Reason and Narration with Ibn Rushd (Averroes)

The Muslim World, 1992

The history of philosophy is, to a large extent, a history of polemics. We need only remember Aristotle and his criticism of Plato: criticism in this case was used as a constructive force in the creation of new thinking. Neither did Aristotelianism stand apart from the polemical process. When Aristotle's works were 'discovered. in the first century of the common era, they immediately became the focus of much philosophical discussion. Galen of Pergamon (129-199 A.D.), better known as a physician, moved away from the usual path of interpretation and 'corrected' Aristotelian theories. Such an attitude provoked the reaction of a contemporary scholar and fellow of the same school, Alexander of Aphrodisia (160-230 A.D.), who tried to give 'Aristotelian' answers to the problems raised by Galen.' This process reveals a "three-phase' structure which has often been present in the history of philosophical polemics. It can be summarized as follows. One authority establishes a thesis; another thinker makes objections or even refutes the original proposition; in a third moment, someone claiming to be the true follower of the first authority goes on to destroy the opinions of the second and seeks to demonstrate the validity of the first thesis. The result is not merely a return to the point of departure. Through the polemical process, a particular question comes to be considered under new aspects, and the s u m of knowledge is increased. New explanations may mean a closer approach to reality. Other paths of philosophical discourse should not, of course, be overlooked. In contrast to the polemical process stands that of synthesis, which sometimes leads to syncretism. We may remember, for example, how Plotinus (205270 A.D.) or Porphyry (234-301 A.D.), his main disciple, 'Platonized' Aristotle with such success that philosophy in the later Roman Empire became generally Neo-Platonic. Al-Farabi in his turn sought to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, in Galen's critical remarks on Aristotle are found throughout his works. Cf. Claudii Galeni Opra Omn& ed. C. G. Kfihn. Leipzig, 1821-1833, 20 vols. In vol. XIX. pp. 39-48, he gives a list of his own works, but none is directed expressly against Aristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisia answered him in different ways. There cue, for instance. the PhpXai' P. Moraux refers accurately to their content in his book M m i d ! & A p h~.~2 k , er&g&edefanm??que d%&'ote (Paris: Li*ge, 1942), pp. 19-24. Other works are extant only in Arabic, as we know from N. Rescher & M. Marmura, the editors and translators of The Refutation by Mkxandre OfAphrdikia of Gafen 's 7)eatrke on L3e 72myofNotion. * (Islamabad. 1965). X~O~~8 J ' a~~~i .~8 i. f y S e J~ edited by I. B m S in R l~8 n d d '~~t 8 M~O r a R~; q U a I I , 2. (BSh, 1892). 113 114 THE MUSLIM WORLD which endeavor he was facilitated by the fact that his understanding of Aristotle was already Platonic. The present discussion, however, examines the polemical method. A second example confirms its three-phase structure. Belief in the world's eternity was commonly accepted in antiquity, and proofs sustaining it did not need to be particularly stringent. As Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity brought into special relevance the doctrine of a personal God as Creator of the world and therefore of its temporal origin, the discussion became sharper. A renewed defense of eternity was produced by the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclos (412485), Btiruqliis for the Arabs, who wrote eighteen theses in support of the philosophical view.2 The second phase is represented by John the Grammarian (ca. 490-580), known both as Philoponus and, among Arabs, as Yahya al-N&wi. This Christian thinker was the author not only of a book Conh Ahktoteleem but also of a De &ernAate mund contra Prc~lum.~ John was an Aristotelian in disagreement with Neo-platonic emanationism, and was perfectly ready to criticize Aristotle when the latter's opinions came in collision with his own beliefs. Thus, while remaining one of the most important of Aristotle's commentators, he is exemplary of the polemic process we are considering as an advocate of temporal creation. For the third phase of this process, we look at Simplicius, who moved to Ctesiphon in 529 after the closure of the Athenian school of philosophy and on to Rome in 533. Simplicius was a still more detailed commentator of Aristotle and the last great Neo-Platonist. He refuted Philoponus, or John the Grammarian, and returned to Aristotle following the arguments of P r o c l~s .~ With him, the polemical process reached its end in the Hellenistic world. &JCh~?Jh?kw& pn' uIdot&os tou komou. The them are preserved not i n an independent book, but in that of Philoponos' Lk detem~2atemund'contra Prdum, ed. H. Raabc (Lcipzig, 1899). T. Thylor selected the theses using Philoponus' Renaissance edition (Venice, 1535) and translated them into English: The Fragments that Remah of the bst CyN2.j.s of Prmfus (London, 1825), pp. 35-92. 3 Only some fragments of the contra Anjfodmare premed. The a~ ~tum2ate mundicont/8 P d u m is mentioned in note 2, above. John also wrote a non-polemical work on the subject: op~zffo mund'fibr; l% Ed. W. Rcichard (Leipzig. 1897). A brief, but excellent, exposition of the polemic is presented by S. Pines in the article A lost work of John Philoponus,' fsrd Orimtaf Stud&, 2 (1972). pp. 337-346. See also M. Mahdi's 'Marabi against Philoponus,' fournaf 0fNe.r fistem Stud'es 26 (1%7), pp. 233-260. His arguments against Philoponus on the present subject are mainly produced in his commentaries on the PhFCssand on On the Heavens.. fn histot& Phpcorum fVLbrospnores cm?.mmtan> (C.A.G. IX). idem, fVh&rmptmoms. Ed. H. Diels, (Berlin. 1882-1895). &Andot& Lk c d o commenturJi (C.A.G. X). Ed. J.L. Heiberg (Berlin. 1894). ' ' 'Book on restraining the common p p l e from the science of Kalh.' See M. Bouyges. &.sai.de Chmdogi/p. t 63, pp. 80-82; the book was f~s h e d in the month Of /UL?Wd.'//505/Dec. 1111, 'qudques jows avant la mort dAlgrzel.' ' Bouyges. Essi de chronologfk # 28. pp. 41-44, places its composition between the years 48911096 and 495/1101-2. There is an English translation of the whole Ihyd by Fazal-ul Karim. (Lahore,,,1983). 4 v. in 2. From among the partial translations are the following: fdamsde Ethd-:

