying-jeou and President Tsai Ingwen toward the regional quarrel. He also employs primary source data, including government documents, media accounts, scholarly publications and even interviews

This study suggests that a modified theory of new classical economics is useful in assessing Taiwan's economic diplomacy during both the Lee Teng-hui and current administrations by means of a holistic perspective (levels of analysis). 'Business' is the independent variable in the analysis. The theory of new classical economics implies that the utilities of Taiwanese investment are more effective than the contradictory political objectives of the Taipei government. The impact of business on the result of economic diplomacy is the unintentional easing of tensions across the Taiwan Strait while Taiwanese businesses have pursued profits. Collectively, businesses have strengthened the security of the Taiwanese state, while the Taiwanese government has pursued inconsistent policies (other variables) since President Lee took office. The holistic perspective is heuristic for understanding and explaining Taiwan's economic diplomacy during the Lee Teng-hui administration. This approach produces the recommendation that the government provide disinterested and effective judicial systems and conclude investment guarantees, double taxation and free trade agreements to help Taiwanese businesspeople. In a wider context, Taiwan's economic diplomacy aims not only to serve the interests of the government or state but also to further the interests of the Taiwanese state as a whole, including all residents of Taiwan.

This study suggests that a modified theory of new classical economics is useful in assessing Taiwan's economic diplomacy during both the Lee Teng-hui and current administrations by means of a holistic perspective (levels of analysis). 'Business' is the independent variable in the analysis. The theory of new classical economics implies that the utilities of Taiwanese investment are more effective than the contradictory political objectives of the Taipei government. The impact of business on the result of economic diplomacy is the unintentional easing of tensions across the Taiwan Strait while Taiwanese businesses have pursued profits. Collectively, businesses have strengthened the security of the Taiwanese state, while the Taiwanese government has pursued inconsistent policies (other variables) since President Lee took office. The holistic perspective is heuristic for understanding and explaining Taiwan's economic diplomacy during the Lee Teng-hui administration. This approach produces the recommendation that the government provide disinterested and effective judicial systems and conclude investment guarantees, double taxation and free trade agreements to help Taiwanese businesspeople. In a wider context, Taiwan's economic diplomacy aims not only to serve the interests of the government or state but also to further the interests of the Taiwanese state as a whole, including all residents of Taiwan.

In Yoram Evron and Rotem Kowner, eds. Israel-Asia Relations in the Twenty-First Century: The Search for Partners in a Changing World. London: Routledge, 2023, pp. 29-49.

Since their early years, Israel-China relations have experienced recurring waves of progress, halt, and recovery. These circles have been neither coincidental nor unrelated. Instead, they constitute a structural outcome of the relations’ fundamental features: their subjection to the China-United States dynamic and to a lesser extent to China’s Middle East policy. Sharing complementary interests over the years, both Israel and China have searched patiently for new ways to overcome this obstacle, and since the late 2000s, this has included more areas of interest and more active participants from both states. Positive as this development has been, this chapter demonstrates that it has also exerted a destabilizing effect on the relationship. While providing the relations with greater resilience than before, it gave Washington additional reasons for concern over the Israel-China rapprochement.

In Israel-Asia Relations in the Twenty-First Century: The Search for Partners in a Changing World. Edited by Yoram Evron and Rotem Kowner (pp. 1–25). Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2023

By the early 2020s, Israel had come to regard Asia as a vital pillar of its international relations as well as a crucial element in its future development. It currently maintains diplomatic relations with no fewer than 21 Asian countries beyond the confines of the Middle East and the transcontinental region of the Caucasus (see Map 1.1). 1 Asia also makes up about a quarter of Israel'si n t e rnational trade, and some 30 to 60 percent of its arms exports. 2 This is a rather new situation, as this continent had heretofore never occupied a significant place in Israel's economic affairs, let alone in its future vision. Incredibly, it was only some thirty years ago that this state of affairs was entirely different. At that point, Israel had no diplomatic relations with either China or India, whereas other significant players in this continent largely ignored it. The takeoff in Israel's relations with Asia took place in the early 1990s. Some four decades after Israel had established its first diplomatic ties in the Asian continent, the walls that had kept it apart began to crumble. In 1992, Israel set up diplomatic relations with China and India and began to improve its relations with Japan and South Korea significantly. During the same year, Israel also began to establish relations with the new Muslim republics in Central Asia. One year later, it established or restored its diplomatic relations with the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos), Vietnam, and Cambodia, and expanded its ties with several more Asian countries within a decade. Nonetheless, and as significant as Israel's breakthrough in Asia may have been, this development was only a starting point. Restricted at first to contacts with Asia's weak states based on military and technological aid and involving limited interactions with each of them, relations now expanded to the majority of Asian countries, covering a broad variety of areas and encompassing various circles and sectors in the states concerned. As such, this evolving Asian network has provided Israel with a variety of new political, economic, strategic, and other opportunities, while affecting its relations with states outside Asia. This new set of relations has also presented Israel with fresh challenges and dilemmas and, at times, forced it to make hard choices. Indeed, this transition represented a challenging process, both perceptually and practically, to Israel, but one which has also held great benefits and promise.