2020

Islamic theology as axiology that advocates various social inequalities both social and religious aspects. Although it is recognized that Ibn Rushd had the capacity as the greatest Muslim philosopher who was influential not only in the Islamic world but in the West. However, another fact Ibn Rushd was also an Islamic theologian based on philosophical and jurisprudential views. Both of these sources influenced Ibn Rusyd's theology which was more rational but did not lead liberal because it was following his jurisprudence. This simple research is a type of library research, using theological approach. The purpose of this research is to know that Ibn Rusyd has succeeded in describing Islamic theology through the method of the inauguration and the proposition of the Ikhira ‘which combines belief, faith, and creation of the universe. The method used by Ibn Rusyd is not independent but rather an inseparable unity, so the two methods are not contradictory.

The Muslim World, 1992

The history of philosophy is, to a large extent, a history of polemics. We need only remember Aristotle and his criticism of Plato: criticism in this case was used as a constructive force in the creation of new thinking. Neither did Aristotelianism stand apart from the polemical process. When Aristotle's works were 'discovered. in the first century of the common era, they immediately became the focus of much philosophical discussion. Galen of Pergamon (129-199 A.D.), better known as a physician, moved away from the usual path of interpretation and 'corrected' Aristotelian theories. Such an attitude provoked the reaction of a contemporary scholar and fellow of the same school, Alexander of Aphrodisia (160-230 A.D.), who tried to give 'Aristotelian' answers to the problems raised by Galen.' This process reveals a "three-phase' structure which has often been present in the history of philosophical polemics. It can be summarized as follows. One authority establishes a thesis; another thinker makes objections or even refutes the original proposition; in a third moment, someone claiming to be the true follower of the first authority goes on to destroy the opinions of the second and seeks to demonstrate the validity of the first thesis. The result is not merely a return to the point of departure. Through the polemical process, a particular question comes to be considered under new aspects, and the s u m of knowledge is increased. New explanations may mean a closer approach to reality. Other paths of philosophical discourse should not, of course, be overlooked. In contrast to the polemical process stands that of synthesis, which sometimes leads to syncretism. We may remember, for example, how Plotinus (205270 A.D.) or Porphyry (234-301 A.D.), his main disciple, 'Platonized' Aristotle with such success that philosophy in the later Roman Empire became generally Neo-Platonic. Al-Farabi in his turn sought to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, in Galen's critical remarks on Aristotle are found throughout his works. Cf. Claudii Galeni Opra Omn& ed. C. G. Kfihn. Leipzig, 1821-1833, 20 vols. In vol. XIX. pp. 39-48, he gives a list of his own works, but none is directed expressly against Aristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisia answered him in different ways. There cue, for instance. the PhpXai' P. Moraux refers accurately to their content in his book M m i d ! & A p h~.~2 k , er&g&edefanm??que d%&'ote (Paris: Li*ge, 1942), pp. 19-24. Other works are extant only in Arabic, as we know from N. Rescher & M. Marmura, the editors and translators of The Refutation by Mkxandre OfAphrdikia of Gafen 's 7)eatrke on L3e 72myofNotion. * (Islamabad. 1965). X~O~~8 J ' a~~~i .~8 i. f y S e J~ edited by I. B m S in R l~8 n d d '~~t 8 M~O r a R~; q U a I I , 2. (BSh, 1892). 113 114 THE MUSLIM WORLD which endeavor he was facilitated by the fact that his understanding of Aristotle was already Platonic. The present discussion, however, examines the polemical method. A second example confirms its three-phase structure. Belief in the world's eternity was commonly accepted in antiquity, and proofs sustaining it did not need to be particularly stringent. As Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity brought into special relevance the doctrine of a personal God as Creator of the world and therefore of its temporal origin, the discussion became sharper. A renewed defense of eternity was produced by the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclos (412485), Btiruqliis for the Arabs, who wrote eighteen theses in support of the philosophical view.2 The second phase is represented by John the Grammarian (ca. 490-580), known both as Philoponus and, among Arabs, as Yahya al-N&wi. This Christian thinker was the author not only of a book Conh Ahktoteleem but also of a De &ernAate mund contra Prc~lum.~ John was an Aristotelian in disagreement with Neo-platonic emanationism, and was perfectly ready to criticize Aristotle when the latter's opinions came in collision with his own beliefs. Thus, while remaining one of the most important of Aristotle's commentators, he is exemplary of the polemic process we are considering as an advocate of temporal creation. For the third phase of this process, we look at Simplicius, who moved to Ctesiphon in 529 after the closure of the Athenian school of philosophy and on to Rome in 533. Simplicius was a still more detailed commentator of Aristotle and the last great Neo-Platonist. He refuted Philoponus, or John the Grammarian, and returned to Aristotle following the arguments of P r o c l~s .~ With him, the polemical process reached its end in the Hellenistic world. &JCh~?Jh?kw& pn' uIdot&os tou komou. The them are preserved not i n an independent book, but in that of Philoponos' Lk detem~2atemund'contra Prdum, ed. H. Raabc (Lcipzig, 1899). T. Thylor selected the theses using Philoponus' Renaissance edition (Venice, 1535) and translated them into English: The Fragments that Remah of the bst CyN2.j.s of Prmfus (London, 1825), pp. 35-92. 3 Only some fragments of the contra Anjfodmare premed. The a~ ~tum2ate mundicont/8 P d u m is mentioned in note 2, above. John also wrote a non-polemical work on the subject: op~zffo mund'fibr; l% Ed. W. Rcichard (Leipzig. 1897). A brief, but excellent, exposition of the polemic is presented by S. Pines in the article A lost work of John Philoponus,' fsrd Orimtaf Stud&, 2 (1972). pp. 337-346. See also M. Mahdi's 'Marabi against Philoponus,' fournaf 0fNe.r fistem Stud'es 26 (1%7), pp. 233-260. His arguments against Philoponus on the present subject are mainly produced in his commentaries on the PhFCssand on On the Heavens.. fn histot& Phpcorum fVLbrospnores cm?.mmtan> (C.A.G. IX). idem, fVh&rmptmoms. Ed. H. Diels, (Berlin. 1882-1895). &Andot& Lk c d o commenturJi (C.A.G. X). Ed. J.L. Heiberg (Berlin. 1894). ' ' 'Book on restraining the common p p l e from the science of Kalh.' See M. Bouyges. &.sai.de Chmdogi/p. t 63, pp. 80-82; the book was f~s h e d in the month Of /UL?Wd.'//505/Dec. 1111, 'qudques jows avant la mort dAlgrzel.' ' Bouyges. Essi de chronologfk # 28. pp. 41-44, places its composition between the years 48911096 and 495/1101-2. There is an English translation of the whole Ihyd by Fazal-ul Karim. (Lahore,,,1983). 4 v. in 2. From among the partial translations are the following: fdamsde Ethd-:

This article examines the claim that Ibn Rushd of Cordoba (“Averroës,” 12th century B.C.) is a precursor of the Enlightenment and a source of inspiration for the emancipation of contemporary Islamic societies. The paper critically discusses the fascination that Ibn Rushd has exercised on several thinkers, from Ernest Renan to Salman Rushdie, and highlights the problem of literalism in Qur’anic interpretation. Based on Ibn Rushd’s Decisive Treatise (Fasl al-maqāl), the paper investigates Ibn Rushd’s proposed division of (Muslim) society into three distinct classes. The main question here is whether there is a substantial link between the people of the Muslim community, given the three distinct kinds of assent (tasdīq) introduced by Ibn Rushd. I argue that if such a link cannot be supplied, then it is hard to see in Ibn Rushd an enlightened social model for today’s Muslim societies. Furthermore, that the great majority of people are prevented from having any contact with non-literal interpretation of the Scripture and non-revealed ways of thinking. The latter position, though, does not seem to bring Ibn Rushd close to the Enlightenment. My analysis of religious language is inspired by Wittgenstein’s position that the meaning of a term cannot be detached from its use. I suggest that given the different lives of people belonging to Ibn Rushd’s different classes, the terms they use can mean quite different things. This argument in fact weakens Ibn Rushd’s association with the Enlightenment.